

University of Alberta

**Un-settling Memory:
Cultural Memory and Post-colonialism**

by

Cliff Lobe

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.**

Department of English

Edmonton, Alberta

Spring 2000

7



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-60207-9

Canada

University of Alberta

Library Release Form

Name of Author: Cliff Lobe


Title of Thesis: Un-settling Memory: Cultural Memory and Post-colonialism

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

Year this Degree Granted: 2000

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Library to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as herein provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form without the author's prior written permission.



7747 Stave Lake Street
Mission, BC
V2V 6E8

Jan 28/2000


Looking back on the writings from some distance I do not
wish to deny that fundamentally they speak only of me.

Friedrich Nietzsche, on his Untimely Meditations
Ecce Homo


University of Alberta

Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research


The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommended to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled *Un-settling Memory: Cultural Memory and Post-colonialism* submitted by Cliff Lobe in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




Prof. Stephen Slemon



Prof. Daphne Read




Prof. Paul Hjaranson



Prof. Robert Wilson



Prof. Richard Young



Prof. Alan Lawson

1 November 1999

For my father and mother,

Vern and Joan Lobe

Abstract

This dissertation considers cultural memory in theory and literature. It reads memory as a mediatory or discursive process of inscription and interpretation in both modernity and postmodernity. By locating memory in the secular and technological domain of culture rather than in the organic or metaphysical, rather than in psychical processes or in a mystical collective mind, I insist that memory is a *representation*—a relational process or *tekhnè* of meaning-making that is organized by culture, by the sign system of the social. Memory's representational forms, which always stand for something else, can thus be linked to the earliest models of writing as well as to the latest digital inscriptions or simulations: to Plato's use of the "seal" (*sème* or "sign") impressed in the wax-tablet; to Simonedes' architectural mnemonics; to Freud's *Wunderblock* or "mystic writing pad"; to the materiality of the sign and the inscribed sound-image; to the semiotic and cybernetic processes by which cultures acquire and re-construct meaning in time; to post-structural or deconstructive models of knowledge and language in which the textual logic of grammatology (palimpsest, trace, dialogism, intertext) displaces the phonologic of origin, essence, and auratic self-presence; and even to the icons and hypertext links of electronic information technologies. In this view, the governing logic of memory is textual and selective; its location is at the level of culture, "in-between" the ideal and the material, "in-between" mind and matter; it operates in the mechanisms and matrices of signification and in the tropic processes and narratological shapings of condensation and displacement, repression and reconstruction.

In Section One, I consider the theoretical implications and imbrications of "culture" and "memory" in the modern and postmodern periods. As secular concepts organized around the problematics of temporality, discourse, language, consciousness, subject and social formation, and so forth, "culture" and "memory" are linked together by *re-presentation*: by the *social* ways that we "mark" time and "fix" meaning in the present as inscriptions, as signs. In Section Two, I read memory in two post-colonial intertexts from the settler-invader society of Australia: Peter Carey's *Illywhacker* and David Malouf's *Remembering Babylon*. In *Illywhacker*, memory is

mediated by the material surfaces and infelicitous *architectural* spaces of the prison, a Pet Shop that becomes a national "gaol" and tourist attraction, the inhabitants of which embody and exhibit an amnesiac carceral unconscious. In Remembering Babylon, the "order of things" in a settler-invader community is un-settled by a colonial encounter with the ambivalent *body* of a hybrid or "in-between creature," a European male who has spent half his life with Australian Aborigines. I read both novels not only as "places" of memory where Australia's penal-colonial past persists into the post-colonial present but also as places or texts where this persistence is interrogated. Such self-reflexive thinking of the past and of the semiological and social organization of memory (theoretical and literary) is at the heart of cultural mnemonics: how we maintain our attachment to the past and, like Simonides, remember—that is, speak "of" and "for" but not "with"—the dead. Memory's relation to the past, as one critic suggests, is not that of truth but of desire.

Acknowledgements

I owe tremendous debts of gratitude to the following people and organizations for various forms of support, without which this project would have been impossible:

My family: Vern and Joan Lobe; Karen Vern, Brett, Tori and Tanya Epp; Murray and Brenda Lobe; Michael and Tina Lobe. I have received unfailing support—emotional, financial, editorial, and otherwise—from my family; their kindness, patience, support, and love is impressed in my memory.

Charlene Diehl-Jones, whose laughter, and words, break the silence of Lethe; Johanna Ens, for her grace and goodness; Suzette Mayr, whose inimitable words, kindness, and style leave their marks; Karen Halil, who kindly, and repeatedly, reminds me to get out of my own way; Dave "Davus" Buchanan and Theresa Agnew, whose "meritorious" friendship during the Worst Coast Era and shuttle services I have greatly appreciated; Sue Fisher, who is incomparable and wise; Jane Watt, who thinks the past off-campus; Nicole Markotic, who is encouraging and generous; Garnet and Gloria, Sheryl, Kevin and Lynn, and Erin McKee, for their gracious hospitality; the staff at Chez Mingay.

The members of my Ph. D. Committee—Dr. Stephen Slemon, Dr. Daphne Read, Dr. Paul Hjartarson, Dr. Alan Lawson, Dr. Richard Young, Dr. Robert Wilson—whose tolerant readings, critical suggestions, and judicious questions helped me to find my way through, and beyond, the labyrinth of cultural memory.

I would also like to individually thank: Alan Lawson for his scrupulous editorial work on various chapters of this dissertation, for his encouragement, and for his kind hospitality during my stay in Brisbane; Daphne Read, for her critical and collegial support throughout this project and its various incarnations, as well as for her meticulous editorial work; Dawne McCance, for her gentle and generous enthusiasm, for her critical insight into the problem of memory, and for her theoretical and pedagogical guidance; Gillian Whitlock, for her suggestions about how to begin to read Australia; John Murray and his family for their warm hospitality and for an unforgettable hike to Flat Rock; Anna Johnston, Doug and Terra Lea Ranson and family, and Edgar and Vivian Garner, for their hospitality and guidance during my stay in Australia.

The University of Alberta for a University of Alberta Ph. D. Scholarship, a Walter H. Johns Graduate Fellowship, and for a University of Alberta Dissertation Fellowship; the Province of Alberta for a Ralph Steinhauer Award of Distinction; the Government of Canada for a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Fellowship.

Stephen Slemon, my supervisor, without whose patience, optimism, encouragement, wisdom, and critical support this project would have been forgotten long ago; whose models of rigorous academic dialogue and inquiry I have benefited from and shall continue to aspire after: "One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil."

And Gloria Borrows, who is unforgettable.

Table of Contents

Introduction: The Question of Cultural Memory	1
---	---

Section One: Cultural Memory: In Theory

Culture.....	41
Memory.....	66

Section Two: Cultural Memory and Literature

Introduction.....	125
-------------------	-----

Carceral Architecture and Cultural Amnesia in Peter Carey's <u>Illywhacker</u>	141
---	-----

Colonial Encounters and "In-between Creatures": Cultural Mnemonics in David Malouf's <u>Remembering Babylon</u>	182
--	-----

Conclusion

Speaking of Cultural Memory.....	223
----------------------------------	-----

Works Cited.....	233
------------------	-----

Section One

Introduction

§

The Question of Cultural Memory

Like a well-censored dream, and subject perhaps to similar mechanisms, memory has the orderliness and the teleological drive of narrative. Its relation to the past is not that of truth but of desire.

John Frow

Time and Commodity Culture

This dissertation is a beginning to think about cultural memory. It records my attempt to interrogate memory in contemporary culture, to test some of the links between cultural memory and theoretical and literary discourse, and to contribute, in some minor way, to the dialogues that have recently begun to organize in and around this category. The path I have taken through this field has not been straightforward. Both "culture" and "memory" are terms that resist simple explanation or identification; more than once as I prepared this text I thought I might have pinned down "culture" or enunciated "memory" in a meaningful way only to find that the linkage severed or the idea disseminated into other discursive formations or contradictory concepts that seemed to exist at even higher levels of abstraction. During those *lovely and treacherous* moments, I confess, I repeatedly thought of Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow and one of that novel's most memorable characters: the senile Brigadier General Ernest Pudding, with whom (for reasons that will become obvious soon enough) I want to claim a *partial* kinship. Pudding is a veteran of the Great War, and he is also its perpetual mnemonic prisoner; but what is more pressing, here, in my preliminary invocation of the Brigadier General, is his attempt to complete his magnum opus, Things That Can Happen in European Politics. Pudding, we read, found himself muttering at the beginning of each day's work: "Never make it . . . it's changing out from under me. Oh, dodgy—very dodgy" (77).

It is a commonplace that *culture* is an amorphous and inclusive concept, and I have come to believe that there are few things more "dodgy" than *memory*: the term "culture" might denote the ways in which crops and animals are cultivated, "superior" aesthetic knowledges and practices, the disciplinary forces and apparatuses that unite (or fragment) social groups, or even the "semiotic institution" or social mechanism that generates the relational and conflictual "regimes of value" in what John Frow calls the "struggle over how the world is to be understood—a struggle over the terms of our experience of the world" (Cultural Studies 72); the

term "memory," which in the past has been variously understood as part of the "soul" of man and thus the seat of "truth" and "self-presence" or the system that underlies consciousness and perception, more recently has been imagined as the "locus" for language (Silverman 11) or, in another way, the "mechanism by which ideology materializes itself" (Terdiman, Present Past 33). In this view, memory becomes the location for the various "invisible" structures or "discourses" that organize social activity and determine the subject positions and social formations that we inhabit in the present. Such a view of memory, as Richard Terdiman argues in Present Past, began to develop in the nineteenth century, along with the "human" sciences, psychology and sociology; it continues to develop today, I will argue, as a problem about human knowledge but also about social groups and the cultural systems that hold them together. For memory is imbricated in the thoughts we think, the words we speak and write, and the narratives we hear and read, not to mention the communities we "imagine" for ourselves; put another way, memory itself is a semiological mechanism, and its effects intersect with subject formation and with the social organization of knowledge and power at countless points. To study the mechanisms of memory in culture, or how cultural groups remember, is to keep both the subjective and the social in play: it is to ask, as Richard Terdiman does in Present Past, how we know or seem to "know . . . things without knowing that we know them" (34); it is to question how memory in the modern period "appears to reside not in the perceiving consciousness but in the *material*: in the practices and institutions of social or psychic life, which function within us, but, strangely, do not seem to require either our participation or our explicit allegiance" (34).

Memory can thus seem to be everywhere and nowhere, at once a bodily practice, a neurological event, and an aspect of consciousness: bodies "remember" through sensations, rituals, deportments, and repeated gestures or movements, this last some claim a form of "muscle" memory involved in such complex actions, for instance, as walking or riding a bicycle or striking a golfball; contemporary neuro-psychologists study the dynamic neural networks and synapses of the brain and model the mnemonic processes of storage and recall as interactive "modules" or systems within the brain, envisioning, at one level, the cell adhesion molecules that form in-between pre-synaptic and post-synaptic membranes (Rose 158-60) and, at another level, a multistore model of memory, one that relies on different "encoding" systems and modes of retrieval for different forms of input or information, even though there is a substantial disagreement about how these terms are applied in the biological and psychological domains (Sejnowski 162; Parkin 10-14, 22-25); "brain" memory itself, or the memory system which underlies consciousness in humans, as William James claims in his 1890 Principles of Psychology, can be divided into "short term" or "primary" memory, which supports consciousness, and "long term" or "secondary" memory, which comprises our "permanent record of the past" or unconscious (Parkin 2), a bifurcated model of memory (rational/irrational, permanent/impermanent, censored/un-censored, in-time/timeless) developed at the end of the nineteenth century in such pioneering works on mnemonics and psychology such as Théodule Ribot's Maladies de la mémoire (1881), Herman Ebbinghaus' Über das Gedächtnis (1885), Henri Bergson's Matière and mémoire (1896), and, of course, in the numerous published works, essays, and letters of Sigmund Freud. As a social practice or cultural modality, memory is no less ubiquitous: the cultural processes of "storage" and "retrieval" surround us and help us to explain the worlds in which we think and act, as is evinced in the expressive effects of cultural systems which "preserve" the past as textual traces, not the least of which, for some critics, is language itself and the related concepts of the sign and the "sound" image; in addition to the first order cultural system of language, other *inorganic* acts of cultural expression like films and literary texts, monuments and architecture, traditions and social rituals *re-present* the past and in doing so regulate how we understand experience and construct meaning and value in the present. As an aspect of technology, memory can be "found" in certain metals and plastics, not to mention machines: a "materials" memory ensures that deformation or deflection due to external physical stress is temporary; cameras and phonographs seem to "record" the past, but the most obvious

contemporary use of memory in machines is in silicon-based electronic technologies such as computers, in which memory might be allocated as "random access," "read only," "virtual," or "parameter."

These are only a few of the many ways that we talk about memory. To say the least, the field of memory is not unified nor easily circumscribed. Nonetheless, two of the most common taxonomies that are enlisted to organize memory are the *internal/subjective* and the *external/social*. At the internal/subjective level, memories seem to occur and reoccur voluntarily or involuntarily, to be distinguishable, as James argues, as "short term" and "long term" or, with Freud, as "conscious" and "unconscious." At the level of the external/social, which is the level of group or social memory¹ and which includes individual memories of personal experiences but denotes the conflictual and cumulative *social* constructions of the past, what is remembered or forgotten tends to be more instrumental, to be determined by "social frames" of memory that can be manipulated and organized to incite passion and to produce specific political ends, not least the social bonds of what has been called the "imagined" community of the nation, unquestionably the dominant social formation of the twentieth century.

This is an especially important development for a contemporary theory of cultural memory, as we shall see, since it relocates memory not "in" the mind or body but rather in the liminal and semiological, in the "external" domain of the social itself: in-between, we might say, the ideal and the material. The genealogy of cultural memory thus can be traced back to the emergent discourse of sociology and the sociological studies of memory, back, most notably, to the work of Maurice Halbwachs, whose The Social Frameworks of Memory and The Collective Memory were published in the 1920s.² Halbwachs, a reformer and socialist and former student of

¹ Although the terms "collective" and "cultural" memory are often used interchangeably in critical writing about contemporary mnemonics, along with terms such as "group," "social," and "public," I will not use them as synonyms. The term "collective," with its purchase in Jungian psychology and Durkheimian sociology, connotes a problematically metaphysical *connectedness* at the level of the social that tends to obscure the technical and semiological (the inscriptive and material) bases of memory that I want to foreground here. For Jung, the "collective unconscious" is the "sympathy of all things" (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 138); for Durkheim and for those "second generation" Durkheimians such as Maurice Halbwachs, memory becomes a problem of sociology or social construction, one that must be studied in the groups, institutions, and systems of beliefs that exist between humans. Like *temporality*, which takes its structure from social life—"Time is real only insofar as it has content, insofar as it offers events as material for thought" (The Collective Memory 127; qtd. in Coser 8)—memory becomes meaningful only within the context of the social group. Thus Halbwachs' "social frames" or "the collective frameworks of memory" are not simply "the sum, or combination of individual recollections of many memories in the same society" (39) but rather perpetual reconstructions or selections of the past generated at the level of the social. The term "social" memory is derived from Halbwachs' sociology of memory and it denotes the socially constructed nature of knowledge and consciousness, as well as the symbolic dimensions of all social processes (Olick 2); it thus comes close to the sense of memory as a cultural technology that I want to explore here. But it is the term "cultural" that, I will argue, when appended to "memory" best emphasizes the mechanical and conflictual processes of signification (inscription-interpretation) that organize the social: culture, the sign system of the social, is not so much "collective" as it is *contested*, the "un-settled" domain in which individuals and the social groups they form produce and preserve, mould and manipulate, "meaning" in the present.

² Halbwachs (1877-1945) was born in Riems. His family moved to Paris when he was two years old, and he eventually studied there under Henri Bergson at the prestigious Lycée Henri IV. For a brief summary of the intellectual and social context of Halbwachs' life, including an account of Halbwachs' switch from Bergsonian philosophy/psychology to Durkheimian sociology, see Coser (1-34). Halbwachs, protesting the murder of his Jewish father-in-law and mother-in-law by the Vichy militia/German Gestapo, was imprisoned at Buchenwald, where he died shortly before the end of World War II.

Henri Bergson, developed his theory of social memory within the paradigm of Emile Durkheim's sociology, a move that coincided with Halbwachs' first trip to Germany to teach and study and his consultation there with Durkheim on how to "switch from philosophy to sociology and from Bergsonian individualism to scientific objectivism" (Coser 8). Halbwachs abandoned Bergson's intuitive and contemplative approach to "individual" or "subjective" memory, a philosophy which Bergson himself saw as a revolt against the "rationalism and scientism" of the age, or a liberation of French philosophy from Descartes and Kant (Coser 7-8). Halbwachs embraced instead the sociological methods of statistics and measurement, of "objective" research and "collectivist" construction. This move enabled Halbwachs to develop his own ideas in "social psychology" or the "sociology of knowledge," but to retain some Bergsonian elements in his work, such as the centrality of time or "duration" to human experience and the importance of individual psychology for the study of memory (Coser 3); most importantly, however, it cleared the way for Halbwachs' theory that "memory depends on the social environment" (On Collective Memory 37) or the "social frameworks" of "collective memory" (37-40). Of course, each individual will perceive his or her present differently, and dream in isolation, but recollection or remembering, for Halbwachs, is always a reshaping of mnemonic fragments within social frameworks, the most elementary and stable of which, for Halbwachs, are verbal conventions or language (45): "even at the moment of reproducing the past our imagination remains under the influence of the present social milieu" (49).

Halbwachs' argument remains forceful today; Paul Connerton, for example, writes in How Societies Remember, which was published in 1989, that "it is through their membership in a social group—particularly kinship, religious and class affiliations—that individuals are able to acquire, to localize and to recall memories" (36). Connerton's thesis is perhaps the most recent account of (Halbwachian) social memory and the ways that *incorporative* (somatic) practices such as commemorative rituals and bodily performances selectively and collectively "preserve" the past. Indeed, as Connerton concedes, "our experiences of the present largely depend upon our knowledge of the past, and . . . our images of the past commonly serve to legitimate a present social order," but the most important feature of this claim is that "images of the past and recollected knowledge of the past are conveyed and sustained by (more or less ritual) performances" (3-4) and not by the inscriptive technologies of language or writing.

We shall reconsider Connerton's argument and this claim more carefully in Section Two. What is important here, what is essential for my discussion of contemporary cultural mnemonics, is the notion that memory is a social construction:

Most frequently, if I recall something that is because others incite me to recall it, because their memory comes to the aid of mine and mine supports theirs. Every recollection, however personal it may be, even that of events of which we alone were the witnesses, even that of thoughts and sentiments that remain unexpressed, exists in relationship with a whole ensemble of notions which many others possess: with persons, places, dates, words, forms of language, that is to say with the whole material and moral life of the societies of which we are a part or of which we have been part. (Connerton, How Societies Remember 36-37)

But such a sociology of memory implies a problematically homogeneous and collective social group, as well as "stable" social spaces in which consensus seems both desirable and inevitable—a vision of the world that post-structural critiques of knowledge and postmodern forms of cultural expression clearly challenge, and that the *facts* of post-colonial social formations such as metropolitan diasporas and settler-invader societies clearly contradict. Nonetheless, for Connerton, social memory is made possible within unified groups: "Groups provide individuals with frameworks within which their memories are localised [sic] and memories are localised by a kind of mapping. . . . That is to say, our images of social [or material] spaces, because of their relative stability, give us the illusion of not changing and of rediscovering the past in the present" (36-37).

In addition to the division of memory into internal/subjective and external/social modes, memory tends to be configured in relation to space and time and to be organized into other binary or structural relationships as well: private and public, conscious and unconscious, voluntary and involuntary, short-term and long-term, natural and artificial, organic and cybernetic, memory for words (nominal) or memory for things (eidetic), to list only a few. Of course, such divisions are hardly absolute nor clear-cut, and such systematic approaches to memory can create a false sense of objectivity. This is not to say that memory is impossible to comprehend much less locate, but rather to set the stage for a cultural analysis of memory that relocates memory somewhere else than within the mists of essentialism or the rigid structures of binarist thought, in a more liminal and indeterminate position that orients memory *in relation to* language, to *un-settled* cultural processes, and to the social frames of semiology.

Having said that, I still think that some classifications of memory are useful. In *The Book of Memory*, for instance, Mary Carruthers suggests that memory can be anatomized as *rote* memory, which she designates as the "ability to reproduce something exactly" and *recollection* or *reminiscence*, which is more meditative and subjective; Carruthers further subdivides memory into two more related classes, *heuristic* and *hermeneutic*: the first including pedagogical schemes to aid learning, memory storage, and retrieval, such as the classical *ars memoria*; the latter involving "the methods and content of textual interpretation" and ultimately the *indeterminate* problematics of representation, semiosis, and meaning-making (19-20).

It is this last aspect of memory—the hermeneutic—that I am most concerned with in the following dissertation. For it is, I think, through the study of memory as cultural inscription within the "external" social frames of semiology that the problematic of cultural memory best comes into focus as a way to generate critical insight into the purchase and processes of memory in language, into the mechanisms of semiosis and of cultural signification, into the function of memory in subject and social formation, and even into critical theory. To think through cultural memory as an epistemological problem that demands meticulous acts of critical self-consciousness and self-reflexivity, and from which there is no escape to an "outside," is to question memory's cultural functions, to think through "memory" and "meaning" as indeterminate and uncertain positions *in-between* the past and the future, *in-between* certainty and uncertainty, *in-between* the subject and the social, *in-between* the ideal and the material, *in-between* the silence, or oblivion, of death and the manifold, cacophonous sounds and signs of individual and cultural life.

If it is frustrating to try to pin memory down, perhaps it is because that is not the best critical method to adopt when it comes to questioning memory. And here I think the notion of the "oppositional," especially as developed by Ross Chambers in *Room for Maneuver: Reading the Oppositional in Narrative*, is particularly useful to my interrogation of cultural memory. Chambers delineates "oppositional behavior" [sic] as "a perpetual recourse to tactics, and it cannot become strategic without simultaneously losing its oppositional quality. It is that which eludes definition, the residue of all attempts at pinning it down" (10). Chambers distinguishes between *tactics*, which entail "the art of existing in territory that is occupied by an other," and *strategy*, "which is the behaviour of those in control of a given situation" (10), and he elaborates a convincing *tactical* model to explain some of the ways that reading literary texts might help us to change our worlds. Although my project is dissimilar to Chambers' in many ways, what most strikes me about his argument is the role that memory plays in the linkages between desire and mediation, in the organization of power and authority (251), in the structuring of the "oppositional," and in the act of reading itself, which Chambers claims is an "art" or "technology of the self," a "*techné*" with specific functions in the realm of the social (250).

I will not fully articulate Chambers' model at this point, but I think that his explication of reading and desire, as I will argue later, invokes a third term that Chambers only hints at in one or two places in his text: *memory*. Chambers' model is based, in part, on a Freudian memory model, but it also depends upon complex interactions between desire, or expectation, memory, and

reading. In doing so, it invokes an even older memory paradigm: St Augustine's conception of memory as developed in his *Confessions*. For Augustine, expectation (consciousness of the future) cannot be separated from perception (consciousness of the present) and memory (consciousness of the past) (*Confessions* 269). Of course, Chambers' model of reading and desire as oppositional is much more subtle than my crude paraphrase of it might suggest, and it does not advance a theology of memory, as Augustine's confessional text does. But it is based upon the fundamental importance of memory to *representation* and textual interpretation—a model of reading that recognizes the role of memory-work in the formation of human knowledge or meaning-making. As I see this, memory is always *occupied* and *un-settled* territory, always a representation. We then might usefully shift Chambers' model around somewhat and say that if memory is a kind of reading, reading utilizes acts of memory; perhaps it is memory that is a first order *technology of the self*, a mode of consciousness or a kind of (non-literal, textual) representation that language-use continually activates and inhabits.

From a slightly different point of view, Andreas Huyssen makes a similar claim in *Twilight Memories*, his 1995 study of temporality and of cultural amnesia in contemporary Germany. "It does not require much theoretical sophistication," Huyssen writes,

to see that all representation—whether in language, narrative, image, or recorded sound—is based on memory. *Re*-presentation always comes after, even though some media will try to provide us with the delusion of pure presence. But rather than leading us to some authentic origin or giving us verifiable access to the real, memory, even and especially in its belatedness, is itself based on representation. The past is not simply there in memory, but it must be articulated to become memory. The representation is unavoidable. Rather than lamenting or ignoring it, this split should be understood as a powerful stimulant for cultural and artistic activity. . . . The temporal status of any act of memory is always the present and not, as some naïve epistemology might have it, the past itself, even though all memory in some ineradicable way is dependent on some past event or experience. It is this tenuous fissure between past and present that constitutes memory, making it powerfully alive and distinct from the archive or any other mere system of storage. (2-3)

Huyssen's concern in *Twilight Memories* is to reconsider memory as an in-between state in the postmodern era, to clear a space and time for new forms of memory—at once critical and self-conscious—in-between the past and the future. Huyssen insists that memory *comes after*, that memory is always a representation; it is tied, on the one hand, to consciousness and perception, and, on the other, to "the very structures of representation itself" (Huyssen 3). Hence memory must be located *in* time: "Human memory may well be an anthropological given, but closely tied as it is to the ways a culture constructs and lives its temporality, the forms memory will take are invariably contingent and subject to change. Memory and representation, then, figure as key concerns at the fin de siècle when the twilight settles around the memories of this century and their carriers" (Huyssen 2). In this way, Huyssen attempts to preserve the political purchase of memory in the cultural history of the West, a "postmodern, post-Auschwitz culture . . . fraught with a fundamental ambiguity: Obsessed with memory and the past, it is also caught in a destructive dynamics of forgetting" (260). To counteract such nostalgia and amnesia, Huyssen argues that the past must be articulated or "marked" in new and contestual ways, within the domain of culture. Such a tactical model of remembering and of constructing temporality is indeed "in-between": it resists precisely the strategic or totalizing mastery of nationalism as much as it refuses the boredom, or paralysis, that can result from hyper-consumption and exposure to high-tech media—what Huyssen calls the "waning of historical consciousness" in the postmodern period (9).

If memory might never be "pinned down," if memory is perpetually *unsettled* and *unsettling* and hence in an *in-between* state, we can nonetheless take comfort in the fact that we do not need to strategically master memory in order to tactically understand its uses and cultural

functions, in the same way, perhaps, that we do not need to fully classify or structure language in order to speak about it. Huyssen calls this cognitive and social reorganization of memory, this "marking" of postmodern time, a transformation of the concept of time itself, and he traces it back to the emergence of modernity and to the effects of modern technology. For Huyssen, this new temporality or "temporal anchoring" impacts upon, among other things, how we understand the past-present-future, how we imagine our selves and understand our social relations. It depends most obviously upon the "unnatural" developments of semiology and of language or *discourse* in the modern and then postmodern worlds, but especially on how we understand those technologies of communication that increasingly shape the "cyber-spaces" of "spectacular" late-capitalist culture.

Approximately two decades before Chambers' *Room for Maneuver* and Huyssen's *Twilight Memories* were published, the historian and philosopher of consciousness Hayden White recognized the centrality of *representation* or *discourse* to literary and cultural criticism, as well as to questions of philosophy or history in the twentieth century, a movement that White characterizes in his 1978 *Tropics of Discourse* as a movement away from logic to "tropology," to the "tropic element" or "figure of speech" or "style" that is embedded in all language use: "our discourse tends to slip away from our data towards the structures of consciousness with which we are trying to grasp them; or, what amounts to the same thing, the data always resist the coherency of the image which we are trying to fashion of them" (1). In other words, to use language is to trope, to interpret, to represent: "tropics is the process by which all discourse *constitutes* the objects which it pretends only to describe realistically and to analyze objectively" (2); it is thus the "soul" of discourse, "the mechanism without which discourse cannot do its work or achieve its end" (2), which for White is the effort to earn the "right of expression" (2).

White's *diatactical* model of discourse as "tropology" has several implications for a theory of cultural mnemonics, which studies memory as representation, as a cultural process located in-between the subjective forms of consciousness and the social frames of the material. First, it is through or within the systems of consciousness and through language—and for some thinkers these two are inseparable—that humans make "efforts to endow their world with meaning" (5). Second, these efforts, this struggle to understand, to use Frow's terms, are, at bottom, mnemonic. That is, we become "acquainted" with the structures of consciousness such as memory as they manifest themselves in discourse, White argues, since consciousness

in its active, creative aspects . . . is most directly apprehendable in discourse and, moreover, in discourse guided by formulable intentions, goals, or aims of *understanding*. This understanding is not, we suppose, an affective state that crystallizes spontaneously on the threshold of consciousness without some minimally conscious effort of *will to know*. This will to know does not, in turn, take shape out of some confrontation between a consciousness utterly without intention and the environment it occupies. It must take shape out of some awareness of difference between alternative figurations of reality in images held in memory and fashioned . . . into complex structures, vague apprehensions of the forms that reality *should* take even if it fails to assume those forms (especially if it fails to assume those forms) in existentially vital situations . . . Understanding, I presume, following Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud, is a process by which memory images are assigned names or linked up with words, or ordered sounds, so as to be combined with other memory images similarly linked with words in the form of propositions—probably of the form "This is that." (20)

Memory, in this model, underwrites understanding or knowledge; in other words, discourse is an effect of memory. So, as White explains, "even if we cannot achieve a properly scientific knowledge of human nature, we can achieve another kind of knowledge about it, the kind of knowledge which literature and art in general give us in easily recognizable examples" (*Tropics* 5, 23). Such discursive knowledge, as White reasons, is a model of consciousness at work, "a product of consciousness's effort to come to terms with problematical domains of experience"

and of the inherently social and ethical aspects of "human nature" (5, 23); for White, discourse is a mediative enterprise. . . . it is always as much *about* the nature of interpretation itself as it is *about* the subject matter which is the manifest occasion of its own elaboration" (4); discourse "is our most direct manifestation of consciousness seeking understanding, occupying that middle ground between the awakening of a general interest in a domain of experience and the attainment of some comprehension of it. . . . when it is a matter of speaking about human consciousness, we have no absolute theory to guide us; everything is under contention" (22).

I doubt that memory ever has been fully apprehended, or rendered transparent; in fact, the category of transparency, as Gianni Vattimo reminds us, is ill-suited to describing postmodern social formations, which tend to be disorienting, complex, and chaotic (4, 8). Rather, in what follows, I will suggest that memory is indeed implicated in consciousness and in the discursive "manifestations" or representations through which we try to come to terms with experience, and it is always a "contentious" cultural process. Perhaps we can even say that memory occupies the "middle ground" White mentions, which I think of as the realm of culture or the sign system of the social. If memory is so closely linked to understanding, if memory is the system of consciousness where images are in fact linked up with concepts and words and combined with other concepts and words to form propositions, perhaps then it is not surprising that memory is a contentious problem with its own history, or that the problem of memory is inseparable from questions about language and representation, about knowledge and culture, about ethics and politics, about identity and ideology, about psychology and sociology.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the question of memory has nagged at the philosophical and scientific, the theoretical and literary imaginations of the West through the ages, and it is poised to continue to do so in the twenty-first century.³ A theory of memory as a cultural modality recognizes the mnemonic activity of "discourse" as a way to apprehend the past—to speak about memory and meaning-making and their indeterminate or "topological" social functions and locations. In contrast to such contemporary theories of memory, which seem to be resolutely *materialist* or *external/social*, most of the earliest conceptions of memory tended to be *metaphysical* or *internal/subjective*, involving aspects of the spirit or mind or soul or heart. In fact, as Francis Yates points out in her pioneering work *The Art of Memory*, such early models often equated the mind and the soul with proof of divinity or immortality, as in the case of Platonic and Pythagorean models (57-58), particularly in the "untutored" or "universal" truths elicited by careful questioning in the dialogues (Hermann and Chaffin 25-55). Even for Aristotle, memory was a part of the soul, like the imagination, the part that made thought possible (46-48). In the case of St. Augustine, whose thoughts on memory and on confession we shall also consider in some depth in what follows, especially in the context of Paul Ricoeur's arguments about temporality and narration, memory is considered the seat of God in Man and the faculty that makes salvation possible: "It is as a Christian that Augustine seeks God in the memory, and as a Christian Platonist, believing that knowledge of the divine is innate in memory" (Yates 61).

But such *internal* conceptions of memory are only one part of a larger story. If one's memory was considered in antiquity to be an aspect of one's soul, the models that explained how memory worked, such as the classical *ars memoria* or "architectural mnemonic," still tended to be material and external; that is, they employed ordered architectural structures like buildings, architraves, or arches, or even the pigeon holes of an aviary, along with objects like ladders or wheels and various "inscribed" surfaces such as wax tablets as metaphors to explain how memory

³ For an excellent survey of the history of memory see Douglas J. Hermann and Roger Chaffin's *Memory in Historical Perspective*, which traces extant scholarly writings on memory from Hesiod and Heraclitus through the classical mnemotechnists Cicero and Quintillian, through the renaissance and enlightenment "mnemonics" of Montaigne, Bacon, and Kant, up to the "experimental" mnemonics of Ebbinghaus and the advent of modern psychology.

operates and can be trained for the purposes of persuasion and oration. As Socrates says in Plato's Theaetetus.

Imagine . . . that our minds contain a block of wax, which in this or that individual may be larger or smaller, and composed of wax that is comparatively pure or muddy, and harder in some, softer in others, and sometimes of just the right consistency. . . . Let us call it the gift of the Muses' mother, Memory, and say that whenever we wish to remember something we see or hear or conceive in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions or ideas and imprint them on it as we might stamp the impression of a seal ring. Whatever is so imprinted we remember and know so long as the image remains; whatever is rubbed out or has not succeeded in leaving an impression we have forgotten and do not know. (qtd. in Carruthers 21)

Socrates' metaphor of the wax tablet is perhaps the most famous model of memory in Western mnemonics, and it oddly prefigures the *inscriptive* model of cultural memory that I want to advance and understand here; significantly, both Mary Carruthers and John Frow use it to buttress their own arguments that memory is not an essential nor metaphysical activity, an aspect or proof of self-presence, but a technical process organized by the "logic of textuality"—inscribed traces or palimpsestic writing that can be linked not only to the problematic of representation but also, I will suggest, to the philosophical project of Derridean deconstruction.

Less speculatively, in the early Greek and Roman memory models that were translated into Medieval and Renaissance Europe, memory was clearly considered essential and invaluable; "Ancient and medieval people," Carruthers writes, "reserved *their* awe for memory" in ways that a modern, post-Romantic, post-Freudian world might not understand. "Their greatest geniuses they describe as people of superior memories, they boast unashamedly of their prowess in that faculty, and they regard it as a mark of superior moral character as well as intellect" (1). In contrast, a "good" memory today, in an era of gigabytes and hypertexts, might seem to be little more than a novelty, one that astonishes guests at parties or guarantees success at Trivial Pursuit. And a good deal of New Age babble about the past simply recycles essential aspects of the memory—"old" souls and heroic former lives. We can even see vestiges of the rhetorical art of memory in late-night infomercials, which promise prodigious memory improvement and untold wealth for several easy payments. Of course, these modes of remembering the past display little, if any, concern for the art of rhetoric itself, much less for oration, for the health of the *polis*, or for what Yates calls the Platonic tradition of "the soul's true knowledge" (Yates 51). Yet this hodgepodge of interest in the past runs parallel to a popular but also political and scholarly interest in the past in the West, in countries like Germany, Poland, France, England, Israel, and the US, that Huyssen calls a "memory boom of unprecedented proportions" (5) and that Michael Kammen suggests originated in the 1980s—an interest in cultural mnemonics that, as Kammen puts it in Mystic Chords of Memory, saw the development of veritable "memory industries" (3). These memory industries tended to be organized around *institutional* sites or places of memory like museums and monuments and around events like national commemorations or bicentennials. This "boom," curiously, roughly overlapped with the "conservative" governments of, say, Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl, as well as with the tangled discourses of international mobility (migration and tourism), the cultural desire for "authenticity" and national "origins," the desire for purity and self-presence, the need for national legitimation grounded in "deep" pasts, the amnesiac habits of nostalgia, and the transformation of the museum from elitist conservation to a space of public entertainment or spectacle—all of which added to the cultural phenomenon Huyssen designates under the rubric "musealization" (14) and that we might call aspects of *mausoleum* culture.⁴

⁴ Jeffrey Olick traces the connection between "museum" (a Latin term derived from the Greek *mousetion* or seat of the Muses) and "mausoleum" (a Latin term derived from the Greek *Mausöleion* or

More positively, such an interest in the past went "far beyond" the so-called "official political or cultural sphere" to include "struggles for minority rights and identity debates about gender, sexuality, and race (Huysen 5). To be sure, the struggle for identity and for understanding that is played out at the level of culture and memory is central to a discussion of the social formation of the nation, as well as to post-colonial studies, as we shall see. It is useful, however, to recognize how traces of memory-as-metaphysics remain even in the more subjective and ostensibly "experimental" mnemonics of modern psychology and psychoanalysis—the latter being, as Terdiman claims, "our culture's last Art of Memory" (*Present Past* 240). Some theorists of memory claim it can be found in the form of hereditary or instinctive behaviours, in muscle-memories, and in physico-chemical mechanisms, an especially prevalent view in the late nineteenth century, during which time memory was conceived, as we have seen, by "psychologists" like Bergson or Freud, as an intuitive but physical part of the body itself, as an inherently *organic* faculty or "biochemical mechanism" that stored "hidden information" or explained the lack or repression of memories from the past⁵; more recently, some have suggested that memory can be located within identifiable "memory molecules," or that memory is even a component of the human genome, though most neuroscientists today would dismiss such claims and favour instead updated variations on the model advanced by the Canadian neuro-psychologist Donald Hebb in the 1950s, in which brain memory is dynamic insofar as it follows neural pathways or *synapses* that strengthen as they are used. But even the most "internal" workings of memory in the psyche cannot simply be excised from the external or cultural frames that make both subjective and social memories possible, and attempts to understand neurobiology, as Steven P. R. Rose concedes, remain partial:

memory . . . seems to stand at the juncture between the objective world of the laboratory and the subjective world of our lived experience. I confess that I am still a long way from unifying my understanding of what goes on in the synapses I study for a day-to-day research living with the cascading memories that I carry with me in my inexorable journey from cradle to grave. I am convinced that if I had a personal cerebroscope, wired up through life to a portable MEG machine or whatever, I could make this connection. On the other hand, however well I understand the circuitry and neural patterns [of the brain], I am also pretty sure that the content of my memory will always be coded in the language of my mind, and not in the brain language to which it undoubtedly corresponds.

Mausōlos, the 4th century BC king whose tomb—one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World—was named after him) to Adorno's "Valery Proust Museum" in *Prisms* (Trans. S. Weber. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967 173-86); qtd. in Olick, "Social Memory Studies: From 'Collective Memory' to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices" (7).

⁵ See Laura Otis, *Organic Memory: History and the Body in the Late Nineteenth & Early Twentieth Centuries*. Otis argues that the period between 1870 and 1918 in the West can be named "the age of organic memory, because of the theory's intimate relationship with nationalism and because it was in 1870 that physiologist Ewald Hering first formulated it as a scientific hypothesis. The idea that history and the development of the individual can be seen by examining the individual and the culture of the present, however, had been thriving for some time in romantic philology and has continued to thrive in psychoanalysis" (ix). "The theory of organic memory placed the past *in* the individual, *in* the body, *in* the nervous system; it pulled memory from the domain of the metaphysical into the domain of the physical with the intention of making it knowable" (3). The concept of *organic memory* equates memory with heredity, and asks where we can locate the past; it treats the past and history like the accumulated silt of a river, and we can hear in it echoes of Darwin's evolutionary biology. It is based upon two fundamental "laws": Jean Baptiste Lamarck's law of inheritance, or the idea that an "organism evolved by responding to its environment; the body changed as use of its parts increased or decreased," and Ernst Haeckel's biogenetic law that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" (Otis ix, 1-8).

Of that language, poets and novelists, not neuroscientists, must speak, for it is they who have the gift of tongues. (160-61)

Even though Rose's rhetoric hints at a level of poetic inspiration that I distrust, I think his model signals the importance of indeterminacy to an understanding of memory; furthermore, such a neuro-physiological model of memory, as Wolfgang Iser suggests, is an "exact image" of intertextuality (xvi), of the textual processes or "multifarious interrelations" (xiii) and linkages through which the cybernetically operating structure of culture stores and recalls information. But Rose's disclaimer also suggests that memory is too complex a phenomenon to isolate from the language, that memory is never only in our heads. Few, I think, would disagree that memory can imbue "present" monuments and buildings with meanings from the past, as is the case, for example, in the solemn and hybrid architecture of the Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne; and surely most would agree that the same things can be said of the more intimate topographies of the houses or domestic spaces we inhabit—what Gaston Bachelard calls those "felicitous spaces" that literally and figuratively "house" our memories (*The Poetics of Space* xxxi, 3-16). Such spaces, Bachelard claims, buttress our private worlds and stabilize our thoughts for the duration of our lives—they fix us in space and time—which is roughly the thesis of David Malouf's evocative and autobiographical *12 Edmonstone Street*. Similarly, the contours of landscapes and the topographies of cities possess their own distinct mnemonic economies: the former a component, for example, of the Aboriginal Australian "Songlines" or "Dreaming"; the latter a feature of street and park names, or, less obviously, Hausmann's boulevards and Hugo's sewers in Paris or even of what Robert Venturi calls the "exponential" development of cities like Las Vegas and Los Angeles (*Learning From Las Vegas* 246). In such urban spaces, as Paul Connerton claims in "Contemporary Cultural Amnesia," a particular kind of cultural amnesia is caused by evoking certain memories from the past and by forgetting others, by facilitating (disciplinary) social relationships in the present that organize—disorient, distribute—bodies in the ephemeral and instantaneous, in the "compressed" and "accelerated" times and spaces of the modern city, spaces that eventually, through cultural representation and technological innovation, through the accelerated relations and technologies of capitalist production, come to seem increasingly natural and inevitable as effects of modern or capitalist production in what Walter Benjamin calls "homogenous" or "empty time" (261).

Connerton's thesis is not unfamiliar, and we shall encounter more than one critical theorist in the following dissertation who feels that the ligatures of memory tie it to both material exchange and to a perceiving consciousness; more troubling, though, is the prevalent nostalgia, the cloud of cultural amnesia that seems to settle in and around those social formations that ask us, implicitly or otherwise, to *look back* to an age of plentitude and self-presence and *away from* a degraded present, from a "now" that is devoid of history and the ability to "truthfully" remember. This is the familiar charge of critics who claim that the postmodern period is an age of unprecedented loss and a state of cultural exhaustion, and we shall study it more carefully in Section One as a problem of postmodern cultural mnemonics, particularly as an aspect of Fredric Jameson's assertion that we have surrendered to the cultural logic of postmodernity and to the fetishes of the commodified sign, and in doing so we have *fallen* from "history into amnesia" (Frow, *Time and Commodity Culture* 218).

Such a claim not only reflects both a cultural and scholarly unease with the past and with the *subject of memory*,⁶ but also an intense interest in memory that, as we have already seen, has

⁶ I use the term "subject" in this dissertation in the sense that Paul Smith uses it in *Discerning the Subject*. As opposed to an "individual"—a typically unified, autonomous, and ego-centric construction of European Man, the legacy of the Enlightenment, of humanism, and the bourgeoisie—the "subject" is identified by the structuralist critique of language and the post-structuralist critique of metaphysics, that is, the reconsideration of the nature and function of *homo sapiens* as "subjected" to all manner of dominations,

become a feature of cultural and intellectual production in the West at the end of the current millennium. It laments what seems to be a waning of history as an empirical or objective science and sets up an antagonistic relationship between history and memory that says less about the past, I think, than it does about the status of historiography as a discourse in a postmodern age. What interests me especially about such claims is how in the postmodern period⁷ memory can, and must, be linked to the post-structural critique of "metaphysics" and to the problematic of language—an expansive critical project in the cultural history of the West, to say the least, in which the unified categories of "History" and the "Human" themselves are no longer tenable.

One of the first casualties of such inquiry into how we remember the past at the level of culture is the notion that the processes of memory can be located only within the sphere of the subjective or used as proof for self-presence, along with the assumptions that memory can be apprehended wholly in organic or psychological terms, that "oral" and "literary" forms of memory are essentially different, that "performative" or "incorporative" memory is different from "inscribed" memory, or that there is, in a word, such a thing as an "outside" of memory to begin with (to appropriate and distort Derrida's famous phrase). I am jumping ahead of myself here and anticipating my argument somewhat, but the cultural analysis of memory and its *secular*—its inorganic and semiological—functions, I will argue, is possible if not necessary in the postmodern period precisely because of the technological and epistemological developments of the modern and postmodern periods, precisely because of the proliferation of information technologies and the self-reflexive nature of postmodern theoretical discourses which must make sense of our "new" world. Such a move, then, is occasioned not so much by a fall or loss, or some further

knowledges, power-relations, discourses. But as Smith suggests, the "subject" can also be separated from various dominations, can be "dis-cerned," a move that, Smith recognizes in psychoanalytic theory (Lacan in particular) and various feminisms (specifically Kristeva). Smith argues for a "dis-cerning" of the subject that would allow it to inhabit a more ambivalent, flexible position—a "colligation of multifarious subject positions" that takes into account both the "interpellated positions and the permanences of ideology" (Althusser) and yet conceives of "the possibility of resistance through a recognition of the *simultaneous* non-unity or non-consistency of subject positions. Such a position is intrinsically dialectical . . ." (118). His invocation of the dialectic notwithstanding, Smith acknowledges the "subjectedness" (or domination) of the subject at the same time that he attempts to protect the subject's "agency"—its ability to act, to resist the protean and oppressive prescriptions of political and discursive domination. Such an ambivalent, polyvalent theory of the subject, Smith argues, remains "theoretically responsible"; it explains how the subject is capable of both acting and of being subjected, and, I think, posits some interesting linkages between memory, ideology, and subjection. Kaja Silverman also articulates a theory of an "unconscious" and "overdetermined" subjectivity as the product of cultural signification or semiotics, as opposed to the Renaissance (neo-Platonic) idea of the conscious and rational "individual" in *The Subject of Semiotics* (see esp. 126-93). Although this brief note hardly circumscribes the relationship of culture to semiology or even memory, I want to use it to prepare the ground for my claim that memory is something of a wildcard in systems of cultural and linguistic signification—an aspect of culture that can make powerful though subtle claims on the subject and on his or her language and perception of the present, even to the point of circumscribing possible agency; at the same time, I want to suggest that memory is also a powerful force within acts of political resistance to domination and subjection. As Terdiman suggests, memory is both contestatory and conservative; it is deeply, ineluctably embedded in subjects and in the social formations and institutions they inhabit, and are inhabited by.

⁷ I acknowledge the problems that such a periodicity or narrative of "universal rupture" (Frow, *Time and Commodity Culture* 1) between the modern and the postmodern creates—no doubt many more than it solves; but in one view, the periodic hypothesis itself is a form of the memory problem: it is an attempt to organize the present in relation to the past according to a neat and linear *chrono*-logic. Current debates about the proliferation of the prefix "post" ("after in time or order") in critical discourse and even about the term "modern" (from L. *modo* or "just now") demonstrate the importance of temporality to questions about how cultures construct and maintain attachments to their pasts.

evidence of cultural degeneration in the present, but by more sophisticated and subtle, by more critical but complicitous (to use two terms from Linda Hutcheon's theoretical lexicon) epistemologies and ontologies: by configurations of power and knowledge and attempts to understand subject and social formation in the present that begin with the fundamental premises of post-structuralism and its critique of the abstractions of metaphysics (originality, essence, purity, authenticity, the self-same, and so on) and which are organized around the problematics of language, meaning, and signification.

The point I want to make here is that a theory of cultural memory is one way to talk about the past and about subject and social formation in the present that rejects theoretical and political totalization, that respects the *differential* and *oppositional* natures of both individual consciousness and cultural groups, and that insists on studying memory as a component of discourse. In this way, the category of cultural memory can incorporate "historical" writing about the past but open out to include other modes of constructing and recollecting the textual traces we use to "mark" the *always already* absent past. "Memory," writes Huyssen, "as a concept rather than merely material for the historian seems increasingly to draw literary critics, historians, and social scientists together" (6). Such a convergence will undoubtedly create its own theoretical dilemmas, but in the most general terms it is organized around the links between memory and the problematic of *representation*. It thus can be placed under the general aegis (or tactical analyses) of *postmodernism*, which, as Young explains in *White Mythologies*, "becomes a certain self-consciousness about a culture's own historical relativity—which begins to explain why, as its critics complain, it also involves the loss of the sense of an absoluteness of any Western account of History" (19). This "loss," however, might be better read as an increase in critical or theoretical self-consciousness and a refusal to think in terms such as "absolute" or "universal"—even, or especially, when dealing with the problem of the past, with the "science" of History. Post-structuralism itself, as Young continues, "which in its own way participates in that [Hegelian] history of Western Marxism, differs only insofar as it foregrounds the implications of the theoretical difficulties involved rather than repressing them in pursuit of the unrealized ideal" (24).

Young frames his defence of post-structuralism and his "decolonization" of History in the postmodern period as an abandoning of the unrealizable ideal of a single (Eurocentric) historical meaning in the past. This involves, Young explains, a critique of the Hegelian model or dialectic, which Young sees as based upon a dyad of master-slave and which, as Young explains, "presupposes a governing [binary] structure of self-realization in all historical processes" (3). The problem for Young is that this model has proven to be inadequate as a way to understand the past—not only the history of the class struggle but also of the relationship of colonizer to colonized, of minority or marginal groups to dominant cultural groups. "In fact it is arguable whether such dualistic conditions ever existed" (5). Young traces this form of knowledge and domination back to Enlightenment rationality and to its humanist and universal (Eurocentric) knowledges and values, a particularly insidious "white mythology" that, as we shall see in our subsequent analyses of Young's argument, has dominated the "realm of consciousness" (4) and the relation of individual consciousness to society" (8) in the West.

In one view, this "mythology" is a set of culturally ratified "memories"—racist "Eurocentric values" or what Young calls "meaning as 'History'" (22). An interrogation of a culture's consciousness or memory, then, is an interrogation of such "universal" values, an "interrogation of rationality" (9) itself and, by implication, of the problem of European colonialism and the "collusive forms of European knowledge" (9). Far from being an ahistorical critique, post-structural thought is deeply concerned with history and Western knowledge and power, with the discourse of history and such related categories as temporality and memory. Young recognizes this as *a certain self-consciousness about a culture's own historical relativity* in the postmodern period and its theoretical discourses, a self-consciousness, we can assume, that leads to questions such as how do we represent the past? Who controls it? Who *orders* its

discursive matrices? Its chains of signification? How is the past remembered? As Young argues, the question of history in the postmodern period, passed through the discursive prism of structuralism and post-structuralism, can no longer be viewed as a problem of simple antithesis—now-then, us-them, fact-fiction—but rather “becomes the more interesting one of the relation between different significations, and the ways in which such differences can, or cannot, be articulated to and unified under the same horizon of totalization to produce a single meaning” (22). Until the “lonely hour” in which the “philosophical proof of the truth of history is produced, then history will inevitably continue as a representation and interpretation of the past” (22).

Memory is nothing if not a problem in the postmodern period, and a theory of contemporary cultural memory preserves this sense of an un-settled present in its critical anatomy. For a theory of cultural memory pivots on a critical *and* self-conscious understanding of the “present past,” to use Terdiman’s prescient phrase. As Young puts it:

Today, if we pose the difficult question of the relation of poststructuralism [sic] to postmodernism, one distinction between them that might be drawn would be that whereas postmodernism seems to include the problematic place of Western culture in relation to non-Western cultures, poststructuralism as a category seems not to imply such a perspective. This, however, is hardly the case, for it rather involves if anything a more active critique of the Eurocentric premises of Western knowledge. The difference would be that it does not offer a *critique* by positioning itself outside ‘the West,’ but rather uses its own alterity and duplicity in order to effect its deconstruction. . . . Contrary, then, to some of its more overreaching definitions, postmodernism itself could be said to mark not just the cultural effects of a new stage of ‘late’ capitalism, but the sense of the loss of European history and culture as History and Culture, the loss of their unquestioned place at the centre of the world. (19-20)

For Young, both the descriptive term “postmodernism” and the critical agenda of “post-structuralism” belong to the larger critique of Western History and Western Man. Such critical thinking is a kind of timely and necessarily self-conscious *remembering*, and therefore hardly an amnesia. As my readings of two paradigmatic post-colonial memory-texts in Section Two will demonstrate, this theoretical project runs parallel to, but also overlaps, the critical discourses generated within the field of post-colonial studies. One of the most recognizable features of post-colonial discourse—and this field is by no means consolidated nor stable nor reducible to an “obsessive insistence on similarities” (Mukherjee 10)—is precisely the problematic of the past, the question of how to remember or forget the political and personal traces of European imperialism.

A theory of cultural memory thus affiliates itself, in part, with a project like Young’s, even if, as Stuart Hall has noted, Young’s “Promethean desire for the ultimate theoretically correct position—a desire to out-theorise everyone else” in *White Mythologies* seems to set up a hierarchy from the ‘bad’ (Sartre, Marxism, Jameson) through the ‘not-so-bad-but-wrong’ (Said, Foucault) to the almost ‘OK’ (Spivak, Bhabha) without ever once putting on the table for serious critical inspection the normative discourse, the foundational figure—i.e. Derrida—in relation to whose absence/presence the whole linear sequence is staged. (“When was ‘The-Post-colonial’? Thinking at the Limit” 249)

Hall is concerned with the “connection between the post-colonial and the critique of the western metaphysical tradition” (249) or, in other words, historicism and post-structuralism. He reasons that post-colonial critics err when they assume that the *theoretical* deconstruction of empire-as-text implicit and explicit in the post-structuralist orientation of post-colonialism proceeds at the same pace and in the same direction(s) as its *political* deconstruction:

While holding fast to differentiation and to specificity, we cannot afford to forget the over-determining effects of the colonial moment, the ‘work’ which its binaries were constantly required to do to *re-present* the proliferation of cultural difference and forms of life, which were always there, within the sutured and over-determined ‘unity’ of that

simplifying, over-arching binary, 'the West and the Rest' . . . We have to keep these two ends of the chain in play at the same time—over-determination and difference, condensation and dissemination—if we are not to fall into a playful deconstruction, the fantasy of a powerless utopia of difference [or endless semiosis]. It has been only too tempting to fall into the trap of assuming that, because essentialism has been deconstructed theoretically, therefore it has been displaced politically. (249)

Like Young, Hall recognizes the interventions of post-structural (anti-foundational) theoretical discourse in critiques of post-colonialism. But Hall's main point is that the charge that the "post-colonial" is either too universal or too periodic—too concerned with placeless identities or the (linear) epochal stages of "Eurocentric time" (252)—cannot be ignored, but neither does it justify the wholesale discrediting or disavowal of the 'post-colonial' as a way to talk about current "modes of comprehending the world" (256), about "different ways of 'staging the encounters' between colonising societies and their others" (247). The post-colonial, for Hall, does not mark the colonial encounter as an absolute "'then' and 'now'" but as an obligation to re-read—to represent and interpret—the binaries as forms of transculturation, of cultural translation, destined to trouble the here/there cultural binaries forever" (247). In Hall's scheme, we are once again in the un-settled middle, in the domain of discourse and memory, where "new" stories about the "communal past" reposition and displace *difference* without subsuming it, disrupting the "settled [Hegelian] relations of domination and resistance" (251). If the anti-essentialist emphasis in post-colonial discourse "sometimes seems to define any attempt to recover or inscribe a communal past as a form of idealism, despite its significance as a site of resistance and collective identity" (251), it is also the case the "past *could* always be negotiated differently," be re-presented "not as a static fetishized phase to be literally reproduced but as fragmented sets of narrated memories and experiences" (251).

Hall goes on to argue that the 'post-colonial' paradigm presents an epistemological choice: between "a rational and successive logic" (historicism) and a "deconstructive one" (255); too often this choice is figured too simply as a choice between economist or teleological versions of the past and discursive ones, between the world and the text as if these were absolutely separable entities. Hall points out that this sort of either/or theorization usually results in profound failure, and that an "unbridgeable chasm" does not exist between economist versions of history and anti-foundationalist discourse (258). Indeed, though such a theoretical forgetting does not "address the question of the conceptual role which the category of 'capitalism' may have in post-foundationalist 'logic,' certain articulations of this order are *in fact* either implicitly assumed or silently at work in the underpinning assumptions of almost all the post-colonial critical work" (258).

Hall thus attempts to keep both modes of production analysis and post-structural models of knowledge in the "general discourse of the 'posts'" (255) as "key concepts" of the post-colonial, as "conceptual instruments and tools with which to think about the present" (255), a claim that, in a much less sophisticated way, I want to make for cultural memory and its possible interventions and uses in post-colonial literary studies. We shall return to this question. In Hall's thinking, the post-colonial cannot ignore or forget—Hall names this the "sleep of reason" (259)—that the problems of European colonialism are imbricated in the history of "global" or "late" capitalism just as they are deeply implicated in the "tangled" historical events and discursive structures that cannot be separated from the emergence of modernity, from European imperialism after 1492, and from the development of capitalist exchange and accumulation. Hall insists that the post-colonial theoretical paradigm must be able to think within this time and space of global and transcultural context, within the various "forms of translation and transculturation which have characterised the 'colonial relation' from its earliest stages—the disavowals and in-betweenness, the here-and-there, [that] mark the aporias and re-doublings whose interstices colonial discourses have always negotiated" (251) if it is to be creditable as a way to look at the diasporas of the "new" world. As Hall writes,

From that turning point in the closing decades of the fifteenth century forwards, there is, of course, no 'single, homogeneous empty (Western) time'. But there are condensations and ellipses which arise when all the different temporalities, while remaining 'present' and 'real' in their differential effects, are also rupturally convened *in relation to*, and must mark their 'difference' in terms of, the over-determining effects of Eurocentric temporalities, systems of representation and power. (251)

Once again, Hall's rhetoric invokes a Freudian memory paradigm: condensation, displacement, over-determination; once again we see memory in the modern world as the site of tropology, of discursive struggle, of meaning-making. I find Michel Foucault's work on language as discourse, on history, and on memory and difference to be a clear statement on the linkages of knowledge and the systems of representation to the processes of power. Foucault's work on the birth of the modern prison and on carceral discipline especially connects the accumulation of capital with the international migration of European men, and we shall consider it in some detail in Section Two. Here, I want to briefly consider Foucault's work on epistemology, on History, and on memory, and the ways that this work intersects with what I am calling cultural mnemonics. For Foucault, "History" denotes a consolidated and continuous (enlightenment) project or science of the past; in contrast, "history" denotes a more differential and discontinuous epistemology, what Foucault will eventually term "counter-memory," which insists that the fundamental linkage between consciousness and representations of the social is the place where we must apprehend not only memory and its dissensions but also such categories as the "past," "truth," "being," the "subject," the "other." As Young puts it, Foucault's interest in the past, in its epistemological silences and erasures, is based upon a view of the past in which memory functions as a central mechanism of power and ideology. In this way, as Young explains, Foucault's project asks

how do we come to terms with the event, with continuities and discontinuities, in short with history as difference and not just the story of sameness? Foucault adopts a strategy . . . designed to restore the otherness that History by definition must disallow: he produces an account of epistemic shifts, with prior *epistemes* presented as altogether estranged from the present. In order to come to terms with the past, the initial gesture must be to confront its strangeness, rather than to seek for similarities and continuities so that it can be equated with the present and thus, in effect, dehistoricized. (75)

There is always something strange about memory, and the chronic dehistoricization of modern Western thought, at least for Foucault, is itself a kind of cultural amnesia. In fact, one of the fundamental conditions of modern power relations, Foucault claims, is a "basic forgetfulness" (*Language, Counter-Memory, Practice* 75) that can be read as a distinctly modern and capitalist refusal to think *difference* as that which arises when "representation can only partially present what was previously present, when the test of recognition is stymied" (183). Once again, our discussion of the past folds back into the problem of representation. Foucault opposes this amnesiac (Hegelian) tendency in thinking with his concept of "counter-memory": the "philosophy of difference," or that which begins when we can think about individual and social identities as differential, as incommensurable, as discontinuous—a task that History has not typically accomplished but that a theory of cultural memory squarely faces. I will only suggest, at this point, that a common thread runs through Foucault's excavation of the artificial continuities and totalizing logic of History—the distinctly modern habit of selective remembering that cannot be easily separated from the accumulation of capital, much less the mass media—that weaves his work into the larger "text" of critical projects that deal, in one way or another, with memory: for example, Georg Lukács' analysis of the commodity form as an amnesiac process of "reification"; Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "genesis amnesia"; Russell Jacoby's "social amnesia"; Paul Fussell's understanding of modern irony and "irony-assisted recall" as forms of cultural

mnemonics; and perhaps even (as a kind of theoretical riposte) by what Martin Heidegger has termed the neglected "question of being" that has "today been forgotten."⁸

A good deal of the theoretical interest in cultural memory and in the strangeness of the past that I speak about can be read as efforts to think through the implication of the claim that the past is always absent and that we can only ever "recover" or "re-collect" it as a textual trace, a representation, a memory. As Linda Hutcheon writes, this is what is at stake when we talk about "re-presenting the past": the postmodern "narrativization of past events" is an imposing of order and convention, a signification that makes the past intelligible. This "does not in any way deny the existence of the past real, but it focuses attention on the act of imposing order on that past, of encoding strategies of meaning-making through representation" (*Politics of Postmodernism* 67). This imposition of order and meaning is what I am calling the "business" of memory. Paul Ricoeur frames this as the problem of "temporal value," a particularly indeterminate and unsettled sense of time and duration that is, ultimately, narrative in nature. Ricoeur suggests that the "plots" or narratives through which "we invent the privileged means by which we re-configure our confused, un-formed, and at the limit mute temporal experience" (*Time and Narrative* 1: xi) are tied to the problematic of temporality and thus memory: "time becomes human time," Ricoeur continues, "to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience" (1: 3). This paradoxical and tautological thesis, as Ricoeur himself notes, is not intended to result in a dead end; rather, as Ricoeur points out, "the circular character of my thesis that temporality is brought to language to the extent that language configures and refigures temporal experience" (1: 54) foregrounds, ultimately, the "serious question" of to "what degree a philosophical reflection on narrative and time may aid us in thinking about eternity and death at the same time" (1: 87)—or in other words, to think about being and memory. A no less important question, then, as far as I understand Ricoeur's ambitious project, is the way that what Ricoeur calls "poetic composition" relates to or mimics "our field of temporal experience," the way that language "fits" onto

⁸ Lukács develops the notion of the commodity as the "universal structuring principle" that subjugates "men's consciousness to the forms" of commodity production and its reification (*History and Class Consciousness* 85-6); as Theodor Adorno puts it in a letter to Walter Benjamin, "every reification is a forgetting" (qtd. in Terdiman, *Present Past* 13), which means roughly that commodity production and the increasingly abstract relationships between producers and consumers in capitalist production effect human consciousness as a kind of hollowing out or amnesia that isolates the present from the past and that makes the inequitable social relations of capitalist production seem to be relations between objects or things, not to mention inevitable and natural; Bourdieu's "genesis amnesia" builds on this idea and suggests that "The unconscious is never anything other than the forgetting of history which history itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it produces in the second natures of habitus" (*Outline of a Theory of Practice* 78-9); Jacoby meditates upon the linkages between Marxism, psychoanalysis, and modernity and argues that today society wilfully represses or "remembers less and less faster and faster. The sign of the times is thought that has succumbed to fashion. . . . The forgetfulness itself is driven by an unshakeable belief in progress: what comes later is necessarily better than what came before" (*Social Amnesia* 1); Fussell argues in *The Great War and Modern Memory* that "modern understanding" or "political and social cognition in our time" (35) is dominated by irony, which can be construed as a particular form of amnesia: "In reading memoirs of the war, one notices the same phenomenon over and over. By applying to the past a paradigm of ironic action, a rememberer is enabled to locate, draw forth, and finally shape into significance an event or a moment which otherwise would merge without meaning into the general undifferentiated stream" (30); Heidegger's phenomenological inquiry into Being in *Being and Time* begins with an injunction to remember, to question the structure, the "thatness" and "whatness" of Being (6), to reject "positive" returns to the past (19), to begin a questioning of Being that Western metaphysics since Plato and Aristotle has neglected.

experience: "the composition of the plot is grounded in a pre-understanding of the world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic resources, and its temporal character" (1: 54).

We are talking about memory, here, when we speak about the "pre-understanding" of the meaningful structures and symbols of human action, as Ricoeur himself implies earlier in his argument when he discusses St. Augustine's concept of time and memory: "Narration, we say, implies memory [of the past] and prediction implies expectation [of the future]. Now what is it to remember? It is to have an image of the past. How is this possible? Because this image is an impression left by events, an impression that remains in the mind" (1:10). Ricoeur's argument deserves closer attention than I have given it here, particularly the importance it ascribes to consciousness and memory as aspects of "being" in time, and to the invention and preservation of images of the past, at subjective and social levels. But the point I want to make is that questions about our "basic forgetfulness" or "social amnesia" or "pre-understanding" are indeed questions about our cultural memories, and to think through them we need "new" ways to "mark time" in the postmodern present and to speak about the discursive persistence of the always already absent past. Such a "new" or self-reflexive epistemology, then, might well be necessary in the postmodern, especially since, as Hayden White puts it, "transitional ages in the lives of cultures" are periods when

received traditions in thought and mythic endowments appear to have lost their relevance to current social problems or their presumed coherency, as in the Hellenistic Age or the late Middle Ages. During such times, thinkers may try, by means of what is usually called "historical perspective," to gain some purchase on their cultural legacy and to distinguish between "what is living and what is dead" within it. ("The Tasks of Intellectual History" 606)

It hardly needs to be said that the postmodern (or for that matter the modern) is a transitional age, one in which our "mythic endowments" or cultural memories seems especially un-settled and opaque. To be sure, the "social problems" and sense of incoherence that plague the postmodern world are real; and the double mystifications of nostalgia and utopianism, of Tradition and Progress, not to overstate the case too grandly, have failed to provide solutions to current economic and environmental problems, much less to explain the *presumed coherency* of the postmodern and post-colonial worlds. I am not suggesting that "anything goes" in the postmodern period when it comes to knowledges of the past—to memory—or that there are not pressing social and environmental problems of apocalyptic scale in the present that demand our immediate attention. Rather, that the extra-historical interest in the past in the postmodern period, in the relation to what is dead and what is living—and memory has always been positioned somewhere *in-between* life and death, *in-between* consciousness and oblivion⁹—puts questions

⁹ In Greek mythology, which is one of the earliest, most powerful, and certainly most codified systems of cultural mnemonics in the West, the Titan Mnemosyne is the figure of Remembrance. After a protracted union with Zeus, Mnemosyne becomes the Mother of the nine Muses, each of whom functions variously as inspiration for the arts and sciences (not the least of which for my purposes being poetry, history, and music). And the importance of remembering and forgetting in Greek mythology does not stop there: in most conceptions of the Underworld, such as the myth of Er, the river Lethe or Oblivion flows from the well-spring of forgetfulness while its counterpart the river Mnemosyne flows from the well-spring of memory. Although accounts vary, it seems that the souls of the dead were to drink from Lethe in order to facilitate reincarnation by obliterating their past lives; or, as Orphic tablets found in tombs suggest, the souls were not to drink of Lethe but to drink of Mnemosyne and remember if they wanted to achieve salvation. As Bertrand Russell writes in *The History of Western Philosophy*: "The soul in the next world, if it is to achieve salvation, is not to forget, but, on the contrary, to acquire a memory surpassing what is natural" (39). Such a configuration of memory and morality has curious linkages to the development of the Western conscience and to Nietzschean mnemonics, but also to the Foucauldian sense of modern social discipline and the carceral architecture of the modern prison, where prisoners are confined or "isolated"

about cultural mnemonics in the critical spotlight. As J. P. Stern asks in the context of Nietzschean mnemonics and the "will to power," the central question about the past and its persistence into the present becomes "who decides what should be forgotten?" (xvi). This is one of the central questions of cultural memory. In an age in which "data-warehouses" store information about our purchasing patterns, in which the majority of mass media is owned by a dozen or so "global" corporations, and in which cultural factories such as Disney export a distinctly American and late-capitalist mono-culture—let us call this a set of *manufactured cultural memories*—around the globe with a disturbing efficiency, there is perhaps no more pressing social or political (not to mention psychological or philosophical) question to be asked.

In his "Introduction" to a special issue of *Representations*, an issue dedicated to historical forms of memory, Randolph Starn puts the question of memory another way. Starn argues that despite the fact that memory is "notoriously malleable," the "precise terms and definitions [of memory] are less important . . . than the working principle that whenever memory is invoked we should be asking ourselves: by whom, where, in which context, against what?" (2). The spectrum or range of interest in cultural memory itself in the modern and postmodern periods testifies to the integrity of this principle. Certainly, memory can be programmed or manipulated by totalitarian governments, as is the case in George Orwell's anatomy of modern memory and the political uses of amnesia in 1984. Orwell's dystopian novel examines the circular logic of totalitarian states that attempt to control the past in order to control the present:

'Who controls the past,' ran the Party slogan, 'controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.' And yet the past, though of its nature alterable, never had been altered. Whatever was true now was true from everlasting to everlasting. It was quite simple. All that was needed was an unending series of victories over your own memory. 'Reality control', they called it: in Newspeak, 'doublethink'. (34)

Winston Smith, the novel's doomed hero, is initially rebellious because "his memory was not satisfactorily under control" (34), because he has an "independent" memory and hence a potentially independent past. And, perhaps, an independent future. As Winston asks, "Was he, then, *alone* in the possession of a memory?" (55).

Winston's question forces us to think about the relation of the subjective to the social, of the personal to the political. In a similar way, Milan Kundera's *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* explores the vicissitudes of memory and the relation of power to knowledge, of politics to representation in the context of both personal and political amnesias in Czechoslovakia, shortly after the Prague Spring: as Mirek says in the novel's oft-cited opening, "the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting."¹⁰ But memory, as Kundera also reminds us, can also be elicited at much less bureaucratic and much more "intimate" levels: for example, by musical or poetic rhythms, by scents and tastes (Marcel's famous *petites madeleines* and the *tilleul* [linden blossom] infusion he dips his tea cake into at Combray in Proust's famous novel being one well known example; Saleem's pickles and "chutney of memory" in Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* another); by textures such as the black, polished granite of the Vietnam Veteran's Memorial on Washington Mall (the reflective granite surface is inscribed with the names of 58,196 who died in the war) or the bullet holes in the siding of the Rectory at Batoche; by the inscribed surfaces of coins or the gritty "authenticity" of

with little more to do than to meditate upon, to remember their pasts in order to (ostensibly) achieve rehabilitation.

¹⁰ For Kundera, cultural amnesia is a malady of the modern and its inorganic information technologies: "The bloody massacre in Bangladesh quickly covered over the memory of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, the assassination of Allende drowned out the groans of Bangladesh, the war in the Sinai Desert made people forget Allende, the Cambodian massacre made people forget Sinai, and so forth until ultimately everyone lets everything be forgotten" (7).

religious relics; by the nationalist iconography of stamps or the colours and designs of uniforms and flags; by the mimetic figures of portraits and statuary; by gestures and rituals.

These are just a few examples of the specific locations where cultural memory can be studied, and it might be useful to add to Starn's principle a caveat that reminds us that private and public, that individual and cultural memories are inextricably bound together, that as soon as we try to separate one strand of memory from another, the private from the public, we begin to unravel the "memory" text that we seek. For the subject is caught up in the sign systems of the social and hence, I think, is no more able to "remember" or "forget" in isolation than he or she could speak or listen in the same situation.¹¹ As Halbwachs has written, it is "in society that people normally acquire their memories," and this acquisition places them in relationships within social groups. "One may say," Halbwachs continues, "that the individual remembers by placing himself in the perspective of the group, but one may also affirm that the memory of the group realizes and manifests itself in individual memories"; as a result, "no memory is possible outside the frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections" (*On Collective Memory* 40, 43).

Halbwachs' model, as we have seen, forecloses on "purely" psychological models of memory, such as Bergson's or Freud's. As Halbwachs maintains,

[t]here is nothing mysterious about recall of memories . . . There is no point in seeking where they are preserved in my brain or in some nook of my mind to which I alone have access: for they are recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am a part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them, upon condition, to be sure, that I turn toward them and adopt, at least for the moment, their way of thinking. . . It is in this sense that there exists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this memory that it is capable of the act of recollection. (38)

Halbwachs argues against the unconscious as a repository or physical storehouse of memories of the past, suggesting instead that recall is a social phenomenon, that the past is endlessly reconstructed through the organization and manipulation of *present* social frames: what he calls "the instruments used by the collective memory to reconstruct an image of the past which is in accord in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society" (40). A theory of cultural memory extends Halbwachs' critique of psycho-physiological mnemonics, but it does so in a way that makes clear how memory, too, is a social process, a representation that must be considered in relation to the divisive configurations of power and knowledge that organize cultural groups and enable them to compose their *predominant thoughts* (or one might say their *dominating thoughts*) and not simply in relation to a (Halbwachian) "mystical group mind" (Olick 4). A culture's memory, in this scheme, begins to sound a lot like ideology, what Althusser identified as the ultimately repressive "apparatuses" by which the conditions of production and of individual subjection are socially reproduced: "Ideology is a 'Representation' of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real Conditions of Existence" ("Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" 87). Such "lived relations," Althusser maintains, are grounded in "imaginary" representations in the present—recognitions of "the existing state of affairs" (101) and of the

¹¹ "Memory," Terdiman writes, "is the precondition for any intertextuality, for any dialogism" (*Present Past* 48). "Dialogism . . . is a memory model insofar as language carries the past and the sign conditions or determines culture"; dialogism "enforces the reestablishment of such relations for all cultural objects and ensures the restoration of a fundamental cultural memory at the level of the sign itself" (45). Thus memory in the modern period becomes inseparable from language: "We are not free to keep the past past—it colonizes our present whether or not we realize its encroachment"; as writers and thinkers such as Gustave Flaubert or Charles Baudelaire discovered in the nineteenth century, language itself became "the primary product and primary mechanism of memory" (46).

material conditions of production that suppress temporality and encourage an amnesiac self-subjection: a state of complacency, submission, and of obedience that Althusser calls the lived inscription of the prayer: "so be it" (101).

I want to think of cultural mnemonics as a way to read the social role of memory in the "ideological" apparatuses of self-subjection. Halbwach's work certainly acts as a starting point for such a critique, but it is one that the semiological or cultural analysis of memory in culture moves beyond. If the pedagogical, philosophical, psychological, or neurological approaches to mnemonics tend to rely on *internal/subjective* modes of remembering and forgetting, a theory of cultural memory is concerned with the ways that the past is remembered at the level of the *external/social* or culture and its semiological mechanisms, at the centre of which lurks one's "perception" of the past and its protean operations in consciousness, in the construction of temporality, in language. This view of the past, as I have already said, includes such modes of recollection as History or Tradition, but it casts a much wider net in what it considers to be the ways that we can "know" or "read" the past and the effects of memory. As Marita Sturken describes it, cultural memory is "memory that is shared outside the avenues of formal historical discourse yet is entangled with cultural products and imbued with cultural meaning" (*Tangled Memories* 3). For Sturken,

Cultural memory can be distinct from history yet . . . is essential in its construction. . . . Personal memory, cultural memory, and history do not exist within neatly defined borders. Rather, memories and memory objects can move from one realm into another, shifting meaning and context. . . . Because of these kinds of boundary crossings in what is remembered, true distinctions between personal memory, cultural memory, and history cannot be made. (4)

The "tangle" that Sturken identifies is what I see as the overlapping and intersecting times and spaces between remembering and forgetting, between meaning and meaninglessness, between the past and the present, between the subject and the social. Sturken acknowledges that cultural memory is a particularly "inventive social practice" (259) or way of inscribing the past as "liminal" texts, and she argues that the concept of memory is a constitutive and healing one, but also a form of resistance in American culture, especially in the context of the Vietnam War and the AIDS epidemic—histories that "disrupt" the American master narratives of "imperialism, technology, science, masculinity" (16). For Sturken, cultural memory is re-inscribed most clearly by "survivors" and other minority groups in opposition to the dominant culture at times of national crisis; in this way it most powerfully influences cultural production and helps us to *engage* with the past, to re-create it, not simply to conjure it up as literal reproductions. "If memory is redefined as a social and individual practice that integrates elements of remembrance, fantasy, and invention, then it can shift from the problematic role of standing for truth to a new role as an active, engaging practice of creating meaning" (257). In this way, Sturken emphasizes the inseparability of memory from cultural production and circulation, from language and representation, from discourse and meaning. "It is precisely the instability of memory that allows for renewal and redemption without letting the tension of the past in the present fade away" (17).

Sturken's framing of American cultural memory might seem, on the one hand, rather general, but it correctly asserts memory's role as a "changeable script" that is "crucial to its cultural function" (17). "We need," Sturken asserts, "to ask not whether a memory is true but rather what its telling reveals about how the past affects the present" (2). Memory organizes the ways that personal and public identities and values are constructed, and reconstructed, in the present. Such a model, I have already hinted, is characterized by two distinct features or conditions: first, by the fact that a culture's memory is *secular* as opposed to being theological or metaphysical; second, that it is *semiological* and therefore *technological* or *inorganic* as opposed to being organic or natural. As Marko Juvan explains, emphasizing the secular and inorganic aspects of cultural memory,

cultural memory . . . enables an individual's acculturation, the construction of their [sic] identity in the discourse (knowledge, values, ideologies, phantasms) of a certain community. Our memory recalls personal experience through social frames. It contains pictures, themes, ideas, and values which originate from others, and from tradition. . . . Cultural memory is thus based on socially organized mnemonics, institutions, and media.

(2)

Both Sturken and Juván note the social and semiological nature of contemporary memory: the way that memory in, and we can presume after, the twentieth century is considered to be attached to cultural products and imbued with cultural meaning (Sturken 3); the questions of cultural memory, that is, are inseparable from language, from such concepts as representation and semiology, from configurations of power and knowledge, from temporality, and even the structure and organization of consciousness itself. Instead of imagining memory in "crisis," then, or in some form of perpetual (urban-industrial-technological) degeneration, we must seek it in its contentious and tangled social and semiological frames.

Whatever else it does, culture binds subjects together and organizes them into seemingly coherent social formations: to speak about cultural memory is to question the memories that bind us together and make our "now" meaningful and intelligible; it is also to summon the ghosts and the elisions—the "occupations"—that we would rather forget as cultural groups. If this embeddedness or "tangledness" of memory makes it one of the most difficult concepts to apprehend, it is also what makes an inquiry into how cultures remember and forget, and into how cultural memory intersects with theory and literature, both interesting and invaluable.

Locating memory within the sphere of culture and reading into memory in theory and literature, as trendy as that might well be,¹² can go by many names: "cultural studies," "comparative literature," "the sociology of memory," "psychoanalytic theory," "literary history," "historiography," "the philosophy of memory," and so forth. I am not particularly concerned in what follows with a precise "institutional" location of cultural memory, but I would point out that my training as a literary critic in post-colonial literature, without question, influences both the methodology and the outcome of this dissertation. In addition to this, my discussion of the cultural meanings of memory is not meant to be systematic nor exhaustive: this dissertation is a meditation on one aspect of one of the most foundational but also un-settling categories of epistemology and ontology: memory. It is a *reading-into-memory* in theory and literature on the *undecidable* level of culture that asks, following Linda Hutcheon, "that important postmodern question: how exactly is it that we come to know the past?" (*The Politics of Postmodernism* 92).

In many ways, to be sure, but invariably as memories, as representations or textual traces that "stand for" the past. And always through culture, the sign system or cybernetic structure that stores and recalls information about the past and translates (condenses, displaces, disseminates) it into the present. There are obviously many approaches to the interrelation between memory and culture, between the subject and the social, some of which I will examine in the following pages. But, at the most general level, it is the "un-settled" cultural location of memory that attests to the ubiquity of memory in the social, and perhaps even to what John Frow calls the "productive uncertainty" of cultural studies itself (*Cultural Studies and Cultural Value* 7). Frow understands cultural studies as something of an "anti-discipline" that "doesn't have the sort of secure definition of its object that would give it thematic coherence and the sense of a progressive accumulation of knowledge that most established disciplines see, rightly or wrongly, as underlying their claim to produce and to control knowledges" (7). Nonetheless, "given its present institutional consolidation" (7), Frow recognizes that a poverty of theoretical self-reflection exists

¹² When I began to research this topic in 1991 or so, electronic searches of databases such as the MLA CD ROM would produce less than half a dozen records for "cultural memory"; using the Northern Light Search Engine (www.northernlight.com) in July 1999, I located 159,414 records for the same terms.

in cultural studies, and thus in his study of culture-as-value he works to "indicate the danger of positing imaginary social unities as the explanatory basis for accounts of cultural texts, and to think of cultures as being processes that divide as much as they bring together" (13).

My interest here is in how memory, as a mechanism of culture, and perhaps even the mechanism *par excellence*, divides and brings together, how the various discourses and disciplines that memory traverses use acts of remembering and forgetting to legitimate power, to create the "normal," to explain "now" and "then." Though I will restrict my questions, as much as possible, to theory and to literature (and more exactly to modern and postmodern as well as post-colonial configurations of cultural memory), such a gesture might seem at best Quixotic and at worst a move that creates more contradictions than it solves, not least because the methodologies upon which cultural studies and literary criticism are based overlap, and because the borders between them are as imaginary as they are porous. Yet, as a literary critic, I am interested in textual representations of memory and how memory's logic is textual: in how meaning is inscribed as memories and how memory is "used" in literary texts, as well as in how the question *who decides what should be forgotten* foregrounds not only the specific problematics of the past in the field of post-colonial writing but also aspects of the more general concerns of literary and theoretical discourses written in English. If the past is only accessible to us as textual traces, in whatever forms, it nonetheless remains one of the most common concerns in all forms of cultural expression: from the earliest epics to the latest post-colonial novels, from the earliest pictographs to the latest films. Furthermore, if culture is best studied by self-consciously examining its structures and operations, its relations and exchanges—by analyzing its "interactive force and meaning," its "circulating energies," its systems of "constraint and mobility"—one does not have to look too far into the regime of value to recognize the ubiquitous operations and effects of memory to see that each of us is, indeed, entangled therein. This, I will argue in Section One, is the logic that underwrites Terdiman's claim about the modern memory crisis, but moreso his notion that memory and theory are not "reifiable and separable entities" but mutually determining instances of our continuous and intricate negotiation with the past" (*Present Past* 18). If theory itself is a sort of cultural *memory machine*, as Terdiman suggests, it follows that the intersections of memory and culture—and by this I mean the myriad sites where we can apprehend cultural memory as a subject, as well as the subject of cultural memory—might well provide interesting, if often overlooked, vantage points for critical literary study.

This is especially the case, I think, for the sort of examinations of textual worlds that are grounded in the belief that, to recall Chambers' argument in *Room to Maneuver*, when a person reads a book, "whether a book of fiction or not—and is 'influenced,' that is changed, by it," that change can best be understood as a "change in desire—the further implication being that to change what people desire is, in the long run, the way to change without violence the way things are" (xii). Chambers acknowledges that the issue of changing the world is a complex one, and we can hear a distant echo of Marx's famous "Thesis XI" from his 1845 "Theses on Feuerbach," posthumously published in 1888: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it" (145). Nonetheless, Chambers asks us to think about how we read and how this event—how what literature *does*—influences our desire, our modes of thinking and speaking and acting, including our remembering and forgetting. As I have already noted, Chambers' project is dissimilar to mine in many ways, but the transformational function of reading as an oppositional discourse usefully intersects with the discourses of cultural memory in two ways: first, in the sense that reading as a kind of remembering can be an "oppositional" practice that itself is a "form-of-resistance available to the relatively disempowered" (Chambers xi); second, in that the spectrum between reading and desire is an endlessly shifting one that, in fact, utilizes complex acts of remembering and forgetting to "make" and re-make meaning.

Chambers' model invokes a Freudian memory paradigm in which the past is stored in the unconscious as permanent or "timeless" memories that the conscious mind can only partly control (screen or repress); when the repressed returns, as it does, for example, in dreams, it is always in

disguise, transformed. It is this transformation or re-presentation, this model of meaning-making, which I have been arguing operates in the same way as the semiological model of memory, that Chambers figures into his model for reading and social change. For Chambers, the longer term "effects" of narration—the mediatory or figurative nature of discourse and the ironic or *anamnesiac* effects of language—upon reading subjects in this space of conversion and mediation counteract the *literal* or *amnesiac* view of language as transparent and texts as static or sealed-off objects. When reading is figured as an un-settling event, as a mediated textual remembering (or self-representation) that destabilizes the reading subject, literature begins to function not only as a repository of a culture's past but as an activity that can help to "re-write" ourselves and our social futures. A "fundamental asymmetry is a primary fact in the world of discourse" (3), Chambers writes, and

without falling into idealism, it is possible to argue that discourse—and notably the discourse called literary—has characteristics that enable it, in an important sense, to elude both repression and recuperation, [that is, forgetting or literal remembering] or, more accurately to "maneuver" within the room that opens up between the two. These are the characteristics of address that imply reading as a mode of reception inscribed *without closure* in time, and hence history. (93)

Such a description of literature and its ambivalences hinges upon the act of "seduction" and the notions of "complicity" and "duplicity," on a "becoming different" that occurs at the intersection of reading and desire. This is possible only when readers are aware that "they are constituted by the language of the other while knowing themselves to be other than the language that constitutes them" (105). Such an interstitial or liminal consciousness is, I will argue, as essential to understanding cultural memory as it is to comprehending the constitution of nimble and desiring reading-subjects who refuse to "unthink" differences or to "'forget' the role of mediation in the present" (251). "If reading," Chambers writes,

is a technology of the self that is fostered in social formations such as ours, we can understand that fact in terms of an apparent paradox. Power depends on that which simultaneously opposes it, that is, on "reading" as a manifestation of mediation. If we need to *learn* to read—learn, that is, to oppose power in acquiring the techniques of interpretive reading (an activity for which in our own society expensive educational institutions are maintained)—it is because reading is also, and primarily, a condition of the production of authority, and "power" is a product of the same system as "opposition." Power is not a given but a (produced) "effect of power," an allegory read as literal; and it depends therefore on being read, a by product of that fact being that it is simultaneously vulnerable to oppositional (mis-)reading. And so the "effect of power," when it succeeds, is itself the product of a repression, since it is the inhibition of oppositional (mis-)reading through the ability to "forget" and to cause to "forget" the role of mediation. It is only as a result of that inhibition that the discourse of power comes to seem (to be read as) literal. (251)

Power, in this view, if I understand Chambers' argument, is generated in the psycho-social nexus of remembering and forgetting; it is an hermeneutic activity that depends upon selective remembering and literal interpretation: in the simplest terms, literal reading or textual *amnesia* precludes the possibility of difference, of "genuine" social or personal transformation, which, of course, remains the goal, however obliquely, of both social and psychoanalytical theory. Such change is clearly Chambers' goal in his theory of reading as a "space" for psychic and social maneuvering, and he uses the mnemonic model of "palimpsestic layering" (xviii) to explain his own argument and the importance of reading to one's "self-education" (xviii). This tropological model, I think, invokes the moment and scene of inscription as a memory event, a textual meaning-making that we have linked to discourse but also to the "idea" of power. It is discourse, and especially the literary text, that thus demonstrates the instability or vulnerability of power: "the point of *Room for Maneuver*," Chambers explains,

is precisely that the "authority" that permits literary narrative to function oppositionally through the phenomenon of reading is not different in kind, because it is a manifestation of the same discursive system, than the effects of power that reading "opposes." It is just that power has an interest in keeping the functioning of its authority *unexamined* whereas literary discourse—as a "technology of the self," a discipline that must be taught and learned—foregrounds the practice of reading that produces authority, and on which the whole system depends. That is why literature can provide such fertile ground for speculation on the nature of the system itself. (xviii, emphasis added)

Chambers' project is especially interesting as a way to think about literary texts and memory because it stages the ambivalent process of reading as an *oppositional* practice—at once personal and political, at once inherently subjective but resolutely social. For it is, in this view, within the reader's memory that the over-determinations of authority, that the processes of ideology, most subtly, and strongly, embed themselves. Authority, Chambers argues, "produces an effect on the hearer or reader that outlasts the original situation . . . and in the case of 'readability,' a narrative text achieves—in addition to this memorable quality of all narrative authority—a power similarly to affect a theoretically infinite series of *new* readers" (11). To refract the processes of subject and social formation through the divisive prism of language, then, to understand that "the language I speak is the language of the 'other'" (Chambers 105), is, in a word, to inhabit the complicitous and duplicitous process of discourse and, hopefully, to be open to being *changed* by it. This is how we begin to read and re-member ourselves as well as our cultural "others."

Chambers' project can be linked to the post-structural critique of metaphysics and the sort of "relational" or "anti-foundational" thinking that we have already touched on in the work of Stuart Hall or Robert Young; it also utilizes concepts from psychoanalytic theory to understand the complex relations between reading, desire, power, and subjection—concepts that intersect at countless points with the discourses of memory, as we have already noticed in Freud's memory paradigm, and, in different ways, in the work of Althusser and Foucault. To momentarily look ahead, we shall also notice such intersections with memory in the writings of Deleuze and Guattari and of Homi Bhabha—this last who, in his *relocation* of contemporary culture from the post-colonial perspective, develops such ideas as the "ambivalent," the "interstitial," and the "hybrid" to account for relational processes of cultural difference and for the indeterminate and unstable ("mediated," "tangled") conditions of subject and social formation that I read in this dissertation as effects of cultural memory. For Bhabha, the split or doubled nature of identification-as-representation does not affirm a "pregiven identity" (the Self-Same) but forces us to tactically locate the subject—to locate our selves and our "others"—in language. In doing so, we formulate a fragmentary or discontinuous model of culture that Bhabha imagines as interstitial, a series of over-lapping spaces in-between "us" and "them" (Location 43-4).

I shall return to these points below when I explore the linkages between cultural mnemonics and theory. To locate memory in discourse, within culture or the sign system of the social, is to locate the various operations of memory in-between the psyche and the social, in-between, we might say, Freud and Marx. Memory, like desire or dreams, is as protean as it is unstable and "unnatural"; yet memory, like History or Tradition, is also a material record or cultural inscription of what has gone before us, of experience. Perhaps, then, it is no more useful to try to isolate memory in one realm or the other—in the psyche or the social—than it would be to do the same thing with language or consciousness. As Marx himself says in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," trying to clear a political *and* psychic space for social change, trying to articulate a "new" temporality or sense of history, "The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare upon the brain of the living" (595). Critical methodologies and self-conscious concepts of knowledge and power such as Chambers' "oppositional," Foucault's "counter-memory," or Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's "molecular" memories or

"rhizomes"¹³ all in one way or another question this intersection of memory with the discourses of psychoanalysis and the social relations of production. Such projects question the febrile inheritance or conjured and crippling spirit of the "literal" or "reproduced" past and the way that it seems to persist, indelibly, and to determine behaviour, whether in the form of what Marx identifies as "tradition" or what Freud names the associative processes or effects of the "unconscious" or "Id," including "character, which is based in the memory-trace of our impression" (578).

We are once again, or still, on the threshold of memory. For it is our personal and cultural representations of the past that connect us to what we have been and, at least to a certain point, determine what we might become. A theory of cultural memory, we can say, studies memory's social frames and their effects on individual subjects, on behaviour. In this way, it is linked not only to Marx's science of history but also to Freud's bicameral art of memory—both "modern" attempts to re-present the past. It is also closely tied to Friedrich Nietzsche's pioneering work on morality and power, to his anti-foundational critique of metaphysics and memory at the end of the nineteenth century. Let us briefly consider Nietzsche.

As Freud was beginning to develop his *psychological* explanations of the human mind, Nietzsche was exploring the *cultural* conditions in which it existed and operated. Most important for my present purpose is Nietzsche's work on the development of a Western *conscience* or *memory*. In his *Untimely Meditations* (1873-76), particularly the essay "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life"¹⁴ (1874), and later in *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887), Nietzsche interrogates Western history and morality, advocating a revolutionary theory of the importance of *forgetting* to cultural mnemonics in his polemic versus history and versus the (ostensibly metaphysical) origin of "moral phenomena" (Kaufmann 10). This critique predates more properly postmodern configurations of the present-past, of cultural mnemonics, by almost a century, but it shares its basic concern with the persistence of the past and with consciousness and temporality as effects of *representation*. In addition, it makes clear the role of memory in the production of power and, ultimately, morality—what Nietzsche will call the Western *conscience*. "My formula for greatness in a human being," Nietzsche writes, aphoristically and with some irony, "is *amor fati*: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity" (*Ecce Homo* 258). Such a *timeless* being, Nietzsche imagines, refuses to be crushed by the weight of the past, and instead joyously affirms and accepts the responsibility of being in the present—a characteristically Nietzschean reversal and thinking beyond the traditional and

¹³ The "rhizome," Deleuze and Guattari argue, is a non-totalizing multiplicity, a playful and nomadic, deterritorialized and heterodox way of understanding linkages and connections; it is a line or path of rupture and transgression, of endless formation and reformation, an anti-genealogy, a place of plateaus (*A Thousand Plateaus* 3-25). "Man constitutes himself as a gigantic memory, through the position of a central point," write Deleuze and Guattari; he sees himself as a "molar" or "arborescent" entity that obliterates difference in order to erect an edifice, a logic, a self-resemblance at any cost (292-94). But "rhizomes" or "antimemory," the multi-linear points, the lines between which can be broken and reformed endlessly, counteract such delusory thinking: a "rhizome ceaselessly establishes connection between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles" (7). This epistemic and ethical model, as far as I can tell, seems especially well-suited to a semiological model of cultural memory; the rhizome is a kind of "short-term memory" that incorporates breaks, inscription and erasure, discontinuity, and forgetting, that enables writing and becoming, that resists the law of continuity (16).

¹⁴ "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life" (sometimes translated as "On the Use and Abuse of History for Life"; see Bové) and the three other essays familiar to us as *Untimely Meditations* originally appeared separately between 1873 and 1876; "Peter Gast" (Heinrich Köselitz) anthologized them in *Untimely Meditations* in 1893, four years after Nietzsche's mental breakdown at Turin (Stern x).

historicist morality of "good and evil" (*Will to Power* 12-13; 532-33), a "learning to will the past into the future" (Williams, *Confessional Fictions* 270). Of course, at this point Nietzsche's books were all "failures," his health was poor, and his stint as the Basel *Paedagogium* a "professional" disaster (Kaufmann 258n; Stern vii-viii), so we might well ask interesting questions about the *love of fate* as a mode of reconciling the past to the present.

Without stirring up too much dust off the tomes of Nietzsche criticism, and with the problematic of the past and of cultural memory in focus, I want to pause momentarily in this already lengthy Introduction to present some of the basic concepts from Nietzsche's writing on memory, concepts that serve both as cornerstones for this dissertation. When it comes to contemporary cultural memory, I think, all roads lead to Nietzsche. But first, let me state again that my use and abuse of Nietzsche's work is not intended to definitively explicate his ambivalent and often ironized writing on memory; nor is it to blithely affirm the desirability of forgetting. That is simply a misreading of Nietzschean mnemonics. Rather, I want to think of Nietzschean mnemonics as a clear-eyed and self-conscious interrogation of memory that insists, when it comes to memory and the present-past, no less than when it comes to language or knowledge or culture itself, we are perpetually entangled in it. Nietzsche's "perspectival" meditations thus underwrite my own descriptions of modern and postmodern mnemonics in what follows, not to mention underpin the larger critical project of post-structuralism and its discursive reconsiderations of the past.

In "Nietzsche's *Use and Abuse of History* and the Problems of Revision: 'Late-comers Live Truly an Ironical Existence,'" for example, Paul Bové argues that far from advocating an ahistorical amnesia Nietzsche provides "one of the most unrelenting excavations" of the self-reflexive "problems of 'revision,'" of "its power structures and epistemological contradictions" (3). Bové is arguing that Nietzsche's essay can be read as a defence of the (postmodern) tendency to revise the past, to self-consciously deconstruct and reconstruct it, according to the "needs" of the present. Bové is especially concerned with literary criticism and with the charge that postmodern theoretical discourse is formalist and autotelic, and hence moribund, not unlike the American New Criticism. This is not the case, Bové argues, since "the central initiatory discourses of Postmodernism—linguistics, Marxism, psychoanalysis, phenomenology—have aroused fluid, adaptive speculations in theory of literature and criticism" (12), speculation, I think, that occurs in-between what Bové calls "the 'nostalgia of tradition and the affirmations of freeplay'" (12). The postmodern tendency to *revise* or *represent* the past critically and with a "greater self-consciousness" can thus be understood in terms of the tropic "complexities of narrative, desire, and defense" [sic] (11) as modes of value-formation. This is, for Bové, one of the lessons Nietzsche has taught us: to think about how we make meaning while we seem to perpetually move—or while time seems to move through us—from the "it is" to what Nietzsche calls the "it was" ("Uses" 61). This process, perceived movement, for Nietzsche, this perceived and perspectival "remembering" and "forgetting," is always a representation, an interpretation, a text.

The discursive nature of knowledge and the *textual* nature of the past, Nietzsche insists, is one implication of the relational and anti-foundational life-affirming "will," which asks, relentlessly, and in the present, "what is this for me" (*Will to Power* 301). In the "Use and Disadvantages," Nietzsche outlines a kind of heroic "happiness" as one possible answer to this question: a happiness that is directly related to Nietzsche's revolutionary or revisionary mode of evaluation, to discourse, to a "new" form of consciousness and temporality possessed of what Nietzsche sees as the ability to remember and forget in a balanced and life-affirming manner. Nietzsche distinguishes between three different "species" ("Use and Disadvantages" 67) of memory or history—the antiquarian, the monumental, the critical (67-72)—and argues that it is only the latter that will permit the self-conscious (ironic) thinking of difference and displacement of the past in the present: a "will to power" that envisions the past as an endless deconstruction and reconstruction of the past, as Bové rightly claims, that allows men to gather the "strength to

break up and dissolve a part of the past" ("Uses" 75-6) and thus to forget it, to refuse the past as the "crown" or "fulfillment" of the present. We must read Nietzsche's anti-humanist epistemology in the context of the return of history as an enlightenment (positive) science and its cultural effects in Bismark's Germany, which only proved to Nietzsche that history must serve life, and not the other way around: "for it is possible to value the study of history to such a degree that life becomes stunted and degenerate—a phenomenon we are now forced to acknowledge, painful though this may be, in certain striking symptoms of our age" (59). Nietzsche goes on to remark on the colourlessness of German cities, on the privileging of science, and on the contradiction of form and content, amongst other things, that he sees as endemic in modern Germany; using Hellenic models (remembered from the past) he insists that a chronic nostalgia and disunified subjectivity have gripped his homeland, one result of which is a "merely decorative" (123) German culture. Nietzsche saw this as a coarsening of public life in Germany after the War of 1870 (Stern xiv), and a tendency to feel belated and overwhelmed by the past. "Man wonders at himself," writes Nietzsche,

that he cannot learn to forget but clings relentlessly to the past: however far and fast he may run, this chain runs with him. And it is a matter of wonder: a moment, now here then gone, nothing before it came, nothing after it has gone, nonetheless returns as a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment. . . . He who cannot sink down on the threshold of the moment and forget all the past, who cannot stand balanced like a goddess of victory without growing dizzy and afraid, will never know what happiness is—worse, he will never do anything to make others happy. ("Uses" 61)

We would not be far out of line to think of this chain as the chain of signification, or to remember that the rhetoric of "monumental" and "antiquarian" histories, in contrast to that of critical histories, is, in fact, organized into the structure of the romance, a social frame, we might say, that, as Bové points out, imposes order on the past in the form of cyclically repeated tradition: "always a projected image fulfilling the present and represented as a 'causal' or 'genetic' progression from a recuperable origin to the present end" (Bové 7-8).

Nietzsche rejects such teleological, such mythic and religious models or knowledges. According to Hayden White, Nietzsche

hated history even more than he hated religion. History promoted a debilitating voyeurism in men, made them feel that they were latecomers in a world in which everything worth doing had already been done, and thereby undermined the impulse to heroic exertion that might give a peculiarly human, if only transient, meaning to an absurd world. The sense of history was the product of a faculty which distinguished man from the animal, namely memory, also the source of conscience. History had to be "seriously hated" . . . if human life itself were not to die in the senseless cultivation of those vices which a false morality, based on memory, induced in men. (Tropics 32)

For Nietzsche, history is never an end in and of itself; it possesses no transcendent pattern or meaning other than its repeatability and to live as if it did is to make the past into a petty tyrant and to *devalue* the present, to make it into a perpetual paralysis, a belatedness, a time of personal and cultural dis-ease. As Nietzsche claims, this is the logic of passivity, of the "herd"; in contrast, Nietzsche advocates an active forgetting, of choosing-to-forget that is a "joyful" and "heroic" model for subject and social formation: "Forgetting," Nietzsche writes, "is essential to action of any kind"; it is "possible to live almost without memory, and to live happily moreover . . . but it is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting" (62). Such a nostalgia amounts to what Nietzsche calls "*a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal to the living thing, whether this living thing be a man, a people or a culture*" (62).

Of course, the extent to which we must forget the past and deconstruct "false" or "coarse" morality is a crucial question, and Nietzsche equivocates on that point. Nietzsche's "forgetting" is, in one sense, at the same time a curious "remembering" of the classical past—of the

"beautiful" and the "good," of the unified and composed, of the "pre-existing" and "noble" values of Hellenic culture. As J. P. Stern points out,

Katyn, Auschwitz, the Japanese massacres of Hong Kong are the stigmata of our experience of 'critical history.' Listing them, are we not moving into an area of the politics of violence beyond Nietzsche's ken? We cannot be sure. For here we come face to face with an ambivalence that is entirely characteristic of his thinking at such danger points. Endowed with a powerful imagination that functions in unpredictable ways, he does undoubtedly envisage some of the consequences inherent in the planned obsolescence of the past. Every present . . . is founded in past crimes. The suppression of such knowledge must be faced for the sake of a healthy national culture and life. (xvi)

Yet if Nietzsche's model of cultural memory seems to pave the way for an heroic individualism and a problematic aestheticism (romanticism), it nonetheless clears a space for a theory of cultural mnemonics as a mode of *critical* thinking in which we can study the deconstruction and reconstruction of the past as discourse, including the ultimately moral or ethical dimensions of memory in the present, and the importance of choice or selection in how we use the past. As Nietzsche explains, such critical thought is an attempt to

confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge of it, and through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away. It is an attempt to give oneself, as it were *a posteriori*, a past in which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which one did originate: —always a dangerous attempt . . . ("Uses" 76)

This, it seems to me, is one of the fundamental habits of self-reflexive thinking, of the post-modern theoretical discourses, of *that important postmodern question: how exactly is it that we come to know the past?* Man, Nietzsche insists, must learn to mediate his remembering and forgetting, to organize his present temporality and to (ironically) oppose the illusions of truth and certainty—what Marx called the nightmarish "weight" of the past. For only in doing so will he learn to understand the phrase "it was": that password which gives conflict, suffering and satiety access to man so as to remind him what his existence fundamentally is—an imperfect tense that can never become a perfect one. If death at least brings desired forgetting, by that act it at the same time extinguishes the present and all being and therewith sets the seal on the knowledge that being is only an uninterrupted has-been, a thing that lives by negating, consuming and contradicting itself. (61)

Nietzsche goes on to outline a mode of "strenuous" and *willful* happiness in which "historical" and "ahistorical" action or living are balanced, in which remembering and forgetting are basic conditions of individual and, by extension, cultural life. That is, it is only when man-the-historian or man-the-philosopher is able to forget, to be in-between, that the life-affirming and self-creative interplay of the discontinuous and of the differential can occur.¹⁵ This is where memory is so crucial to our understanding; as Gayatri Spivak notes, "through the network of shifting values, we begin to glimpse the complexity of the act of *choosing* forgetfulness" (Spivak, Translator's Preface xxxi). Of course, Spivak points out that nothing is ever as it seems in Nietzsche's texts, and that even the choice of an "active forgetting"¹⁶ is characteristically ambivalent: indeed,

¹⁵ The geneticist and cultural critic David Suzuki writes in "Back to the Future: Is This the World We Want?" that the human subject is poised between the past and the future: "[a] unique trait of our species, and one that is critical for our survival, has been our ability to reflect backward on times past in order to understand how we got here, and to project our thoughts ahead into the future to see where we may be heading. Even though we are fixed in the reality of the present, our imagination enables us to roam across time and to use that capacity to learn from the past" (42).

¹⁶ As Spivak notes, "the joyous affirmative act of forgetfulness is also a deliberate act of repression," a forgetting that makes the always unstable and "nowhere isolatable" present possible and

Nietzschean mnemonics pivot upon such in-between acts of affirmation and denial, of deletion and legibility, of determinacy and indeterminacy that, as Spivak explains, will eventually underwrite the projects of Heideggerian and Derridean deconstruction. As Nietzsche puts it, such a model of memory "is a parable for each one of us" insofar as man

must organize the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs. His honesty, the strength and truthfulness of his character, must at some time or other rebel against a state of things in which he only repeats what he has heard, learns what is already known, imitates what already exists; he will then begin to grasp that culture can be something other than a *decoration of life*, that is to say at bottom no more than dissimulation and disguise. ("Uses" 123)

It should not be an especially outrageous claim to state that a semiological theory of how cultures remember the past is indebted to Nietzschean mnemonics, as briefly as I have covered that subject here. Like Nietzsche's category of "critical history," cultural memory involves a "thinking back" that is self-reflexive, a meditation on how cultures and the "individuals" that comprise them *make meaning* in the present. This process is the reverse of the paralytic and decorative, of the patriotic and chauvinistic, of the authoritarian and ethnocentric—the ethos that Nietzsche recognized and despised in his countrymen and women. Curiously, as Andreas Huyssen argues in *Twilight Memories*, some of the same tendencies have resurfaced a century later in the "memory boom" in Germany in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most obviously in the debates about national identity and in the political questions that have collected around the event of German reunification and of the proposed European unification (fortification), a fact that Huyssen attributes in *Twilight Memories* to the conservative aspects of the "*kulturkampf*" (culture wars). Perhaps this should not be surprising: as Huyssen recognizes, "The discourses of race and nation are never very far apart"; the concept of nation "never functions alone, but in relation to other signifiers in a semantic chain including patriotism and chauvinism, civic spirit and ethnocentrism, democracy and authoritarianism, constitutional rights and xenophobic exclusions" (71).

Such concepts, such *resentment* and hatred, it hardly needs to be said, have deep roots. In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche broadens his criticism of the German national past and sacrosanct historicism and traces the connections between morality and memory. Nietzsche writes against a chronic transcendentalizing of remembering-as-conscience in the West, one that he claims begins in the experiential or wounded (sacrificial and suffering) body but that ends up translated into the human *conscience*, the history of which is a slave morality. Central to Nietzsche's argument about the genealogy of morals in the West is the close connection between memory and *pain*; according to Nietzsche, pain has been an especially effective mnemonic in social history: "If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory—this is the main clause of the oldest (unhappily also the most enduring) psychology on earth" (61). Memory, Nietzsche insists, is caught up in an economy of wounded and suffering bodies and all manner of self-hatred, not to mention a reluctance to spend the mental energy demanded by "critical" or self-conscious thinking:

Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices of the first born among them), the most repulsive mutilations (castration, for example), the cruelest

desirable. "Nietzsche's work is the unreconciled playground of this 'knowledge' and this 'forgetfulness,' the establishment of the knowledge (that presents all knowing as mere symptom) as convincing as the voice of forgetfulness (that gives us the most memorable prophecy). The most common predicament in the reading of Nietzsche is to defeat oneself in the effort to establish a coherence between the two. But the sustaining of the incoherence, to make the two poles in a curious way interdependent,—that is Nietzsche's superb trick" ("Translator's Preface" xxxii).

rites of all religious cults (and all religions are at the deepest level systems of cruelties)—all this has its origins in the instinct that realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics. (*Genealogy* 61)

To counter such fearful and powerful "memories," such painful but politically useful representations, Nietzsche argues, it will take great strength; to exist in such a way one must learn to forget—to repudiate the past, as the moderns put it—and to live fully in a present in which human potential is not hamstrung by tradition or the "science" of history, not to mention religious systems. Of course, the past Nietzsche has in mind here is Judeo-Christian, that which he claims has produced the negative and resentful, the inverted and slavish "herd" mentality and "democratic" values of modern European man (*Will to Power* 501); in contrast, Nietzsche posits the heroic, the noble, and the good; these are the life-affirming values of classical Greece and Rome, of "great men" who ostensibly possess the power to forget that they, too, have been determined by the past. As Terdiman explains, Nietzsche projected the "radical obliteration" of the past "in the consciousness of a new human being with the strength to forget the past" (*Present Past* 51); to put this in other words, Nietzsche projected a "new human being" with the strength to "will" change, to accept its fate, to face its own inability to stop time, its own meaninglessness; such a being would, nonetheless, possess the power to interrogate itself, its own deepest convictions and beliefs, its emotions and ethics, its knowledges and memories, even its language.

In this way, we can say that a self-reflexive Nietzsche embodies the "art and power of forgetting" (120) as an antidote to the calcified mode of "historical" living typified by the values of the "eternal," the "changeless," the "universal," the "traditional" (120-21). These are the values that Nietzsche would have "great men" *re-value*. Of course, this is only one half of a surprising story: as Nietzsche concedes, we must be able to "forget at the right time" as well as "remember at the right time"; "the unhistorical [forgetting] and the historical [remembering] are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people, of a culture" (63). Such a subjective and civic model, such a configuration of "ideology and habituated practice" (Terdiman, *Present Past* 48), forces us to confront the past in the present, but moreso, I think, to confront the present in the present. Terdiman calls this the Nietzschean "hypercontrariety," an attitude that might not result in, say, Marx's social revolution but that nonetheless projects a new consciousness grounded, ultimately, in language. As Terdiman continues, in "the Nietzschean attitude, the denial of the past and the crisis of representation reveal themselves as coterminous, as the inseparable recto and verso of a historical page that Nietzsche wished once for all to turn. But through this work of denial the determinations of the representation problem emerge into our own theoretical memory" (52).

It is this emergence of memory into language or of the problem of representation into "our own theoretical memory" that most clearly establishes the need for the cultural or semiological analyses of memory in the postmodern period. My project, in one view, picks up where Terdiman leaves off in his analysis of the modern "memory crisis" at the end of *Present Past*. For Terdiman, the postmodern seems to be a time in which the disturbances of memory and the feelings of crisis that plagued the moderns are displaced by the sheer volume of the past as re-presented in the media—a proliferation of "dull facticity" that modulates the "enigma of the past" or temporality through the information technologies that make its retention increasingly technical and eventually "indistinguishable from the experience of the representations by which and within which we live" (358). In this "new" world, we call upon memory to slow time down, to anchor it, as Huyssen argues, in places like museums or monuments. Huyssen calls this the postmodern "marking of time" (3) in which the "indescribable catastrophes" and "ferocious hopes" (2) of the "global

postmodern" are stabilized and examined not as crises but as a time of "twilight memory"¹⁷: a mode of memory that is neither amnesiac nor nostalgic but more "in-between"; an era in which "waning generational memory" intersects with the hypermnnesia of high-speed electronic information technologies. When this occurs, Huyssen suggests, we can, following Nietzsche, perceive the past as representation, a form of discourse, and study it as a function not of loss or degeneration but of cultural semiosis—as one of the most basic modes of meaning-making and thus a "powerful stimulant for cultural and artistic creativity" (3).

Terdiman sees this global and postmodern model of memory in less positive and hence partly nostalgic terms: "the time line appears to turn definitively circular and eventually to diffuse altogether. Then memory and its problem seem almost to disappear" (35). But nothing could be further from the truth, I will suggest; instead, memory and its components—temporality, representation, consciousness, language—do not disappear but simply shift registers or valences in the postmodern period. That is, they change their functions and habits; they "upgrade" their operating systems to reflect technological and epistemological transformations in the social realm. Memory in the postmodern period is no less a concern than it was for the modern period: in fact, I will say that memory is one of the questions, one of the perennial and irreconcilable problems that cuts closest to what it means to be human, to exist in time and in social spaces, and to inscribe value and use language in an admittedly bewildering—at times *amnesiac* but no less *anamnesiac*—postmodern present. It is not that memory, much less the past, has disappeared; rather, the ways that we "know" the past and name it have become different.

This claim is not especially original. But my fundamental move here is to foreground the question of cultural memory as a mode of *representation*. From the point of view of cultural mnemonics, there are certainly differences between a Hollywood film and cave paintings at Uluru. But these, and other, forms of cultural mnemonics or acts of cultural inscription are attempts to re-present cultural information about the past. To culturally re-member. To transfer and translate meaning across time. Such acts *defer* meaninglessness or oblivion. And although digital electronic charges "stored" in silicon chips or photographic images "recorded" in light-sensitive emulsion on plastic film or grooves carved in rock surfaces are radically different, what is more important, for my purposes, is the claim that they function in similar ways, that they do similar work: the "art" of inscription, whether the memory-image or linguistic sign, the painted line or printed text, is a fundamental technology by which individuals and cultures remember, through which they "stabilize" or "fix" meaning in the present. In fact, and this is the most abstract level of my argument, the process of inscription that we use to explain memory-as-palimpsest is analogous to the process that we talk about when we talk about language and writing, about signification and representation, about sound-images and semiology. In other words, this is the process of *fixing information in time*, on surfaces or texts that seem to resist the irreversibility of temporality or duration and in doing so promise to "outlast" both the writer and the reader of the memory-text. If the technologies by which cultures "inscribe" or "encode" their pasts themselves change with time, as they obviously do, it seems fair to say that cultural interest in the past—whether it is an interest in repudiating the past or recovering it—is consistent from generation to generation, despite such technological changes.

I am predominantly concerned with literary texts—especially the novel—as sites of cultural memory in this thesis. But in order to understand the emergence of memory into "our own" literary and theoretical imaginations I approach the subject of memory from two different vantage points in what follows: one "theoretical," one "literary." In Section One, which bears the rather auspicious, and ambitious, name "Cultural Memory: In Theory," I tentatively trace some of

¹⁷ "Twilight is that moment of the day that foreshadows the night of forgetting, but that seems to slow itself, an in-between state in which the last light of the day may still play out its ultimate marvels. It is memory's privileged time" (Huyssen 3).

the linkages between memory and its emergence in what Jameson usefully identifies as postmodernism's "theoretical discourse" (*Postmodernism* xvi, 218)—which includes, according to Jameson, post-structuralism. I begin by prying apart the terms "culture" and "memory" in order to anatomize each concept. In one view, the two abstract terms act like similarly charged poles of two magnets and seem to repel each other, to dodge critical efforts to link them together; but they also behave like oppositely charged poles and seem to attract each other, and to pull toward themselves related concepts that deal with the representation of the always already absent past, such as temporality, language, and consciousness, as well as the novel and even the nation.

Chapter One is entitled "Culture," and in it I survey some of the contemporary critical models of culture, beginning with Raymond Williams' "cultural materialism" and ending with Homi Bhabha's differential or discursive model of cultural translation and cultural hybridity. I proceed with an eye toward explaining how we can conceive of culture as a contestual and performative space—a field of struggle and of value in which we must locate the semiological activities of memory and language. What links "culture" and "memory" together most obviously for my purposes, I argue, is *representation*—the idea that culture itself is the sign-system of the social and that the representation problem is "nothing less than how a culture imagines the representation of the past to be possible, for the problem of representing the past is really the representation problem itself, seized at its most critical locus" (Terdiman, *Present Past* 32). If we can say that social being determines consciousness" (75), as Raymond Williams does in *Marxism and Literature*, we still might wonder how the internal aspects of consciousness are determined by the external forces of the social. A theory of cultural memory, however, avoids the idea of a "collective" group mind that is implicit in Halbwachs' model and insists that the social impacts in culture *through* the mechanisms or materiality of the sign and the matrices and chains of signification. We can thus avoid separating the material from the immaterial, the base from the superstructure. As I will say more than once in what follows, language and memory are inseparable; we speak and remember in the *un-settled* and *in-between* space of culture.

I then proceed in "Memory," the next chapter, to follow up some of the implications of this argument, to explore some of memory's "theoretical" history—the critical models and categories that have been used to "explain" memory—and to further interrogate the idea that a theory of cultural memory such as the one I want to interrogate and advance in this dissertation is a *postmodern* mode for understanding the relationship of the past to the present, for "organizing temporality" or "marking time," and for understanding what we mean when we talk about a past that is forever out of reach but that, nonetheless, is palpable and powerful in its countless forms as textual traces. To locate memory in culture and to test the linkages of memory to theory is to foreground semiological questions about codes and competences, to approach memory from the perspective of the sign, and to reject outright as essential and nostalgic models of memory that are based upon organic or metaphysical premises. Memory, as I will show utilizing particularly the medieval memory models advanced by Mary Carruthers and the critique of postmodern cultural mnemonics developed by John Frow, always has been a matter of representation, of *inscription* or *writing*. Central to these questions about discursive relations, from the perspective of cultural mnemonics, is the assertion that the mechanics of representation and the *technical* art of writing link the sign-systems of language to the processes of cultural memory: like language and other systems of signification that make up the symbolic structures and codes of a particular culture, cultural inscriptions can be studied as a "semiotics," as a set of rules that governs signification, as what Jonathan Culler calls the "distinctions and conventions that enable objects and activities to have meaning" (25). Memory, I will venture, is the locus, the *sine qua non* of such meaning-making.

I begin this chapter with a brief consideration of the history of memory. Utilizing Terdiman's work on modernity's memory crisis and Frow's critique of the social organization of time in the postmodern, and bringing to bear the work of critics such as Hayden White on discourse, Linda Hutcheon on postmodernism, Fredric Jameson on the ostensibly "amnesiac"

cultural logic of late-capitalism, and Renate Lachmann on *intertextuality* as a model of cultural memory, I consider memory and the problem of the past from a theoretical point of view. My purpose is to set up a critical framework for understanding cultural memory as a distinctly modern but especially postmodern response to the past and its discursive persistence. Such a project, of course, is immediately faced with the limitations of time and space, and I do not pretend to do much more than scratch the surface of these debates: my assessments of the arguments made by Frow, Hutcheon, and Jameson, as well as of Jean-François Lyotard and Robert Young, for example, hardly exhaust the critical literature on memory nor fully represent what we might call "postmodern" positions on cultural mnemonics. But I take the work of these critics to represent some of the most important and interesting critical debates about how we know the past and hence "culturally" remember or forget. With no false modesty, I confess that my reading of this impressive and erudite scholarship is little more than a palimpsestic sketch.

My argument is that memory plays a central if submerged role in every act of representation, in the mechanisms that govern the formation and circulation of signs, whether in literary intertexts or cultural theories: meaning is tied to memory just as memory is tied to meaning. Terdiman puts it this way in the context of his reading of Freud: "the problems of memory and of interpretation . . . are indissociable" (*Present Past* 296). In Freud's memory paradigm, as I have already said, the unconscious *stores* literal images of the past, whereas the conscious can only represent the past in the present through images that must be interpreted through memory "effects" which always mean something else; hence the modern "art of memory" or Freudian psychoanalysis and its two dominant foci—one which Terdiman terms *maieutics*, the other interpretation or *hermeneutics*. In Freud's model, there is an inherent tension between the unconscious reproduction of the past or "memory" and conscious interpretations of the past or "hermeneutics." For Freud, Terdiman claims, we need hermeneutics precisely because memory fails, because we can remember "too well" or "too much," or not at all:

In such cases interpretation is how we choose between the profusion of possible contents that present themselves for credence even as they mutually subvert the competing claims each makes to faithfulness [reproduction] and undermine the reliability of the faculty that has perversely produced them, helter-skelter, in our consciousness. (297)

I consider Freud's "modern" art of memory in some detail in this chapter since it sets the stage, I think, for an understanding of just how important memory is to the processes of (cultural and individual) meaning-making, to social signification. The basic dilemma that Freud tried to reconcile and that Terdiman recognizes in the context of modern Europe's memory crisis is a crisis of cultural value and meaning, which translates in Freud's model to a problem of *temporality*, of permanence and impermanence: the mnemonic linkages that once tied Europeans to their pasts, and hence made their presents "meaningful" and transparent, such as Tradition or History or Religion, in the modern era have become strained, and in some cases severed. Social theorists and scientists in the nineteenth century explained this "crisis" by constructing new models of time, of man, and of social organization; psychoanalysts, for example, tried to "read" (to construct or reconstruct) the slippage between permanently preserved unconscious memories and the impermanent re-presented interpretations of the unconscious in the conscious system of the analysand: it is the irreversibility and the inevitability of change or "The determined productivity of time [that] thus converts mnemonics into hermeneutics" (298). Or, in other words, the subject is translated into language, into discourse, a translation, I think, that critical theory in the twentieth century is still sorting out. Thus Terdiman can conclude: "The Memory crisis was never a complication to be *solved*. It was always a disquiet about origins, and arose in a sudden opacity of the relation between *then* and *now*. With the perturbation of the past, even memory recedes. The memory crisis could be understood as an instantiation of itself" (298).

I explore this idea, and others, in the context of Freudian mnemo-analysis and Terdiman's theory of the modern memory crisis: "not only remembering means changing in Freud: *meaning* means changing too. The fundamental interpretive rule of psychoanalysis thus is:

everything is transformed, everything requires interpretation. No psychic content gives itself to us unmediated; none carries transparent significance" (300). We could say that this is the fundamental interpretive rule of post-structuralism; that if psychoanalysis is a modern art of memory, if the transformations and transferences it studies "centre in memory" (300) and its contents, then the semiological analysis of language and culture is a postmodern art of memory, of the *hermeneutic* activity of "non-transparent representation" (297) and of the mediated world of discourse. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of this anti-foundational model is the apparent tautology that language exists, in part, in the subject's memory, and that the subject of memory, somehow, exists in language—in the structures and pathways that organize the human mind, but also in the words we speak and in the words that have been spoken by our ancestors, in the signs we inscribe on various surfaces.

I end this rather lengthy chapter on memory with a brief reading of what I assert is an example of *postmodern* cultural mnemonics from Thomas Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49*, a novel, I will argue, that clearly frames the problem of postmodern cultural mnemonics as a problem of representation, of meaning-making. *Lot 49* acts as a textual paradigm for my own critical readings of memory literature in Section Two. I could just as well have read the *post-colonial* problems of slavery and "rememory," as Sethe puts it in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*,¹⁸ or of the "pickled" colonial past in Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children*,¹⁹ but Pynchon's text

¹⁸ Morrison's text "embodies" the personal and political horrors of American slavery—infanticide, rape, racism—as a "rememory" of the colonial past, as a ghost that literally haunts the amnesiac and racially fragmented "society" of post-civil war America. Some readers are surprised to learn that *Beloved* revises, or perhaps, put better, responds to, historical texts—to a set of intertexts which themselves deal with the "actual" past. See Ashraf Rushdy's "Daughters Signifying History: The Example of Toni Morrison's *Beloved*." As a memory-text, *Beloved* invokes a horrible endgame, an unforgettable zero-sum contest in which no one wins and in which those who survive are destroyed by the past. But a slippage occurs in the narrative present, one that un-settles the determinants of the past (slavery, infanticide, sexism). Sethe is "haunted" by her infanticide, just as she is haunted by the brutality and dehumanization of institutionalized slavery at Sweet Home Plantation. But through this haunting, this rememory, she is able to break the cycles of violence and pain that have circumscribed her life: Denver, finally, is able to symbolically and actually "leave" 124. Through Sethe's rememories, Morrison projects an alternative way to think through the past in the present, one that re-writes the linear chronology of Western historiography and its clinical division into past, present, and future. Morrison seems to favour instead a non-chronological "now" that does not causally attach to "then." Morrison thus un-settles the (racist, sexist) present by challenging traditional epistemological and chronological boundaries—a sense of being that is in touch with both the past and the present, and in which "nothing ever dies" (36). As Sethe puts it: "I was talking about time. It's hard for me to believe in it. Some things go. Pass on. Some things stay. I used to think it was my rememory. You know. Some things you forget. Other things you never do. But it's not. Places, places are still there. If a house burns down, it's gone, but the place—the picture of it—stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there, in the world. . . . outside my head" (35-6).

¹⁹ Rushdie's *Midnight's Children*, which interrogates the importance of the past and the power of cultural memory, is a novelistic history addressed to "a nation of forgetters" (37). Rushdie refracts the past through a (parodic and Proustian) prism of "involuntary memory," one that is not activated by *petites madeleine*s but preserved in vats of pickles. Rushdie's comic account of Saleem Sinai's "chutnification of history" and attempted "pickling of time" (459), however, belies the sober history of a nation that, indeed, as Rushdie prophetically but sadly puts it in the last sentence of his 1981 novel, has been "unable to live or die in peace" (463). Saleem, a child of Indian Independence, pickles the past in order to one day force feed it to his countrymen and women; his vats full of cultural memories "include memories, dreams, ideas, so that once they enter mass-production all who consume will know what pepperpots achieved in Pakistan, or how it felt to be in the Sundarbans. . . . Thirty jars stand upon a shelf, waiting to be unleashed upon an amnesiac nation" (460). For Saleem, "To pickle is to give immortality . . . to give it shape and form—that is to say, meaning" (461).

asks us to think about cultural memory and computers—about postmodern cultural mnemonics and technology in the age of “accelerated” cultural production and consumption, in an era of “digital” silicon memory: “zeroes and ones” (181). To be sure, both Morrison’s “embodied” past and Rushdie’s “pickled” representations of the past are important instances of post-colonial cultural mnemonics; but I want to look closely at inscription *in relation to* technology. No less than the ways writing and then print transformed the way cultures remember, technologies such as the phonograph, the camera (including video), and the electronic digit seem to “fix” an “instant” of time in ways that will no doubt transform how postmodern cultures remember and forget their pasts, the ways that they will make and re-make meaning, the ways that they will “see” themselves and their others.²⁰ The heroine of *Lot 49*, Oedipa Mass, has embarked upon a conventional enough quest, but her goal seems to elude her: we might say it is endlessly deferred. *Lot 49* thus stages a kind of postmodern attempt to apprehend the past, to invest it with meaning in the post-industrial or late-capitalist, in the narcotic and fashionably neurotic “present” of Pynchon’s central California in the 1960s. For my purposes, this roughly means that Oedipa’s struggle in the narrative is, quite literally, to remember; she must find that balance of remembering and forgetting, of meaning and meaninglessness, that Nietzsche prescribes for “happiness.” What is especially prescient, I think, about Pynchon’s 1965 novel is the role played by computers: the combinations of “zeroes” and “ones” and the cultural transformations that this form of inscription will produce and that Oedipa and her generation must learn to “read.” As a paradigmatic *postmodern* subject-of-memory, Oedipa repeats the following phrase like a mantra: “I am meant to remember” (118). In an age of “placeless” silicon archives and hypertexts, such as our own, the question of the persistence of the past into the present is, I think, all the more pressing. What parts of the past are we *meant* to remember? To forget?

This is roughly the question that I apply to two Australian novels in Section Two, which I have termed “Cultural Memory in Literature.” I change both my focus and method in this section and set out to “read” memory in two paradigmatic post-colonial texts from the settler-invader society of Australia: Peter Carey’s 1985 novel *Illywhacker* and David Malouf’s 1993 *Remembering Babylon*. This archive is admittedly slight: it has next to nothing to do with cybernetic technologies and is not meant to represent post-colonial writing (much less settler-invader writing or even settler-invader novels from Australia) in any way. Its most obvious subjects-of-memory, if you will, are two white, European male bodies—bodies that, perhaps curiously, have suffered a good deal of abuse and degeneration *in time*. But this archive nonetheless underscores the inexorable problem of the past and hence memory in postmodern and post-colonial literature. As I attempt to explain in a short Introduction to Section Two, Australia possesses a distinct mnemonic economy: like most of the places that have been colonized by European countries, Australia has a lot to remember and a lot to forget, by which I mean the exploitations and injustices of colonization, which might range from a racist sense of cultural inferiority to the genocide of Australian Aborigines and the obliteration (and more recently the commodification for tourism) of their complex systems of cultural mnemonics—most notably,

²⁰ “The photograph,” writes Marita Sturken, developing the argument made by Roland Barthes in *Camera Lucida*, “achieves its moment of certitude in its evidence of death, its capacity to conjure the presence of the absent one”; “the photograph appears to hold memory in place and to offer a means to retrieve an experience of the past” (*Tangled Memories* 23, 19). Sturken’s point is that this literal reproduction is only part of the mnemonic economy of the photographic image: she cites evidence such as the Zapruder film, the Challenger disaster, the television coverage of the Gulf War(s), and the video footage of the Rodney King beating as evidence of how photographic images seem to *reproduce* the *national* past when in fact, like all representations of the absent past, they re-construct them. For a brief discussion of the photograph, of photographic representation, and of the idea of “arresting” time in a photograph, see notes 1, 3, and 9 to Chapter One (264-5).

the Dreaming. But the cultural production of "White" Australia cannot be understood fully without "remembering" the history of convict transportation, the fact that between 1788 and 1868, 163,000 or so British convicts were transported to Australia in what Robert Hughes calls the "largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history" (*The Fatal Shore* 2). For Hughes, as we shall see, "space itself was the jail" (596) in Australia, and until recently a "national pact of silence" (xii) surrounded this ignoble *penal-colonial* moment of origin.

Efforts to "remember" or "represent" the national past in Australia are, of course, complex and contentious. For critics such as Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra, for example, Australia's European origin as a penal colony, along with its displacements and erasures of Australian Aboriginal culture, only served to compound and deepen the sense of cultural unease and illegitimacy that comprises the "dark secret of Australian consciousness" (xvi). Hodge and Mishra call this cultural neurosis, this memory pathology, a kind of national schizophrenia: a set of "paranoid" "double" messages that undercut the social meanings of Australia (xv, 216-18). My reading into memory in *Illywhacker* and *Remembering Babylon*—two novels in which I will argue memory is foregrounded both as "content" and as "means"²¹—asserts that this unease is a problem of cultural memory. One of the fundamental lessons of studying the past through the lens of cultural memory is that the past cannot be re-presented without stirring up ghosts, without linking the "actual" but absent past to the parameters and meanings and concerns within which it must be located and interpreted in the "present." To say the least, the commemorative moment of 1988 and its mnemonic reversals and revisions have been well studied: I will not contribute much to that discussion. But its fictional treatment, I think, its discursive purchase and ambivalences, its concerns and complications, its representations and interpretations, are carefully staged and can thus be read in both *Illywhacker*, which was published in 1985, and *Remembering Babylon*, which was published in 1993. What is it that Australians are "meant" to remember? Who decides what Australians should forget?

These are fundamental questions about cultural memory and, in a different way, of post-colonialism. In both *Illywhacker* and *Remembering Babylon*, the past is a problem: both texts frame the temporal or *postmodern* question of 1988 as much as they frame the *post-colonial* question of what to remember and what to forget about the colonial past. Perhaps this is not surprising. As Stephen Slemon writes, "'post-colonialism'—whatever else it is—functions in the academy as a political analysis of *what to do* about the 'problem' of colonialism both as a structure of historical power and as a debate within 'theory'" ("Scramble" 25). The question of cultural memory, I think, touches on both aspects of these debates as debates about the relation of the past to the present—the critical analysis of the historical structure and specific locations of colonialism and the critical analysis of the "troubled" field of colonial discourse. Somewhere in-between these two projects a critical and self-conscious model of cultural memory and post-colonialism must be located, one that can read into the imperial past and its political and economic apparatuses but also, as Hall has wisely argued, into the discursive machinery that make empires possible. It is a "profound" and "disabling" failure of "theorisation," as Hall suggests, to think these two modes of thinking the past—economist, discourse analysis—can ever be separated; to do so is to "enable much weaker and less conceptually rich paradigms to continue to flourish and dominate the field" ("When Was 'The Post-Colonial'?" 258).

In "Carceral Architecture and Cultural Amnesia," I consider Carey's novel and its carceral architecture as sites of memory, as memory-texts that ask readers to think about Australia's penal-colonial past and its persistence into the present as a *carceral unconscious*—an unforgettable past that conscripts Carey's Australians so thoroughly that they willingly consent to

²¹ These terms are Richard Terdiman's; they denote the double nature of memory in literary writing as both a thematic and a mode of interrogating the "present past" (26).

their own imprisonment at the hands of their latest, multi-national gaolers. Carey's excavation of the effects of the prison (as a kind of "monumental" architecture) on the personal and national identity and on the inadequacy of cultural amnesia in Australia is thus a demythologization of the national past and a remembering of difference and of discontinuity. In "Cultural Memory and 'In-between Creatures,'" I press my analysis of Australian cultural memory and literature one step further by reading Malouf's novel as a meditation on the epistemological and ontological links between Europe and colonial Australia and on the mnemonic economy of settler-invader societies.

The penal history of Australia is not Malouf's central concern in *Remembering Babylon*; rather, he explores the "in-between" or liminal position of a young ship-wrecked European boy and the (paranoid) cultural effects of his return to a settler-invader community. When Gemmy Fairley, who spends 16 years with Australian Aborigines in Queensland in the mid-nineteenth century, returns to white society his reception is un-settling in several ways; most obviously, he disturbs the cultural memories of the Europeans whose connection to their past is, at best, as tenuous as it is delusive—no more nor less "superstitious" than the belief systems of the "blacks" who surround the settlement and whose presence, and absence, whose unknown and unknowable value-systems, *haunt* the newly transplanted settler-invaders. This disturbance becomes the interstitial occasion for Malouf to fictionally interrogate the values and beliefs of the "transported" colonial society and the potentially "hybrid" consciousness of those (few) Europeans who are open to colonial encounter in the in-between space of the settlement, bordered as it is, on the one hand, by "darkness" and "savagery," and on the other, by "light" and "civilization." Malouf reads the ambivalences and indeterminacies generated by the return of this "repressed" European body and of the English language as translatable and "new" hybrid "signs"—signs that circulate through the social space of the community and in doing so "un-settle" colonial cultural memory.

This is some of the territory that I navigate in the following dissertation; these are some of the questions that I circle around. They form several of the parameters within which I will maneuver²² as I set out to think through some of the linkages between cultural memory and theory and attempt to "weave" together my own memory-text. In one view, these questions each point toward, or flow from, the *problematic of the past*, what Terdiman has adroitly designated as the "present past": that which precedes us but still preoccupies us (*Present Past* vii). But they also point into the future—into revisions of the *order of things* and habituated practices, of the myriad ways that power both resists change and can be contested. In order to begin to explore these questions, and others, in order to stake out some of the theoretical ground that a discussion of cultural memory must cover, I focus on one central problem: how memory is understood to be an attribute of culture, and how this move can be seen as an attempt to establish and understand the interrelationship of the past and the present in the postmodern period—a secular and technical "organization" of time, to use John Frow's term, that rejects (modern) ideas of "the present as pure presence" and the sort of nostalgic "narrative teleology that relegates real history and the time of lived experience to a time before representation and the mass-mediated spectacle" (*Time and Commodity Culture* 4, 11). At the same time, as I have already stated earlier, such a move affirms a more ambivalent, "in-between" understanding of the postmodern present that is at once critical and self-reflexive, that refuses "epochal coherence" (Frow 8) and totalizing unities but

²² I use this term to acknowledge an ongoing intellectual debt to, and inspiration derived from, Ross Chamber's *Room For Maneuver*. I would also point out that the etymology of the term "maneuver" derives from the Latin *manus* ("hand") and *operari* ("to work"), and arrives at its contemporary meaning through the Anglo-French *maymoverer* and Old French *manouvrier* ("to manure").

that is perhaps not quite as incoherent nor constitutively vague as the "postmodern" seems to be in Frow's polemic. We stand on the threshold of the "present," *in-between* the "past" and the "future," wondering, as Stephen Kern explains in his discussion of the measurement of time in Europe and of Wilhelm Wundt's 1880 experiments, "what constitutes the instant or present." ²³

If the interval of the present is so difficult to locate in time or space, and no less difficult to "name," perhaps we can begin to see this as a problem of the relation of consciousness to memory, of memory to temporality, of temporality to representation, of language to time, of "now" to "then." These are some of the dimensions of the memory questions that I consider in the following dissertation: questions I raise in my discussion of memory and theory and memory and literature; questions that I do not pretend to solve but that I want to think through *in relation* to the idea of representation and of the always already absent past, or should I say the always already absent present. So, in what I think is a fitting spirit of *productive uncertainty*, of playful²⁴ but serious academic inquiry, of a *bricoleur's* provisional borrowing and a *nomad's* theoretical and literary wanderings, and always with a desire *to change without violence the way things are*, I want to find a path of my own through what I will call (with no pretence of originality) the labyrinth of cultural memory. It would be an understatement to say that this labyrinth opens into other labyrinths, that it contains other fields and invokes other domains of literary and critical theory. I will not attempt to circumscribe nor provide a genealogy for each of the theorists or theoretical models I encounter; my method, rather, is to foreground the problem of cultural memory and to circle around it, to keep the idea of how contemporary cultures remember and forget in the postmodern period in my sight, and in doing so attempt to bring related concepts, theoretical constructions, and submerged questions—but particularly the question of representation or memory-as-inscription—to bear on my discussion of cultural mnemonics. To adapt the phrase of Martin Heidegger, I want to *adequately formulate the question* of cultural memory. "The challenge in thinking through the interpenetration of present and past in literary history," as Cary Nelson writes in *Repression and Recovery*, his study of cultural memory, the canon, and modern American poetry, is "not to master the problem, or even to identify all its

²³ Wundt conducted experiments to "determine the duration of the present—that interval of time than can be experienced as an uninterrupted whole" (qtd. in Sturken 265). Wundt estimated that this interval was five seconds; one of his students set it at twelve; another set the figure at 1/5000 of a second, the shortest interval an ear could determine between clicks; still another used .044 seconds as the shortest interval the eye could determine before retaining a "permanent" image (Sturken 265). Henri Bergson reports that "the smallest interval of empty time which we can detect equals, according to Exner, 0.002 seconds" (205).

²⁴ In "Hyperplay," Robert Wilson challenges the temptations of "certainty" while championing a deconstructive "uncertainty" principle—think of Hamlet and Werner Heisenberg, a connection allusively made in the PBS series *Nobel Legacy*, which focuses on the development of quantum mechanics and the careers of Neils Bohr and Werner Heisenberg (Prod. Adrian Malone. Discovery Channel, 26 August 1996). Wilson rejects theoretical dogmatism and ossification—symptoms of a professional discursive domination which only claims to promote tolerant models of knowledge or social change while thickening CVs and securing tenures. The etymology of theory leads to the Greek *theōros*, or spectator, which derives from *theōreō*, to look at (OED). Perhaps the most useful aspect of Wilson's essay, though, is its insistence that theoretical models themselves can be used in politically and epistemologically responsible, in serious and yet playful, ways. The crux of Wilson's argument rests upon a distinction between the world and the text, between contextual theory and textualist approaches to writing, and a tendency that he sees endemic in "cottage-industry" (54) literary theory to blur these distinctions: "play for understanding," Wilson exhorts, "not knowledge" (53); "focus by coordination, not subordination" (54). Theories, to co-opt Pierre Bourdieu's phrase, are attempts to "understand understanding" (The Rules of Art 283), to understand the social conditions of knowing and being (310).

components—for neither goal is achievable—but rather to decide how to proceed in the midst of the problems that can be acknowledged and clarified but not fully resolved” (3).

Faced with objections to my material-at-hand model or peripatetic method, I would point out that my theoretical meandering is part of a larger exploration of how “we,” as literary critics, as readers and writers, make meanings and recognize the discursive organization or “matrices of signification” (Wilson 54) in and around theories, in and around texts, in and around our institutional (and other) selves. Far from being a peripheral concern of literary or critical discourse, as I have discovered, memory lurks in the middle of things. Memory, to recall Terdiman’s words in Present Past,

is omnipresent, so fundamental to our ability to conceive the world that it might seem impossible to analyze it at all. Memory stabilizes subjects and constitutes the present. It is the name we give to the faculty that sustains continuity in collective and in individual experience. Our evidence for it may be as indirect as Freud’s evidence for the unconscious, but it is an essential postulate in our attempt to explain how the world remains minimally coherent, how existence doesn’t simply fly apart. Memory functions in every act of perception, in every act of intellection, in every act of language. (8-9)

Of course, Terdiman also notes that memory is not only a determining but also a disruptive force, a form of resistance or oppositionality that is as difficult to control at personal or subjective levels as it is at social levels. Linking his understanding of memory in Present Past (1993) to his Discourse/Counter-Discourse (1985), Terdiman points out that memory is particularly ambivalent: it is a discourse of *both* dominance and difference, a centripetal force that keeps experience from disintegrating but at the same time a centrifugal force that acts as “problem” or “site of cultural disquiet” (vii). As Terdiman explains, “memory sustains hegemony, [but] it also subverts it through its capacity to recollect and restore the alternative discourses the dominant would simply bleach out and forget. Memory, then, is inherently contestatory” (20).

I am not trying to construct a genealogy of cultural memory, here, one that would link diverse thinkers together, or exhaustively account for the ways that cultures remember the past—in languages and texts, in inscribed surfaces and performed rituals, in religious systems and traditions, in literary expressions and historical writings, in museums and archives, in films and buildings, in monuments and landscapes. Rather, I want to project a view of, to clear a space for, a theory of culture and memory in a preliminary and suitably palimpsestic way that might accommodate such a wide variety of knowledges of the past. Such a theory and the analyses it might generate locates memory in the interactive relations of production and the technological or semiological forces of culture that organize the social and thus circumscribe the subject. As Kaja Silverman writes in The Subject of Semiotics, “Semiotics involves the study of signification, but signification cannot be isolated from the human subject who uses it and is defined by means of it, from the cultural system which generates it” (3). Something similar can be said about the subject of memory. For it is a commonplace of structural linguistic semiotics as much as cultural semiotics that “language constitutes the signifying system *par excellence*, and that it is only by means of linguistic signs that other signs become meaningful” (Silverman 5). A theory of cultural memory treats memory as an aspect of culture, as a mechanism of the systems of signification that produce, and represent, social life; memory is thus closely linked, perhaps even indistinguishable from, language itself. Such a model of memory poses what I think will be some of the most perplexing questions we will encounter in this dissertation: what is the relationship of language to consciousness and consciousness to memory? how does culture, which is the sign-system of the social, determine consciousness? how do duration and temporality factor into consciousness and subjectivity and thus memory? how can we talk about cultural memory as a semiological system? In short, how is memory a *representation*?

This dissertation tears off one small piece of that large and dodgy question, and asks, in the context of theory and literary discourse, what can be said about cultural memory. Memory has its own complex history, and to posit a theory of cultural mnemonics in theoretical and literary

discourses as I will try to do in the following pages is to enter that history *in medias res*. Yet as Raymond Williams notes in his discussion of modern tragedy and its relation to classical models of tragedy, the difficulties posed by such a critical project—at once personal and impersonal, at once intimate and academic—“are in any case so severe that no time is really long enough. But the moment comes when it is necessary to make a beginning” (*Modern Tragedy* 15). The problematics I have just outlined, and which I treat in the following pages, are an attempt to make a beginning. It should be clear by now that my foray into memory in theory and literature will pose a good many more questions than it will answer. Nonetheless, I believe that a theory of cultural memory is a *tool* with which to more effectively interpret the texts, and the worlds, in which we live. With it, we might learn to (more) effectively read cultures by what they remember and forget. That is, we can learn to read the past as a representation in the present, and to interpret that information in ways that are beneficial to a critical and self-conscious, a subjective and social *happiness*—one that is derived, in part, from the anti-foundational and “presentist” project of Nietzsche but also from the recognition of the importance of social frames, responsibilities, and constraints. In doing so, we might learn to “read” and “write” the values of our present—our personal and political mistakes and successes—in a world increasingly organized by information technologies and the media. In this cyber-space, such self-reflexive cultural remembering and forgetting, such a discursive model of language and of memory, might well help us to remember that meaning is constructed, that information is powerful, and that democratic social change can and must begin *in-between*. Thinking the past is difficult and dangerous. As the proverb goes: Dwell on the past and you lose an eye; forget the past and you lose both.

Chapter One

§

Culture

We can understand society because we have made it.
Raymond Williams
Marxism and Literature

What can be said about cultural memory? Under what conditions is memory no longer considered to be a physical or metaphysical faculty but an attribute or technology of culture? How do we understand memory as what Richard Terdiman, somewhat disparagingly, calls the "postmodern mutation" of memory into the "general process of culture" (Present Past 357), a move that Terdiman warns is in constant danger of privileging "unlimited" or "groundless" semiosis and "endless" interpretation. Such a cultural and textual model of memory frames the central dilemma in understanding memory: is memory a hermeneutics, a question of *representations* and interpretations or is it a matter of reference, of stored facts and literal *reproductions*? Terdiman attempts to resolve this dilemma, as we shall see, by recourse to a dialectical model of memory and to a textual ambivalence that deserves our close attention. For now, however, let us note that this dilemma *is* the memory problem, in its oldest and most basic formulation, and that it pivots on the difficult problems of how memory can seem both permanent and impermanent, conscious and unconscious, and how the processes by which we remember and forget are linked to the social, to the science of signs, to inscription, to language. These are difficult questions, and they lead into some of the ground I want to cover in this chapter, which explores the category of contemporary culture in the work of some representative thinkers—beginning with Raymond Williams and concluding with Homi Bhabha. My objective in posing these questions is, roughly, to understand precisely how memory can, and has, become relocated in the sphere of contemporary culture. But, of course, as Jacques Derrida has written, "As often happens, the call of or for the question, and the request that echoes through it, takes us further than the response" (The Gift of Death 115). I have no doubt that this will be the case when we pose the question of culture *and* memory.

In questioning the concept of "cultural memory" and its linkages to theory and literature, my first step is to isolate the two terms of this critical neologism in order to think through some of the debates within which each is entangled, and to see how, if at all, and to what critical end, the

two concepts can be brought together. I have already stated that the terms "culture" and "memory" are themselves abstract categories and that they mark out what until very recently has been uncharted theoretical territory. I want to manage this conceptual instability and uncertainty by meditating briefly upon "culture" in this chapter and on "memory" in the next. By focusing as specifically as possible on memory as a cultural modality, as a process or mechanism of culture, I want to ask what "culture" and "memory" mean when we read them together. Let us first consider culture.

I have said that one of my fundamental assumptions in what follows is that memory is best understood not by its metaphysical connections to an individual or social group, but, rather, by its semiological features or discursive functions within the field of culture and cultural production. This move, one might say, is of a piece with the structural understanding of language and the post-structural critique of metaphysics and of history, though that might not seem to make things much clearer. As Raymond Williams has pointed out in Keywords, his 1983 study of the language of cultural transformation in the West, the term "culture" is one of the "two or three most complicated words in the English language," a "noun of process" the major meanings of which range from the "tending of animals or crops," "the relations between general human development and a particular way of life," civilization, intellectual and artistic development and activity, to "superior knowledge" (86-93). Williams' Keywords is derived, in part, from earlier works that deal with the problem of culture, including Culture and Society (1958) and The Long Revolution (1961), the purpose of which, as Williams writes in 1982, was to find "a position from which I could hope to understand and act in contemporary society, necessarily through its history, which had delivered this strange, unsettling and exciting, world to us" ("Introduction to the Morningside Edition" xii). In The Long Revolution particularly, Williams identifies three general categories in the definition of culture: the "ideal, in which culture is a state or process of human perfection, in terms of absolute or universal values"; the "documentary, in which culture is the body of intellectual and imaginative work, in which . . . human thought and expression are variously recorded"; and the "social . . . in which culture is a description of a particular way of life, which expresses certain meaning and values not only in art and learning, but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour" (The Long Revolution 41). Williams acknowledges that "there is value in each of these kinds of definitions" (42) and that "any adequate theory of culture must include the three areas of fact to which the definitions point" (43). Thus, as Williams explains, the analysis of culture

is the clarification of the meaning and values implicit and explicit in a particular way of life, a particular culture. Such analysis will include the historical criticism . . . in which intellectual and imaginative works are analyzed in relation to particular traditions and societies, but will also include analysis of elements in the way of life [such as] . . . the organization of production, the structure of the family, the structure of institutions, which express or govern social relationships, the characteristic forms through which members of the society communicate." (41)

Williams frames the complex of culture as both an "abstraction" and an "absolute," as what he calls "a whole way of life" that connects the *material* (the realm of production) to the *immaterial* (the realm of the personal, the aesthetic, the moral, the intellectual) and that is concerned with "new kinds of personal and social relationship" in the modern world (Culture and Society xvii-iii). In Marxism and Literature, published in 1977, Williams further clarifies his argument about culture and its connections to the social: he states that this kind of cultural analysis—his theory of "cultural materialism"¹—negotiates the split between the material and the

¹ Williams acknowledges that the "complexity of the concept of 'culture'" is a problem for any modern theory of culture but especially for a Marxist theory (17); his later analysis of the key concepts of Marxist cultural theory thus opens up the strict or orthodox determinism of the base-superstructure model

ideal by resisting the reduction or abstraction of totalizing practices and by staking out a middle ground *in-between* the inner/ideal and the external/material. For Williams, cultural materialism posits that an adequate theoretical formulation of any historical period must trace the "indissoluble connections between material production, political and cultural institutions and activity, and consciousness" (80). Such a relational re-conception of culture as a "constitutive human process" (20), one that "cannot be separated from material social life" (19), quite nicely accommodates language and memory as forms of consciousness and gives us ways to connect them to the social. As Williams argues, restating Marx's position, "consciousness . . . is social being" (41); "social being determines consciousness" (75):

What really has to be said is that the sign is social but that in its very quality as sign it is capable of both being internalized—indeed has to be internalized if it is to be a sign for communicative relation between actual persons, initially using only their own physical powers to express it—and of being continually available, [or externalized] in social and material ways, in manifest communication. This fundamental relationship between the "inner" and the "material" sign—a relationship often experienced as a tension but always lived as an activity, a practice—needs further radical exploration. (41)

Williams thus establishes a "practical" and "connected" middle ground for culture—between the "material" and the "ideal"—which functions as one of the strongest links connecting the *determining* base to the *determined* superstructure. This, I argue, is the space of cultural memory, and such a "sociology of culture," for Williams, will generate different analyses of different forms of cultural activity. For, as Williams writes,

if we have learned to see the relation of any cultural work to what we have learned to call a "sign-system" (and this has been the important contribution of cultural semiotics), we can also come to see that a sign-system is itself a specific structure of social relationships: "internally," in that the signs depend on, were formed in, relationships; "externally," in that the system depends on, is formed in, the institutions which activate it (and which are then at once cultural and social and economic institutions); "integrally," in that a "sign system," properly understood, is at once a specific cultural technology and a specific form of practical consciousness: those apparently diverse elements which are in fact unified in the material social process. (140)

In Williams' semiological scheme, culture functions as the sign-system of the social—at once ideal and material. Yet it is precisely the way that forms of culture begin to run together in Williams' model that leaves a critic such as John Frow wondering just how useful such a model might be—when its strength as a concept is also its greatest flaw. Focussing on Williams' earlier work, Frow argues that Williams' "preferred 'social'" definition is a problematic reworking of

of culture to include more interactive and variant (more *in-between*) kinds of thinking. Williams names this "cultural materialism," which can be briefly described as "a theory of the specificities of material culture and literary production within historical materialism" (*Marxism and Literature* 5). I am especially interested in the concept of "practical consciousness," which Williams' derives from Marx and Engels' *The German Ideology* and develops into a non-ideal understanding of language as social activity, as interior and exterior, as phenomenon and relation, as "usable signs," as a practical process of signification or "social creation of meaning through the use of the formal sign" (*Marxism and Literature* 28-44). I think that memory can be considered a kind of *practical consciousness*: creative practice, Williams concludes, is of many kinds and takes many forms, but it is "in practice a struggle at the roots of the mind—not casting off an ideology, or learning phrases about it, but confronting a hegemony in the fibres of the self and in the hard practical substance of effective and continuing relationships" (212). Such an evocative and hopeful model of understanding consciousness and its linkages to material and social being might well double as a description of cultural mnemonics and the ways that the "grasping of the known," the present-past, enables us to creatively conceive the "unknown," the future, to better resist those parts of the past that would preclude social transformation.

two contradictory concepts of culture: on the one hand, "Marxist theorizations of superstructures" and, on the other, "an even longer [Romantic] tradition, extending from Herder to Leavis, of the theorization of cultures as particularized expressions of the coherence of organic communities" (*Time and Commodity Culture* 8). Frow's assessment is limited to Williams' early writing on the language of cultural transformation, and Frow's own understanding of the social organization of cultural value, as we shall see momentarily, is of a piece with the *sociological* and *semiological* model that Williams develops in *Marxism and Literature*. Nonetheless, Frow presciently points out a perennial problem for theorists of culture who construct comprehensive or totalizing schemes² or versions of culture that tend to be autonomous and universal, elitist and withdrawn from "everyday labour and everyday realities"³; as Frow writes, "the concept is taken to be coextensive with the whole realm of meaningful structures" and "it then becomes so inclusive as to lose any structure of its own" (*Time* 9).

Frow's objection to Williams' concept of culture is that it is too "normative" and "absolute" insofar as it "tends to repress the specific apparatuses, institutions and techniques through which subjectivity is formed" (10), a problem that Frow links to Williams' misreading of the concept of semiology in *Marxism and Literature* and to a romantic understanding of "community" in the context of English culture—as monolithic, national, organic, pure. But it is precisely to prevent such mystification, I think, that Williams has focused on the "historically based conventions of language and representation" (Williams, "Afterword," 231). Certainly, Williams' theory of "cultural materialism" and concepts such as "practical consciousness," especially as developed in Williams' later work, refuse such normative definitions or nostalgia.

Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield advance aspects of Williams' theory of cultural analysis and link it to the more general "convergence of history, sociology, and English in cultural studies," not to mention developments in feminism and continental Marxist-structuralist and post-structuralist theory (*Political Shakespeare* 2-3). For Dollimore and Sinfield, culture has been used in (at least) two ways: the first, analytic; the second, evaluative. By "analytic," Dollimore and Sinfield mean that sociological and anthropological model in which the analysis of culture seeks "to describe the whole system of significations by which a society or a section of it understands itself and its relations in the world" (vii); by "evaluative," they mean the possession of ostensibly "superior" aesthetic and intellectual values (vii). A theory of cultural materialism thus "draws upon the analytic sense of 'culture'" and insists that "culture does not (cannot) transcend the material forces and relations of production. Culture is not simply a reflection of the economic and political system, but nor can it be independent of it" (vii-viii). For Dollimore and Sinfield, culture must be located *in-between* the material and aesthetic, and "social practices" such as literature reflect the mediatory forms of cultural production: "our belief is that a

² The nineteenth-century British anthropologist E. B. Tylor defined the concept of modern "culture" in his 1871 *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion* as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (qtd. in Tomlinson 4); for a detailed assessment, and defence, of Tylor's "relativistic" concept of culture within the larger context of the "racist" ethnography and anthropology of the nineteenth century see Young's *Colonial Desire* (45-50).

³ Georg Stauth and Bryan Turner argue in "Nostalgia, Postmodernism and the Critique of Mass Culture" that The Frankfurt School (roughly speaking, the cultural critique of Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Max Horkheimer) as was predominantly nostalgic or "backward looking" (507): in its opposition of "high" to "low" or "mass" culture; in its utilization of Marxist analysis of history which "maximized the naked economic tie between human beings" (512-13); in its elitist intellectual and sociological explanations of culture as a "negation of the present in favour of some imaginary place constituted prior to the devastating consequences of urban industrial rational capitalism" (517); and in its myths of "premodern stability and coherence" or cultural integration and of the precedence of "aesthetic supremacy" in pre-modern societies (509-26).

combination of historical context, theoretical method, political commitment and textual analysis offers the strongest challenge" to traditional modes of literary criticism, not to mention cultural dominance and those forces that would resist the "transformation of the social order" (vii, viii).

In his historical-materialist descriptions of the postmodern as a stage of capitalism, as the emergence of a "new social order within late capitalism" (Staught and Turner 519), Fredric Jameson provides a more properly Marxist understanding of the concept of contemporary cultural change. Particularly in his *Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Jameson works to explain the category of culture in the postmodern period and the way that human consciousness is determined by social being. Jameson views "culture" as our "second nature," as what one has left "when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good" (ix); that is, culture, for Jameson, at least in the postmodern period, transforms from the classical model of the all-encompassing aesthetic "sphere" to the realm of product, consumption, and commodity by means of an "immense dilation" (x), which is governed by the fetishistic logic of late-capitalism. For Jameson, this "logic" has many different features, but most obviously it enacts the

effacement . . . of the older (essentially high-modernist) frontier between high culture and so-called mass or commercial culture, and the emergence of new kinds of texts infused with forms, categories, and contents of that very culture industry so passionately denounced by all the ideologues of the modern, from Leavis and the American New Criticism all the way to Adorno and the Frankfurt School. (2)

This new "system" and its cultural production, Jameson argues, can be recognized by its "constitutive features": "a new depthlessness"; a "weakening of historicity" into "private temporality" or memory; a new tone of emotional "intensities" that is suspiciously romantic; new technology, at once the causes and effects of a "new economic world system"; and a new sense of "built" and "world" space that is the space of "late or multinational capital" (6).

These are, according to Jameson, some of the features of postmodern culture, a heterogeneous "cultural dominant" which faces its "new" world without adequate modes of representation. As Jameson argues, the "truths" of multinational capital will require "unimaginable new modes of representing" the world so that "we may again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralized by [postmodern] spatial as well as . . . social confusion" (54). I have my doubts that time and space can be so easily and absolutely separated as ways to explain the modern in opposition to the postmodern,⁴ or that social confusion itself is a uniquely postmodern malady. But Jameson argues that culture or the "postmodern force field" is suffering a unique "crisis of historicity" since postmodern culture is

increasingly dominated by space and spatial logic. If, indeed, the subject has lost its capacity actively to extend its pro-tensions and re-tensions across the temporal manifold and to organize its past and future into coherent experience, it becomes difficult enough

⁴ The interconnected constructs of "time" and "space" are closely tied to culture and memory. Most obviously, we are said to "anchor" temporality in the spaces we inhabit: for example, in "felicitous" domestic space, as Gaston Bachelard argues in *The Poetics of Space* or in institutional, "museal" space, as Andreas Huyssen's claims in *Twilight Memories*. As well, the high-modernist repudiation of the past and (utopian) belief in "progress"—the temporal narrative of the modern or "just now"—was encoded in the glass and steel of "international style" buildings, reflecting, in one sense, the *amnesiac* abstraction of labour and the reification of the commodity form that both symbolized and enabled the accumulation of monopoly capital and thus "anchored" time in the modern city); similarly, the postmodern parodic repetition of, and appetite for, the past is clearly visible as a strategic temporal organization or way to re-present the past in postmodern architecture (think of how Las Vegas' "pyramids" re-present ancient Egypt, or how the facades of contemporary shopping malls and cinemas in North America are "depthless" re-presentations of the "authentic" and "meaningful" Greco-Roman past in the postmodern present).

to see how the cultural productions of such a subject could result in anything but "heaps of fragments" and in a practice of the randomly heterogeneous and fragmentary and aleatory. (25)

These are recognizable features of the postmodern for some, especially those who claim, following Jean Baudrillard, that "simulation has replaced production at the center [sic] of our social system" (Huyssen 175). According to Jameson, this is the central problem in the transitional era of late capitalism: there is no "real" or accessible referent in the postmodern, just more signs; postmodern artists and theorists, especially those who participate in the "tireless and implacable search and destroy mission of poststructuralism [sic]" (218), gaze with increasing intensity and excitement (or exhaustion and indifference) at their own navels while the *formalist* or *immanent* problem of *representation* dominates, displaces, and ultimately denies *transcendent* models of history or class—especially those Marxist or "modes of production" narratives that alone promise to make sense of the world. Of course, Jameson himself acknowledges that he enjoys some of the cultural forms of this stage of capitalism—architecture, music, food, film, and so on—as his insightful and erudite analyses certainly make clear; for Jameson, the "postmodern" is a "slogan" of which he is critical and with which he is, he confesses, regretfully complicit (418). But this is hardly surprising: as Robert Hughes once wrote, "Pleasure is the root of all critical appreciation of art" (*The Shock of the New* 7). Yet the "waning of affect" or the "loss of history" in the postmodern remains a paradoxical problem for Jameson who, as a Marxist cultural critic, labours to comprehend the *underlying concrete social reality or the historical conditions of possibility*. As a problematically self-incriminating era and concept, as a fascinating and repulsive cultural logic, the postmodern can be seen as a cultural response to the emergence of new economic orders and social forms in which "History" has been displaced by discourse and simulation; it is an era in which "Tradition" and "Progress" have been obliterated by "new," less totalizing conceptions of *space* generated by innovations in information technology, politics, banking, global travel, and so forth. In the postmodern, cultural processes are certainly accelerated and intensified, most obviously by the media and by multinational corporations. But according to Jameson the "postmodern" remains an anti-systemic concept, a staging of power at the level or surface of the sign. The problem is that this enticing and shocking "new" world is depthless, that it has discarded modern and pre-modern teleologies—those grand narratives that once ensured agency and the connectedness and continuity of *time* at the level of the social. In this disconnected and disjunctive social space, *non-historicist* forms of recollecting the past such as memory proliferate. But postmodernity, for Jameson, is nevertheless profoundly amnesiac since its modes of "remembering" the past lack a commitment to a collective politics: "memory" is a category that must be seen as a more or less futile attempt to "think the present historically in an age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first place" (ix).

Jameson's argument pivots on the problem of *representation*, on the status and circulation of the sign in postmodern cultural formations and relations of production: as Jameson writes, postmodernism names the agglomeration of formal "shifts and irrevocable changes in the *representation* of things and of the way they change" (ix). It also depends upon the notion of *loss*. Whereas culture might once have had some purchase, some residual connection, to the "real" or to "nature" in the modern period, even if it was an antithetical one, these (authentic) ties are severed and dispersed in the postmodern, a time and space in which "something has changed" (xxi). As Jameson writes,

Capitalism, and the modern age, is a period in which, with the extinction of the sacred and the 'spiritual,' the deep underlying materiality of all things has finally risen dripping and convulsive into the light of day; and it is clear that culture itself is one of those things whose fundamental materiality is now for us not merely evident but quite inescapable. This has, however, also been a historical lesson: it is because culture has *become* material that we are now in a position to understand that it always was material, or materialistic, in its structure and function. (67)

Fair enough, but there is a hint of nostalgia at work here, as elsewhere in Jameson's rhetoric: one is left with the feeling that things were better in the modern period, and much better in the pre-capitalist period, when the "subject" of history had some, or full, control over his or her destiny, when art or language had access to the "actual" past or referent, when History was not "enfeebled" by discourse or the "doxa" of the postmodern but *positively* made sense as an "untranscendable horizon" (*The Political Unconscious* 10).

In the transitional period of the postmodern, then, things indeed have changed: culture itself, Jameson argues, has become a product, a secular commodity that refers to nothing so much as itself, to more signs, as opposed to (an illusory or romantic) set of aesthetic, evaluative, or intellectual practices. This process corresponds roughly to the death of the individual subjects and the failure of collective agents, as well as to philosophy's "turn to language" in the twentieth century; it can be located in the last of the three stages that Jameson, following the thinking of Marx, Lenin, and Mandel, respectively, names "classical," "monopoly," (or "imperial") and then "global" (or "multinational" or "late") capitalism.⁵ In the social *space* of the late-capitalist world, the cultural logic of which is postmodernism, Jameson argues that the subject is decentred or dead, and the ostensible solidarity and plentitude of pre-existent social forms are displaced by the dis-orienting *abstract* and *amnesiac* times and spaces of the metropolis, the media, and the multinationals (399-418). The most obvious casualty of this new organization of the social is the loss of the "socialist political project" (416), and one of the most insidious effects of it is the proliferation of the "postmodern philosophical discourses," which, for Jameson, are formalist or discursive language games—"nominalist" and "synchronic" forms of thought or "commentary" (393) that lack political agency or critical interest in historical process. Thus as the media and the market become increasingly indistinguishable, "the referent seems to have disappeared, as so many people from Debord to Baudrillard have warned us it would" (415); consequently, we witness the failure of pre-existing models of "cognitive mapping" or "class consciousness" and the emergence of the bewildering and secular postmodern global spaces Jameson brilliantly describes:

Alongside the emergence of this kind of space . . . we witness that familiar process long generally associated with the Enlightenment, namely, the desacralization of the world, the decoding and secularization of the older forms of the sacred or the transcendent, the slow colonization of use value by exchange value, the "realistic" demystification of the older kinds of transcendent narratives in novels like *Don Quixote*, the standardization of both subject and object, the denaturalization of desire and its ultimate displacement by commodification (or, in other words, "success") and so on. (410)

Something similar happens in the *secular* postmodern theoretical discourses, which are not really theories, but rather themselves unconscious structures and so many afterimages and secondary effects of some properly postmodern cognitive mapping, whose indispensable media term now passes itself off as this or that philosophical reflection on language, communication, and the media, rather than the manipulation of its figure. (417)

Jameson's complaint here is that collective action is replaced by reflection, that ideology is displaced by semiology: the figure being manipulated by the media—at once labourer the (new international) consumer—is being duped by its critics, philosophers, and culture industry. The best we can hope for in the postmodern is the short-term subjective memory of the brand name, the proliferation of the mnemonic or textual trace, the theoretical "afterimage"—copies of copies, which only remind us that there never was an "original" or an "authentic" to begin with.

This is a familiar mode of thought, and it is not unique to late-capitalism. The point, for Jameson, is always to *change* history, to change the social even if it "hurts," *not* simply to exist in

⁵ See Chapter 4, note 3.

it, to be numbed by the quantity and velocity of its representations. But neither are we to become panicky or paranoid because of it—to become *bored but hyper* as Andy Warhol once said. In such a model of (postmodern) culture, the subject can easily succumb to a kind of pathological amnesia, one that is a consequence of hyper-consumption or what Arthur Kroker and David Cook call the “pestilential spirit” of “estheticized [sic] recommodification” (10). The “governing logic” of this mode of being is self-reference and self-liquidation, excess and exhaustion; in technological society, Kroker and Cook argue, it is characterized by “*the atrophication of emotional functions and the hyper-exteriorization of the mind*,” not to mention the death of the social and the (re)vitalization of the (electronic or virtual) text (15-17). Without the guidance of the once sacrosanct “science” of History, without modes of production narratives to order social space as collective and time as revolutionary, cultural production will simply chase its own semiotic tale, will feed on its own textual excrement. Without the study of the historical conditions of possibility, any effort to culturally remember is at best facile—a form of analysis that, like all other discourses, stalls out at the level of the text, desire, and the sign.

The key problem with such an abandoning of the Truth of History for a “perspectival” or “nominalist” understanding of culture, for Jameson, is that in the postmodern period “the cultural and the economic” in fact “collapse back into one another and say the same thing, in an eclipse of the distinction between base and superstructure that has itself often struck people as significantly characteristic of postmodernism in the first place” (*Postmodernism* xxi). Such a model of culture, Jameson reasons, itself becomes

semi-autonomous and floats above reality, with this fundamental historical difference that in the classical period reality persisted independently of that “cultural sphere,” whereas today it seems to have lost that separate mode of existence. Today, culture impacts back on reality in ways that make any independent and, as it were, non- or extra-cultural form of it problematical . . . so that finally the theorists unite their voices in the new doxa that the “referent” no longer exists. (277)

Jameson’s analysis of postmodern culture obviously extends well beyond my own discussion of cultural mnemonics, and his argument is more subtle and sophisticated, and more wide-ranging, than my efforts to paraphrase it might suggest. But it points toward the *amnesiac* cultural logic of capitalism, toward the *basic forgetting* or “immaculate deception” (Kroker and Cook 11) of the modern and postmodern “operating systems,” that I am arguing must be viewed as modes and mechanisms of cultural memory. Crudely speaking, those who produce and accumulate capital have an interest in abstracting the social relations within which it is produced in order to make the social relations of production seem palatable or natural or inevitable. I will have more to say about this amnesia in what follows: from the literary perspective, it helps to explain, for example, why Crusoe faints at the end of Defoe’s famous novel when he links the producers of his wealth—his slaves “in the Brasils” [sic] (281)—to himself; it also helps us to understand what Harry Joy, the protagonist of Peter Carey’s 1983 novel *Bliss*, understands (literally remembers) when he turns his back on his successful advertising agency and the carcinogens his multinational clients manufacture so that he can retreat to “nature” at Bog Onion Road, where he will grow his own “forest” with Honey Barbara. In the case of postmodern culture, however, which describes Harry’s urban and suburban worlds well enough, this abstraction or forgetting reaches its apex in the proliferating social formations of this last and most intensely abstract stage of capitalism. As Jameson explains:

The new space that thereby emerges involves the suppression of distance . . . and the relentless saturation of any remaining voids and empty places, to the point where the postmodern body—whether wandering through a postmodern hotel locked into rock sound by means of headphones, or undergoing the multiple shocks and bombardments of the Vietnam War as Michael Herr conveys it to us—is now exposed to a perceptual barrage of immediacy from which all sheltering layers and intervening mediations [read History, High Culture] have been removed. (412)

The immediacy that Jameson identifies here is the *temporality* of the postmodern media and the depthless (electronic) sign-image, a machinery of cultural production that recycles and re-presents images of the past at an unprecedented rate and in unprincipled, ahistoric ways. Architecture especially records this neurotic, narcotic cultural activity:

The survival, the residue, the holdover, the archaic, has finally been swept away without a trace. In the postmodern, then, the past itself has disappeared (along with the well-known "sense of the past" or historicity and collective memory). Where its buildings still remain, renovation and restoration allow them to be transferred to the present in their entirety as those other, very different and postmodern things called simulacra. Everything is now organized and planned; nature has been triumphantly blotted out, along with peasant, petit-bourgeois commerce, handicraft, feudal aristocracies and imperial hierarchies. Ours is a more homogeneously modernized condition . . . (310)

But buildings, I think, have always been signs, partial memory-traces of the "archaic." Jameson sees postmodern architecture, however, as, on the one hand, a record of the rupture between past and present and, on the other, a symptom of cultural logic that obliterates difference, that celebrates and studies cultural effects (such as memory) instead of collective ones. In Jameson's scheme, the death of the modern is precisely what the postmodern mourns:

from this nostalgic and regressive perspective—that of the older modern and its temporalities—what is mourned is the memory of a deep memory; what is enacted is a nostalgia for nostalgia, for the grand older extinct questions of origin and telos, of deep time and the Freudian Unconscious . . . for the dialectic also, as well as the monumental forms left high and dry by the ebb tide of the modern moment, forms whose Absolutes are no longer audible to us, illegible hieroglyphs of the demiurgic within the technocratic world. (156)

But all mnemonic traces, all such "hieroglyphs," in one sense, are *representations*: interpretations and re-creations of past events that cannot be, and never were, fully or authentically "present" as *reproductions*. But Jameson dismisses those "poststructural denunciations of the ideologies of nature and the 'authentic'" (197), what he calls postmodern "theoretical discourse" (218), as "secondary effects" or afterimages precisely because they are representations: because they refuse to posit an exteriority or transcendent point of view from which to "objectively" apprehend the social; because they privilege *visual* or inscriptive (semiological, differential) models of meaning as opposed to *auditory* and teleological ones (speech as self-presence, collective); because they do not subscribe to a theory of historical materialism that explains the relationship between the cultural and the socio-economic; because they do not work to reveal the historical conditions of possibility or subscribe to a referential epistemology. The familiar enough charges go something like this: the postmodern period is devoid of politics; its epistemology avoids history; its semiological or discursive (nominal) analyses, but particularly post-structuralism, have too much to do with language and its shell games and not enough to do with the "real," with context, with the referent, with the social organization of the relations of production within which signs are produced. The culprit, for Jameson, as I have already suggested, is the culture of an especially amnesiac late-capitalism, the tendential web of big-business and electronic media, which accelerates and expands the cycles of production and consumption to the point that they incorporate (ingest) culture itself and transform, reify, reality and social relations into an increasingly abstract and hollowed-out *virtual* reality—a depthless cybernetic cultural surface of signs and of simulacra that, from the point of view of the dialectic, are heading nowhere.

Like all theorists of culture, Jameson must negotiate the split between the material and the ideal, and he does so by expanding the sphere of culture, much as Williams in Culture and Society and The Long Revolution did, to include just about everything. As Steven Connor writes, Jameson closes the gap between the aesthetic and the material by aestheticizing the relations of (postmodern) production (48); even more problematic, however, as Robert Young clearly

explains in *White Mythologies*, is Jameson's category of History as science and knowledge—as the one “master code” in which meaning precedes interpretation (107). Nonetheless, Jameson's impressive and erudite analysis of postmodern culture and its mnemonic economies is invaluable for my present purpose, even though it is limited by its nostalgic insistence that the postmodern is an age of amnesia, a period *and* aesthetic which is dominated by a wilful forgetting that empties out experience and severs authentic, *historicist* connections to the “actual” past: “I have tried to maintain an essentially historicist perspective,” Jameson write in his Preface to *The Political Unconscious*, “in which our readings of the past are virtually dependent on our experience of the present” (11). This present is fully determined by what Jameson names the “*société de consommation* (or the disaccumulative moment of late or monopoly capitalism), what Guy Debord calls the society of the image or spectacle” (*The Political Unconscious* 11); it amounts to an epistemology and ontology in which everything is *unprecedentedly* a commodity in a “world of universal simulation” (Huyssen 189), including the sign itself, a point that Jameson develops from Lukács' thesis on reification or the “dissociation of sensibility” (Huyssen 182) and that, as we shall see shortly, John Frow disputes in *Time and Commodity Culture*.

Frow's re-thinking of the commodity and of temporality and memory will resonate later on in my argument about the importance of inscription as a “fixing” or “making” meaning, whether linguistic or mnemonic, at the level of culture. For now, we can note that for Jameson attempts to “think” the past without a theory of History can be little more than humanist or formalist propaganda, attempts to *remember* the past in the present in non-historicist ways. But a theory of cultural mnemonics, I will argue, does just this in resolutely self-reflexive and self-conscious ways: speaking crudely, it recognizes other modes than History as ways to represent the past, which is only ever, which is always already, accessible to us as text, as trace, as discourse. In contrast, for Jameson “only Marxism can give us an adequate account of the essential mystery of the cultural past” (19); only a Marxist version of History as “the unity of a single, great collective story” (19) will grant us access, in Jameson's own terms, to the “actual” and “essential” past. Thus a consistent feature of postmodern culture and its “waning of affect” (16), for Jameson, is the so-called *loss* of history and commitment and the resurgence of memory, which Jameson argues is the inability to organize temporality and the tendency to conflate or displace time with a bewildering and apolitical sense of postmodern space. Such a conception of culture might well describe some aspects of a world that has decisively—that is, demographically, technologically, epistemologically—changed, but it fails to acknowledge the potentially oppositional and critical energies that are also available in the production of culture, just as it fails to recognize how time and space are inseparably braided together in human experience, how “new” narratives of time and space such as Einstein's “relativity theory” or Hiesenberg's “uncertainty principle” can be read as attempts to adequately understand the present.

Jameson's model of postmodernity's cultural logic, as meticulous, coherent, and as critical as it might be, thus fails to recognize that cultural semiology organizes the *reconstitution* of the past in the present in heterogeneous ways, and that we can critically and self-consciously study such *representations* at the level of culture—aural and visual, textual and architectural—and personally and politically question the intersections of race, class, and gender with desire or language or even memory. A model of cultural memory, I think, can thus open up whole new modes of inquiry and interest in how we re-present the past,⁶ ones that are not

⁶For example, in *Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of American Culture* Michael Kammen identifies a world-wide (but particularly Western) preoccupation with memory in the 1980s that constitutes what he calls a “trans-national phenomenon” or, in some cases, a “memory industry” (3). At a basic level, the interest in recalling *national* pasts that Kammen sees signals conflict inherent in the idea, structure, and practice of nations and the strictures of institutional history. More importantly, such interest

necessarily restricted to nor governed by Marxist analyses of history; as Connor writes, such a grand narrative fails to recognize "the more oppositional aspects of postmodernist culture, the ways in which, as well as mutely giving expression to postmodernity, postmodernist culture might offer ways of resisting its most baleful tendencies" (44-45).

Jameson's privileging of the doctrines of realism, empiricism, and historical materialism, then, and his rather utopian insistence that postmodern culture is ahistorical or amnesiac, returns us, in one sense, although rather ahead of ourselves, to the problem of cultural memory: how a semiotics of memory might help us to think through the modes in which cultures "know"—that is, remember and forget, represent and interpret, record and read—the past in the present. In this scheme, nostalgia and utopianism are two faces of the same coin: "knowledges" that negate the present by looking backward or forward, that "affirm the reality of an origin by proclaiming its loss" (Frow, *time* 225), that refuse to inhabit the middle ground or *in-between* position of the present that is, as I have been arguing, at once critical and self-reflexive. To be sure, Jameson is not the only thinker whose concept of culture seems to be one-sided or simply flawed by nostalgia.⁷ Edward Said, for example, usefully establishes the inexorable *discursive* and *disciplinary* connections between European imperialism and European culture in his pioneering yet problematic *Orientalism*: "without examining discourse," Said writes, "one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period" (3). For Said, culture is a force or apparatus, a persistent, durable, and saturating hegemonic system that to a great degree determines "what can be said about the Orient" (3, 14). Said poses this problem as one of discourse analysis, and tries to show in *Orientalism* "that European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self" (3). Encoded in Said's Foucauldian analysis is an understanding of cultural production as negation, as a discursive formation that operates by defining itself against its geopolitical, aesthetic, moral, intellectual—that is, cultural—Other.

It would be an understatement to say that Said's *Orientalism* has touched off prolific and even vitriolic debates about colonial discourse analysis and the objects of post-colonial studies; I will not recount this scholarship here. But it would be no less short-sighted to say that Said's critique of imperial power and knowledge has not been valuable. As Anita Loomba puts it,

although Said's critique is anticipated by others, it was new in its wide-sweeping range and focus, in its invocation of Foucault's work to make connections between the production of knowledge and the exercise of power, and innovative also in its use of literary materials to discuss historical and epistemological process. In many ways, Said's use of culture and knowledge to interrogate colonial power inaugurated colonial discourse analysis. (47)

But this discursive connection between the world and the text is also the Achilles' heel of Said's

in the use of the past foregrounds a sense of an uneasy present—of national contexts in which existing relations between the past and the present are inadequate, are thrown into crisis by the need for new pasts and new narratives to explain and to legitimize changing *present* structures of social interaction. Kammen lists Austria, Brazil, France, Great Britain, Israel, Poland, and both the former West Germany and Soviet Union as places where, in the 1980s, for different reasons, celebrations and commemorations of national heritage and *patrimoine* occurred, where programs of historical revision and rewriting attempted to rehabilitate the reputations of leaders and of "history in general" (3). Such national mnemonic activity, Kammen notes, diverse in location and in its aims, serves as evidence that "societies reconstruct their pasts rather than faithfully record them and that they do so with the needs of contemporary culture clearly in mind—manipulating the past in order to mold the present" (3).

⁷ Once again, Staught and Turner provide a clear if perfunctory analysis of critical theory as a form of nostalgia in "Nostalgia, Postmodernism and the Critique of Mass Culture." See note 3 in this chapter.

argument. That is, even though Said shows us that "doubtless the Western expansion into the East was determined by economic factors . . . the enabling cultural construction of Orientalism was not simply determined by them, and thus [Said] established a certain autonomy of the cultural sphere" (Young, *Colonial Desire* 159). It is this autonomy, I think, that is most problematic in his model: for some critics, it underwrites the charge that Orientalism *repeats* the very racist fantasy of domination and incorporation that it sets out to critique. So, even though Said provides us with "powerful evidence of the complicity between politics and knowledge" (160), a complicity that Guari Viswanathan meticulously explores in the context of the export of British literary education to India in *Masks of Conquest*,⁸ Said's critique remains, for some critics, stuck in its own "self-generating" logic insofar as it creates its own "knowledge" and textual "reality" and ignores historical specificities and local differences.

Ajiz Ahmad, for instance, claims that Said, in the wake of Foucault, cannot make up his mind about the crucial question of the "primacy of representation" facing the post-colonial critic, whether it is the postmodern/post-structural textual question of discourse as a system of "representations as representations" or the "realist" and historicist problem of *misrepresentations* (185). For Ahmad, Said equivocates on this central question, which, when boiled down, is a question about whether or not "true" statements can be made: "no," post-Nietzschean critics answer; "yes" Marxist critics such as Ahmad respond (Ahmad 193). Said seems to have a foot in both camps, and his model of culture reflects this apparent indecision. Said seems to be as fascinated by the simulacral epistemologies of Nietzsche and Foucault as he is haunted by the realist or "mirror" model of representation and political agency. But as Ahmad complains, Said panders to the First World "metropolitan intelligentsia" (195) by invoking "an anti-bourgeois stance in the name of manifestly reactionary anti-humanisms enunciated in the Nietzschean tradition" (192) and by refusing to posit an exterior site of resistance for the "real" project of human liberation that takes seriously the promises and analyses of the class struggle and political economy⁹: "In this sort of formulation the 'contest over decolonization' becomes mainly a literary and literary-critical affair, and the elite academic intelligentsia claims for itself, in an amazing gap between fact and self-image, the role of the world's revolutionary vanguard" (208). For Ahmad, Said invokes Marxist terminology, via Foucault, in his criticism of the emergence of the bourgeois and its complicity with colonialism, but Said does so without jettisoning the "humanist" or "idealist" baggage he carries: Said wants to affirm the liberal and humanist ideals of "tolerance, accommodation, cultural pluralism and relativism, and those insistently repeated words *sympathy, constituency, affiliation, filiation*" but without accepting the responsibility of history or of modes of production analysis, a problem that Ahmad feels comprises a "peculiar blockage" in Said's work, especially in his *Orientalism*, which ultimately fails to "undo the centuries old tie between narrative of High Humanism and the colonial project" (164). In other words, despite its erudition and impressive readings of the "colonial trace" (Ahmad 172), Said's model of culture in *Orientalism* and elsewhere seems to tacitly, if not explicitly, approve of the cultural production that was made possible by the hierarchical social structures of the age of empire and the (high) modernist forms of cultural expression that record

⁸ Viswanathan's thesis is that the export and effects of Western cultural hegemony at the height of age of empire were accomplished to a great deal by the "mission of educating and civilizing colonial subjects in the literature and thought of English" which was adapted to the "administrative and political imperative of British rule" (3).

⁹ Ahmad reads this sort of intellectual as one who apolitically propagates textualist interpretation "under the signature of an anti-empiricism, anti-historicism, structuralism, and post-structuralism, specifically Lévi-Stauss, Foucault, Derrida, Glucksmann Kristeva [sic] and so on. It is in contrast to these reactionary anti-humanisms, across the whole spectrum of cultural theories, that the rectitude in the careers of people like Raymond Williams now seems so bracing" (192-93).

this apogee—a Western projection of a cultural will to govern the Other.

For example: in *Culture and Imperialism*, Said focuses directly upon the connections between culture and empire, further clarifying the politics of colonial (and post-colonial) representation and the study of the “discursive operations” and “diverse ideological practices” of colonialism that he began in *Orientalism* (Young, *Colonial Desire* 159). In *Culture and Imperialism*, Said defines “culture” in two ways: first, it denotes a set of “practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principles is pleasure” (*Culture and Imperialism* xii); second, and restating Matthew Arnold’s definition from *Culture and Anarchy* almost verbatim, Said says that “culture is a concept that includes a refining and elevating element, each society’s reservoir of the best that has been known and thought . . . Culture, in this sense is a source of identity, and a rather combative one at that . . . a sort of theatre where various political and ideological causes engage one another” (viii). Although Said’s understanding of culture usefully interrogates the discursive and disciplinary connections between culture and imperialism, between “the modern metropolitan West and its overseas territories” (*Culture and Imperialism* xi), between the economic and the social, it is compromised by the notion of its “relative autonomy” from these spheres, by its latent, or not so latent, privileging of the realm of the aesthetic—what Robert Young calls the racist tradition and “values of humanism” (*White Mythologies* 131).

Young recognizes how Said’s understanding of humanist culture seems to be built, in part, albeit precariously, upon the twin pillars of the European “Individual” and his “high” culture: as Young points out, “Said’s culture, for all his reservations, resembles nothing so much as that of Arnold, Eliot or Leavis—there seems to be no irony intended at all when Said, the great campaigner against racism and ethnocentrism, laments in Leavisite tones the loss of culture’s ‘discrimination and evaluation’” (*White Mythologies* 133). Said himself seems to recognize the potential problems posed by such a concept of culture: “the trouble with this idea of culture,” he writes, “is that it entails not only venerating one’s own culture but also thinking of it as somehow divorced from, because transcending, the everyday world” (viii). Said attempts to preserve the “worldly” nature of culture—as material, as social, as the domain of representation—by warning that culture, in this picture, can indeed become an “antiseptically quarantined” “protective enclosure” (xiv); Said counters this exclusive model by arguing that the sphere of culture is a *battleground*, a position that the critic both inhabits and studies as discourse that must be located in-between the world and the text. The novels Said considers in *Culture and Imperialism*, then, can be usefully connected to the “pleasure” and “profit” of the aesthetic and evaluative world as well as to the “imperial process of which they were manifestly and unconcealedly a part” (xiv).

In this way, Said attempts to relocate his idea of culture in a more hybrid and indeterminate position, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of “orientalist” fantasy or “true” cultural nationalism and championing an idea of culture-as-contamination that invokes aspects of Foucault (the imbrication of power and knowledge; discourse analysis), Jameson (consumer culture as the dominant culture), and Bhabha (culture as secular, hybrid, and contestatory). As the realm of, on the one hand, domination and, on the other, “hybrid counter-energies,” culture remains fundamentally divided and productively unstable, the aggregate of “numerous anti-systemic hints and practices for collective human existence (and neither doctrine nor complete theories) that is not based on coercion or domination” (335). It is this ambivalence, however, that fails to convince Said’s critics of his commitment to social and political change. Said himself returns to it reluctantly, almost with an air of defeat, at the end of *Culture and Imperialism*:

I keep coming back—simplistically and idealistically—to the notion of opposing and alleviating coercive domination, transforming the present by trying rationally and analytically to lift some of its burdens, situating the works of various literatures with reference to one another and to their historical modes of being. What I am saying is that in the configurations and by virtue of the transfigurations taking place around us, readers

and writers are now in fact secular intellectuals with the archival, expressive, elaborative, and moral responsibilities of that role. (319)

Said's articulation of culture as the realm of the secular can be suggestively linked to my own thinking on cultural memory as a *technical* and *inorganic* way to gather the past. Said's model, of course, can be traced much further: back, through Foucault, to Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics and history, and to his ambitious but life-affirming "revaluation of all values" (*Ecce Homo* 326); back, eventually, to Marx. As Said writes in *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, his 1983 polemic on *criticism*:

I shall use the word *culture* to suggest an environment, process, and hegemony in which individuals (in their private circumstances) and their works are embedded, as well as overseen at the top by a superstructure and at the base by a whole series of methodological attitudes. It is in culture that we can seek out the range of meanings and ideas conveyed by the phrases *belonging to* or *in a place*, being *at home in a place*. (8)

Said goes on to distinguish two types of culture that "best serve" his purposes: "In the first place, culture is used to designate not merely something to which one belongs but something that one possesses, and along with that proprietary process, culture also designates a boundary by which the concepts of what is extrinsic or intrinsic to the culture come into forceful play" (9); "in the second place," Said continues,

there is a more interesting dimension to this idea of culture as possessing possession. And that is the power of culture by virtue of its elevated or superior position to authorize, to dominate, to legitimate, demote, interdict, and validate: in short, the power of culture to be an agent of, and perhaps the main agency for, powerful differentiation within its domain and beyond it too. . . . What is more important in culture is that it is a system of values *saturating* downward almost everything from above without at the same time being available to everything and everyone it dominates. . . . Historically one supposes that culture has always involved hierarchies; it has separated the elite from the popular. The best from the less than best, and so forth. . . . But its tendency has always been to move downward from the height of power and privilege in order to diffuse, disseminate, and expand itself in the widest possible range. (9)

Said's model of culture also begins to sound all-inclusive. Culture might well be a battle ground, but it seems limited and unilateral, at least as far as I understand Said's argument, when it is located along a vertical axis only in-between the powerful (above) and the powerless (below). This begins to resemble a great chain of being, a binarist model that indeed seems unilateral and perhaps even Eurocentric in its location of culture as a transcendent centre and along a "downward" vector, even if it usefully preserves some of the features of culture-as-struggle, of the disciplinary nature of power and knowledge, of discourse as a site of contest and discursive analysis as a tool for understanding the value-laden use of non-transparent language.

Stephen Greenblatt takes a slightly different approach to culture. He, too, emphasizes the secular aspects of modern culture, but he focuses more clearly on culture's disciplinary effects which he link to the historical context and relations of production in which culture is produced. This web or network of relations in turn produce the subject and connect culture to the complexes of power and knowledge that underwrite the social order. But like the term "ideology," Greenblatt reasons, "culture is a term that is repeatedly used without meaning much of anything at all, a vague gesture toward a dimly perceived ethos: aristocratic culture, youth culture, human culture" ("Culture" 225). We could easily add to Greenblatt's list the terms "high," "low," "popular," "multi," and so on, but such an attempt at definition does little to set up the framework for a precise critical practice. Yet as Greenblatt notes,

we might begin by reflecting on the fact that the concept gestures toward what appear to be opposite things: *constraint* and *mobility*. The ensemble of beliefs and practices that form a given culture function as a pervasive technology of control, a set of limits within which social behavior [sic] must be contained, a repertoire of models to which

individuals must conform. (225)

Like Said, Greenblatt articulates the contradictory nature of culture-as-contestual. Most clearly, his reading of the disciplinary forces in the cultural is, as I see it, an important link for a concept of culture as secular and memory as a technology that determines behaviour. The limits for such a disciplinary account of culture, of course, need not be narrow, Greenblatt continues, nor are they likely to be spectacular; most often they tend to be "innocuous responses," either positive or negative: condescending smiles, respectful nods ("Culture" 225). But they still participate in a ubiquitous yet subtle network of power and knowledge: Foucault's *microphysics of power*. This modern disciplinary culture produces the subject within a web of evaluative relations that literature, as Greenblatt notes, has long been in the service of in its dispensing of praise and blame. To put this another way, questions about cultural memory and the past are questions about how we "imagine" the past in the present and how this persistence can be said to determine individual and social behaviour: concepts like "ideology" and "hegemony" are ways to talk about how power and knowledge tap into the "remembered" past to legitimate the present, to organize, at the most intimate levels, how we think, act, and express ourselves. As Greenblatt insists, culture is closely linked to discipline, and one of the strongest ligatures in this linkage is mnemonic.

We can see this focus on the disciplinary culture especially in the discontinuous and divergent scholarship of the New Historicism,¹⁰ of which Greenblatt is a pre-eminent spokesman. The New Historicism's scholarship, which is particularly concerned with the English Renaissance, reads the past as a mnemonic-trace, as a text that we must still interpret, precisely because this past records the cultural perturbations produced most obviously by the concomitant emergence of capitalist exchange and modern discipline. H. Aram Veenser reasons that "the Renaissance is *our* culture [our past] because it is the origin of our disciplinary society" (*The New Historicism* 239; qtd. in Veenser, *The New Historicism Reader* 18).

The New Historicist model of culture explains some aesthetic aspects of the cultural and its symbolic exchanges and negotiations, such as the problem of representation, but always in relation to the historical context and the social organization of power; it adheres to what Veenser calls the first assumption of New Historicism: "that material and aesthetic practices incite each other. They cannot flourish but together" (15). Of course, few critics agree on precisely what the New Historicism is, on whether or not its inclusive historical methods justify its textual ends. Nonetheless, the models of culture developed by Greenblatt or Veenser seem to cover much the same ground that we covered in Williams' theory of cultural materialism, although the latter methodology seems to posit a clearer theoretical connection to "specific historical referents" and political positions (Shea 128). More precisely, the ultimately sociological insistence of the New Historicism that the analysis of culture will illuminate the "self's deep implication in its founding culture" (Harman 63, qtd. in Veenser 3) is a fundamental claim of a theory of cultural mnemonics as well. In fact, I suggest that one of the deepest and most powerful ties that implicates, that imbricates the self in-between the material and the ideal, that is, in the realm of culture and its disciplinary apparatuses, is memory: memory functions as deep in our minds as language itself (although the archaeological metaphor here might be misleading), and its determinations of

¹⁰Veenser lists five points that define New Historicism and its understanding of the cultural: "1) that every expressive act is embedded in a network of material practices; 2) that every act of unmasking, critique, and opposition uses the tools it condemns and risks falling prey to the practices it exposes; 3) that literary and non-literary 'texts' circulate inseparably; 4) that no discourse, imaginative or archival, gives access to unchanging truths or expresses unalterable human nature; and 5) that a critical method and a language adequate to describe culture under capitalism participate in the economy they describe" (*The New Historicism Reader* 2). The (problematic) filiation of the American "New Historicism" to British "cultural materialism" or "cultural poetics" is briefly dealt with in Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield's *Political Shakespeare* (vii-viii; 2-17).

behaviour, its links to the processes of ideology, are no less implanted. Of course, this process is by no means natural, transparent, nor straightforward; to remember is to *re-present*, to select, to interpret and re-interpret. To revise Greenblatt's famous dictum: perhaps we do not so much speak *with* the dead when we gather our thoughts of the past as speak *of* them, as Simonides did.

The picture of culture that should be emerging is one that reflects this state of productive uncertainty and indeterminacy, one that forces us to think about—and within—the empire of signs, about the slippery conceptual ground between the signifier and the signified, about the links between the ideal and the material, about, as we have already noted, *representation*. Robert Young imagines culture to be less ordered and much more semiotic than it might appear to, say, Greenblatt, and much less sacrosanct than it might seem to Said. Culture, for Young, is conflictual, uneven, and unpredictable: capable, on the one hand, of producing monological and metaphysical, racist and sexist knowledges; and, on the other hand, of producing more hybrid and anti-syncretic forms, including—especially—the sorts of cultural formations that we regularly encounter in the study of colonial and post-colonial discourse. As Young notes, the contemporary category of culture is inherently ambivalent, often uncertain and riven by its “unending internal dissension” (*Colonial Desire* 53). For Young, “culture never stands alone but always participates in a conflictual economy acting out the tension between sameness and difference, comparison and differentiation, unity and diversity, coherence and dispersion, containment and subversion” (53).

Young's account of culture is, at bottom, dialectical, and he traces it back, curiously, through Arnold's “objectionable” anthropological formulation of English culture to a dynamic and antithetical mixture of cultural and racial difference that is “ambivalent, antagonistic, conflictual and divided” (*Colonial Desire* 88). Once again, we see that culture is a site of struggle, the place where the “antagonistic forms of inner dissonance” caused by imbalances of power and informed by (political) questions of race, gender, and class meet and mutate (xii). But any account of the cultural must own up to its “imagined past” (28), to the ideological or “imaginary” representations of the real conditions of existence, to invoke Althusser's definition, that organize culture and desire. This is roughly the task that Young sets out to accomplish in his excavation of the category of race in Western culture in *Colonial Desire*: “Culture and race developed together,” he writes, “imbricated within each other: their discontinuous forms of repetition suggest, as Foucault puts it, ‘how we have been trapped in our own history.’ The nightmare of the ideologies and categories of racism continue to repeat upon the living” (*Colonial Desire* 28). Echoing Marx's famous line from “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” Young reasons that

[a]ny notion of culture will involve a form of history; indeed, culture as well as capital is the form through which history manifests itself in the present, the labours of the dead that weigh upon and revisit the society of the living. The close relation between the development of the concepts of culture and race in the nineteenth century means that an implicit racism lies powerfully hidden but repeatedly propagated within Western notions of culture. (91)

Young's analysis of the concept of culture as a seedbed, as a site of mutation for potentially transcultural and dynamic *hybrid* social formations, but also as the location of monocultural and moribund forms of thought such as racism, might discomfort some; nonetheless, Young's position is particularly useful for understanding post-colonial discourse and its representations of how racist colonial desire persists from the past into the present. For a critic like Stuart Hall, however, *Colonial Desire* itself is a flawed piece of work, one that conflates Victorian racial theory and its concept of “hybridity” with the more recent deconstructive (analytical) way that postcolonial critics such as Homi Bhabha use the term to anatomize subjective and social identity formation from the perspective of the post-colonial and its sign systems (259). For critics such as Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, however, Young's project is more defensible: it “offers a number of objections to the indiscriminate use of the term” *hybridity* and draws our attention to the difference between the “unconscious process of

hybrid mixture, or creolization, and a conscious and politically motivated concern for deliberate disruption of homogeneity" (*Key Concepts in Post-colonial Studies* 120).

Once again, the split between "unconscious" and "conscious" processes is mobilized to explain individual and social behaviour, or how our thoughts and memories are linked to actual social practices and formations, like racism, or to concepts that object to such essentialist forms of thought, like hybridity. This, in one sense, is the heart, the location, of what I will call the post-colonial memory-work—the way that the past can determine us, the way that it can seize hold of our minds, but it is also the way that we can remember the past differently. Culture, to put it bluntly, is where change, where social transformation must begin to happen. In Young's analysis, as in the models of culture I have already considered, culture is an un-settled field, one that is continually shaped and re-shaped by the dialectic forces of history and desire: in the modern period and then more forcefully in postmodern period,

the externality of category against which culture is defined is gradually turned inwards and becomes part of culture itself. External or internal, this division into same and other is less a site of contradiction and conflict than culture's founding possibility: like gender, class, and race, its willing accomplices, culture's categories are never essentialist, even when they aspire to be so. This is because culture is always a dialectical process, inscribing and expelling its own alterity. The genealogy of the concept 'culture' shows that it does not so much progress as constantly reform itself around conflictual divisions, participating in, and always a part of, a complex hybridized economy that is never at ease with itself, but rather involves, in Jonathan Dollimore's words, "a mercurial process of displacement and condensation, so fluid yet always with effects of a brutally material, actually violent kind" (Young, *Colonial Desire* 30).

Young's conflictual and dialectical concept of secular culture rejects any form of essentialist thought, and it is useful to think about memory's operation within the economies of power and desire from this point of view. As well, we can hear terms from Freudian mnemonics—displacements, condensation, manifestation—used to describe culture as a material process of meaning-making. It is this semiological aspect of culture that I am most concerned with in this dissertation—with how memory operates within, and is inseparable from, the sign, from language, and from its ultimately cultural locations and mechanisms of inscription. These processes might well be dialectical, but they seem to be more *dialogical* to me. To be sure, they reflect the fact that culture is an un-settled field. To explore this notion further, let us turn to the critical project of John Frow, whose own anti-essentialist critique of contemporary culture, and especially his rejection of the endemic and illusory distinction between high and low culture in contemporary cultural studies, preserves a sense of culture as a "regime" of value or a "field" of struggle.

Frow considers, amongst other things, what he sees as an "essentialization" of high culture even in the work of such venerated social critics as Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau. As I have already hinted, Frow denotes the cultural as a "field" or "regime of value"¹¹ characterized by "negotiation, contestation, discrimination" as well as by its interactive and distinct "frameworks of value," which are "irreducible to a single perspective" (*Cultural Studies and Cultural Value* 6, 133). As Frow reasons, there is no escape from culture, from "the discourse of value, and no escape from the pressure and indeed the obligation to treat the world as though it were fully relational, fully interconnected. But what becomes entirely problematical is just the possibility of relation: that is, of critical movement across the spaces between incommensurate

¹¹ Frow argues that "the concept of regime expresses one of the fundamental theses of work in cultural studies: that no object, no text, no cultural practice has an intrinsic or necessary meaning or value or function; and that meaning, value, and function are always the effect of specific (and changing, changeable) social relations and mechanisms of signification" (*Cultural Studies and Cultural Value* 6, 144).

evaluative regimes" (134). By shifting his discussion of "culture" to what it does, to its *effects*, to specific economies within the regime of value, Frow attempts to avoid the sort of relativism and universalization that he suggests has hamstrung cultural studies: knowledge, too, is embedded in social relations and must not be allowed the "false glow of transparency" (130). This is especially the case, Frow protests, of the "cultural intellectual" who refuses to acknowledge his or her own cultural politics and the speaking positions he or she "objectively" inhabits. As Frow writes, the problem of culture is the problem of value and relation or, more precisely, the problem of how to "account for the systemic formation of value without assuming criteria that hold good right across the cultural field" (135). Such a conception of culture might strive to be specific but it invariably ends up limited in its discussion of the social relations of value and the norms and positions of those who attempt (and pretend) to carry "dispassionate analysis" (135). Culture, Frow argues, following James Clifford, "is always relational, an inscription of communicative processes that exist, historically, between subjects in relations of power" (136).

This is an idea we shall carry forward into our discussion in the next chapter of memory and inscription *in-time*, especially in the context of Foucault's concept of "counter-memory" and in Frow's own critique of postmodernity in *Time and Commodity Culture*, in which he sees the postmodern as modernity gone to seed, as an "imaginary" totality or form of social organization based upon a bewildering relativism and perhaps even a contemptuous indifference. For Frow, the regime of culture denotes "a semiotic institution generating evaluative regularities under certain conditions of use, and in which particular empirical audiences or communities may be more or less fully imbricated. . . . Regimes of value are mechanisms [or semiotic apparatuses] that permit the construction and regulation of value-equivalence, and indeed permit cross-cultural mediation" (*Cultural Studies* 144). Culture thus exists as a semiotic network; culture, as Frow argues, is a framework in which we socially organize value or signs and construct our selves against the mirror images of our mythic "Other" (3-4). To study culture is to understand the values and positions that organize this specular relationship: "culture," Frow writes,

is always a matter both of what binds together and of what keeps apart. At its most basic, it is a concept that refers to the means of formation and of identification of social groups. More precisely, as Jameson argues, it refers to a social group seen as other, or to my own group's ways and customs *as seen by another group*. . . . To use the concept is to suppose and to enforce a distance of perspective and value. (*Cultural Studies* 2)

Since I shall reconsider Frow's perspectival or *in-between* location of culture in the next chapter, in the context of his rejection of postmodern cultural relativism and postmodern epistemology as a rather poorly thought out "imaginary" totality that amounts to nothing more than the "exacerbation of modernity" (3), I will not dwell on it here. Frow's view of culture, nonetheless, flows from his concern to understand the "linkage between culture and class," from the "ocular" problematic of "social identity" and its mnemonic frames at the level of the sign: "To say that the concept of culture refers to the existence of social groups—their formation their maintenance as coherent entities, their definition against other groups, the constant process of reformation—is to raise difficult questions about the categories of unity that groups lay claim to, and upon which the theorization of groups often uncritically relies" (13).

Although Frow's work "only tacitly and tangentially . . . coincides with the critique of identity and identity politics that informs some of the more interesting work in feminist and post-colonial theory" (13), including the work of Homi Bhabha, it nonetheless demonstrates the importance of culture as a regime of value and as a set of particular but interrelated social positions in which each of us must *see* and *hear* ourselves. As Frow claims: "My concern is to indicate the danger of positing imaginary social unities as the explanatory basis for accounts of cultural texts, and to think of cultures as being processes that divide as much as they bring together" (13). Culture, once again, is described in terms of its centripetal and centrifugal energies, including its ways of "marking time," to use Huyssen's apt phrase. As such, memory plays a considerable role in the organization of such a delusive totality or continuous temporality,

what Frow calls "epochal coherence" (3).

I have accounted for some of the divisive and unificatory forces and energies of contemporary culture as an un-settled field in the previous pages, and I want to conclude my description of culture with a snap shot of the work of a critic who, more so than most, theorizes the *in-between* spaces, the *interstitial* times, and the antagonistic processes of culture and their relation to the process of signification: Homi Bhabha.

Bhabha's work is characterized by a range and a catachrestic energy that makes it both daunting and enticing; I will not try to provide a systematic account or exegesis of it here. What strikes me about Bhabha's re-location of culture, however, as far as I understand it, is his ability to bring into play a sense of modern (secular) culture as disciplinary and conflictual and to add to it, from a post-colonial perspective informed by psychoanalytic and post-structural theory, a sense of culture as *iterative* and *differential*—a model that is inherently *secular* and *semiological* in its framing of culture as place of dissemination and contamination where hybrid and ambivalent border lives can be enunciated. In one view, Bhabha's model explains how *newness enters the world* at the level of the sign, in the nexus of language and desire, in-between "new" and "old" worlds, in-between "us" and "them."

Bhabha argues that modernity itself is "cut up" by the disjunctive or "interruptive temporality of the present" (245), by the time-lagged "sign of the present" (241) or "just now," as Bhabha puts it, which can never coincide with itself and which

ensures that what seems the 'same' within cultures is negotiated in the time-lag of the 'sign' which constitutes the intersubjective, social realm. Because that lag is indeed the very structure of difference and splitting within the discourse of modernity, turning it into a performative process, then each repetition of the sign of modernity is different, specific to its historical and cultural conditions of enunciation. (247)

In this differential account of modern culture—of culture as deferment and *différance*—Bhabha insists that a new cultural space of representation and signification can be opened "from the stroke of the sign that establishes the intersubjective world of truth 'deprived of subjectivity,' back to the rediscovery of that moment of agency and individuation in the social imaginary of the order of historic symbols" (251). To be sure, this time-lagged "stroke" or inscription is a kind of memory-event, a marking-in-time and a "coming after," to use Huyssen's terms, that occurs at the moment of signification (representation) and of subject formation: it connects, in a dynamic and elastic (but always belated) way, the past to the present. As Bhabha claims, his interstitial relocation of culture *to—or as—the margins in-between* is essential to understanding the diasporic migrations and hybrid cultural formations of the post-colonial world, not to mention the post-structural "revolutions" at the level of critical theory. "I have attempted to provide a form of the writing of cultural difference in the midst of modernity," Bhabha explains, "that is inimical to binary boundaries: whether these be between past and present, inside and outside, subject and object, signifier and signified" (251).

In such a semiological and performative model, culture inhabits a middle ground: the interstitial and ambivalent *in-between* time and space of the enunciated (inscribed) sign. Suspended between the material and the ideal, between "now" and "then," "Culture only emerges as a problem, or a problematic, at that point at which there is a loss [or forgetting] of meaning in the contestation and articulation of everyday life, between classes, genders, races, nations" (Bhabha, *Location* 34). Such an interstitial or hybrid understanding of culture, as my interpretation of Bhabha's argument shows, is ultimately hopeful; it forces us to re-think, to re-value, the boundaries where cultures interact, where "meanings and values are (mis)read or signs are misappropriated" (34), not to mention the mnemonic mechanisms that govern the centripetal and centrifugal forces, the entropic exchanges that occur there. In doing so, we begin to create a space for a "new" understanding of cultural value and difference as negotiable and translatable, as "undecidable" and "uncertain," as Bhabha suggests, that runs us head-long into the problem of the past or cultural memory: the problem of the relation of the past to the present that, indeed, in

the context of Western modernity might once have been imagined as a great, binary "epistemological distance" (30), but that turns out to be something much more intimate and uncanny—an aporetic, epistemological space which instead of widening as time seems to pass folds over onto itself, doubles, and spirals out of such linear or mimetic conceptions into something more tautological, ghostly, and "corrupted." As Bhabha explains,

The enunciation of cultural difference problematizes the binary division of past and present, tradition and modernity, at the level of cultural representation and its authoritative address. It is the problem of how, in signifying the present, something comes to be represented, relocated and translated in the name of tradition, in the guise of a pastness that is not necessarily a faithful sign of historical memory but a strategy of representing authority in terms of the artifice of the archaic. (Location 35)

Instead of a linear conception of culture and meaning-making which retains some sense of continuity with the "real" or "pure" or "authentic" past—which can, of course, only ever be lamented (nostalgia), repeated (myth) or repudiated (utopia)—Bhabha's semiological model of culture as artifice is tied to representation and iteration and to the specific and unrepeatable moment of cultural inscription: to context and to the "stroke" of the sign. Bhabha traces the genealogy of modernity's amnesiac self-conception to its sense of the occult persistence of the past into the present, to a deterministic logic or historicism that the moderns wanted to forget. In the "high" modernist scheme, the "talented" individual is always already de-centred and alienated—"belated," to invoke T. S. Eliot—and hence incapable of acting, much less believing in the "science" of History or other forms of chronological self-consolidation such as Tradition or the comforts of "collective" memory. This is what Terdiman calls the modern (European) "memory crisis." Analysis of the subjective and social implications of this modern cultural event intersects with many different theoretical discourses: biology, geology, psychoanalysis, sociology, relativity theory and quantum physics, structuralism and post-structuralism, anti-foundationalism and anti-humanism, discourse analysis, deconstruction, and so forth. But as Terdiman claims in *Present Past*, the central event in this memory crisis is the crisis of representation, the recognition that words are not the equivalents of things, which is the awareness that signifiers and signifieds are arbitrarily fastened together in and as a culture's memory, in and on other texts as modes of inscribing meaning or value. The problem of representation can thus be "construed as the memory crisis seen from within [its] own cognitive restrictions" (8). "What is at stake," Terdiman writes, "is nothing less than how a culture imagines the presentation of the past to be possible, for the problem of representing the past is really the representation problem itself, seized in its most critical locus in experience" (32).

Bhabha's articulation of the semiological mechanisms of modern and postmodern (not to mention post-colonial) culture explores this "critical locus" not as a "crisis" but, rather, as a more hopeful and performative site or cultural event where we can learn to inscribe and to interpret identity as more plural and contingent precisely because, as Nietzsche has shown us, we can *forget* in-time. He thus refuses the binarist and essentialist logic of nostalgia and utopianism, of coherent or unified selves, of freely perceiving and transcendent consciousness—the theoretical self-justifications of modernity's *grands recits* of "progress, homogeneity, cultural organicism, the deep nation, the long past," values which, as Bhabha notes, have been regularly mobilized in the modern to "rationalize the authoritarian 'normalizing' tendencies within cultures in the name of the national interest or the ethnic prerogative" (*Nation and Narration* 4) and which, as Lyotard maintains, have ostensibly "failed" in the postmodern. These narratives are, in one view, outdated codifications of cultural memory—*myths* that no longer explain the world. For Bhabha, identity, like the category of meaning, is more performative and contingent, more constestual, and it must be sought in the *secular* domain of culture: in the overlapping, interstitial, and conflictual space of cultural difference and value; in the semiological processes of signification, of deferral, of slippage; in the cultural spaces where subjects are formed and where signs (and memories) circulate.

Bhabha's theory of cultural translation and of meaning-making in *time* and *space* thus further articulates what some of the contours and conditions of possibility of a hybrid or interstitial model of diasporic metropolitan culture might look like from a post-colonial perspective. Informed as he is by the discourses of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, Bhabha explains that to understand culture from the post-colonial perspective, which is the perspective that underwrites this dissertation, we must ask:

How do strategies of *representation* or empowerment come to be formulated in the competing claims of communities where, despite shared histories [or memories] of deprivation and discrimination, the exchange of values, meanings and priorities may not always be collaborative and dialogical, but may be profoundly antagonistic, conflictual and even incommensurable? (*Location of Culture* 2; emphasis added)

This relocation and reconfiguration of culture rejects notions of organic and traditional pasts, of nationalism and progress, of origins and authenticity—the glorious “it-was”—and gives us room to recognize the emergent and differential, the negotiable and translational, aspects of hybrid “border lives” in the present, in the difficult time and space of the “it-is.” Such post-colonial border lives, lived in and as the “sentences of history,” Bhabha writes, force us to “confront the concept of culture outside timeless *objets d'art* and beyond the canonization of the “idea” of aesthetics, to engage with culture as an uneven, incomplete process of meaning and value, more often than not composed of incommensurable demands and practices, produced in the act of social survival” (*Location* 172). This, we might say, is the site of post-colonial cultural memory, where representations of the past are organized in and as the present but always “through a process of alterity”:

[c]ulture becomes as much an uncomfortable, disturbing practice of survival and supplementarity—between art and politics, past and present, the public and the private—as its resplendent being is a moment of pleasure, enlightenment, or liberation. It is from such narrative positions that the postcolonial prerogative seeks to affirm and extend a new collaborative dimension, both within the margins of the nation-space and across boundaries between nations and people. (175)

This view of culture also sets us on a trajectory that leads us to the problems of temporality and consciousness, and hence memory. For it is within the field of culture, the sign system of the social, that the displacing and embracing operations of remembering and forgetting, of “old” and “new” representations, work to make up our “mongrel” selves and societies.

Bhabha calls these hybrid cultural or discursive spaces the “Third Space of enunciation,” that in-between time and space which

makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, destroys this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is customarily revealed as an integrated, open, expanding code. Such an intervention quite properly challenges our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People. In other words, the disruptive temporality of enunciation displaces the narrative of the Western nation which Benedict Anderson so perceptively describes as being written in homogeneous, serial time. . . . It is that Third Space of enunciation, though unrepresentable in itself, which constitutes the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized and read anew. (*Location* 37)

This unrepresentable “Third Space” is the space of culture, and it is both the *location* of memory and, in a different way, the *object* of its critical analysis. That is, the production of meaning, for Bhabha, occurs in relation to the polarities of “You” and “I,” “Other” and “Self,” and even, in one sense, “past” and “present”: “The linguistic difference that informs any cultural performance is dramatized in the common semiotic account of the disjuncture between the subject of enunciation, which is not represented in the statement but which is the

acknowledgment of its discursive embeddedness and address, its cultural positionality, its reference to a present time and a specific space" (36). This contact or in-between condition destroys the logics of synchronicity and evolution [diachronicity] which traditionally authorize the subject of cultural knowledge. It is often taken for granted in materialist and idealist problematics that the value of culture is an object of study, and the value of any analytic activity that is considered cultural, lie [sic] in a capacity to produce a cross-referential, generalizable unity that signifies a progression or evolution of ideas-in-time, as well as a critical self-reflection on their premises or determinants. (36-7)

But signs, like memories, like culture itself, are disunified; they constantly and continuously remake themselves, and hence like the iterative present seems to be inadequately named, to be "unrepresentable." It is within this *in-between* time and space, Bhabha insists, that we must locate culture, where identities and intertextual relations can ensure culture's hybridity in the present at the same time that they "explain" the past. My interest is in this cultural mechanism, this iterative space and interstitial time: with how memory works from the post-colonial perspective to organize temporality and to negotiate identity as cultural difference. Such an elaboration of memory's role in establishing a "new" epistemology or knowledge of cultural difference as "struggle" and in undermining essentialist or archaic modes of "cultural synthesis" rests upon a clear understanding of the interstitial space or theoretical threshold in-between the past and the present, a differential and deferred semiotic space that, in one view, is contemporary culture itself. As the anthropologist Clifford Geertz suggests, following Max Weber, culture consists of those semiotic "webs of significance" and of "meaning" that man spins for himself and within which he is suspended (*The Interpretation of Cultures* 5).

At the heart of Bhabha's heterogeneous understanding of culture-as-difference and of the mnemonics of the time-lag is a fundamental re-thinking of modernity, of the relationship between the past and present, between tradition and progress, between "then" and "now"—the *un-settled* grounds of the postmodern and the post-colonial. This is also the territory of cultural memory, as I will argue more carefully in the next chapter: cultural memory, in the most general terms, is the semiological or discursive analysis of how contemporary cultures remember and forget the past; it is the study of the social function of memory and its roles in constructing and maintaining various attachments to the past. All manner of cultural inscriptions can be read as attempts to represent the past. As I will show, the forces and values of contemporary culture, some of which we have just considered, mark the disunified domains in-between which subject positions are formed and communities are "imagined" from the unequal, the impure, and the incommensurable "stubborn chunks" of "archaic" identities and traditions, values and beliefs (Bhabha, *Location* 219). We "become" our selves, we might say, in and through memory; we remember our selves through the cultural frames and mechanisms of signification as always already written up/on (inscribed) surfaces—"chunks" of old wax. To anticipate my argument somewhat, what is essential is to see that these conflictual values and forces are profoundly mnemonic, that memory is necessary to social organization as much as to the question "who am I" or even Nietzsche's "why?" Another way to put this is to say that the forces of constraint and mobility that comprise culture (its mechanisms of signification, its values and energies), the *binary* structures by which modern power and knowledge tend to be ordered (including the categories of inclusion/exclusion, us/them, normal/abnormal, civil/savage, Same/Other) operate primarily, if in an occult manner, at the level of cultural remembering and forgetting. Terdiman calls this "habituated practices"; I will argue that we must move away from such structural and homogeneous, such organic and binarist models, to more semiological and discursive models of cultural production and circulation that are spatially and temporally *disjunctive*. This move, I think, is part of what underwrites Bhabha's impressive "commitment to theory," which, far from privileging an endless semiosis, prohibits simplistic or totalizing interpretations or epistemologies based upon purity and polarity, which understands the links between the present and the past, or memory, just as it understands language, to be cultural systems of signification, and which itself turns upon a *relocation* of

modern and postmodern culture that Bhabha slyly (and I think optimistically) designates as the attempt "to turn the present into the 'post'" (*Location* 18).¹²

I will return to Bhabha's theory of cultural translation and difference, to his post-colonial and psychoanalytic *relocation* of culture and re-thinking of the temporality of the present in Section Two. By insisting upon a differential understanding of culture, Bhabha opens up lines of questions about how culture operates that I want to press further in the context of a sociological theory of cultural memory and my own reading of *Remembering Babylon*. By insisting that genuine cultural change must begin at the level of the sign and within the intersubjective realm of the social—on the level of culture—Bhabha refuses to simply set up "new symbols of identity, new 'positive' images that fuel unreflective 'identity politics'" (247). Instead, Bhabha's relocation of culture forces us to remember—to reflect upon—those aspects of the colonial past that have remained hidden, repressed, and hitherto forgotten. From this perspective, culture becomes an important location for re-thinking the modern and postmodern present—the "now" that can never coincide with itself:

The challenge to modernity comes in redefining the signifying relation to a disjunctive 'present': staging the past as symbol, myth, memory, history, the ancestral—but a past whose iterative *value as sign* reinscribes the 'lessons' of the past into the very textuality of the present that determines both the identification with, and the interrogation of, modernity. (247)

I want to carry Bhabha's notion of culture as a discursive space where the "staged" or represented past and a "disjunctive" present coalesce into the remainder of this dissertation; as Bhabha insists, culture is where meaning and identity are continually re-inscribed upon the grainy surfaces of texts, upon the "waxy" surface of souls; culture is where mankind, covered in "white" or "black" skin, as Frantz Fanon reminds us, can be found "digging into its own flesh to find a meaning" (*Black Skin, White Masks* 9). A theory of cultural memory must negotiate the remembered past and read the stroke of the sign without essentializing it or succumbing to the temptation of teleology—of nostalgia or utopianism; a theory of cultural memory, as I see it, questions the discursive persistence of the past in the modern and postmodern but also, in my own more limited argument, in the post-colonial. Bhabha's work, then, is invaluable to my present inquiry and its two aims: on the one hand, to understand how cultural memory can be linked to theory; on the other, to a sense of what the contours of cultural mnemonics in post-colonial novels from the *settler-invader* society of Australia might look like. Most obviously, memory, as I see it, operates in the ambivalent processes of cultural recollection that govern the textual (or intertextual) "return" or "re-staging" of the past around which culture and its components—especially temporality and language—is organized in the present, whether in the metropolitan diaspora or the *settler-invader* colony. As Bhabha says of language,

The work of the word impedes the question of the transparent assimilation of cross-cultural meanings in a unitary sign of the "human." In-between culture, at the point of its articulation of identity or distinctiveness, comes the question of signification. This is not simply a matter of language; it is the question of culture's representation of difference—manners, words, rituals, customs, time—inscribed *without* a transcendent subject that knows, outside of a mimetic social memory . . . What becomes of cultural identity, the ability to put the right word in the right place at the right time, when it crosses the colonial nonsense? (125)

What becomes, we might ask, to turn Bhabha's question slightly, of the subject of an interpretive

¹² Anne McClintock notes that the paradox and paranoia in the "almost ritualistic ubiquity of 'post-' words in current culture (post-colonialism, post-modernism, post-structuralism, post-cold war, post-marxism, post-apartheid, post-soviet, post-ford, post-feminism, post-national, post-historic, even post-contemporary) signals . . . a widespread, epochal crisis in the idea of linear, historical 'progress'" (292).

cultural memory, a subject that is made up of the "permanent" and "impermanent" bits of the past, of mnemonic-traces? a subject in which remembering and forgetting, sameness and difference, meaning and meaninglessness are revealed to be arbitrary and changeable cultural choices? How do a culture's intertexts—its novels, its monuments, its traditions, its "cultural libraries"—cross oceans? and what becomes of the colonial (and postcolonial) subject of memory as a result of these *discursive sea changes*? To focus this question more precisely, how do settler-invaders locate themselves *in relation to* their "others" amidst the decontextualized and, in some cases, indecipherable signs—bodies and languages—of "new" cultural spaces and times? These are questions of cultural semiology and of what I think of as the (post-colonial) work of memory: "the cultural meaning of any particular object is determined by a whole system of constitutive rules: rules which do not regulate behaviour so much as create the possibility of particular forms of behaviour. . . . It is in this sense that a culture is composed of a set of symbolic rules" (Culler, *Structuralist Poetics* 5). Memory, I think, functions as a dynamic system that helps to determine the cultural "rules" of the present in-between the past and the future, in-between *now* and *then*; memory organizes or re-presents past experience (social life) in the present and constitutes the subject in the overlapping spaces of culture and in the interstices of the time lag. In "Unpacking my Library . . . Again," an honorific and critical repetition of Walter Benjamin's essay on book collecting, Bhabha puts it this way:

In emphasizing the mediated nature of both identity and event, while stressing the crucial differential 'densities' that are involved in the process of designating a historical transformation, Benjamin alerts us to a way of reading *and being, or dwelling, "in" History*. He insists on the need to recognize the "human" (or the historical) as always in need of translation, or mediation, in order to accede to its historicity: the human as the cultural "sign" of a social or discursive event, not simply the assumed abstract Idea or symbol of the universal similitude of all Humanity. (203)

I have sketched at length how the disjunctive and performative field of culture might be construed as the *un-settled* location for an anti-humanist hermeneutics of memory, for a mnemonics that refuses abstraction, for a psychology and sociology of inscription and representation, and for the emergence of a hybrid post-colonial subject whose present and past are determined, in part, by discourse. What then can be said about "memory," the second term in our neologism, which to some thinkers is culture itself?

Chapter Two

§ Memory

Memory plays strange tricks on us.
David Malouf
12 Edmonstone Street

If "culture" is an unsettled field, things are not necessarily more solid, nor apparent, when it comes to "memory," the etymology of which leads us to the Latin *memoria*, a noun of quality or condition that is derived from *memor*, to be mindful, a reduplication of the root *mer* that the OED traces to the Indogermanic *smer* and the Sanskrit *smar*. The idea of memory as a "mindfulness" is preserved, I think, in both Mary Carruthers' definition of memory as "the matrix of all human temporal perception" (192) and Martin Heidegger's notion of memory as a "gathering of thought" ("What Calls for Thinking" 352). Building on the romantic mnemonics of Hölderlin and the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger defines memory by extending it beyond a strictly historical or psychological understanding to involve consciousness and temporality: "It is plain that the word means something else than merely the psychologically demonstrable ability to retain a mental representation of something which is past" (352). "Memory," as Heidegger continues,

thinks back to something thought. . . . Memory is the gathering of thought upon what everywhere demands to be thought about first of all. Memory is the gathering of recollection, thinking back. It safely keeps and keeps concealed within it that to which at each given time thought must first be given in everything that essentially is, everything that appeals to us as what has being and has been in being. Memory, Mother of the Muses—the thinking back to what is to be thought—is the source and ground of poesy. (352)

Heidegger's descriptions of existence or the "question of being" are not my concern in what follows, but his point that "Time must be brought to light and genuinely grasped as the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of being" (Being and Time 15), that "the central range of problems of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time correctly viewed and explained" (16), reminds us of the importance of time to mnemonics, to consciousness, and to perception. Memory, or the gathering of thought, is a thinking back to what has already been thought in-time:

In its factual being Da-sein always is as and "what" it already was. Whether explicitly or not, it is its past. It is its own past not only in such a way that its past, as it were, pushes itself along "behind" it, and that it possess what is past as a property that is still objectively present and that at times has an effect on it. Da-sein "is" its past in the manner of its being which, roughly expressed, on each occasion "occurs" out of its future. (17)

Heidegger does not use the term "memory" *per se* in his "destructuring" of the history of ontology, but Da-sein's interpretation of itself as its past, its inquiry into its historical past and tradition, for Heidegger, poses the question of being in relation to the past, to temporality, and hence to memory. Of "tradition," in which being is entangled, Heidegger writes: "What has been handed down it hands down over to obviousness; it bars access to those original 'wellsprings' out of which the traditional categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. The tradition makes us forget . . ." (19).

Heidegger's project in *Being in Time* is to "remember" the forgotten question of being that has been neglected, according to Heidegger, since Greek metaphysics was "uprooted." For my purposes, Heidegger's useful if rather elliptical definition of memory in "What Calls for Thinking" remains at a high level of generality; to say that Memory or Mnemosyne is the Mother of the Muses¹ is to say that memory is involved in all "thought-provoking" (353) activity: in the poetry, music, drama, science, history, and so on that the Muses are said to inspire. And just how such a phenomenological "gathering" might be accomplished is a good question. For even though the phenomenological inquiry into memory is invaluable for any study of memory,² including this one, it posits (to a greater or lesser degree) a freely perceiving subject that contradicts the fundamental assumptions of the post-structural critique of metaphysics and of the mediated nature of language and truth, not to mention the semiological study of culture and the *materialist* claim that social being determines consciousness.³

¹ "Mnemosyne, daughter of Heaven and Earth, bride of Zeus, in nine nights becomes the mother of the nine Muses. Drama and music, dance and poetry are of the womb of Mnemosyne, Memory" (Heidegger, "What Calls for Thinking" 352). "Mnemosyne . . . was traditionally portrayed as a young woman dressed in green, crowned with ever-verdant juniper, and carrying her recording implements, a book and a pen" (Fara and Patterson 2).

² One cannot venture too far into the labyrinth of memory before encountering critical terms and concepts from the discourse of phenomenology—"consciousness," "being," "time," the perception of "things in themselves." To study memory is to study "being." A phenomenological study of memory might take the same object as a cultural or semiological one, but it proceeds in a different direction: it questions the "internal" and "philosophical" aspects of memory as opposed to the "technical" and "external" focus of a semiological study of memory. Most obviously, the idea of a freely perceiving subject contradicts the fundamental laws of post-structural theory that being is social, that culture and language are, in a sense, inseparable and relational "social phenomenon" (Lotman 213). Of course, there are no clear boundaries between such critical categories: where does the subject end and the social begin? Perhaps in the sphere of memory.

³ Heidegger points out at the beginning of *Being and Time*, which was first published in the spring of 1927 in *Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Vol. VIII ("Author's Preface" xvii), that the phenomenological project begins with a particular cultural amnesia, a philosophical forgetting that since Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger argues, trivializes the "question of being" and thus fails to interrogate it, to question being (*Dasein*) as a "thing" itself. As Heidegger explains, Being "has today been forgotten—although our time considers itself progressive in again affirming metaphysics" (*Being and Time* 1). The study of consciousness as a manifestation or ordering of phenomenon is an exceptionally complex and wide field within the realm of theoretical discourse, and I will not attempt to present a comprehensive outline of it here. Rather, I will note that contemporary theorists of memory build upon the pioneering phenomenological studies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Gaston Bachelard, for example, develops a phenomenological model of memory *The Poetics of Space*: in this evocative study of consciousness Bachelard argues that "felicitous space" helps us to structure the languages, images, and localized memories that emerge in our imaginations. Bachelard suggests that "At times we think we know

In a similar way, psychoanalytical models can be said to *internalize* memory insofar as they "recognize the past in the present" and treat the "relation as one of imbrication (one in the place of another)" through the interpretive or hermeneutic activities of masking, reversal, repression, return, disguise (de Certeau, *Heterologies* 4). Such a "distribution of memory" (4), which is linked to the Freudian "mechanism" of the *return of the repressed*, is also "linked to a certain [modern] conception of time and memory, according to which consciousness is both the deceptive *mask* and the operative *trace* of events that organize the present. If the past (that which took place during, and took the form of, a decisive moment in the course of a crisis) is repressed, it returns in the present from which it was excluded, but does so surreptitiously" (3). Thus psychoanalysis "contradicts historiography, which postulates a continuity . . . and a complicity between its agents and its objects," which "conceives the relation as one of succession and correlation, of cause and effect, and which "is based upon a clean break between the past and the present, between two supposedly distinct domains" (4).

Freud is usually credited as being the founder of modern psychoanalysis; he is said to have "discovered" that the content of dreams is derived from waking life and hence meaningful, capable of being interpreted not as divine messages, symbols, or prophetic warnings but as forms of wish fulfillment (*Interpretation of Dreams* 35-46). Dreams are memory effects, and Freud's work led him to further develop his theories of primary and secondary systems of consciousness, of the conscious and the unconscious, of the ego and the id; Freud's model of memory's "untrustworthy" (551) hermeneutic/interpretive structures is, in this view, an anatomy of the human psyche and its complex processes: of the storage and retrieval of permanent and impermanent or unconscious and conscious mnemonic traces of "past" experiences, and of the power these traces, these memories, have over "present" human behaviour. As de Certeau writes, there is something "uncanny" about the past and its "cannibalistic" activities in Freud's paradigm, the way the past "re-bites": "memory becomes the closed arena of conflict between two contradictory operations: forgetting, which is not something passive, a loss, but an action directed against the past; and the mnemonic trace, the return of what was forgotten" (3).

De Certeau claims that history and psychoanalysis "distribute" the space of memory in different ways: one sees the past in the present (psychoanalysis); the other, the past beside the present (historiography) (4). But the two projects, one "internal," one "external," take a similar object: namely,

to find principles and criteria to serve as guides to follow in attempting to understand the differences, or guarantee the continuities, between the organization of the actual and the formations of the past; to give the past explanatory value and/or make the present capable of explaining the past; to relate the representations of the past or present to the conditions which determined their production; to elaborate (how? where?) different ways of thinking, and by doing so overcoming the violence (the conflicts and contingencies of history), including the violence of thought itself; to define and construct a narrative, which is for both disciplines the favored form of elucidating discourse. (4-5)

De Certeau's description of the common ground in-between psychoanalysis and history uncannily repeats what I think of as the central objectives of a theory of cultural memory. Furthermore, it is Freud, de Certeau claims, whom we must understand in order to link these two seemingly disparate yet interdependent projects together, a claim we shall have cause to reflect upon shortly in our subsequent discussion of the modern "memory crisis" in Europe and the "end" or "loss" of history in the modern and postmodern worlds. As Terdiman insists, Freud's *mnemo-analysis* is

ourselves in time, when all we know is a sequence of fixations in the spaces of the being's stability—a being who does not want to melt away, and who, even in the past, when he sets out in search of things past, wants time to "suspend" its flight. In its countless alveoli space contains compressed time. That is what space is for" (8). For Bachelard, "Memories are motionless, and the more they are fixed in space, the sounder they are" (9).

"our culture's last Art of Memory": "for psychoanalysis memory is the heart of the matter" (*Present Past* 240-41); memory registers the power of the past's hold on us or, conversely, our inability to come to grips with the past. Terdiman continues:

With Freud, preoccupation with memory proliferates and pervades psychological and cultural theory until the individual almost seems to have been reconceived as a cluster of mnemonic operations and transformations. Desire, instinct, dream, association, neurosis, repression, repetition, the unconscious—then appear to have been rewritten as memory functions or dysfunctions. Moreover, they were theorized as such by Freud himself. (241)

As Terdiman suggests, the Freudian paradigm frames the problem of *modern* memory⁴ and psychoanalysis: the past is absent and cannot be *reproduced* in full, yet its presence as *representations* continues to determine us in ways that even the most skilled analyst, or historian, can only approximate. In the modern period, the recognition of the "complications" of the present, of the "denaturalization of traditional social forms" (325), of the "recession of meaning that constitutes hermeneutics" (326), and of the "intractability" of time—in short, of what seems to be the double-nature of memory and the past—these complications indeed "constitute us but conflict ceaselessly" (289-90). Hence the modern memory crisis arises since "memory does not ground us but registers our drift. . . . Freud did not initiate this broad reconception of the stability of memory, but psychoanalysis carried it further than it had ever been brought before" (290).

In the work of Freud, as well in the work of other nineteenth-century theorists of "modern" memory, including Théodule Ribot, Frédéric Paulhan, Henri Bergson, and even Marcel Proust,⁵ the psychology of memory becomes a central preoccupation, a formulation of the formerly *theological*, *philosophical*, and then *historical* (and, eventually, by the end of the twentieth century *cultural*) question "how does the past contrive to determine us?" or how "do we understand how our lives are in fact determined?" (Terdiman, *Present Past* 247). In one view, biologists like Darwin, sociologists like Durkheim, historians like Marx, and anthropologists like Lévi-Strauss all worked to answer such questions about the past and its persistence into the

⁴ In *Present Past* Richard Terdiman suggests that the genealogy of the memory crisis of modernity, enacted in Europe throughout the "long nineteenth century" (4), must recognize the epochal shift from precapitalist forms of "social existence based upon traditional family and village structures to new forms rooted in urban existence, in the anonymous market, and in the abstract relations of civil society" (5). Citing Eugene Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen*, as well as John Berger's *Pig Earth*, Françoise Zonabend's *The Enduring Memory*, and *The Return of Martin Guerre*, Terdiman points out that more traditional, agrarian societies "carry their pasts and their meanings openly" (6). As Weber puts it, following the sociologist Henri Mendras, the peasant shows what he does or is about to do in forms of behaviour that are wholly familiar to his fellows and so are easily interpreted by all of them" (qtd. in Terdiman 6). The lack of transparency in regard to the past and to social behaviour in post-Revolutionary societies and proto-capitalist economies that Terdiman identifies is a central problematic of the memory crisis because "the recollection of the past—particularly by that growing segment of the urban population who had grown up far from the cities where they had come to live as adults—obliged people to reconstruct their prehistory of their new environment in the effort to naturalize it. They were involved in an effort of memory that made the very lack of transparency of the past a conscious focus of concern" (6).

⁵ For a detailed study of the genealogy and possible influences for Proust's famous "involuntary" mnemonics, including taxonomies of memory by Ribot, Paulhan, and Bergson, see Terdiman's *Present Past* (151-239); for a brief summary of memory and its history in psychology in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly in the works of Hermann Ebbinghaus and William James, Henri Bergson, Kurt Goldstein, and Aleksandr Romanovich Luria, see Laura Otis, *Organic Memory*; for Terdiman's remarkable interrogation of Freudian mnemonics, that is, Freud's *maieutics* and *mnemo-analysis* and the connections that exist between the "reconceptions of individuals, their culture, and their predicament in psychoanalysis and the problematic of memory" see *Present Past* (240-342). "No modern theory of individual action or cultural process," as Terdiman writes, "has made more of memory than Freud's" (242). Freud himself provides a brief survey of existing "scientific literature" on dreams, memory traces, and consciousness in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (35-55).

"modern" present in their respective fields. In the most general terms, Freud's "topographic" models of the psyche and his analysis of its systematic interrelations are "a theory of interpretation which calls into question the 'commonsense' facts of consciousness" (Wright 2) to explain the (at times pathological) persistence of the past in the human mind and what appears to be its determinations: modern man indeed digs into his or her flesh for meaning—or, we might say, into his or her memories. Freud's "psychoanalytic project to free individuals from the paradoxes of memory and the uncanny persistence of the past recirculates and resituates this long cultural interrogation concerning the nature of determination" (Terdiman, *Present Past* 246). This determination can be figured roughly as the result of the past being literally "stored" in the repository of the unconscious, and re-called or "re-presented" after the fact, so to speak, in the conscious mind as "screened" or "repressed" memories. Reading this "interpretive" event, for Freud, is the "analytic situation," an event which may be taken as evidence of the belief that "that no experience the body has is ever totally erased from the mind" and that the subject makes its "perilous entry via language into culture" (Wright 2-3). In the discourse of psychoanalysis, "memory is an essential part of the process of humanization," one that is "concerned with the workings of, and the formation of, unconscious memory. It is not an easy subject" (Mitchell 96).

The central tension in the Freudian paradigm lies in the idea of a "stored" or "timeless" past that poses certain structural problems for the human mind: it theorizes a paradox between positivist "data" or "master registrations of the past" (Terdiman, *Present Past* 273), on the one hand, and models of remembering-as-interpretation, on the other—roughly speaking, the difference between *transcendence* (memory-as-reproduction, reference) and *immanence* (memory-as-interpretation, hermeneutics, text), between *permanence* and *impermanence*. This paradox lies at the heart of Freud's project: "In effect, the immutable inscriptions of the unconscious unsettle the paradigm of interpretive mobility usually thought of as defining psychoanalysis" (Terdiman *Present Past* 272-3). As Mitchell glosses Freud, memory is the response to "'Life already threatened by the origin of memory which constitutes it, and by the breaching which it resists, the effraction which it can contain only by repeating it'" (111).

This repetition and interpretation of the past as textual trace, as a representation or inscription, characterizes psychoanalytic models of memory, which are obviously much more complex than my brief sketch suggests; but what strikes me as especially important for understanding a theory of cultural memory are the connections that psychoanalysis theorizes between the subject and the social, between language and memory, or, to put this in different terms, the way the subject enters culture through the *immanent* system of language, through signs. The subject of memory is never *literally* itself; the subject of memory can never coincide with itself in a frozen moment of plenitude and self-presence. Rather, it must inscribe itself in time as after-images, construct itself from various fragments or memory-traces: "memories can never be replications [reproductions] nor even the same as themselves, not from one day or one minute to the next" (Mitchell 112).

The fragmented and discontinuous modern self is a commonplace in the last half of the twentieth century, and most contemporary conceptions of memory in one way or another incorporate temporality and images of unity/disunity as a way to partially explain the operation of memory in such a fragmented subject. As Patricia Fara and Karalyn Patterson write,

Whether we are trying to recall particular details of our own lives, or, to construct historical narratives describing broader cultural changes, we must all confront the gaps and distortions inherent in recapturing the past. This perplexing faculty, so central to our existence, exerts a universal fascination: as individuals, we wish to learn more about how our own memory functions; as members of society, we are concerned to appreciate the multiple ways in which our history is preserved. What we remember is intimately linked to how we remember, but innumerable approaches have been devised to explore that complex web of connections. (1)

A theory of cultural memory is one such "approach" to understanding how and what we remember of the past *at the level of the social*. It assumes that we do not "capture" the past in an memory-molecule or unlimited unconscious as much as *re-present* it according to the material and external social frames that make knowing and being, that make language and memory possible in the first place. In contrast, both phenomenological and psychological models of memory advance an inherently "internal" understanding of memory. In these models, memory tends to remain "both abstract and ambiguous" (13), as Ian Hunter concedes; but memory does contain

one common thread of meaning, which is this: what the person does and experiences here and now is influenced by what he did and experienced at some time in his past. When we talk of a person's memory we are almost always drawing attention to relationships between his past and his present activities. . . . It refers to the ways in which past experiences are utilized in present activity. (14-15)

In the most comprehensive sense, as Hunter continues, memory refers to the effects of a person's past on his present. The person is modified, changed by what he does and experiences. And these persisting modifications affect what he does and experiences on later occasions; they enable him to accomplish much which would otherwise be impossible . . . Their value lies in their enabling him to adjust to present circumstances in the light of past events. In a phrase, they enable him to profit by experience. (19)

Hunter's definitions of memory suggestively alludes to the model of the labyrinth, and they usefully connote the importance of *temporality* to consciousness and personal experience, an *internal* relation between the past and the present, between the representation of past experience in the present that, for some critics, is the problem of memory itself. Of course, some think of memory in less orderly terms. Aldous Huxley, for instance imagines memory as random event; he writes in *Eyeless in Gaza*: "Somewhere in the mind a lunatic shuffled a pack of snapshots and dealt them out at random, shuffled once more and dealt them in a different order, again and again, indefinitely. There was no chronology" (23); others conceive of (modern) memory as even more sinister and pathological: in his parabolic "Funes the Memorius," for example, Jorge Luis Borges weaves the story of a man called Funes who suffers a strange mnemonic pathology that enables him to remember everything. But this deadly accumulation of detail, this model of the modern archive, eventually suppresses his ability to think and causes his death: "To think," writes Borges, "is to forget differences, generalize, make abstractions" (66). Such a *deadly* model of memory, such a referential or positivist "storage" model of the past, reminds us of the endlessly accumulating (postmodern) archive, of what Borges calls a "garbage heap" (64).

It could be argued that what makes memory invaluable as an internal or cognitive process for explaining the present but absent past is what makes it difficult to apprehend. Where do we locate memory? And as much as the psychological-philosophical models of memory explain some aspects of memory function, they provide a limited account of the contradictory processes and operations of memory, of the social contexts and material mechanisms that in fact shape our memories, including precisely how the systems of consciousness and memory are determined by external and material forces such as the field of culture or language, or how semiology itself is an anthropological "modeling" process. One of the most common strategies for apprehending memory, as we can see in the earliest *internal* models as well as in more recent psychological-philosophical ones, then, is to classify it, to divide or anatomize it in hopes of defining it more clearly. Plato, for example, literally conceives of memory as a *storehouse* for immutable information that the soul would need in the afterlife, and, curiously, we shall see a version of this model at work in contemporary psychoanalytic models of memory. Aristotle imagines memory to belong to the faculty of sense perception: "neither Perception nor Conception but a state of affection of one of these, conditioned by lapse of time" (qtd. in Herrmann and Chaffin 64); and, like Plato, Aristotle figured the central problem posed by memory as "the question of how being

which has disappeared can persist [be literally stored] in memory."⁶ St. Augustine, as we shall see shortly, links memory to temporality and divinity, and he sets memory against perception and expectation. David Hume distinguishes between memory and imagination and argues that "memory preserves the original form in which its objects were presented, and that wherever we depart from it in recollecting anything, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty" (Herrmann and Chaffin 172; Morris 10). Freud, throughout his career, divides the mind into different domains: initially, in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, into the *unconscious*, which is the repository or storehouse of the "actual" past, and the *conscious* (and *preconscious*) system, which has limited access to the unconscious through language.

These are only a few of the ways that memory has been imagined in the past, some *internal* models for explaining the operation of memory and its determinations as psychical processes. A theory of cultural memory such as the one I am essaying in this dissertation reverses this picture and configures memory in relation to the *external* social frames or cultural determinants that organize the past and temporality, in relation to the semiotic mechanisms that govern culture. The question of the relationship of the subject to the social is thus central, and indeed ineluctable, in such a socio-semiotic model of memory, in which memory is conceived as a cultural force or social technology—one that is determined by the sign systems of the social. The trajectory of such an inquiry thus relocates the mechanisms of memory in the social frames of culture and not in the internal or psychological and phenomenological paradigms. Of course, it is worth remembering that when we look at memory in the psyche or in culture we are in fact looking at two sides of the same coin: when it comes to memory there really is no "outside."

We have already noted Maurice Halbwachs' work on the social frames of remembrance⁷ and the "active past" (Olick 3), including the futility Halbwachs saw in attempts to apprehend memory in the mind; we have also touched on Connerton's embodied or "social memories," which are transferred across generations by ritual performances and commemorations. Let us now briefly consider a specific and recent adaptation of the social or collective memory model to modernity: Richard Sennett's description of the social frames of remembrance and what he sees as their *failure* in the modern period. Sennett's model of memory is sociological and hence external, and it decries the internal or subjective/psychoanalytic mnemonics that are used to explain modern existence. Utilizing the sociological model of the frames of memory developed by Halbwachs, Sennett argues that modernity and capitalism encourage the idea of memory as a "private possession," a conception of time and of the subject as alienated and isolated victims of the social relations of production in which "memory becomes like a form of private property, to be protected from challenge and conflict—a property of the self which those exchanges might erode" (24). People forget in the modern (and I presume postmodern) period, according to Sennett, because "the economy does not encourage it" (25) and because the self has been

⁶ See Frow, *Time and Commodity Culture*: the first stage of his solution to this enigma is to posit two figures of representation: the mental image (*phantasma*) inscribed 'in the soul,' and the physical trace (*typos* or *graphé*) which supports it but to which it is not reducible, inscribed in 'that part of the body which contains the soul.' Since the question still remains whether what we remember is the past thing or event itself or the image that we have of it, Aristotle then proposes a second stage of his solution, which rests upon the intrinsic ambivalence of the *phantasma*: figured now as a portrait or pictorial representation (*zographéma*), it can be read either as an object of contemplation in its own right (*zoion*) or as a likeness or copy (*eikón*) of the thing remembered" (226, n. 19).

⁷ Cultural memory is implicated in both human consciousness and social formation: "No memory is possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections" (43). Halbwachs has written, noting that these mnemonic frames or "commandments" (50) are present-day structures of constraint to which we consent: "in our present society we occupy a definite position and are subject to the constraints that go with it, memory gives us the illusion of living in the midst of groups which do not imprison us, which impose themselves upon us only so far and so long as we accept them" (50).

"decentred" by the increasing shortness and atomism of "biologic" (Darwin) and "economic" (Marx) time (25). In his sociological argument, Sennett touches on the cultural problem of time and its representation in the modern period, as well as the ways in which social being determines consciousness; but as a "good Durkheimian" he must regret the failure of Halbwach's "liberal dream" because, finally, in the modern "there is no solace in the truths of memory" (11), because narrative can no longer be shared, and, finally, because the social frames of community no longer *constrain* the subject in "meaningful" ways: since subjects no longer "share" experiences from the past they no longer "authentically" remember. "Put formally, the interaction of recall and reconstruction [or collective memory] occurs only under the conditions of diversity: many contending narratives are necessary to establish painful social facts" (14).

To remember is to re-work the past, to select and interpret details in contending narratives, not to collect them like "authentic" property or "literal" facts. A theory of cultural memory comes close to the category of social memory as it is explained here by Sennett, to what Jeffrey Olick calls a "subfield of the sociology of knowledge" (1) or "the connective structure of societies" (1). But it turns slightly from a purely sociological goal to a cultural and semiological one: a culture's memory is a contestatory and disunified field, a set of practices that indeed speak to the question of the past and about the "connective" social structures, but more precisely to the ways that the past is re-presented in the present and that our memories are determined not by an organic connection but by cultural processes, by the sign system of the social. It represents the past not via direct access to facts or through some organically unified group but *in* the material vestiges and inscribed cultural frames of the social—the languages, bodies, buildings, monuments, and texts we read as sites of cultural production. Nonetheless, the sociology of memory or "social memory studies" "as a general rubric for inquiry into the varieties of forms through which we are shaped by the past, conscious and unconscious, public and private, material and communicative, consensual and challenged" (Olick 4) comes close to a theory of cultural memory, and in some ways is indistinguishable from it. As Olick continues, under the aegis of the sociology of memory, "We refer to distinct sets of mnemonic practices in various social sites, rather than to collective memory as a thing. This approach, we argue, enables us to identify ways in which the past and present are intertwined without reifying a mystical group mind and without including absolutely everything in the enterprise" (4). Methodologically, this involves, for some sociologists, "specifying the different institutional fields that produce memory such as politics and the arts"; for others it entails theorizing "the varying links between media and memory"; and for still others, placing "special emphasis on memory's cultural forms" (4).

These are only a few very random samples—sound bytes, if you will—that signal the conceptual slipperiness and ambivalences of the discourse of memory, of the paradoxical internal (psychological-philosophical) and external (social-material) models of memory. When it comes to the past and to thinking through memory, things have never been clear nor settled. This brief sketch of memory could go on at some length: there is no shortage of critical work that attempts to delineate and describe memory and its spiritual or material functions, its psychological or sociological operations, its internal or external locations. Think for a moment about the proliferation of attempts to "name" memory that, a lot like attempts to define the word "culture," invariably resort to overlapping adjectival constructions which show how "memory" elusively derives its meaning from specific places and the ways that memory connects past experience to the present. But even such constructions do not necessarily solve the problem of abstraction, even though they seem, at first glance, to denote discrete and even quantifiable *kinds* of memory: muscle-, materials-, artificial-, eidetic-, organic-, random access-, virtual-, true-, false-, habit-, social-, group-, popular-, national-, voluntary-, involuntary-, repressed-, recovered-, stored-, true-, official-, unofficial-, vernacular-, historical-, twilight-, tangled-, and the list can be extended. Each one of these terms designates a way to talk about the past.

In this chapter, I want to introduce several more concepts and map some of the ground that we must cover in order to talk intelligibly about the problem of memory. The task of recalling the history of memory in a confined space such as this one is next to impossible. But it strikes me that one way to begin to think memory is to identify several of its fundamental features, its conceptual fault lines: first, I have already delineated *internal* and *external* modes of memory, and I want to further develop this division of memory into two related types of memory that I have already adumbrated in the Introduction: *hermeneutic* and *heuristic*; second, I want to consider memory in relation to *space* and *time*; third, I want to briefly look at the linkages between memory and theory, that is, at the purchase of memory in modern and postmodern epistemologies. These distinctions inevitably fold back into one another and are linked together in countless (rhizomatic) ways, thus they might seem less than helpful at times. But what gathers memory together for my purposes is the central problematic of *representation*, the role of the sign in modern and postmodern cultural mnemonics. What I mean here is that the problem of representation is implicated in the oldest heuristic and hermeneutical models of memory and of meaning-making: as Saussure reasons, the sensory or material "sound-image" of the linguistic sign *fixes* the abstract concept or signified by *inscribing* it in the mind ("Nature of the Linguistic Sign" 4). This basic concept from semiology is repeated in the language of memory: think of the wax tablet, the palimpsestic (textual) mnemonic-trace. The linguistic sign, then, seems to be "inscribed" in the psyche in the same way that the units of information we know of as "the past"—memory-images—are inscribed in our minds. It is this mechanism of semiosis and the materiality of the sign that underwrites the Piercean principle of interpretation, which says that "a sign is something by knowing which we know something more" (Eco, *Semiotics* 2); it is this mechanism that underwrites the semiological principles of psychoanalytic and sociological cultural interpretation to which a theory of cultural memory is buttressed. Such an hermeneutic modeling of the activity of meaning-making enables us to read how we selectively interpret our pasts, how we gather our thoughts, how we "mark" time, as Huyssen puts it, how, in the most general terms, we make our selves and our worlds *meaningful*. Memory is a gathering, as I have already said, a kind of system of deferral and difference and dissemination the "constitutive strength" of which, like language itself, is that "it can be contested from new perspectives, novel evidence and from the very spaces it had blocked out" (Huyssen 250).

To use signs is to "mean something more," and memory is deeply implicated in this process, in the webs of cultural signification and discursive meaning-making. The goal toward which I want to work in this section is to understand some of the critical contours of memory, to think through the various ways that memory like language, operates within the sign system of the social. It is a commonplace that the modern is a *time* of cultural forgetting, an era in which the past was repudiated and in which the idea of Progress seemed to weaken or sever cultural linkages to the Traditional (pre-urban, pre-industrial) past or History; in contrast, the postmodern has been vilified as a "virtual" or depthless late-capitalist *space* by critics for whom the "failure" of the *grands recits* of modernity is lamentable and for whom memory seems to be at odds with, or irreparably diffused into, the sort of "interminable" semiosis that proliferates in a digital universe. But the problem of memory cannot be simply isolated in one period or the other, as a problem of either *time* or *space*. A more fruitful way to think through memory is to figure the question of memory as it is imbricated in the processes of signification—in discourse. We can, I think, then notice how time and space come together at the "stroke" of the sign, where difference-in-time is partially inscribed or fixed on the textual surface, where the sign then endlessly defers the meanings it stands for, which rely on shared conventions or social spaces for interpretation. My argument, which is mostly unoriginal and derived from the work of critics of memory such as Richard Terdiman, Mary Carruthers, and John Frow, is that memory always has been an inscriptive or semiotic technology: memory is *virtual* and *artificial*. Perhaps, then, memory is not in such dire condition in the postmodern. Perhaps it is even oddly at home in the age of

simulation. In one sense, memory acts like an index, a barometer against which cultural transformations and epistemological and ontological shifts can be measured. My purpose in reading memory in space and time in the modern and postmodern periods is, as I have already said, to clarify some of the concepts that are invoked when we speak about memory-in-culture, including the notions of nostalgia and loss. More practically, I want to set the stage for my readings of two novels in Section Two in which the past, and memory especially, figures predominantly. To anticipate my conclusion somewhat, or at least to foreground the most pressing question that runs through this dissertation—which is the question *what happens to memory in the modern and postmodern periods?*—I would say that we learn to “read” it more effectively and self-reflexively as a cultural text, as a sign system, as a representation: memory, like language, is “a sign of something else” (Carruthers 10). Just as the modes in which we remember and forget have changed in the West in other periods of historical and technological transition, most obviously with the advent of writing and with the development of print culture, the cultural modalities of memory in the postmodern present have shifted to incorporate the emergence not long ago of “new” cultural technologies for preserving the past, such as analogic recordings, photography, cinematography, video images, and most recently “bytes” of digital information; events such as the Great War, the Holocaust, apartheid, various political assassinations, Vietnam, the AIDS epidemic, the recent genocides in the Balkans and Africa, to name only a few of the unforgettable events of the twentieth century, are events that we must learn from or remember in the twenty-first century. If the postmodern is an *amnesiac* period, as some claim, it is also an equally *anamnesiac* one—an era, as critics as various as John Frow and Andreas Huyssen suggest, that is indeed concerned with the past, with signification, and with the organization of temporality.

There are many ways to approach the subject of memory, many ways to think of the past and its relation to the present, of “then” to “now.” I want to briefly look at one of the oldest models of

* Jean François Lyotard explores the status of knowledge and, by association, memory in *The Postmodern Condition*. Lyotard explains the differences between “scientific” and “narrative” knowledges in “the most highly developed societies” (xxiii) or “computerized societies” (3) by suggesting that the former hoards and stores information (think of the computer and its accumulations) with an Enlightenment precision but with the assumption that “the facts speak for themselves” (4); thus scientific knowledge and research fail to communicate or “frame” that information in a recognizable social context: its goal or logic is to accumulate and to commodify—to capitalize—knowledge; scientific knowledge refuses the self-reflexive or critical model of narrative knowledge that, as Lyotard writes, recognizes “that knowledge has no final legitimacy outside of serving the goals envisioned by the practical subject, the autonomous collectivity” (36). In contrast, “narrative” knowledge pre-dates and post-dates the totalizations of Enlightenment rationality and its delusory legitimations; it is performative; it “consumes” the past and represents it, and in this it possesses a unique and enduring (cultural) *memory* that constitutes social bonds, the “golden rule” of which is “never forget”: “a collectivity that takes narrative as its key form of competence has no need to remember its past. It finds the raw material for its social bond not only in the meaning of the narratives it recounts, but also in the act of reciting them. The narratives’ reference may seem to belong to the past, but in reality it is always contemporaneous with the [present] act of recitation” (22). In this way, narrative knowledge underwrites an “evanescent and immemorial temporality” (22) and “defines what has the right to be said and done in a culture” (23). “It is not inconceivable that the recourse to narrative is inevitable, at least to the extent that the language game of science desires its statements to be true but does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its own. If this is the case, it is necessary to admit an irreducible need for history understood . . . not as a need to remember or to project (a need for historicity, for accent), but on the contrary as a need to forget” (28). The postmodern failure to preserve master narratives, which are themselves memory systems, complex discursive structures that order the world, might well signal such a return to discontinuous and performative narrative knowledge; as Lyotard asks, echoing our Nietzschean question of memory: “Who decides the conditions of truth?” (29).

memory and consider how it figures memory as a technical inscription, a model of memory in which spatial order⁹ is of utmost importance and which ancients used to train their memories to "embody" texts in an age before print.

At the end of *The Art of Memory*, her ground-breaking 1966 study of the history of mnemonics, which studies "artificial" memory systems as "inner writing" (22) from classical Greek models well into the renaissance, Francis Yates claims that the art of memory is a marginal subject, not recognized as belonging to any of the normal disciplines, having been omitted because it was no one's business. And yet it has turned out to be, in a sense, every one's business. The history of the organization of memory touches at vital points on the history of religion and ethics, of philosophy and psychology, of art and literature, of scientific method. The artificial memory as a part of rhetoric belongs into [sic] the rhetoric tradition; memory as a power of the soul belongs with theology. When we reflect on these profound affiliations of our theme it begins to seem after all not so surprising that the pursuit of it should have opened up new views of some of the greatest manifestations of our culture. (374)

Yates's prophetic assessment of the filiations of memory to "cultural manifestations," in one sense, paves the way for subsequent studies of contemporary memory such as this one. Her insistence that memory enables some of the "greatest manifestations of our culture" locates modern memory squarely within the realm of the social. But memory has, in one view, always been implicated therein. As a part of the Greek art of rhetoric,¹⁰ the art of memory was developed as a technique to help orators train their memories in an age before print¹¹; it utilized memory to

⁹ One of the most common tropes employed to speak about memory is *space*: "rigid" or ordered spaces help us to stabilize our "present" and our identities, as well as to model the collection, storage, and retrieval of information, of what ancients called "phantasms" in the brain (Bachelard 8; Carruthers 32). As Carruthers states, "Memory without conscious design is like an uncatalogued library, a contradiction in terms" (33); "the key lies in the imposition of a rigid order to which clearly prepared pieces of textual content are attached" (8). The appeal of structure is precisely its useful order and ability to ostensibly fix relationships between things, to inscribe permanent meanings not unlike the way the sound-image of a sign is inscribed in the mind and thus *fixed* to a concept. "The 'notion of structure' somehow grows in the mind, providing the means for infinite use, for the ability to form and comprehend free expressions" (Chomsky 8). But structural models tend to be organized according to implicit (transcendent and timeless) values, and we must ask how "free" expression can be in the first place. Furthermore, even the most advanced systematic models of artificial intelligence and neural networks, as I have already said, are pale comparisons to what the human mind does when it remembers or forgets, to the "messy neural systems that nature has devised" (Sejnowski 162), not to mention the complex *intertextual* systems that culture uses to ensure its survival.

¹⁰ "The speaker, then, should possess the faculties of Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory and Delivery. Invention is the devising of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing. Arrangement is the ordering and distribution of the matter, making clear the place to which each thing is to be assigned. Style is the adaptation of suitable words and sentences to the matter devised. Memory is the firm retention in the mind of the matter, words, and arrangement. Delivery is the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture" (*Rhetorica ad Herrenium* I.ii.3; translated by H. Kaplan; cited in Herrmann and Chaffin 85-6)

¹¹ The question about the relation of memory to writing or print was already posed by Plato in *Phaedrus*: Socrates tells the story of the Egyptian god Theuth, who is said to have invented numbers and arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, draughts, dice, and letters, and who presented these inventions to Thamus, King of Egypt at Thebes. Theuth claimed that particularly the invention of writing would "make the Egyptians wiser and improve their memory"; Thamus responded by arguing that it would not, that it would "produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are not part of themselves will discourage the use of their own memory within them. You have invented an elixir not of memory but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many

facilitate memory training, the objective of which was to internalize and accurately "reproduce" the oral tradition or text being "remembered." To do so, the classical architectural mnemonic or "places and images" (71) scheme of memory emphasized the importance of stable spatial structures or places for embodying what is to be remembered; some of the most commonly used structures were houses (including the houses of the zodiac), libraries, cathedrals, theatres, apiaries, and aviaries, to name but a few, as well as architectural features such as frescoes, niches, halls, stairs, stalls, columns, and architraves, and even such common objects as candelabras and ladders.

The origin of the art of memory—what Mary Carruthers calls the "architectural mnemonic" (*The Book of Memory* 71)—is recorded in at least three primary texts,¹² each of which attributes its invention to a Greek poet named Simonides of Ceos, who lived circa 556–468 BC. At a banquet given at Crannon by a wealthy nobleman of Thessaly named Scopas, Simonides, who was hired to honour Scopas with a lyric, stepped outside to receive a message from two messengers during which time the roof of the banquet hall fell in, crushing and killing Scopas and all his guests. Simonides was able to remember the place where each guest sat and could thus recite the names of the mangled corpses for the relatives who came to retrieve them (Carruthers 22; Yates 42). Following the Roman statesman, forensic orator, and writer Cicero in his *De oratore*, Yates suggests that it was because of Simonides' "memory of the places at which the guests had been sitting that he had been able to identify the bodies," showing that an "orderly arrangement is essential for good memory" (17).

We are not told how long Simonides spent committing to memory the names of the people who occupied each seat in the hall before the disaster. Instead, accounts of the architectural mnemonic emphasize how familiar and easily recalled—easily *visualized*—but rigidly ordered physical spaces help us to organize and store mnemonic data. "We all know how," Yates writes in *The Art of Memory*, "when groping in memory for a word or name, some quite absurd and random association, something which has 'stuck' in the memory, will help us to dredge it up. The classical art is systematizing that process" (29). One begins, Carruthers adds, by "placing images (*imagines*) in an orderly set of architectural backgrounds (*loci*) in his memory" and when it is time to recall the images one can then mentally "move" through the spaces in which the images and information are stored (22). This movement through rigidly ordered spaces that "store" images uses the principle of systematized association to cue or prompt memory since "images, especially visual ones, are more easily and permanently retained than abstract ideas" (Carruthers 73).

The classical *ars memoria* might seem outdated, perhaps even unimportant, today, but its role in the intellectual and aesthetic history of the West cannot be overstated. It demonstrates not only how *space* is factored into mnemonics but also how *time* or the interval between life and death, between meaning and meaninglessness, plays into in acts of individual and cultural memory. In the simplest terms, Simonides speaks *of*, and *for*, the dead.¹³ Furthermore, as

things without instruction and will therefore seem to know many things, when they are for them most part ignorant and hard to get along with, since they are not wise, but only appear to be wise" (qtd. in Yates 52).

¹² *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which was once attributed to Cicero but is now generally thought to have been compiled by an unknown teacher of rhetoric in Rome around 86–82 BC; Cicero's *De Oratore*, completed in 55 BC; and Quintillian's *Institutio Oratorio*, ca. 55 AD (Herrmann and Chaffin 75–104; Yates 17–21, 32, 37; Carruthers 22, 71–79). These works, along with other important works on memory by Hesiod, Plato, Aristotle, to name only a few, trace the genealogy of memory from its Greek sources, through its Roman incarnations, and into the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Of these sources, the *Ad Herennium* is the most detailed and, as Francis Yates points out, the one upon which "the later Western memory tradition was founded" (41).

¹³ In addition to demonstrating the importance of structuring the intangible "space" of memory, we see in the architectural mnemonic once again that memory is associated with bodies and pain, with death and disfigurement and the loss of identity: "The primal scene of memory," as Renate Lachmann writes,

Carruthers notes, the "architectural mnemonic" influenced Western intellectual and moral development through the Middle Ages (most obviously through the scholastics' translation of classical rhetoric into medieval philosophy) and well into the Renaissance, at which point, as Yates suggests, it disappeared from the "purely humanist tradition" (355) and was relocated in the "Hermetic" or "occult" traditions of, for example, Giordano Bruno or Robert Fludd (134). This is a transformation, I think, of memory into the domain of discourse. Thus memory is said to have been "rediscovered" and further developed by medieval and renaissance thinkers,¹⁴ who used it variously for educating themselves and for "the formation of moral virtues" (Carruthers 156). But the fundamental function of memory in culture in the medieval period, for Carruthers, remains its ability to affect a variety of cultural phenomena (the making of books, composing sermons, glossing texts, pedagogic habits, poetic tropology, even salvation) and to underwrite the virtue of prudence (ethics or behaviour). In this way, Carruthers writes, "we can meaningfully speak of the Middle Ages as a memorial culture, recognizing that, as a set of institutionalized practices, *memoria* was adapted, at least to a point, as these institutions changed, and yet that as a modality of culture it had a very long life as a continuing source and reference for human values and behavior" (260). Yates recognizes a similar valuation of memory in renaissance mnemonics, and points out that the transformations in modes of knowing and remembering from the classical to the medieval, and from the medieval to the renaissance models coincide, to be sure, with the advent of print culture. This raises complex epistemological and ontological questions about the relationship between knowledge, memory, and printed texts that we cannot broach here.¹⁵ The questions that I am concerned with focus on the processes by which memory became less associated with individuals and the rhetorical process of *oration* and more associated with "textual" or "readerly" cultural values and *ethics*—with questions about how we have lived, how we live, and how we should live. As Carruthers explains, the concepts of "memory," "mind," "imitation," and "book" became increasingly strange to her as she studied *medieval mnemonics*:

Many things I have believed could not be done, such as composing difficult works at length from memory, had to be entertained as possibilities. . . . I found, too, that I was dealing in large measure with unstated assumptions on the part of the medieval writers I was studying, chiefly their belief that all human learning is memorative in nature. It is that continuing belief that has led me to emphasize the memorial basis of the medieval

"consists of bearing witness to *anastrophe*, the plunge from life into death. It consists of the indexical act of pointing to the dead (the ancestors) and the iconographic act of transforming the dead into a concept of what they were as living people" (7). Memory is a translation of what is absent into *something more*; as Lachmann continues, memory is a "recollection of order . . . [that] mobilizes a work of construction against destruction" (7). Concealed in this *fabula*, in this prototypical moment of signification, temporality, and cultural transmission, Lachmann insists, is a key to the formation of culture as commemoration, of culture as a work of mourning that links the absent past to the unknown present by re-presenting what is "missing." See also Carruthers (22).

¹⁴For dates of completion and circulation of these (and other works) on memory see Frances Yates' *The Art of Memory* (cf. 11-62), Mary Carruthers' *The Book of Memory* (cf. 1-45), and Douglas J. Hermann and Roger Chaffin's *Memory in Historical Perspective* (cf. 1-105). For an in-depth analysis of memory's role in antiquity and (especially) medieval ethical and literary values see Carruthers; for a treatment of renaissance mnemonics such as the occult mnemonics of Giordano Bruno or the mnemonic theatrical architecture of Robert Fludd see Yates. Both Carruthers and Yates emphasize the historical importance of memory as a central faculty that until the advent of modernity and "documentary" or print-culture "was valued above all others" and considered to be a source of epistemological/ontological *order*.

¹⁵Carruthers points out that memory is not incompatible with writing and print, that memory itself has always been considered a kind of technical inscription or "written surface"—in wax-tablets, for example (16-19). "Books" themselves are distinct mnemonics, Carruthers notes, and their availability obviously changed epistemological and social formation in the West, but writing and then print "did not profoundly disturb the essential value of memory training" (*The Book of Memory* 8). See also John Frow's "*Toute la Mémoire du Monde*," re-printed in *Time and Commodity Culture* (218-46).

cultures of the West. I call them "memorial," knowing that to modern readers the word has connotations only of death, but hoping that I can adjust their understanding of it—as I have had to do to my own—to a more medieval idea: making present the voices of what is past, not to entomb either the past or the present, but to give them life together in a place common to both in memory. (260)

Carruthers' model of memory might remind us of Greenblatt's New Historicist credo. It hinges on the idea that memory is a technical process, an inscription or writing that we can, looking backward, link to the earliest model of memory, the wax tablet; but we can also, looking forward, link it to more "contemporary" textual surfaces: papyrus, vellum, paper, silicon-coated disks. More importantly, Carruthers emphasizes the textual nature of memory and its role in "making present the voices of what is past." That is, the social or cultural function of memory-as-inscription is to make meanings that "stand for something else," that enable cultural groups to represent the past and to give it life *in memory*. For Carruthers, the "memorial" basis of culture—its semiological structure and social institutions—is fundamental to individual and cultural survival: as Simonedes' model shows, memory makes knowledge possible, it translates experience into wisdom and ideas into judgements or values (1).

Although this sketch of memory is still too crude to be of much critical use, it outlines of a model of cultural memory as a critical social practice: cultural theories of memory remind us that memory always has been a *tekhnè*,¹⁶ a writing or mediation or inscription that is organized, to a great degree, by the social frames and cultural values—the times and spaces—within which it occurs. This hermeneutics of memory, curiously, "underwent another of its transformations," as Yates explains, during the seventeenth century (355). Considering the work of Bacon, Descartes, and Leibniz and their writings on memory, Yates explains that at the end of the seventeenth century memory shifted from "a method of memorizing the encyclopedia of knowledge, of reflecting the world in memory" to become an "aid for investigating the encyclopedia and the world with the object of discovering new knowledge" (355). This transformation, I think, is coterminous with the emergence of modernity: it signals the translation of memory from classical and then medieval and renaissance "arts" or metaphysics into modern and secular *discourse*. It is not an exaggeration to say that this transformation of memory into the "new scientific method" (355) prefigures the emergence of modernity and the eventual development of a new conception of "man" in what Foucault, as we have already noted, has called the "modern" or "Western episteme." In other words, the difference between "reflecting" the world or "reproducing" knowledge about it and "discovering" new knowledge *about* the world—the difference between recollecting facts and interpretation—is, as Terdiman claims, "the representation problem itself, seized in its most critical locus" (*Present Past* 32). This threshold of cultural transformation marks a fundamental shift in the epistemology and ontology of the West, a shift, as I have said, that makes it both possible and necessary to think of memory (like the concepts of "subject" or "language") no longer as a biological event nor metaphysical property, nor even a rhetorical technology, but as a secular process of *culture*.

For this reason it is the hermeneutical modes of memory that best explain how the past becomes present, how memory and language are inseparable in an age in which epistemology and ontology are understood in increasingly secular and technological terms. Perhaps this is because the hermeneutic model focuses most precisely upon language and writing, on the events of representation-interpretation-inscription as ways to fix meaning. Memory thus can be understood not only as *rhetoric* but as *discourse*, as a language-game that, as Hayden White has argued,

¹⁶ See Frow's *Time and Commodity Culture* (223-26) or Carruthers' *The Book of Memory* (30-31); medieval texts do not distinguish between "writing on the memory and writing on some other surface. Writing itself, the storing of information in symbolic 'representations,' is understood to be critical for knowing . . . anything that encodes information in order to stimulate the memory to store or retrieve information is 'writing,' whether it be alphabet, hieroglyph, ideogram" (Carruthers 30).

attempts to model consciousness in a self-reflexive yet critical manner (*Tropics* 4-5). This view of the world is one in which words are no longer unquestionably equated with things and in which memory becomes increasingly understood as a secular system of meaning-making—the sort of discursive formations that Umberto Eco explores in both his theoretical and fictional writing on *semiotics*. What is important here is to see how memory has changed, how memory's shift away from a theological-referential model of epistemology prefigures the advent of discourse in modernity. The central question of "occult" or modern mnemonics, for Yates, is: "were these fantastic occult memory systems deliberately made impossible and inscrutable in order to hide a secret?" (352). No, Yates suggests, since the memory systems in the renaissance were not simply *ciphers*. To press this further, the transformation we observe here is the development of technical models for explaining consciousness and being in relation to language, to the "stroke" of the sign and its social frames, systems that make meaning possible, that make signs "stand for something else." Thus Yates wonders: "What was occult memory? Did the change from forming corporeal similitude of the intelligible world to the effort to grasp the intelligible world through tremendous imaginative exercise . . . really stimulate the human psyche to a wider range of creative imaginative achievement than ever before?" (354).

This emergent secular and discursive, dialogic and "diatactical" model of epistemology and ontology is, we might say, the operating system of the modern world. And as White suggests, developing Vico's argument, the mediative processes of discourse "not only mirrored the processes of consciousness but in fact underlay and informed all efforts of human beings to endow their world with meaning" (5). In this period of cultural transformation, memory itself shifts from its sacred and metaphysical functions to more secular but creative (and self-conscious) ones, and this transformation, I think, must be understood in relation to the development and dissemination of print culture, in relation to the linguistic sign. The questions become: how does the transformation from a referential epistemology to a representational one affect the subject of memory? how do the social spaces of secular culture affect the hermeneutic aspects of memory? how does the material past tie into the question of representation that, as I insist in the following pages, leads us to the social, to discursive questions about the materiality of memory and signification, about temporality, about textual interpretation and narration, about desire, about speaking *of* and *for* the dead?

These are complex questions, and I will suggest in the remainder of this chapter that the study of the social frames of cultural texts and the processes of inscription is one way to think through them. In the simplest terms, information as "active" signs can be fixed on material surfaces, whether architectural, corporal, textual, topographic, or monumental. Furthermore, these material inscriptions or vestiges will likely *outlast* the subjects who inscribe them; in doing so, they seem to preserve the past as "fact," to store it in a way that can be fully recalled or made "present." In this way, *memoria*, as Carruthers puts it, is a social institution, a "cultural modality" that is "a public and social phenomenon, neither a private neurosis nor a transcendental norm" (260); in this way, memory is a "conditioner of culture" (Carruthers 260), one through which the *endurance* of the mnemonic sign organizes *temporality*. If we can speak of mnemonics as a precursor to science in the medieval period, and as a model of representation or discourse in the renaissance, I think we can safely advance this model one step further and use it as a framework in the modern and postmodern periods; we can begin to think of cultural memory in theory and literature as a dynamic system of social signification and interpretation that, indeed, determines behaviour, organizes temporality, and orders knowledge.

I am especially curious about Carruthers' framing of memory as a cultural process: her understanding of medieval "memorial" culture is built upon the idea that memory and the past are fundamental features of how we know and think in the present. As I have said, memory in Carruthers' model "make[s] present the voices of what is past, not to entomb either the past or the present, but to give them life together in a place common to both in memory" (260). The discursive life that memory bestows on the past is thus possible because memory is a "lasting"

inscription, a narrative technology, because it is not a "reproductive" or "referential" mode of recovering the "actual" past: there is, as Frow points out, "an indexical linkage between the vanished past and its persistent material vestiges in the present" (*Time* 226). Memory is a system or indexes of signs that "captures both the stability and the instability of inscriptions" (226); "memories," as Frow concludes, "can be worked at" (246). But as Carruthers clearly explains, the idea of representation in the medieval period was *not* precisely the same one that operates in the modern (or postmodern) periods¹⁷:

A functional definition understands the words "representation" and "image" in ways that I think are essentially compatible with ancient understanding embodied in words like *séme-* and its derivatives, and in the subsequent, continuous development of the metaphor of mental images as writing. The "likeness" between the two terms of the metaphor is one of cognition (as a word "represents" a concept) rather than the replication of form. The structures which memory stores are not actual little pictures, but are *quasi*-pictures, "representations" in the sense that the information stored causes a physical change in the brain that encodes (the modern word) or moulds (the ancient one) it in a certain way and in a particular "place" in the brain. This "sort of" image is then used as the basis for cognition by a process (intellection) which understands it to be a configuration standing in a certain relationship to something else—a "representation" in the cognitively functional sense, as writing represents language. (23)

I have suggested that the physical change in the psyche is analogous to the physical act of impression or inscription that constitutes the *fixed* or material aspect of the sign, the part of the sign that *partially* or *temporarily* resists change. Similarly, the semiological model of memory, when located at the site of synaptic connections where memory occurs as a process of physical change in the neural system, resembles the intertextual model of cultural information storage that we shall consider more fully below. We will push this striking similarity aside for now, but note that both concepts assume that meaning is resolutely social, determined by the social context and by a human need to organize information. As Carruthers continues,

Clearly various societies have felt variously a need to put systems of mental representation and organization down on some surface, but the impulse to do this, and the preserved form it may take, has more to do with the complexity of their social organization, the other groups with which they have come in contact, the nature of materials used and their accessibility, than with the way in which a human being is able to organize mental "representation" for cognition and to understand that they *are* representations" (i.e., they "stand for" something). (32)

It is not hard to cite examples of images that "stand for something" else in contemporary mnemonic technologies—the image that comes to mind as I write this is the ("WYSIWYG") desk-top icon pioneered by *Apple Computers*. Older versions of this sort of mnemonic can be seen in the dropped capitals of the first letter or word of a chapter, in or the numbered verses of a text such as the Bible. These are mnemonics or image-signs, the purpose of which is to facilitate recollection by association: "The sources of what is in memory are diverse, but what happens to

¹⁷ Carruthers stresses that medieval signification theory, like modern semiology, assumes that "signs can be meaningfully judged and interpreted. Because it recalls signs, reminiscence is an act of interpretation, inference, investigation, and reconstruction, an act like reading. But in premodern thought, signs only have meaning as they refer to something else. They are not also (as in most modern linguistic philosophy) inherently meaningful as parts of a self-generative, self-sustaining 'system' of grammar that is universal to all human beings. In premodern thought, the memory phantasm is not a picture of what it represents, but neither is it 'language,' as modern philosophers use this term, for it has no 'grammar,' no necessary structure of its own. The task of the recollector who is composing (and . . . recollection is commonly described as an act of composition, a gathering-up into a place) is to select the most fitting and adequate words to adapt what is in his memory-store to the present occasion. Language is shaped to thought (rather than causing understanding)" (26).

an impression or idea once it gets into the brain is a single process resulting in the production of a phantasm that can be "seen" and "scanned" by "the eye of the mind" (17). This sort of language is constant and pervasive in writing on the subject of memory from earliest times; as Carruthers writes:

according to the Greek tradition, all perceptions however presented to the mind are encoded as *phantasmata*, "representation" or a kind of *eikón*. Because they are themselves [lasting] "sort-of-pictures," these representations were thought to be best retained for recollection by marking them in an order that was "readable," a process the ancients thought to be most like the act of seeing. (17)

This model of *inscription* is what I have in mind as the mechanism in memory and in linguistic signification: a thinking through memory as *grammatological* and not *phonological*, to use two concepts from post-structural theory. It is, I think, what Frow and Carruthers focus on as the material or textual component of the "art" or *tekhnè* of memory-as-writing; it is also, as Wolfgang Iser puts it, the classical model of memory or inscribed meaning as a hedge against death, as a marking of time or "writing of": "The sign comprises what eludes description: the void against which it militates" (xv). Umberto Eco demonstrates the difference between the material and the immaterial components of the sign at the close of *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*; for Eco, the world of signs does not act like a mirror (which reproduces) but rather requires a material inscription, a representation or *mnemonic trace* of the content it registers: "The latter, in the world of signs, becomes the shadow of its former self: derision, caricature, memory" (226). In this world of images or simulacra the "former" or "mirror" image is catoptric; it leaves no trace, but might seem to generate the appearance of a plentitude or reality; the latter generalizes, edits, selects, interprets, it is the world of language and memory:

These two universes, of which the former is the threshold of the latter, have no connecting points. . . . There comes a time when one has to make up one's mind and choose which side one is on. The catoptric universe is a reality which can give the impression of virtuality, whereas the semiosis universe is a virtuality which can give the impression of reality. (226)

The question of the "real" and the "virtual" will return in our discussion of postmodern simulacra. To be sure, the status of the sign and the problematic of memory and its roles in subject or social formation are questions as old as philosophical inquiry itself: some of the most enduring images or models of memory, the wax tablet and the inscribed sign, can be traced back to Plato's *Theaetetus*, where Socrates says he was developing a metaphor already present in Homer.¹⁸ The model of the wax tablet itself, as we have already seen, and as Mary Carruthers suggests, is based upon the *technical* process of inscription, of a "seal" (*sêmeia*) made by a signet ring in wax that is itself "based upon how the eye sees in reading, not how the ear hears" (21).

Once again, we encounter the post-structural critique of metaphysics and of the self-presence in language—grammatology versus phonology, sign versus inspiration—in this model of representation, but we must table that idea for the time being. A more useful thread to follow in the discussion of mnemonics and semiotics at this point is way the question of temporality links modern and postmodern models of memory—we might say epistemology and cultural semiology—together. The classification of memory as inscription/interpretation supports my own thesis that in the postmodern period memory has been re-located to the secular and inorganic realm of the social as a dynamic discursive process, to the dazzling "empire" of signs. In this it recapitulates Carruthers' category of *hermeneutical* or *iconographic* memory, memory as an act of interpretation of the "representational character of the memory-likeness" (21) that cannot be separated from language nor from its social frames; as well, though perhaps less obviously, it

¹⁸ For a detailed explanation of Platonic models of memory see Hermann, Douglas J. and Roger Chaffin, eds., *Memory in Historical Perspective* (25-55); Morris, *Theoretical Perspectives on Memory* (3-7); Yates, *The Art of Memory* 50-53) and Carruthers, *The Book of Memory* (16-23).

incorporates aspects of what Yuri Lotman calls the *expressive* aspect of culture-as-memory, a structural model of culture in which the whole world might seem to be a text to be interpreted and in which culture, as Lotman argues, in fact is memory.¹⁹ In contrast, the classification of memory as an heuristic would concern itself with models of memory and the practical side of memory-training, with what Carruthers calls the *pedagogical* aspects of memory that have to do with *inventio* or "finding" (20), that explore and explain the literal (archival) content of memory, and that include such models as the *ars memoria* or "architectural mnemonic," the wax tablet, the aviary, and so forth. Of course, one cannot speak of memory as an hermeneutic activity (memory as interpretation) for long without invoking aspects of the heuristic or content-of-memory model (memory as storage and retrieval), and the "heuristic schemes might well take advantage of certain hermeneutic and/or iconographic conventions in constructing mnemonically valuable markers," even though "such markers are not intrinsically necessary to mnemonic schemes" (21-2).

What should be clear is that there are no indisputable borders when it comes to memory: like the synapses neurologists study or the intertexts cultural critics posit when they think the past, memory itself is not a closed nor static system; memory is not fixed in one location; it is a process, a system that functions *in relation to*. A semiological model of cultural memory studies this process as a social process of meaning-making, as a mediatory and inscriptive technology. A culture's memory thus acts as a dynamic and transformative cybernetic system that incorporates critical modes of "interpreting" and "retrieving" the past other than simply the positivist modes of History or Tradition. The cultural need for new epistemologies and ontologies that emerged in the nineteenth century in Europe can then be read as an awareness of the "irrelevance" of *received tradition in thought and mythic endowments*. As Terdiman argues, the past is never a literal or concrete "thing," even though structures and institutions might seem to possess enduring and absolute meanings, meanings from the past that seem to be literally *reproduced* in the present:

This coincidence is never literal. We age, things change, we forget. The impossibility of absolute replication of the past restores the mystery, indeed the urgency, of the memory crisis about which the nineteenth century never ceased to worry. For if the reproduction of the past in the present is *not* the result of its ontological replication, how *does* the past contrive to determine us? (*Present Past* 246)

This question, Terdiman argues, is the ur-question of modernity; perhaps it is the central question of any self-conscious epoch or episteme. We shall raise it repeatedly in the context of my interpretation of Terdiman's argument about modern mnemonics and my thesis about postmodern cultural memory. For now, I think we can safely say that it has transposed itself into theoretical and literary imaginations in the postmodern period, a "global" time and space in which the modern need for "new" narratives or models to explain the determinants of human behaviour at political and personal, at cultural and ethical levels has intensified. In fact, as Terdiman says, "We might conceive the formation of the human sciences, in particular the disciplines we have come to know as history, political economy, sociology, and psychology, as the result of efforts by a series of seminal theorists to understand how our lives are in fact *determined*" (246). Of course, one might object that attempts to understand how one's life is determined, whether by chance or

¹⁹ In his structural account of culture-as-memory, or memory-as-culture, Lotman explains that according to such a designation of culture "Within the conditions of a culture chiefly oriented towards content and represented as a system of rules, the basic opposition is 'organized—non-organized' (and this opposition can be realized in particular cases as 'cosmos—chaos,' 'ectropy—entropy,' 'culture—nature,' and so on). But within the conditions of a culture oriented primarily towards expression and represented as an aggregate of normative texts, the basic opposition will be 'correct-incorrect,' i.e. wrong (precisely 'incorrect' and not 'noncorrect'); this opposition may approximate, even coincide with, the opposition 'true—false'. In the latter case, culture is opposed not to chaos (entropy) but to a system preceded by a negative sign" (219).

by design, are as old as the earliest forms of consciousness and society, but that does not undercut Terdiman's point that memory is factored into the processes of meaning-making which are inevitably anchored in the material world of the social and which extend into the present as *signs*. This extension (protension/retension) is memory. To speak about memory is to speak about the status of this irreversible transferral, this semiological connection to the past: its locations, its functions, its conditions of possibility, its permanence and impermanence, its effects in the present.

The preceding glance at the history of memory leaves us on the threshold of many difficult questions, but the most pressing ones, I think, are the questions that pivot on the representation of time and social life and the function of time in social life and representation. Let us now look briefly at *memory* and *time* and *representation* as distinctly modern and postmodern problems, but let us do so with the understanding that the division between the modern and postmodern is itself an arbitrary and unstable—and for some, illusory and untenable—one. In the most general terms, as I have already said, the mnemonics of the modern tended to be utopian and amnesiac; the postmodern is more ambivalent: its aesthetic is more contradictory; its epistemology is more self-reflexive and critical; its considerations of the past reflect what I think of as the "presentist" approach to memory, an approach that lends itself to the analytic project of cultural memory and, ultimately, as I have been arguing, to the science of signs.

Memory is the representation of past experience, and it is socially organized insofar as forms of cultural expression (such as language, literature, architecture, and theory) and forces or frames—Althusser calls them apparatuses—that organize the social (such as exchange, technology, political, educational, and religious institutions, and so on) reciprocally—and reversibly—structure the present and stabilize our attachments to the past. In the context of his argument from *Present Past*, as we have seen, Terdiman argues that when these social forces and frames change, as they did drastically in the nineteenth century, memory or the re-representation of the past registers this change as an epistemological rupture. This, for Terdiman, is the temporal "heart" of Europe's modern *memory crisis*, a distinct anxiety about the past and about its persistence into the present, an "anxiety about memory that came into focus in the nineteenth century, and whose representations pervade the period's self-conception and its social practices" (242). Terdiman frames this perturbation as a dialectic of liberation-enslavement, and it is fair to say that the "liberation" Terdiman has in mind here is informed by a Nietzschean *forgetting*, the most obvious and popular (high modernist) expression of which might well be Ezra Pound's exhortation to "MAKE IT NEW," though as Robert Hughes points out Pound cribbed the phrase from a Ch'ing Emperor upon whose bathtub Pound believed the phrase had been written. The phrase, Hughes contends, is misunderstood in North American culture as "disparagement of cultural memory" (*Culture of Complaint* 113) when it was in fact an injunction to carry the work of the past, constantly refreshed, into the present: the "it" is tradition itself" (114).

Hughes links the modernist "alteration in man's view of the universe" (15) to a sense of accelerated time and to a broad cultural transformation in how the past persists, how it is remembered. "What did emerge" in this era, Hughes explains,

from the growth of scientific and technical discovery, as the age of steam passed into the age of electricity, was the sense of an accelerated rate of change in all areas of human discourse, including art. From now on the rules would quaver, the fixed canons of knowledge fail, under the pressure of new experience and the demand for new forms to contain it. (*The Shock of the New* 15)

The "shock" Hughes speaks of here is of a piece with the "crisis" identified by Terdiman in *Present Past* in which Europeans perceived the stress of the present to be "singularly traumatic, particularly new and dire" (4-5). For the moderns, as Terdiman reasons,

The problem was to understand the constitution of the present as an unwitting, involuntary prolongation of the past. In such a structure, the bright independence of each moment of post-Revolutionary time appeared to blur, to surrender its promise. Much more than the present seemed present in the present. As the distinction between *then* and *now* blurred, the persistence of the past, the inertia of practice, the conservatism of habit, the subterranean obstinacy of belief increasingly became focused as a complex puzzle that culture discovered at its heart and sought to comprehend in the service of its liberation. (*Present Past* 244)

In this scheme, culture becomes the force or system that explains the "absent" but "present" past and its constraints and mobilities. For the moderns (and in different ways for the postmoderns), the forces of culture seemed to "isolate consciousness in a perpetual, inescapable present" (45) characterized by "mechanical reproducibility, dehumanization, the flattening of time, the bleaching out or dehistoricizing of tradition" (44). The power of the past to constitute the present becomes the object for psychoanalytic and for social theory; the contents of the past, which is gone, which cannot be fully *reproduced*, nonetheless continue to determine the present as narrative or discursive *re-presentations*. Thus

"memory" might be construed as the generic identifier for the seemingly ineluctable *determinations* that give content to, and create the conditions of possibility for, any present. Memory names the mechanism by which our present is indentured to the past, or, to turn the structure around, by which a past we never chose dominates the present that seems the only place given to us to live. (244)

The domination or determination of the present by the past is, for Terdiman, the most important problem or "effect" of memory, and its history ties cultural theory and representation or semiology together. This is how the problem of memory is construed as a problem—as the crisis of—representation. The problem that nineteenth-century Europeans faced was that these cultural determinants or mechanisms of memory remained oddly unfamiliar, even though they acted some of the most powerful and omnipresent forces in the construction of both subjects and social formations in daily life.

One way to understand this perturbation of memory is to think of it as the outcome of a larger cultural transformation from predominantly metaphysical or theological conceptions of the world to textual and secular ones, to signs: from the organic and sacred to the technical and mechanical, from transcendent gods and the self-presence of speaking and perceiving individuals to the "enlightened" discourses of science which determine or "interpellate" subjects. For such "written" subjects, the past like the notion of "self" becomes an *interpretation*, the function of a dynamic semiological system. Such a narrative is roughly the task that I have set out to (begin to) explore in this dissertation insofar as I want to explain how an understanding of memory in the postmodern period is tied not to transcendent categories or abstract values but to the material processes or mechanisms of signification—to the (iconographic) materiality of the stroke of the sign and to the "freight" or cultural accumulations of language as dialogue or utterance.²⁰ Such a

²⁰ "Dialogism . . . is a memory-model. It seeks to recall the semantic and social history carried by a culture's language, but which tends to be forgotten, to be blanked, in characteristic forms of mystification and amnesia since the revolutions of the nineteenth century" Terdiman, *Present Past* 45). Mikhail Bakhtin's model of dialogism lends itself to such an account of memory: Bakhtin, Terdiman argues, "reasserts the mediations linking social objects and signs to the cultural systems in which their meanings become meaningful" (*Present Past* 45). "For any individual consciousness living in it, language is not an abstract system of normative form but rather a concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have the "taste" of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an

narrative also explains how the idea of memory as a set of *interpretations* or *representations* of the past differs from psychoanalytic models of how memory stores and retrieves information across time, models in which the psyche is said to "contain" the past. At least in its present incarnation in this dissertation, this narrative is not meant to be exhaustive nor systematic; instead, it can be read as a *story* about memory that might help us to see how a contemporary conception of *cultural* memory has developed from the classical understanding of memory as located in the mind or soul. A semiological understanding of memory as a system that does not "contain" the past but that *re-presents* it as signs at the level of culture in much—if not exactly—the same way that the mechanism of signification occurs in language.

What remains constant, I think, from the earliest models of memory to the latest semiological thinking about memory and culture is the awareness that, as I have already said, memory is in the middle of things, that memory is tangled up in the processes of meaning-making and language that structure our lives, that configure the relations of power and knowledge; memory, as Terdiman explains, becomes implicated in the modern period in the ways that "the social, cultural, and psychological past of individuals and group seemed to preserve and impose itself even in the absence of any overt compulsion" (*Present Past* 244). Memory is the mode in which we know or re-present the past and thereby understand ourselves and our societies in the present: "whatever else we want to say about it, memory is somehow the past" (268).

Another way to put this is to say that the emergence of modernity has confirmed the need for malleable and self-reflexive, for secular and inorganic modes of knowledge, including memory. "Truth," as Zarathustra says, "has never yet clung to the arm of an inflexible man" (Nietzsche, *Zarathustra* 79). Terdiman's model of *modern* memory frames the evolution of memory as a modern problem, one that, I think, it has become the legacy of the postmodern to work out. I take some issue with Terdiman's claims about modern memory and precedence, as well as about the status of memory in the postmodern, but it is clear that this dissertation on cultural memory would be much poorer without his remarkable work. Here is a sketch of Terdiman's analysis:

The following might stand as a bare-bones paradigm for memory's activity. *A content of some sort is registered, with whatever fidelity the registering system can manage. Time passes. A representation appears, responsive to the content previously registered.* What has happened is memory. Whenever anything is conserved and reappears in a representation, we are in the presence of a memory effect. Memory thus complicates the rationalist [positivist, realist] segmentation of chronology into "then" and "now." In memory, the time line becomes tangled and folds back on itself. Such a complication constitutes our lives and defines our experiences. The complex of practices and means by which the past invests the present is memory: memory is the present past. (8)

It is not hard to see how the problematic of memory when conceived in this way propels us, willingly or otherwise, into the problems of semiosis, of interpretation, of representation, and thus into the galaxy of postmodern theoretical discourse. Perhaps this is not surprising, given Terdiman's prescient recognition that memories and theories are determinants of what we know and think, that memory must be balanced in-between reference and interpretation—problems I shall consider in more detail below when I use Terdiman's argument about modern memory as a springboard to sketch some of the parameters of a theory of cultural memory in the postmodern

age group, the day and hour. Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words and forms are populated by intentions. . . . The word in language is half someone else's" (*The Dialogic Imagination* 293). All words have a "material" past, a kind of "trace" or "palimpsest" memory: "the writing surface of culture is used for creating new texts, after signs that are already inscribed have been scraped away or scratched off. This scraping or scratching, however, is not an erasure: older signs appear between the newer and newest ones as disremembered [as not quite remembered] fragments of something that, as a whole, remains elusive" (Lachmann 24).

period, an era in which the past is indeed *determinant* but also an *interpretation*, one which is grounded in the sign-system of the social. Most striking, however, is that Terdiman, like Carruthers and Iser and Lachmann, amongst others, configures memory in relation to Thanatos or the death drive, "the oldest content of life," "the lifelessness from which life emerged" (359); against this, Terdiman imagines memory's "outer horizon" as a place of "intense struggle between repetition and innovation, between past and future. *Too much memory, or too little*" (359). As Terdiman reminds us:

Our present is still not on easy terms with how the past endures, with how it continues to occupy and preoccupy us. From the unending recurrence in national and international affairs of conflicts rooted in seemingly bygone political, religious, or cultural disputes to the involuntary repetition of struggles with psychic trauma surviving from an archaic period of our individual lives, we appear unable to cease contending with a past we might otherwise have thought was gone. But the past does not evaporate. Its persistence is the effect of memory. (*Present Past* vii)

Europeans in the nineteenth century, Terdiman claims, could not forget nor come to terms with this uncanny persistence of the past, and despite the increasing civil, political, and religious (not to mention economic) liberties of the age,

it soon became evident that despite these forms of juridical liberation the conduct of individuals and their possibilities continued to be powerfully constrained. At that point, in the face of the more diffuse and mysterious limitations, social theory began to investigate how the social, cultural, and psychological past of individuals and groups seemed to preserve and impose itself even in the absence of any overt compulsion. People appeared to imprison *themselves*. How did they come to do so, and why didn't they stop? (244)

These questions organized the relation between determination and behaviour, between culture and society, between memory and theory, as Terdiman reasons, in the nineteenth century, an age of unprecedented urbanization, industrialization, democratization, and technological innovation. At least "Since the French Revolution," Terdiman writes, "there has been a special intertwining between the problem of memory and the forms and generation of cultural theory" (15). The imbrication of theory and memory proceeds, then, because "Memory is a theory machine. And theories are memory machines" (15).

That is, theory, as Terdiman sees things, arose as an inherently *self-reflexive* cultural symptom in an era in which the past was no longer clearly (or traditionally) linked to the present, an age in which the sort of cultural transformation Hayden White has identified elsewhere was commonplace. For Terdiman, memory and theory are not "reified or separable entities" but "mutually determining instances of our continuous and intricate negotiation with the past" (*Present Past* 18). In this way,

Theories are memory machines because they determine what, in the flux of experience, we apprehend and cognize. Theories organize what we notice, and thereby what we recall. By determining interpretation they act inevitably as schemata for memory. Even those theories most reluctant to credit a relationship between discourse and its referents nonetheless function to model representations and to determine their field of referentiality. (15)

For Terdiman, both theory and memory begin to function as "important cultural technologies" to explain the paradox of or disjunction between *now* and *then*, to explain what we notice about the past and how this process is never "innocent" (*Deconstructing* 13), never value-free nor self-evident; memory, rather, in theory and in literature, is *motivated* and *interested*:

We could say that among the things that memory conserves . . . are paradigms, protocols, practices, mechanisms, and techniques for conserving memory itself. It would not be hard to argue that a culture's theories do the same: they recall and reproduce the cognitive and

epistemological operations their culture has found important. So a culture's theories are among its fundamental memory formations. As such, theories determine how cultures reproduce and represent—how they remember—themselves. (15-16)

The advent of a modern epistemology is not my present concern, and it hardly needs to be said that few critics agree on what precisely the terms "modern," "modernity," and "modernism" denote.²¹ But I have cited Terdiman's framing of the modern memory crisis at some length to demonstrate the depth of the problem of time when it comes to speaking about memory, and to set up a baseline against which to measure postmodern mnemonics and its "imaginary" temporality and unmappable spaces. For Terdiman, the postmodern marks a *disappearance* or shift of memory and the past out of a predominantly psychoanalytic mode and into cultural and semiological forms. As Terdiman puts it, "in contemporary forms . . . the dull facticity of the past modulates into complication, as the enigma of the past's retention expands to become indistinguishable from the experience of the representation by which and within which we live, the time line appears to turn definitively circular and eventually to diffuse altogether. Then memory and its problems disappear" (358).

Terdiman is arguing that the postmodern period experiences what Jameson has called the waning of affect and the referent and the increasing domination of the sign or simulacra, what John Frow will denote as *the accumulation of spectacle*. But curiously, I think, Terdiman's solution is to invoke the model of the dialectic: "The closer we look at how memory has been conceived in the nineteenth century," he argues, "the clearer becomes the need to re-balance it in the delicate dialectic—between reproduction and representation, between fact and interpretation, between recollection and understanding—that we still need to devise and refine" (357). Fair enough. I am arguing something very similar when I suggest that memory as a cultural technology is located *in-between*. But the problem with the logic of the dialectic is that it tends to prescribe interpretation, to shut down representation in order to make it conform to a fairly limited and unitary and teleological (potentially totalizing) epistemological model.²² Memory, I think, operates in a much less predictable way, although our attempts to control the interpretation of the past are, in one sense, "controlled" by our own cultural locations and positions within the determining frames of language and social formation.

²¹ The terms "modern," "modernity," "modernism," and "modernization" are obviously linked, but it might be useful to delineate several specific meanings of them. For a writer and critic like Milan Kundera, for example, "modernity" names that period of European history from, say, Cervantes and Descartes to Proust, Joyce, Mann, and Heidegger (*The Art of the Novel* 3-14); for a critic such as Robert Hughes it denotes a more recent period in European history, from about 1880 to the end of World War II (*The Shock of the New* 8-17); for Terdiman, "modernity" is essentially the "long nineteenth century," 1789-1920 (symbolically, the period from the French Revolution to the end of the Great War) but particularly the period dating from 1880s, which sets the stage for "modernism" but also came to be seen as the modern period itself (*Present Past* 4); for Jameson, modernization "has something to do with industrial progress, rationalization, reorganization of production and administration along more efficient lines, electricity, the assembly line, parliamentary democracy, and cheap newspapers" (304); if "modernization is something that happens to the base, and modernism the form the superstructure takes in reaction to that ambivalent development, then perhaps modernity characterizes the attempt to make something coherent out of their relationship. Modernity would then in that case describe the way 'modern' people feel about themselves . . ." (310). The term "modernism" generally refers to a set of aesthetic strategies that developed in and characterized acts of cultural expression produced in the modern period, the "high" point of which includes such literary artists as T. S. Eliot, James Joyce, and Ezra Pound. Things are not necessarily clearer surrounding the term "postmodern," and there is no real critical advantage to stating simply that the modern "predates" the postmodern.

²² For Robert Young, the hidden logic or law of the dialectic forecloses upon ambivalence and difference, it seeks to link consciousness to history once and for all: "the dialectic as a unity of method and movement, of subject and object, knower and known, requires the writing subject who must effectively hold them together" (*White Mythologies* 38).

It is *time* or *temporality* that, as I suggested in the Introduction, that troubles memory the most: whether we speak about the past in terms of the dialectic, of the conscious and unconscious systems of the psyche, of History or Tradition, or even of social and technological changes that occur as we seem to move from "now" to "then," we are speaking about memory and its registration and representation of change. The transformation in consciousness that Terdiman identifies as the emergence of the modern is an "epochal rupture" (*Present Past* 5) in the organization of power and knowledge, one that produced Europe's modern "memory crisis" and that is roughly analogous to what Michel Foucault has termed the "epistemic rupture."²³ A clear understanding of cultural memory would be impossible without a sense of how time in the modern period is considered to be unsettled, perturbed, in crisis. It hardly needs to be said that revolutions in the ways we know and think are the result of complex economic and political forces and of equally complex and attenuated modern social processes, not the least of which being industrialization and urbanization, political and economic revolution, unprecedented technological development, and the consolidation of "Enlightenment discourses" or the "human sciences" in the West, especially throughout the "long nineteenth century," punctuated as it was by the French Revolution and the Great War. Certainly, it is not hard to recognize the importance of pivotal historical events such as the revolution in France and the Great War and the grip they have upon the cultural memories of the West: the former is a cornerstone of nationalism and "democratic" reformation; the latter a watershed for modern technology, a "hideous embarrassment to the prevailing Meliorist myth which had dominated the public consciousness for a century," as Paul Fussell writes in *The Great War and Modern Memory*, precisely because "It reversed the [temporal and positivist] Idea of Progress" (8).

Terdiman's cultural analysis of modernity and the memory crisis can also be suggestively linked to his earlier argument about symbolic resistance in nineteenth-century France; envisioning a social semiotics in which all discourses (including, I think memory) are located in the social, Terdiman writes in *Discourse/Counter-Discourse*:

The deeply socialized and contextualized semiotics emerging from my argument insists upon the weight of meanings laden, just beyond the immediate field of vision which perceives them, with the conflicted interests they sustain or contest. They carry all the ideological and structural weight of the already constituted paradigms and patterns which involuntarily occupy our memories and appropriate our creativities. Such structures

²³ "The analysis of discursive formations, of positivities, and knowledge in their relations with epistemological figures and with the sciences is what has been called, to distinguish it from other possible forms of the history of the sciences, the analysis of the *episteme*. The episteme may be suspected of being something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape—a great body of legislation written once and for all by some anonymous hand. By *episteme* we mean, in fact, the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems. . . . the episteme is not a form of knowledge (*connaissance*) or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities" (Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* 191). The episteme sounds like a matrix of cultural memory to me; it stands in opposition to History which, for Foucault, "must be detached from the image that satisfied it for so long, and through which it found its anthropological justification: that of an age-old collective consciousness that made use of material documents to refresh its memory" (7); discursive analysis of the episteme is a reconsideration of the past, a "cultural" or "counter" remembering (reconstitution) of the past that "questions the document" (6) and that disintegrates the logic that dictates we "'memorize' the monuments of the past" and in doing so imagine that we "lend speech to those traces which, in themselves, are often not verbal, or which say in silence something other than what they actually say; in our time, history is that which transforms documents into monuments" (7).

determine the realms of our freedom with the weight of constituted practice, which would seem to be an irreducible element of our existence in society. (38)

As early as 1985, Terdiman is thinking about how memory operates at the level of discourse and textual trace. By 1993, which is when *Present Past* was published, Terdiman analyses memory as a kind of knowledge or faculty or process that in fact connects the realm of contextualized semiotics to the domains of psychoanalysis and sociology. Terdiman sees this "reconfiguration" of knowledge and memory in the modern period—under the aegis of the sign—as implicated in the production of the social and the

coordinate shift in the mode of conservation (and awareness) of the past, from the activity of live, organic memory to what might be termed artificial or archival memory (in the form of written documents and similar "extra-individual" mechanisms for recollection, themselves increasingly organized and marshaled by institutions, ranging from the educational to the bureaucratic, dedicated to the preservation of the past. (*Present Past* 30)

I would add that this re-location of memory and textual preservation of the past is organized around the polarity, for Terdiman, of the psychological and the sociological, between an "inner" or psychoanalytic model of memory and what I have called an "external" or cultural model. Terdiman's analysis of the European "memory crisis" focuses mostly on the former, culminating with his readings of memory in Proust and Freud, which centre on the emergence of mnemo-analysis and the modern, fragmented subject who, try as he might, cannot, as Bachelard lamented, consolidate nor locate himself in time, "in the century" (8).

It might be useful, at this point, to stop and remember the distinction between internal and external, between psychological and cultural modes of memory that I made earlier, and to note how in the postmodern period memory is conceived more and more as a cultural or external phenomenon, more and more, that is, as a social determinant which functions in and around the matrices of signification that generate language and meaning. The cultural and material practices that act as an "outer horizon" or "social frame" for memory constitute the *un-settled* field of culture itself. As I see this, memory operates within the nexus of the private and the public—in-between the subject and the social, in-between the tempting but illusory certainty of positivist reproduction and the seemingly boundless semiological realm of representation. To put this another way, the subject-of-memory as I want to imagine it here is circumscribed, on the one hand, by the mechanisms of the psyche, by our "hard" or "wet" wiring, by the personal experiences we "record" and "preserve" in our muscular and neural tissues, but also, and no less palpably, by the social frames and practices in which the subject speaks and thinks and in which the content of the *lifeless* past is "re-presented."²⁴

²⁴ In *How Societies Remember* Paul Connerton argues that "social memory" is the embodiment of the past, that the study of commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices "leads us to see that images of the past and recollected knowledge of the past are conveyed and sustained by . . . ritual performance" (40); Connerton's thesis is obviously indebted to Halbwachs' theories of collective memory: it identifies personal and cognitive memory as the province of psychoanalysts and psychologists, respectively (28), and sees the "inscriptive" "traces" of the past as the business of historians, who do *not* depend on social memory (14); the study of "habit memory" or the embodied past (social memory), in contrast, brings recollection and bodies together: "For the meaning of social habit rests upon others' conventional expectations such that it must be interpretable as a socially legitimate (or illegitimate) performance. Social habits are essentially legitimating performances. And if habit memory is inherently performative, then social habit-memory must be distinctively social-performative" (35). Connerton's argument is impressive, but it seems to devalue the written or inscribed nature of the material sign—the grammatological—and to over-value an essential or transcendent connectedness (self-presence, organic plenitude, phonological) at the level of the social, to ignore the mechanisms, the narrations, which underwrite shared pasts and bind and legitimate social formations.

This dissertation is predominantly concerned with this last sort of memory: the cultural mechanisms by which the past is constructed and interpreted. For Terdiman, who invokes perhaps the oldest coda of cultural memory in the West in *Present Past*, the mythic location of memory *in-between* life and death, memory indeed marks that inner time (or we might say activity) and thus negotiates the aporetic space in-between oblivion and recollection, "now" and "then," meaning and meaninglessness—which may well be just what Heidegger had in mind when he spoke of memory as a "gathering." Certainly, Terdiman reads this split in Freud's paradigmatic modern mnemonics, a complex and paradoxical mix of maieutics and hermeneutics that we shall consider more fully in a moment and that Terdiman figures as a split between the unpredictable peregrinations of the conscious system and the shadowy but censored *literal* repository of the past that Freud names the unconscious: the former bounded by *temporality*, the latter ostensibly *timeless*. Although my point here might sound crude and simplistic, it seems to me that this is the paradoxical human condition—to be able to contemplate timelessness but to be "sentenced" to being in-time, to history, to death. To a biological and physical duration. A theory for understanding the modern or *absurd* and self-conscious subject-of-memory, as Terdiman rightly observes, must model this "temporal displacement" (298) registered by consciousness as memory, as a line or flow or transformation from "then" to "now," in order to be a useful tool for understanding human thought and its social organization: but how? How do our image-memories of the absent past, whether conscious or unconscious, free or constrained, in the most literal sense, differentiate *time*—localize and establish the directionality of time? In what sense does the past determine our present and future even though it no longer "really" exists? The answers to these questions, I suspect, lie in a complex theory of materiality and signification that I am certainly not equipped to provide at this point. Perhaps this is where the call for the question will most obviously outstrip any possible answer to it that I can provide. For how can we imagine memories as the consciousness of duration and in doing so account for a sense of the imagined or desired *continuity* between the past and present but also for a (distinctly modern and eventually postmodern) sense of the *discontinuity* that modern man feels between the present and the past? In the modern and postmodern periods, at least, memory underwrites as much as it undercuts our senses of temporality, subjectivity, and social identity: memory, as I have already said, seems to both hold us together and to undermine that cohesion. This paradox lies at the heart of contemporary memory, as we have already noted, and Terdiman associates it with the "split" modern consciousness of the West and the recognition that meaning and language do not possess access to some breath-taking "authentic" past but are discursive constructions, negotiations, mediations—concomitant to the fragmentation of "individual" consciousness and the dissolution of organic or traditional social forms that emerged most obviously in the nineteenth century in response to technological, industrial, political, scientific, and demographic "revolutions." The product of this "modern" self-reflexivity, for Terdiman, is "a painfully divided structure of consciousness" (*Present Past* 21), an "I" that can never fully remember itself nor absolutely coincide with nor "recover" its absent past-self. This fragmented subject must live with the recognition that there is an unbridgeable "disjunction between the present and the past" (21), with the recognition that man, as Nietzsche says, is unable to stop *time*.

Linda Hutcheon puts it well in the context of her discussion of postmodernism and the past. As Hutcheon explains, such a model of the past and its inscriptions "challenges the process of meaning-making in the production and reception of art, but also in broader discursive terms: it foregrounds, for instance, how we make historical 'facts' out of brute events of the past, or, more generally, how our various sign systems grant meaning to our experience" (*A Poetics of Postmodernism* x). Of course, as Jonathan Culler reminds us, there is no fully objective language that we can use to discuss the past much less semiological systems; there is "no metalinguistic function—language can discuss language—but there is no metalanguage, only more language piled upon language" (xi). Surely the same thing can be said about memory: a position from which to make purely objective observations, measurements, and statements about memory is

illusory; when it comes to memory, to thinking, to speaking, to representation, we are in the indeterminate and uncertain middle. The moderns, Terdiman argues, conceived of this aporetic space, this rift, as an unprecedented epistemological condition in which the past is the "antimony of the present" (52). This canceling or denial of the past, Terdiman claims, is the crisis of representation itself, a problem of how we "know" and or the "name" the present in *language*, which literally carries the burden of the past. This turn to language and to semiology in the modern period results in what Terdiman calls a "hermeneutics of suspicion"²⁵: a modern epistemology that will underwrite the postmodern and post-structural critique of Western Man and temporality, a critique that rejects speech and thought (as well as memory) as proof of self-presence as much as it rejects the auratic "sanctity of texts and meanings" (*Present Past* 301). In Nietzsche's view, "the denial of the past and the crisis of representation reveal themselves as coterminous, as the inseparable recto and verso of a historical page that Nietzsche wished once for all to turn" (*Present Past* 52).

I suspect we are still thumbing these pages in the postmodern period, still *suspiciously* scrolling interminable screens and following endless links in infinite hyper-texts, and that we have not, as Terdiman suggests, witnessed a kind of tautological disappearance of "memory and its problem" (358). How could memory disappear? Rather the modes in and technologies through which we "know" the past shift, and memory seems both to record and respond to these perceptual and material changes in time, to register difference and the problem of temporality, but not in a straight-forward or literal way. Hence, at least in the texts that Terdiman reads from Europe during the "long nineteenth century," memory is increasingly felt to be in a mode of "crisis": the past seems increasingly opaque and disconnected; the present seems unrepresentable. What is important to see here is that the determinants of this crisis are resolutely *social*, even if some, or most, of its effects are psychological and epistemological: the ways we think, speak, act, and feel, the ways we imagine man to possess a soul and a mind, the ways we subdivide the human psyche into a conscious and an unconscious, the ways we say that man "gathers" him or herself are, in one sense, determined by the social context, by the technologies, relations of production, cultural practices, and social formations within which the subject-of-memory exists.²⁶

²⁵ Terdiman develops this term from Paul Ricoeur in *Freud and Philosophy*: the "hermeneutics of suspicion" rejects the sovereignty of consciousness and assumes that there is "no knowledge outside of interpretation" (*Present Past* 306); it maintains that things do not mean what they say. But then the difficulty becomes knowing how they might not mean anything at all" (306). Such is the double hook of "unlimitable semiotic transfer" (306). A "hermeneutics of suspicion," which claims Nietzsche in its critical genealogy, assumes transformation not essence; presumes intelligibility and understanding out of enigmas or semiotic codes; assumes dissemination with no obligatory endpoint or goal; and is profoundly dialogic (305). Memory strikes me as a particularly *suspicious* activity.

²⁶ In *The Shock of the New* Robert Hughes suggests that "the cultural conditions of seeing" (14) transformed in the modern period in unprecedented ways; most obviously the city and the machine, as well as the "dynamics of capital" (10) and the unprecedented growth in science and technology. Modern art in particular recorded this sense of "newness" or acceleration of history that I am trying to articulate here: "what did emerge from the growth of scientific and technical discovery, as the age of steam passed into the age of electricity, was the sense of an accelerated rate of change in all areas of human discourse, including art. From now on the rules would quaver, the fixed canons of knowledge fail, under the pressure of new experience and the demand for new forms to contain it" (15). Hughes' claim about how societies organize temporality and knowledge could easily be emended as "cultural memory"; he lists technological innovations such as the internal combustion engine and the automobile, the re-coil operated machine gun and synthetic fibre, cordite and the cinematograph, amongst many others, and states that Thomas Alva Edison's invention of the phonograph in 1877 was "the most radical extension of cultural memory since the photograph" (15).

Put in other terms: social being determines consciousness no less than it determines memory; but memory is also called upon to register the disjunctions and perturbations between the present and the past, to reflect the *irreversibility* of time not to mention the bewildering social and cultural as well as technological and epistemological transformations that occur in time. "Time," Terdiman writes, "projects not a world of instantaneous (and presumably instantaneously reversible) exchanges, but a world of energies, entropies, and resistances, of work done and inscriptions laid down, of material, inherently directional change" (340). Such a model equates memory and time in several ways, and emphasizes the materiality of the sign and of being; perhaps it is better to say that it preserves at its heart a *double* relationship between cognition and inscription through which memory underwrites not only the ways that we "know" ourselves, to purposefully invoke the Socratic dictum and its classical framing of the perennial problem of identity, but also the more recent questions of epistemology, of the "suspicious" ways we in fact *know*. Memories, like words, like signs, like meanings in general, always have one foot in the past, in the "it was," but also one in the "it is": memory is a thinking of time, a consciousness of duration, a gathering of thought; as Terdiman puts it: "Instantaneity is a fiction; even the time of perception takes time. Memory thus underlies the possibility of intelligibility as its precondition. Cognition cannot be divorced from the *re-cognition* of memory: no memory, no meaning" (*Present Past* 9).

Certainly psychoanalytic models of memory tend to structure memory according to this paradoxical temporality, a consciousness *in* and *of* time, of the differences between "now" and "then," and of the differences between permanent and impermanent inscriptions of the past in psyche. As Alan J. Parkin notes, "For most of us memory is what allows us to recall things from the past—events that happened hours, days, or months ago. Few of us would concede, without some reflection, that being conscious is, itself, an act of memory" (2). Parkin's model is derived from William James, whose *Principles of Psychology*, published in 1890, established the idea that experience requires memory and that "primary memory" or the "rearward" or effortlessly accessed portion of present thought is distinct from "secondary memory," which is more difficult to access and "which comprises our permanent record of the past" (Parkin 2).

James' splitting of the human mind into two sectors with different mnemonic functions bears some resemblance to Freud's mapping of the human psyche as the conscious (memory as representational/hermeneutic) and the unconscious (memory as reproduction/referential). It can also be linked to Bergson's model of memory as the point of contact between matter and consciousness (or perception). For Bergson especially, the idea of time or *duration* (*durée irréversible*) is an essential component of human consciousness: "The duration lived by our consciousness is a duration with its own determined rhythm, a duration very different from the time of the physicist, which can store up, in a given interval, as great a number of phenomena as we please" (*Matter and Memory* 205). This "storing up" is the act of memory, which for Bergson is different than but inseparable from the system of perception:

The capital error, the error which, passing from psychology into metaphysic, shuts us out in the end from the knowledge both of body and spirit, is that which sees only a difference of intensity instead of a difference of nature [or kind], between pure perception and memory. Our perceptions are undoubtedly interlaced with memories, and, inversely, a memory only becomes actual by borrowing the body of some perception into which it slips. These two acts, perception and recollection, always interpenetrate each other, are always exchanging something of their substance as by a process of endosmosis. (67)

Bergson, we know, "desperately struggled to save consciousness from relegation to neurons" or psychology from science (Otis 36), and his *Matter and Memory*, which was first published in 1896, looks at memory at this critical interstice, this junction between the material and the ideal, between science and metaphysics. "The proper office of psychologists would be to dissociate [perception and recollection], to give back to each its natural purity" (67). The failure to do so condemns us, in Bergson's scheme, "to an ignorance both of pure memory and of pure

perception; to knowing only a single kind of phenomenon which will be called now memory and now perception, according to the predominance in it of one or the other aspects; and, consequently, to finding between perception and memory only a difference in degree, and not in kind" (67).

Bergson explained the mystery of memory, in part, by dividing it into "habits and images" (Otis 36): the former consisting of unconscious memories and, roughly speaking, bodily action; the latter, "spiritualized" representations or images, which loosely correspond to consciousness (Otis 36). Bergson thus attempts to preserve the commonsense "reality of spirit and the reality of matter" (*Matter and Memory* 9) by emphasizing the difference between perception and memory: memory is not "in" the brain, it cannot be materially represented or located in neural tissues; memory occurs in perception itself, in the *in-between* time and space of the *incorporeal*. The central tension in Bergson's model remains the larger, perennial question of the relation to matter to spirit, of the material to the ideal—of realism to idealism. Bergson's thesis is that "it is a mistake to reduce matter to the perception which we have of it," just as it is "a mistake also to make of it a thing able to produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they" (9). The first is the error of realism or materialism; the second, the error of the idealism. And both are "dissociations" that incorrectly isolate matter from spirit: the realist (materialist) model turns representation into a thing; the *idealist* model spiritualizes the brain into consciousness" (29). Bergson thus approaches the "classical" problem of soul and body, of spirit and flesh, as it centres upon memory, and particularly on the memory of words; he concludes that the domain of memory is the domain of the spirit, that "pure memory is a spiritual manifestation" (240). As Bergson says, the "spirit borrows from matter the perceptions on which it feeds and restores them to matter in the form of movement which it has stamped with its own freedom" (249). But "in no case can the brain store up recollections or images" (225).

The place where matter and spirit come into contact is the "image" of the body, which is part of the larger "system of images" that Bergson terms "my perception of the universe" (25). It would be interesting to link Bergson's model of the "image" to the semiological model of the linguistic sign being articulated at roughly the same time by Saussure and Pierce; it would be no less interesting to link it to the postmodern (Baudrillardian) sense of the sign as *simulacra*: "Matter," Bergson writes, "is an aggregate of images" (9). But these are questions we must set aside for now. The image, for Bergson, is an index of motion, of action in time, of present duration; the past, in contrast, "is that which no acts longer but which might act, and will act by inserting itself into a present situation from which it borrows the vitality" (240). This is not the same thing as semiological representation but something closer to a cybernetic signal or material movement, a "movement-image" upon which perception depends, which transverses the neural, spinal, and cortical tissues, and which is part of the body and thus inseparably bound to the material world: "What then are these movements, and what part do these particular images play in the representation of the whole?" Bergson asks:

The answer is obvious: they are, within my body, the movements intended to prepare, while beginning it, the reaction of my body to the action of external objects. Images themselves cannot create images; but they indicate at each moment, like a compass that is being moved about, the position of a certain given image, my body, in relation to the surrounding images. In the totality of representation they are very little; but they are of capital importance from that part of representation which I call my body, since they foreshadow at each successive moment its virtual act. (23)

The central question for Bergson, then, in much the same way as for Freud,²⁷ is how spirit and matter interact in the mind, how time or duration is inscribed as image-memory—some

²⁷ Freud understands the unconscious as the repository of the past; its stored memories have the power to determine the present of the subject-of-memory, a concept that retains some of the classical idea

permanent, some impermanent: "The question is: how can these two systems coexist, and why are the same images relatively invariable in the universe and infinitely variable in perception" (250):

The problem at issue between realism and idealism, perhaps even between materialism and spiritualism, should be stated, then . . . in the following terms: *How is it that the same images can belong at the same time to two different systems: one in which each image varies for itself and in the well-defined measure that it is patient of the real action of surrounding images; and another in which all images change for a single image and in the varying measure that they reflect the eventual action of this privileged image.* (25)

Bergson solves this dilemma, as I have said, by spiritualizing the "in-between" event of memory, the system where mind and matter come into contact. This pre-Socratic model of mind and matter deserves much closer attention, not least because it poses one of the most enduring questions in Western philosophy in a way that resonates forcefully in contemporary critical thought. I think of this "in-between" space in more semiological terms, as the *meaningful* space of culture or the sign system of the social. Yet as Bergson insists,

[t]he brain is no more than a kind of central telephone exchange: its office is to allow communication or delay it. It adds nothing to what it receives; but, as all the organs of perception send it to their ultimate prolongations, and, as all the motor mechanisms of the spinal chord and of the medulla oblongata have in it their accredited representatives, it really constitutes a centre, where the peripheral excitation gets into relation with this or that motor mechanism, chosen and no longer prescribed. (30)

For Bergson, habit-memory thus tends to be bodily and unconscious, as Ribot suggested (or as Freud would claim), but image-memories tended to be conscious and disorderly, a feature of the nature of memory, I think, that possesses curious linkages to the hermeneutic or representational model that I am arguing is a cornerstone of postmodern culture. The success, or failure, of Bergson's model, nonetheless, depends upon whether or not we can conceive of the events of "pure" perception and "pure" recollection in spiritual terms, but terms that "get into relation" with the material of bodies, with the world. Bergson imagine *duration* as the inventive and creative instant of this contact, as "pure" or "essential" difference or heterogeneity:

But, as regards the psychical life, unfolding beneath the symbols which conceal it, we readily perceive that time is just the stuff it is made of. There is, moreover, no stuff more substantial. . . . Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation. (*Creative Evolution* 6-7; cited in Lachmann 235)

What is especially compelling in Bergson's model of memory, as in other memory paradigms advanced at end of the nineteenth century, is the close attention it pays to temporality, to the ways that movement (physical reality) and the image (consciousness), bodies and minds, flesh and spirit must be thought *together*. This, I think, is the central problem that faced psychoanalysis and the other human sciences at the end of the nineteenth century; it is also, to speak in sweeping terms, one of the oldest philosophical and theological dilemmas. In one view, we are still trying to articulate, to work out this problem and its avatars at the end of the twentieth century in "our" models of subject and social formation, of temporal organization, of culture, of language, and of memory.

Whatever their mutual influences upon each other might have been at the end of the nineteenth century, however, the early theorists of memory consistently "divided the mnemonic realm into two distinct forms of memory—typically, the memory organized by our intelligence on

that memory is a locus, an ordered space outside of the conscious mind or system that "lays down master [timeless] registrations of our past" (*Present Past* 273). Cognitive psychology, Frow notes, employs a version of the (classical and literal) storage of a "vanished past and its persistent material vestiges in the present" which remains the predominant metaphor for memory "although it is now based more explicitly in the model of the electronic storage and random-access retrieval of coded information" (*Time* 226-27).

the one hand, and an autonomous affective or involuntary memory linked to sensory or emotional triggers on the other" (Present Past 201); and, as Terdiman also writes, most "philosophers of the time proffered the notion that all perception involves a displacement or extension in time as though it were a new discovery" (Present Past 9). But the modern tendency to partition memory in time and space, as memory and matter, is, indeed, nothing new. In the *Confessions* (397-98 AD), for instance, St. Augustine attempts to understand God and to explain his, Augustine's, conversion to Christianity by reconciling spirit to flesh, eternity (timelessness) to experience (time), the world to the word. Augustine, as we have seen, divides cognition into three parts, each of which corresponds to a segment of temporality, a distinctly *modern* model of being in time and, more importantly, of corporeal repression that earns Augustine the titles, at least for Arthur Kroker and David Cook, of being the "first citizen of the modern world" (37), the "Columbus of modern experience" (37), and the "first postmodern thinker" (28).²⁸ In his *Confessions*, Augustine, asks:

What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled. All the same, I can confidently say that I know that if nothing passed, there would be no past time; if nothing were going to happen, there would be no future time; and if nothing *were*, there would be no present time. (264).

These stages correspond to memory (consciousness of the past), perception (consciousness of the present), and expectation (consciousness of the future). Of these, I am most interested in memory, and Augustine the "postmodernist" assigns memory a "theological" function within the human mind-soul. Curiously, in what starts out as a kind of spiritual autobiography, which is problematic enough for a model of memory,²⁹ Augustine recognizes the elusive imbrication of memory and

²⁸ For Kroker and Cook, who follow Charles Cochrane, Augustine marks the end of classical epistemology and the beginning of Christian metaphysics or rationalism and "the terror of its *nihilism*" (37). Augustine's injunction to "directly apprehend experience" and to repress the flesh is, in Kroker and Cook's scheme, the beginning of discourse and emergence of the "radical anxiety" that underwrites the modern world and its legacy in the postmodern age: "If, finally, the embodiment of the will to power in fleshy being was the modern possibility, it was Augustine's strategy, not so much to act in forgetfulness of being but in repression of the corporeal self, by providing a method for the incarceration of that unholy triad: imagination, desire, and contingent will. In making the body a prison-house of the 'soul' (embodied consciousness) Augustine was also the first, and most eloquent, of modern structuralists" (37). Christian metaphysics, for Kroker and Cook, are thus not an aberration of classical thought but "a necessary, and vital, response in Western thought to the flight of being from the vicissitudes of existence" (58), a response to the failure of the "secular" classical mind to "solve the riddle of being in the world" (58). This moment of "fundamental rupture in the interstices of Western consciousness" (125), this transformation of (cultural) memory, is an account of the "desperate struggle of the will to overcome the body" (125) and the subsequent recognition of the failure of the referential illusion and the triumph or "eruption" of modern "lack"; this moment is a recognition that language will eventually stand in as god, as modern power; a recognition that the *sacrificial* episteme has been replaced by a discursive or textual one; a recognition, as Nietzsche once said of nihilism, that the highest values eventually devalue themselves.

²⁹ Frow, following the argument of Staughton and Turner, notes that the "nostalgia paradigm" is a structuring of sociological thought by a series of connections between a realm of authenticity and fullness of being, and the actually existing 'forms of human association' . . . The importance of memory to this paradigm lies not just in the privileged access it gives to this lost world, but in the immediacy with which it evokes it into presence . . . memory is thought of as partaking of a spirituality independent of the materiality of the sign; it is unstructured by social technologies of learning or recall; it is incapable of reflexivity (it cannot take itself as an object), and its mode of apprehension is thus rooted in the 'inherent self-knowledge' and the 'unstudied reflexes' of the body; it is organically related to its community and partakes of the continuity of tradition—a historical time without rupture or conflict, and without any but the most naturalized modes of transmission, above all that of the story, which 'embeds [an event] in the life of the listener in order to pass it on as experience to those listening'" (Time 222-23).

time, of idealism and materialism. As Augustine puts it in Book X, Chapter 8: "So I must go beyond this natural faculty of mine [the senses], as I rise by stages towards the God who made me. The next stage is memory. Which is like a great field or a spacious palace, a storehouse for countless images of all kinds which are conveyed to it by the senses" (214). Augustine's architectural conception of memory is borrowed, in part, from the classical architectural mnemonic—at one point Augustine refers to his memory as "vast cloisters" (215); but it is also informed by a complex, if latent, Manichaeism that facilitates the ambivalent discourse of memory insofar as it configures memory according to the *material* properties that seem to "contain" it—bodies, buildings, and textures, for example. Augustine sets these in opposition to the *immaterial* or *ideal* properties of spirit and consciousness, the faculties that link memory to cosmological duration, to the ability for sinful man to *transcend* the temptations of the flesh and in doing so to know happiness, even (in Augustine's scheme) to know God himself.

This is not the sense of memory that I am concerned with herein, but I do think that Augustine's conception of memory as *spiritual*, a paradigm we also observed in Bergson's philosophy of memory, is prescient, even though I will argue that the modern and postmodern social organization of memory in culture is indeed secular and unnatural—the conditions of a discursive world characterized by *regis* and *deus absconditus*³⁰ and in which the sign and not the self-present "spirit" or "memory-image" is the zone of contact between the material and the ideal, between the body and the flesh. The passionate and curious Augustine, nonetheless, states our dilemma well when he asks: "What, then, is time?"

I will not try to explicate Augustinian mnemonics here; that task has been executed precisely by Paul Ricoeur in *Time and Narrative*. What does strike me, though, is how Augustine perceives memory as powerful, as an attribute of his *obedient* Christian soul: "The power of memory is prodigious, my God. It is a vast, immeasurable sanctuary. Who can plumb its depths? And yet it is a faculty of my soul" (216). Memory, as Augustine confesses, is both familiar and unfamiliar; it connects and disconnects thoughts to material, bodies to time and space, individuals to social groups, past events to present perceptions, narratives to audiences, "now" to "then," and

³⁰ In terms from *The Art of the Novel* Kundera identifies the modern period as a time in which "man becomes the ground of all things. European individualism is born, and with it a new situation for art, for culture, for science" (149); such a conception of man, however, epitomized by Cartesian rationality, loses its footing by the nineteenth century. What Kundera calls the modern condition of "*deus absconditus*" prevails in which "God slowly departed from the seat whence he had directed the universe and its order of values, distinguished good from evil, and endowed each thing with meaning" (149, 6). The development of the novel traces this cultural and epistemological transition, and when we think of the novel as a site of cultural memory, as an intertext, we can begin to see how the transition of memory from a theological to a secular mode is concomitant with the "rise of the novel" and a "newly" literate reading public whose reading habits and *desires* to change their worlds, to invoke Ross Chambers, would certainly require a "new" set of cultural memories—one perhaps not so rigidly bound by a priestly caste or dynastic social formation. This is roughly the argument made by Benedict Anderson in his *Imagined Communities*. Due in part to print culture (especially the newspaper and the novel, two dominant forms of cultural memory) the "idea of a nation" (11) took root in the post-Enlightenment dissolution of dynastic and religious social and political formations. "All profound changes in consciousness," Anderson writes in his revised conclusion to *Imagined Communities*, "by their very virtue, bring with them characteristic amnesias" (204). Out of this kind of estrangement "comes a conception of personhood, *identity* . . . which, because it can not be 'remembered,' must be narrated" (204). "As with modern persons, so it is with nations. Awareness of being embedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of continuity, yet 'forgetting' the experience of this continuity—product of the ruptures of the late eighteenth century—engenders the need for a narrative of 'identity.' . . . Nations, however, have no clearly identifiable births, and their deaths, if they ever happen, are never natural. Because there is no Originator, the nation's biography can not be written evangelistically, 'down time,' through a long procreative chain of begettings. The only alternative is to fashion it 'up time'—towards Peking Man, Java Man, King Arthur, wherever the lamp of archaeology casts its fitful gleam. (205)

even words to things. Memory is so omnipresent that it stands in for the mind, in much the same way it would have for Plato and Aristotle: as Augustine notes, "memory and the mind are one and the same," and through this mind finite men can *know* an infinite and timeless God in time (220).

Augustine utilizes built space to model memory, and he does so in order to "imagine" a present in which the past and the future do not, strictly speaking, exist, but in which there are three different but simultaneous "times": "It might be correct to say that there are three times, a present of past things, a present of present things, and a present of future things. Some such different times do exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see. The present of past things is memory; the present of present things is direct perception; and the present of future things expectation" (269). Augustine's purpose in establishing three "times" is, on the one hand, to begin to explain the creation of the finite world by an eternal God who in fact "created" time and, on the other, to ensure that God will be in his, Augustine's, present and future. But Augustine is also curious about the power of time, interested, as he claims, in "forgetting what I have left behind" (278). The author of the *Confessions* wants to annul his past, no less, we might speculate, than the penitent in the confessional, than Marlow on the *Nellie*, or than the analysand on the analyst's couch. But memory gets in the way. If the past persists as memories, as it does in Augustine's theological meditation, it is clear that memory is powerful enough to save one's soul, or to compromise that process, to fragment the self even further if it is not checked, an idea that will be most fully explored in quite another way in perhaps the most famous modern memory-text, Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*. In that massive novel, Proust develops his theory of *involuntary memory*, a form of (ultimately neurotic) *hypermnnesia*, Terdiman argues, in which the "soteriological" and "salvationist rhetoric" is dense (*Present Past* 156, 231).

Reading against the grain of what he sees as the corpus of Proustian criticism,³¹ Terdiman argues that Proust conceives of memory in a "palpable and painful self-alienation. The inaccessibility of its own contents to a [coherent and unified] consciousness is what authenticates as truth the range of involuntary and unpremeditated epiphanies or self-revelations for whose promulgation and promotion in this period we credit Proust and Freud" (*Present Past* 202). For Terdiman, the individual in Proust's scheme *suffers* his or her own internalized dilemma or memory crisis, and this suffering is, in one way, the result of the interminable processes of interpretation/representation, of a subject-in-language that can never quite coincide with itself nor forget this chronic sense of disjunction and alienation; thus it is involuntary memory, in Proust's novel, that will "re-suture individuality" in a modern world in which both the individual and his or her "traditional" forms of community (including its mnemonic frames) have been shattered (Terdiman 204).

It is not my purpose to further explore Marcel Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu*.³² I do, however, want to emphasize how memory, far from being a peripheral concern in critical

³¹ For an interesting though at times abstruse linkage between Proustian "involuntary memory" and Bergson's "pure private experience," duration, and model of memory as an "inverted cone with the point pressing onto a surface" in which the "point represents the present moment, where memory impinges on the body in the instant," see Jeremy Tambling's "Memory, Mourning, Melancholy" (5) and Terdiman's *Present Past* (199-201); see also *Matter and Memory* (152).

³² In *The Remembrance of Things Past* involuntary memory is evoked by a material object, a piece of "petites madeleine" (48) that functions as a device which establishes in the narrator an extensive nexus between past and present. Curiously, Swann, "the Unwitting author" (47) of his sufferings, is in a familiar and felicitous space from his past; but his "remembrance" is supposedly involuntary: "And so it is with our own past" Swann declares, noting the Celtic belief that souls we have lost are imprisoned in objects: "It is a labour in vain to attempt to recapture it: all the efforts of our intellect must provide futile. The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach of the intellect, in some material object (in the sensation which that material object will give us) of which we have no inkling. And it depends upon chance whether or not we come upon this object before we ourselves must die" (47-8). The past here is configured a lot like Freud's unconscious, the literal repository of the past to which the conscious mind has at best

theory or nineteenth-century literary writing, is a central concern. More precisely, we notice in Terdiman's precis of Proustian mnemonics (as in Bergson's "image" or in Carruthers' presentation of the "intertext" as a palimpsest model derived from model of the wax tablet) a distant echo, or vatic outline, of contemporary semiology and, perhaps more surprisingly, of Derridean *deconstruction* and its critique of Western metaphysics and self-presence: when memory fails to protect and to unify the self or society, as it *seems* to fail in Proust's novel, "when speech fails to protect presence, writing becomes necessary" (*Of Grammatology* 144). This deconstructive "writing" is concomitant to the emergence of the modern subject and to its postmodern heirs; this is the epistemological model, I have been arguing, of discourse, at the "centre" of which is the stroke of the sign and the technical process of inscription as meaning-making.

One of the clearest treatments of modern and postmodern mnemonics I have read is John Frow's essay "*Toute la mémoire du monde*: Repetition and Forgetting," anthologized in his *Time and Commodity Culture*. The larger implications of Frow's "semiological" model of memory intersect with and underscore my own claims that the social organizes memory in the modern and postmodern and that the (technical) processes of signification and inscription—in short, *representation*—are the mechanisms we must study to understand language and memory as cultural modalities. In this way, the Platonic assumption that there is "a block of wax in our souls" (Yates 50) forms a curious (if tangential) linkage to the study of semiotics as well as to the related Foucauldian insistence that the modern carceral has as its task the construction of the modern soul as an effect of discourse,³³ which means roughly that instead of inscribing the body of the condemned with the sovereign's power (the spectacle of tortured flesh and execution) the modern criminal experiences the power of the state as it works on his or her mind or soul (incarceration, surveillance). In this scheme, memory is, once again, a central technology for understanding and altering behaviour. That is, after about 1760 or so, as Foucault reasons, the state attempts "to lay hold of", to judge, to reform the "soul of the criminal" as an effect of property and of discourse (*Discipline and Punish* 16-19). This moment in history Foucault terms the "birth" of the modern prison or penitentiary discipline, and I shall return to it and its linkages to modern mnemonics in Section Two when I argue that a *carceral unconscious* determines the Australians of Peter Carey's *Illywhacker*. In the crudest terms, power is no longer "inscribed" on the body as a spectacle but is made to operate on the (secular) modern soul or mind. Of course, "a trace of 'torture' remains in the modern mechanisms of criminal justice" (16), as Foucault writes, and the non-corporal techniques of modern discipline, which promise to reform the soul of the prisoner, certainly translate into the modern disciplinary architecture. Power works on and into memory; ideology is inherently mnemonic. We could easily substitute memory for "soul" in Foucault's equation, the point being that the modern soul becomes indistinguishable from the

limited access.

³³ Foucault writes that the "modelling [sic] of the body produces a knowledge of the individual," and through this modeling (or surveillance) "submissive subjects are produced, and a dependable knowledge built up about them. This disciplinary technique exercised upon the body had a double effect: a 'soul' to be known and a subjection to be maintained" (*Discipline and Punish* 294-95). The "micro-physics" of this "cellular" or *penitentiary* power composes "the genealogy of the modern soul." Thus Foucault recognizes "the historical reality of this soul, which, unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, supervision and constraint. This real, non-corporal soul is not a substance; it is an element on which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power. On this reality-reference, various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc. . . . The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. . . . The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body" (29-30).

(secular) modern mind and, ultimately, from memory itself. I call this the "carceral unconscious" in the next chapter, and John Frow calls it "disciplinary memory": the confessional and meditative sort of memory that the confined criminal undergoes in the modern carceral when he or she remembers his guilty past; a "memory-work understood as the therapeutic exorcism of repressed and traumatic material" ("In the Penal Colony" VI, 1).

To put this in order words, in the modern episteme, socially constructed memory stands in as a site for the construction (re-presentation) of identity; memory becomes a metonym, a palimpsest for the subject in-time and the values its inscribes. But memory is also protean and flexible; it change in time. In this sense, memory is "unreliable," an invention, a re-representation; it is the name for the mode in which we "know" or "experience" the relationship of the past to the present, "the complex of practices and means by which the past invests the present"; memory "*is the present past*" (Terdiman, *Present Past* 8). At the centre of this complex meaning-making is the event of signification, the "crisis of representation"; as Terdiman concludes, somewhat nostalgically, "the referents of memory are always absent. The past is gone. But then, so is virtually everything else. Maybe just as *everything* is representation, *everything* is memory" (8).

But if "Memory is how the mind *knows* time and registers change," if memory in fact "*inscribes the factor of time*" (Terdiman, *Present Past* 340) the problem remains as to *where* and *how* this inscription occurs. The wax block, the soul, muscles, cells, the unconscious—these all stand in as possible locations of memory, but each of these tells us little more than that memory somehow seems to be inscribed or written on a surface or contained in a place, that memory, as we shall see in a moment, is a "thing," an image, a sign or representation of the absent past. My argument is that we can look at this in a different way, that we can supplement the claims psychoanalysis and phenomenology make about memory and posit that culture is one of the places to look for the determinants of memory and consciousness, of the perceiving and remembering subject. For the representations of the "facts" of the past when imagined as, or in the context of, signification are *one* way to explain how the contents of the past are endlessly re-constructed, re-worked, and re-inscribed in the present. In this scheme, memory seems to *begin* in the social, to set its roots in the sphere of culture and its conflictual determinations in the "rhizomatic" sense of Deleuze and Guattari in which memory is read as a "virtual coexistence" (Tambling 5). It is, then, perhaps not so much that memory inscribes time as that the cultural frames in which we "operate" *organize* and *enable* our systems of meaning-making, including memory and language and the constructed rhythms and measurements, the loops and lines, of time.³⁴ Memory has always been at odds with exhaustive or systematic attempts to explain it, and we have already seen how the inscription or

³⁴ Time is unnatural and unrepresentable, and its function in memory is, to say the least, more complex than my simplistic sketch here can show; but two solutions to this dilemma advanced by pre-eminent literary critics suggest the importance of time to knowing and being, to meaning-making and hence memory: the first allegorical; the second narrative. Since time resists representation the self must problematically and I think amnesiacally "borrow, so to speak, the temporal stability it lacks from nature" (De Man 197); due to the ultimate unrepresentability of time" the self resorts to the "intelligible organization of narrative" (Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* 1:3) to model temporality and to manage the "inconclusive rumination" (1:6) inspired by speculation on time. This is not so much a pathological amnesia, for Ricoeur, but a "healthy circle" (1:3), a utilization of narrative to negotiate the paradox of time. For Ricoeur, narrative models time and thus compensates for a "being that lacks being" (Ricoeur 1: 16) and that "has no extension" (1:16)—in other words, for a being that exists in a (Nietzschean) perpetual present—is familiar enough as a foundation of Western epistemology and ontology; in the philosophical discourses it persists most strongly as a stroke of genius that, Ricoeur tells us, persists into the work of the phenomenologists Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (1: 16).

"writing" model of the wax block can be allusively linked to both metaphysical models of the mind-soul and to the contemporary philosophical project of deconstruction—to both *spiritual* and *organic* and *textual* and *inorganic* models of memory.

But as a theory of cultural memory insists, memory is intentional and meaning is made from and mediated by textual traces in time, by what John Frow calls the "orderliness and teleological drive of narrative teleologies" (229). Such an inscriptive or textual logic is a secular and technical hermeneutic activity—a condition, we might say, that is the result of the subject's inability to possess "direct understanding" (Assmann 129). As Frow says, memory always has been an art, a *tekhnè* [sic] and

To speak of memory as a *tekhnè*, to deny that it has an unmediated relation to experience, is to say that the logic of textuality by which memory is structured has technological and institutional conditions of existence. By "technological" I mean, on the one hand, storage-and-retrieval devices and sites such as books, calendars, computers, shrines, or museums; and, on the other hand particular practices of recall—techniques of learning acquired in school, structured confession or reminiscence, the writing of autobiography or history, the giving of evidence in court, the telling of stories related to an artifact or a photograph, and even such apparently immediate forms of recollection as the epiphanic flash of involuntary memory or the obsessive insistence of the symptom. (*Time and Commodity Culture* 230)

Here, Frow's claim is that memory is materially mediated, and that it is "only by working out the implications of 'writing' . . . for memory that we can avoid the nostalgic essentialism that affirms the reality of an origin by proclaiming its loss" (224). Frow's larger argument, as we have already noted, is that the postmodern period is an imaginary unity in which just such a nostalgic essentialism, just such a crippling amnesia or unproblematic narrative of temporality, seems to be endemic, and he argues for a material model of memory that, following the logic of Mary Carruthers in *The Book of Memory*, can be traced back to the earliest classical *ars memoria* and to the principle that meanings, like memories, are made not found. The nostalgia for "pure" presence and "authenticity"—for unmediated experience—is thus based on a specious epistemology, on a model of memory and time that Frow sees as a distinctly nostalgic cultural pathology, a model of collective memory that *demand*s a "continuity of passage between the living and the dead," one that "is surely no longer tenable. It is not a useful tool for conceptualizing the social organization of memory; it provides no mechanism for identifying its 'technological' underpinnings; and it cannot account for the materiality of signs and of the representational forms by which memory is structured" (*Time and Commodity Culture* 223-4).

My sense of the problem is that memory is better understood when we think of its discontinuity, its mediative and in-between status. To this end, Frow's claim is indispensable. He argues that the "imagining of time" (4) in the postmodern is opposed to the modern as a "surpassed historical stage" (4) and this, he reasons, is part of a larger cultural amnesia, a nostalgia that operates at the level of social organization and temporality in which memory is called on to naturalize the arbitrary "periodizing division" (3) into which the "past is reworked through different economies of value" (79). The problem is, for Frow, that the abstraction of time and the proliferation of the simulacra—the accumulation of spectacle in "depthless" postmodern culture—are part of the "expressive" logic of modernity, "the effect of a process of back-projection in which the present constructs itself as a unity of all present time by distinguishing itself from a stable and archaic past which has a singular form" (1). The "systemic dysfunction" of the postmodern is then seen as the outcome of a confused "social" memory emptied by the circulation and fetishization of the commodity, which degrades the present in unprecedented ways. But Frow points out that when it comes to the past and to the "technologies" or "mediations" of writing history in the postmodern period things are no different than they always have been: the past always has been out of reach, and we can only reconstruct it as signs or simulacra, as textual *traces*. In Frow's argument, modern temporality, figured as a continuous or

historicism (time) line, fails to explain the present, much less the ways that the *imaginary* totalizations of the postmodern period are said to cohere. The past is not an "essence" or completed "thing" but a set of signs, of "active" semiological choices, to invoke Nietzsche. What is especially compelling in Frow's polemic, then, is that, as he puts it, "Nor—with all the obvious variations of technology and scale [in the postmodern period]—was history ever constructed otherwise" (246).

Both Terdiman and Frow interrogate memory and temporality in ways that bring us to the "stroke" of the sign in memory and language, to the degree-zero of signification, to the mechanism of cultural semiosis; in different ways, and for different reasons, both critics assert that the postmodern period is characterized by the unprecedented triumph of unlimited semiosis or uncontrollable representation, that the postmodern is a period in which History disappears amid the chaotic forces, the disconnected values, and the "logical incoherences" of postmodern culture. Terdiman and Frow thus recognize the importance of representation to cultural mnemonics, even if they are both suspicious of the postmodern and its "distinctive temporalities" and knowledges. It is Frow, however, who follows the threads of memory in the postmodern period most elegantly and carefully. Frow is reluctant to see the stroke of the sign in the postmodern as an inherently political event: the sign might well be "beautifully" inscribed on the surfaces of any number of cultural texts but it is, as Jameson warns, depthless; in the postmodern world, all memory is a collection of images the profundity of which is *lost* only to be "restored in a utopian and futuristic politics of deferral" (8). Frow's basic point is that "the relativization of time flows from a relativization of culture" (8), and he reads such concepts as the commodity form, the fusion of "high and "low" culture, tourism, gift exchange, and memory against the "unifying" grain of an "obsolescent modernism" (63), a move that signals "an end of history and the beginning of many histories" (9). For Frow, this kind of cultural difference is positive and defensible; like the commodity form, culture, too, must be "understood as possessing different valencies in different contexts" (10). Perhaps despite itself, the postmodern production of information is one in which, at least for Frow, the commodity form and its abstractions have been extended to their absurd extremes in other areas of cultural life—the modern culture of the spectacle and of production has become the postmodern culture of the simulation.

The cultural vision of modernity and its logical conclusion in postmodernity's "imagined" temporality, against which Frow's book is written, is a nostalgic desire for unity and for coherence formed as an "opposition to a surpassed historical stage" (4). Periodization, consequently, becomes for Frow a narrative or "theoretical fiction" that reflects the faulty (amnesiac) logic of the "just now," of capital, and of the commodity form. As Frow says, the increasingly ocular episteme of the modern fueled the process of abstraction, the process by which things became image or sign and hence were perceived as separate from the "real" or authentic world—a cultural narrative of the loss of premodern unity and of the devaluation of collective experience in the modern world, a "dynamics of separation and abstraction" (6). Memory, for Frow, registers this disruption; it is the sector of cognitive and cultural activity where the *nostalgia* that both produces and flows from this modern and then postmodern abstraction becomes pathological, becomes an illusory temporality the end of which for the culture of commodification is, as Frow says, following Debord, "a world without memory" (7). The remembered past is never authentic or original or stable but a psychic process, a function, a representation, a text, one that indeed refuses "the narrative teleology that relegate real history and the time of lived experience to a time before representation and the mass-mediated spectacle of use." (8). As Frow says of the paradoxical "memory boom" of the postmodern period, the yearning right across the political spectrum for a restoration of the certainties of the unified subject, of a History that would be transcendent of its textual forms, and of a stable domain of cultural values, has led many either to espouse a postmodernism which would call a halt to the moral ambivalence, the elitism, the political pessimism of the art

forms of modernity, or to identify the postmodern as precisely the obstacle to such a desire. (10).

Embedded in this critique of modern and postmodern temporality is the central idea that we must read cultural production and expression as signs: "in a spirit of deep distrust of the realist genres of sociology, economic, and political description," Frow reads the past and memory as discourses; he is, as he puts it, a "literary theorist" whose "expertise . . . lies in the study of genres—that is, in the study of the way effects of the real and the authority to speak are constituted by generic conventions and a generic frame" (11). Such a view of time as a narrative explains the permanence and impermanence of the memory trace, not to mention the ways we know and think as a problem of textuality, of inscription-interpretation. As Frow continues in Time and Commodity Culture:

the time of textuality is not the linear, before-and-after, cause-and-effect time embedded in the logic of the archive but the time of a continuous analeptic and proleptic shaping. Its structure is that of the dynamic but closed system, where all the moments of the system are co-present, and the end is given at the same time as the beginning. In such a model the past is a function of the system: rather than having a meaning and a truth determined once and for all by its status as event, its meaning and its truth are constituted retroactively and repeatedly; if time is reversible then alternative stories are always possible. Data are not stored in already constituted places but are arranged and rearranged at every point in time. Forgetting is thus an integral principle of this model, since the activity of compulsive interpretation that organizes it involves at once selection and rejection. Like a well-censored dream, and subject perhaps to similar mechanisms, memory has the orderliness and the teleological drive of narrative. Its relation to the past is not that of truth but of desire. (228-29)

Such a model of memory, I will argue, clears a space for a cultural understanding of the past, for studying the semiological organization of data, and for a productive and dynamic model of cultural mnemonics that takes language or semiosis and not historicism or teleology as its paradigm for making-meaning when it comes to thinking the past. Of course, this does not mean that history is unimportant, nor that "what really happened" is irrelevant. Rather, it means that we must be self-reflexive about the connections we find and form when we set out, as Stephen Greenblatt does in Shakespearean Negotiations, with the "desire to speak with the dead" (1). Indeed, the most meticulous historians and critical theorists are story-tellers, "shamans at heart" (Assmann 123). In other words, since the past is a representation and not a reproduction, we must be critical and self-aware when we use the past or *link*³⁵ the past and the present together—when we *remember*, precisely because when we do so it is inevitable that our *present* needs and social context will determine what, and how, we recollect.³⁶ The seeming veracity of the remembered

³⁵ The "link" as I use it, "envisions the maximum possible suppression of any logic of determination and leaves only sequentiality: *this* then *that*. It aims at freeing discourses from the domination of pre-scripting" (Terdiman, Present Past 327). Following Lyotard's The Differend: Phases in Dispute, Terdiman also develops this idea in "On the Dialectics of Postdialectical Thinking" (113). The "link" strikes me as a particularly useful tool for apprehending memory and forgetting, which do not operate wholly in linear and logical progression but rather in reversible and discontinuous "linkages" and loops, along the links of the "chain" of signifiers if you will: the mode of memory-as-representation is *sequential* or *metonymic*.

³⁶ A "usable past," as Michael Kammen writes in Mystic Chords of Memory, his 1991 study of how America "uses" traditions, gives "shape and substance to national identity" (6), which usually means creating the "illusion of social consensus" (5) or of the nation being a legitimate, timeless, and "continuous political structure" (Pocock 80). At the level of the social, this kind of invention is particularly powerful; it confirms the by-now commonplace, recapitulated by Kammen, that societies "reconstruct their pasts rather than faithfully record them and they do so with the needs of contemporary culture clearly in mind—manipulating the past in order to mold the present" (4). It also contains what Eric Hobsbawm calls a

past might tempt us to think that what has gone before us is "authentic" and "original," that there is a continuous line to be drawn between events past and present (or as Foucault would say, between event and meaning). But memory is not a literal warehouse of the past, much less a seat of self-presence or guarantor of Truth.. As Terdiman rightly claims, "nothing is natural about our memories" (31).

Frow models this *unnatural* process as a model of reading and writing, as a construction or narrative that is *reversible*, that is open to endless interpretation and reconstruction. Consider the context of traumatic personal and national or "recovered memories" which, Frow argues, certainly invoke passionate responses in "survivors" but are no less problematic—no more nor less "authentic"—than any other memories of the past:

- To say memory is of the order of representation rather than a reflex of real events, and that its temporality is that of the reworking of earlier material rather than that of a causality working as a line of force from the past to the present, is not to deny the reality of traumatic experience, including childhood sexual assault, and its working through in present suffering; but it is to say that this experience is always reconstructed rather than recalled; that reconstruction takes place within the specific and formative circumstances of the present; and that causes are always attributed rather than known. Our attention should thus turn to those practices and structure within which recovered memories are produced. (Frow, *Time* 234).

Frow points out that these practices and structures tend to be cultural, but he does not pursue this much further than to say that, invoking Foucault, "recovered memory is a counter-memory" and that such recollections invoke "a broad folk-cultural reality": "recovered memories are recalled as much from the culture as from the archives of individual memory" (238). This is no less true of personal than historical trauma, and Frow cites the example of the Holocaust as a case in which the "limits" or "truth" of interpretation (memory as hermeneutics) run up against the incommunicable passions and unprecedented horrors of the "real" past, a confrontation that is implicit in the question I asked earlier: who decides what should be remembered and what should be forgotten? And how? As Frow points out, this is an important question to ask not only in the context of personal trauma or historical events such as the Holocaust but also in the larger context of postmodern epistemology and ontology. For the "postmodern" organization of remembrance of the Holocaust is that it is in no way given by the community of experience or tradition. To the contrary: it has been the object of an intensive struggle over the forms of representation and its collective acceptance" (242). In other words, when it comes to Holocaust monuments, or any other cultural text upon which the past has been inscribed, instead of asking questions about the "reification or dehistoricization of the past, it may be more important to come to terms with their *cultural variability* working in the present as an apparatus of collective memory" (242; emphasis added). As Frow reminds us, memory is always "reworked," and to link the past to the present in (or as) memory is to shape data that are not so much "facts" as interpretations—signs that, at the level of the social, have been *shared, contested or agreed upon*.

"curious, but understandable paradox: modern nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so 'natural' as to require no definition other than self-assertion" ("Introduction" 14). Steven Knapp calls this the "imagined collective future" of the modern nation, gilded as ancient and natural, which conscripts the past to justify the future, but "the locus of authority," he writes, "is always in the present; we use, for promoting and reinforcing ethical and political dispositions, only those elements of the past that correspond to our sense of what presently compels us" (131). In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson identifies the relatively *recent* historical phenomenon of the modern nation that forgets its recentness and remembers itself as antique in order to produce and give "political expression" to itself as a continuous and unified community that, as Anderson writes, "always loom[s] out of an immemorial past and, still more important, glide[s] into a limitless future" (11-12).

It might be useful here to pause momentarily and remind ourselves that culture, which is a symbolic field or sign system, as I explained in the previous chapter, is the site where this agreement, or disagreement, occurs. Frow, of course, bases his argument about memory and writing on Carruthers' thesis that memory always has been a contestual material or inscriptive process, on the principle that to remember is to represent; as Frow puts it, "rather than having a meaning and a truth determined once and for all by its status as event, its meaning and its truth are constituted retroactively and repeatedly" (*Time* 229). Frow uses Borges' famous story "Funes the Memorious" as an example of what happens when memory is conceived not as a dynamic and technical process but according to a realist or correspondence epistemology. Funes, we read, could not forget anything, and he eventually dies of this distinctly *modern* pathology—he embodies an archival or positivist storage model of consciousness in which the past does not disappear but heaps itself up as a "thing" in and on the brains of the living. A semiological model of memory, in contrast, explains the perspectival nature of epistemology and ontology and the mnemonic economy of the "absent" but "present" past. Memory is always a question of desire, a matter of textual representation and interpretation, of selection and rejection. Within such a memory model, even conceptions of time become reversible, open to revision and reconstruction.

In this way, a theory of cultural memory marks a critical intervention in this secular and technological understanding of the past *in* and *as* discourse. I have already hinted that this project can be genealogically linked to what Staught and Turner call the "legacy" of Nietzsche in the "social" or "human" sciences: "with the death of God, we are necessarily committed to perspectives, which we may regard as a form of value pluralism ruling out absolute ethical standards" (516). For a theory of cultural memory, this means that History no longer enjoys the status of an objective "truth" and that the multiple *perspectives* on the past that form our competing cultural memories are not located in a completed, objectively verifiable past—in facts or documents—but in narrative, in inscribed texts, in mnemonic-traces.

Such a multiple or discursive view of the past underwrites acts of postmodern cultural expression, including those novels that record and interrogate the epistemological and ontological transformation of the postmodern: texts that both establish an alternative (cultural) mnemonics and inhabit a kind of in-between or liminal space

where documentary historical actuality meets formalist self-reflexivity and parody. At this conjuncture, a study of representation becomes, not a study of mimetic mirroring or subjective projecting, but an exploration of the ways in which narratives and images structure how we see ourselves and how we construct our notions of self, in the present and in the past. (Hutcheon, *Politics of Postmodernism* 7)

My argument here is that cultural memory is one mode—perhaps even the mode *par excellence*—for reading this mediated construction of the self and of society, for interpreting "the act of imposing order on [the] past, of encoding strategies of meaning making through representation" (Hutcheon, *Politics* 67). The next step in this rather attenuated discussion of memory, then, will be toward understanding memory and its links to discourse. The historian and philosopher of history Hayden White, as we have seen, makes the claim in *Tropics of Discourse*, his defense of history-as-discourse, that in order to avoid the charges of being either an "antiquarian, fleeing from the problem of the present into a purely personal past, or a cultural necrophile, that is, one who finds in the dead and dying a value he can never find in the living" (41), the contemporary historian must admit the "current rebellion against the past" (41) and work to establish "the value of the study of the past, not as an end in itself, but as a way of providing perspectives on the present that contribute to the solution of problems peculiar to our own time" (41).

This, as I see it, can be understood as a reconsideration of the past and an invocation of the muse of cultural mnemonics, one that acknowledges the "constructedness" of historiography and the "provisional character" of what White has called "the metaphorical constructions which

[both science and art] use to comprehend a dynamic universe" (50). If White does not really speak about a theory of cultural memory in his analysis of the tropology of discourse and the provisional, narrative, and ultimately ethical nature of contemporary historiography, his argument nonetheless leads us to its theoretical threshold: artists and historians alike, in the second half of the twentieth century, White suggests, must abandon the idea of "specious continuity" and play for something more partial, more process-based, more tropological and textual—something capable of understanding the "discontinuity, disruption, and chaos [that] is our lot" (50). In this way, the historian, like the novelist, like the theoretician, will

affirm implicitly the truth arrived at by Camus when he wrote: "It was previously a question of finding out whether or not life had to have a meaning to be lived. It now becomes clear, on the contrary, that it will be lived all the better if it has no meaning." We might amend the statement to read: it will be lived all the better if it has no single meaning but many different ones. (White, *Tropics* 50)

Although White does not necessarily name it as such, and although he rejects elements of the postmodern theoretical discourses as "dualist" and "absurd," his principle of history-as-discourse is of a piece with other postmodern versions of historiography and with post-structural interrogations of epistemology, particularly the idea of multiplicity or "differentiated histories," to use Bachelard's terminology (Young, *White Mythologies* 63). And it takes aim at a goal similar to that of cultural mnemonics: the postmodern "solves" the problem of the "tyranny of the historical consciousness" (White, *Tropics* 39-40) or *totalization* by focusing its attention on *how* the past is remembered, on the cultural "frames" and intertexts that make "knowing" and "remembering" possible in the first place.

This is roughly the position that White takes in his attempt to rethink history-as-tropology, as discourse: "Is there any reason," he asks, why we ought to study things under the aspect of their past-ness rather than under the aspect of their present-ness, which is the aspect under which everything offers itself for contemplation immediately?" (48). No, he answers, because history in and of itself is not an end; because the past, like the memory-image, is not a thing but a set or series of conflictual interpretations that is, ultimately, grounded in language and hence *tropological* (72). White can then conclude that modern history loses its sensitivity to the dynamic nature of the world, of being, and of time when its masquerades as Truth or Science, when it forgets its own status as linguistically-based narrative and its "specific terminological systems" (72). When this becomes the case, the historian, as Nietzsche charges, is one more deluded servant of decorative (or pathologically nostalgic) culture, of what White calls "triviality" (50). It is the task of thinkers—including historians—in the present, as White puts it, to free man from the "burden of history" and to charge him with "the special task of inducing in men an awareness that their present condition was always in part a product of specifically human choices, which could therefore be changed or altered by further human action" (49).

This perfunctory treatment of White's thesis from *Tropics of Discourse* is not meant to be exhaustive nor particularly critical. Rather, I want to use White's argument here to connote the ways that the larger problematic of the past or history can be linked to a *postmodern* theory of cultural memory and of how we currently understand our "present condition." A theory of cultural memory, of course, is in no way White's subject *per se* in *Tropics of Discourse*. Yet the trajectory of his argument points to (clears a path for) such a theory. "If applied to historical writing," as White puts it,

the methodological and stylistic cosmopolitanism which this [tropological] conception of representation promotes would force historians to abandon the attempt to portray "one particular portion of life, right side up and in true perspective," as a famous historian put it some years ago, and to recognize that there is no such thing as a single correct view of any object under study but that there are *many* correct views, each requiring its own style of representation. This would allow us to entertain seriously those creative distortions

offered by minds capable of looking at the past with the same seriousness as ourselves but with different affective and intellectual orientations. (47)

A theory of memory-in-culture might be one such "intellectual orientation"—indeed, two decades after White published his text on the topological bases of historiography we might push his insights one step further, out of the realm of "proper history" altogether and into the realm of cultural value and cultural semiotics. And although this is clearly not a move sanctioned, nor prescribed, by White in his work, he leaves the door open for such a maneuver, I think, if nothing else as a kind of "creative distortion" on my part that provides one more way to look at the past. Of course, for White, history can be transformed, and a "chaste historical consciousness can truly challenge the world anew every second, for only history mediates between what is and what men think ought to be with truly humanizing effect" (50). I have my doubts that "only" history can accomplish such a task; rather, I would suggest that history is one of many modes of culturally remembering and forgetting, albeit a dominant one in the last two or three centuries. So, to revise White's point slightly, it is *not only* history that "can serve to humanize experience" as long as "it remains sensitive to the more general world of thought and action from which it proceeds and to which it returns" (50). Instead, it might be the case that history itself is only one of many possible modes of mnemonic cultural expression—each of which possess its own discursive registers, economies, grammars, tropologies. And is it not reasonable to conclude that the place from which history proceeds and the place to which it returns is culture itself? If so, White's warning rings true for all sorts of cultural activity that takes the past as its (absent) object: as long as it [history] refuses to use the eyes which *both* modern art and modern science can give it, it must remain blind—citizen of a world in which 'the pallid shades of memory struggle in vain with the life and freedom of the present'" (50).

White's warning against blindness repeats almost verbatim the prophetic and popular warning about memory and blindness with which I concluded the Introduction. To take this one step further, I will suggest that the West might have learned the lessons of modern art and science, of structural and post-structural critiques of knowledge and power, better than some critics would allow. That is, insofar as culture is conceived in this dissertation as an in-between set of conflictual and generative processes or systems of signification in the postmodern period, the West might finally be *beginning* to respect and tolerate—perhaps even one day to celebrate—the incommensurable cultural differences (racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, class-based, gender-based, and so on) that make up the worlds we live in and that our ancestors have lived in for centuries. The dangers of failing to do so are obvious enough: when it comes to the past, just as to knowledge, *there is no such thing as a single correct view*. As White says of Norman O. Brown in Brown's "anti-history" *Life Against Death*,

[he] reduces all of the data of consciousness, past as well as present, to the same ontological level, and then, by a series of brilliant and shocking juxtapositions, involutions, reductions, and distortions, forces the reader to see with new clarity materials to which he has become *oblivious* through sustained association, or which he has *repressed* in response to social imperative. (45; emphasis added)

White invokes Freud and Nietzsche in this passage, both of whose models of memory we have already considered: Freud's return of the repressed; Nietzsche's "heroic" balance between remembering and forgetting. These, White insists, are ways to configure memory and organize perspectives on the past, ways for man to narrate his present in-between the past and the future. Man, Nietzsche writes, must indeed

organize the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs. His honesty, the strength and truthfulness of his character, must at some time or other rebel against a state of things in which he only repeats what he had heard, learns what is already known, imitates what already exists; he will then begin to grasp that culture can be something other than a *decoration of life*, that is to say at bottom no more than dissimulation and disguise. ("Uses" 123)

But what are man's "real needs"? and what if culture in the postmodern period is no more than the proliferation of simulacra? of dissimulation? Although these questions are not my primary concern in the present discussion, they suggest the importance of critical but self-reflexive thinking when it comes to the past. For Nietzsche, "life-enhancing art must express life not deny it or stand opposed to it. Nietzsche was therefore opposed to the new men of distinction, those bureaucrats of the German state who rendered service to the new bureaucratic domination in the world of culture" (Stauth and Turner 518).

Kafka's fictional worlds come to mind, as do Orwell's, when I think about bureaucratic domination and amnesia. To be sure, Nietzsche's critique of German cultural mnemonics is tied to his critique of modernity and of reason, a critique that some critics suggest anticipates many of "the features of the modernist/postmodernist debate" (Stauth and Turner 519). For Nietzsche,

the modern period was ushered in by the secularization of culture, namely by the death of God, the loss of a sense of hell and the collapse of traditional systems of salvation. These developments were associated with other social changes particularly the growth of geographical and social mobility associated with the dominance of the city in social life.

... This period of capitalism was also associated with a growing emphasis on the self and on individualism generally. However, people are still condemned by memory and consciousness to a sense of their own limitations and ultimately to their own death. Therefore one particular feature of the modernist culture of the late nineteenth century was a growing disenchantment with reason and rationality as adequate orientation to life. (Stauth and Turner 520)

What strikes me, once again, is the importance of memory to the subject whose self-apprehension is, in one sense, an effect of memory as much as of language—a ceaseless gathering of thought in time. Not surprisingly, Nietzsche's understanding of the "will" hinges upon modern man's understanding—and acceptance—of time: modern, amnesiac man, Nietzsche reminds us, can neither forget or escape the fact that he or she is "condemned" to temporality, to eventual oblivion. The man of *resentiment*, for Nietzsche, is one who has not learned, or cannot accept, this lesson: the "origins of the revenge-seeking will, which is out to avenge its own botched and bungled instincts, would be *our* inability—as pure will and nothing but will—to overcome the finality of 'time's it was'" (Kroker and Cook 9). As Nietzsche's Zarathustra says of the "fragments of the future": "To redeem the past and to transform every 'It was' into an 'I wanted it thus!'"—that alone do I call redemption" (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra* 161).

This temporal model reminds us, on the one hand, of the modernist impulse to repudiate the past and, on the other, of a willingness to accept the present that is almost indistinguishable from fatalism and resignation. Nietzsche himself was certainly aware of the paradoxes involved in such thinking: on the one hand, a passive or "suicidal" nihilism; on the other, a "will to will," a critical and creative (if complex) form of thinking that, in Nietzsche's scheme, recognizes how the ascetic "will to nothingness" is still a kind of willing, a form of meaning that makes man's suffering tolerable, even desirable (*Genealogy* 163).

But this "will" can also be a prisoner. "Willing liberates: but what is it that fastens in fetters even the liberator?" Zarathustra asks:

'It was': that is what the will's teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past.

The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire—that is the will's most lonely affliction. . . . It is sullenly wrathful that time dies not run back; 'That which was'—that is what the stone which it cannot roll away is called. And so, out of wrath and ill-temper, the will rolls stones about and takes revenge upon him who does not, like it, feel wrath and ill-temper.

Thus the will, the liberator, becomes a malefactor: and upon all that can suffer it takes revenge for its inability to go backwards.

This, yes, this alone is *revenge* itself: the will's antipathy towards time's 'It was'.
(*Zarathustra* 161-62)

Such revenge is, for Nietzsche, the outcome, and fable, of Christian morality—of justice and punishment, of humility and powerlessness, of guilt and responsibility, of reconciliation and salvation (this last, for Nietzsche, a euphemism for *meaning* itself). Nietzsche's solution is to creatively and willfully turn the tables and to state of the past: "But I will it thus! Thus shall I will it!" (163).

We find ourselves, once again, with Nietzsche, gathering our thoughts against oblivion, against death. But even the earliest classical models imagined memory as an integral part of life and death, and Nietzsche's "new" or "heroic" man, despite what some critics claim is a celebration of *irrationality* at the expense of *rationality* and a potentially frightening elevation of the "individual" will, is one who tries to break this silence, to overcome the past, himself, and his memories in order to *live*. Nietzsche's point, as far as I can see, is that a failure to think of the relationship of the past to the present in dynamic and discursive ways can result in *deadly* nostalgia.³⁷ As Staught and Turner conclude in their analysis of postmodernity, mass culture, and nostalgia, and as Frow argues in *Time and Commodity Culture*, such nostalgia is particularly tempting in the modern world; even contemporary critical theorists, as was demonstrated by the Frankfurt School, are not exempt from this sort of thinking of the past: "nostalgia is a very potent mode for a moribund intellectual elite adrift from its traditional culture and institutional setting" (520).

Such *amnesia*, for some, is an indisputable feature of postmodern culture and its relativistic epistemologies; for a critic like Robert Young, however, the critical project of post-structuralism and the cultural expression of postmodernity, as we have seen, is profoundly political and *anamnesiac*. As Young says of postmodern history after the post-structural revolution, it "will necessarily be subject to a whole range of questions that surround interpretation, representation, and narrative" (*White Mythologies* 22). Like White and Frow, Young emphasizes the irresolvable problem of connecting ideas to events and argues that in recent years theorists have "turned their attention back to the question of the historicity of historical understanding, to its status as interpretation, representation, or narrative" (22), and to the problem of temporality as a result of the failures of history as an "objective," totalizing science: "The question about history then becomes the more interesting one of the relation between different significations, and the ways in which such differences can, or cannot, be articulated and unified under the same horizon of totalization to produce a single meaning" (22).

At this point in Young's project we can begin to see a space being cleared for a discussion of the status of history and the textuality of the past in structuralist and post-structuralist theoretical discourse that does not simply accept the dialectical logic of "simple antithesis" (22) but that affirms multiple meanings and the possibilities of contradictory interpretations of the past. This questioning of the past and of history as representation, as Young observes, is one of the most pressing and contentious problems in postmodernism, and it seems fair to say that the recent category of cultural memory as a way to envision and interrogate the past has organized around this problematic, at this intersection of critical and self-reflexive thought—a juncture that Young sees as postmodernism itself, "a certain self-consciousness about a culture's own historical relativity" (*White Mythologies* 19).

This self-consciousness, I think, is a memory-effect, and I want to carry it forward into

³⁷ Staught and Turner establish four principal components of the "nostalgia paradigm": (1) "history as decline and fall, involving a significant departure from a golden epoch of homefulness"; (2) the idea that "modern social systems and their cultures are inherently pluralistic, secularized, and diverse" which results in feelings of "intense fragmentation of belief and practice"; (3) the loss of individuality and individual autonomy, since the autonomous self is trapped within the bureaucratic regulation of the modern state"; (4) the loss of simplicity, authenticity, and spontaneity" (513).

my subsequent discussion of cultural memory and literature—more precisely post-colonial literature—in Section Two. As Young writes in *White Mythologies*,

In addition to the rewriting of the history of non-European histories and cultures, analysis of colonialism therefore shifts the perspective of European history and culture so as to interrogate the fundamental structures and assumptions of Western knowledge. The legacy of colonialism is as much a problem for the West as it is for the scarred lands in the world beyond. (129)

To read the legacy of colonialism and its scarred-inscribed texts (lands-bodies) is to read the problem of the colonial past in the postmodern and post-colonial present. If it is difficult, at times, to speak precisely about memory in the postmodern or post-colonial it is perhaps because the linkages between memory and its social locations lead away from any simplistic or essential formulations, away from the “imperialism of the same” (Young, *White Mythologies* 15) and the totalizations of the “incorporating self” (14) to a more dynamic and un-settled understanding not only of cultural memory but of ourselves and our social worlds. From Husserl on, as Young rightly observes, “the fundamental problem concerns the way in which knowledge—and therefore theory, or history—is constituted through the comprehension and incorporation of the other” (12). Such an “ontological imperialism,” to use Emmanuel Levinas’s term, is nothing very new: it “goes back at least to Socrates,” as Young explains, “but can be found as recently as Heidegger. In all cases the other is neutralized as a means of encompassing it: ontology amounts to a philosophy of power, an egotism in which the relation with the other is accomplished through its assimilation with the self. Its political implications are clear enough” (Young 13).

I am especially concerned with the intersections of memory and the political implications of the amnesiac “white mythologies” of the West, not to mention the “legacy” of Nietzsche and its persistence into the postmodern period, a set of debates that pivot around the question of representation and the *hermeneutics of suspicion*. My conception of memory as a cultural technology is intended to shift discussions of the problem of memory away from autonomous “individuals” and “freely perceiving subjects” and into the uneven “battlefield” of the social, away, especially, from unconsciously collective (synchronic) social groups and the “age-old collective consciousness” identified by Foucault upon which European society has historically and anthropologically justified its knowledge of its other through documents that protect its self-image and perpetually “refresh its memory” (*The Archaeology of Knowledge* 7). Memory, as I have come to think, is everywhere and nowhere: it connects and disconnects, but not like a telephone cable or USB “fire wire”; rather, like Ariadne’s thread or Deleuze’s rhizome, like a link in a chain of signs; memory underwrites our sense of the past, it guarantees our sense of personal and social identity, and it overdetermines our knowledges of the present; memory makes intelligible the signs we interpret, the texts that we read, the social formations we inhabit. When it comes to memory, as Edward S. Casey puts it, “we are in the thick of things” (ix). There are, as I have maintained, no clear borders between subjects and the social frames of memory.

Terdman’s work on memory in the modern period is both an indispensable resource and a point of departure for my study of cultural memory in the postmodern period, particularly Terdman’s sense of the modern crisis of memory as the a crisis of representation. Frow’s critique of the postmodern as a imaginary or nostalgia organization of temporality has guided us further into postmodern cultural mnemonics, where production is “threatened” by simulation and where the importance of “many cultures” and “many histories”—not to mention genres—is of especial importance in the debate about re-presenting of the past. I shall now follow a path that leads us further into the “postmodern theoretical discourses” and their intersections with cultural memory: namely, an understanding of how memory operates at the level of culture in postmodernity that I hope will not only help to explain how the past persists into the present and how literary texts

function as mnemonic sites, but also—and perhaps this is the most important if the most elusive aspect of my argument—that a theory of cultural memory ultimately speaks to the difficulties and impossibilities of knowing and naming, of “imagining” and “organizing,” the present *in* and *as* the present. That is, a theory of cultural memory considers the contours and locations of postmodern memory, but at the most fundamental level it asks us to think through the construction of *time* or *temporality* and of the status and circulation of the *sign*—through our experiences of being and of consciousness, through our equivocations of duration and narrative, through our sense of time’s irreversibility and memory’s reversibility, and even through our designation of terms such as “instantaneity,” “deferral,” “synchronicity,” “diachronicity,” “now,” “then,” “was,” “is,” and “will be.” It is not an exaggeration to say that these concepts order—and help us to organize—our lives. Indeed, I think that meditating upon this unsettled theoretical ground, upon this chronological lexicon, forces us to confront what Pierre Bourdieu calls the “social structuration of temporal existence, of all the anticipations and the presuppositions through which we practically construct the sense of the world” (*The Rules of Art* 329) or “habitus,”³⁸ a process, I will argue, that inevitably leads us further into the problem of representation and its relations to power, to ideology, and to the production of the social—into the slippery territory and differential and anamnestic relationships that exist between words and things. To map this last part of the field we will briefly consider some of Michel Foucault’s work on memory.

I have been trying to explain the close connection that exists between memory, representation, and temporality: memory, as I understand it, registers the epistemological and ontological indeterminacy of temporality, the epistemic rupture, not least because, as Foucault points out, “time is more supple than thought” (*Language, Counter-Memory, Practice* 194). Neither phenomenological nor materialist treatments of ontology and chronology get this quite right; neither, as Foucault suggests, can comprehend Being as theatrical, multiple, fugitive, nomadic, displaced, differential *event*. The problem with such non-differential modes of thinking, “either Sartre or Merleau-Ponty” (175), with a conception of Man as one who “constitutes himself as a gigantic memory, though the position of the central point” (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 293), is that they evolve a “logic of signification, a grammar of the first person, and a metaphysics of consciousness” in which “meaning never coincides with event”

³⁸ Pierre Bourdieu’s “habitus” is that which “above all expresses a rejection of a whole series of alternatives into which social science (and, more generally, anthropological theory) was locked, that of the conscious (or the subject) and the unconscious, that of finality and mechanism, etc.” (*The Rules of Art* 179). The habitus is the relational system of “durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them” (*Outline of a Theory of Practice* 72). Such a “system of dispositions—a present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future by reactivation in similarly structured practices, and internal law through which the law of external necessities, irreducible to immediate constraints, is constantly exerted—is the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism sees in social practices without being able to account for it, and also of the regulated transformations that cannot be explained either by the extrinsic, instantaneous determinism of mechanistic sociology or by the purely internal but equally instantaneous determination of spontaneist subjectivism” (*The Logic of Practice* 54; qtd. in Johnson 6). Three things strike me about the filiations between cultural memory and Bourdieu’s project as I understand it: first, how the *dispositions* and *position-takings* of the habitus resemble elements of the operations of cultural memory; second, how Bourdieu’s historicization or contextualization of the cultural field is a kind of liminal or hybrid discourse that, like memory, operates in-between objectivism and subjectivism, in-between positivist determinism and freely perceiving and acting subjects, in-between phenomenology and materialism; third, how the field of cultural production, which, I think, includes memory, is a field of struggle for legitimacy or power by agents who are both determined and determining.

(Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice* 175). To put this in slightly different terms, the tendency to negate or forget the present and remember the past is an idealism or essentialism, a philosophy of the "permanent and ideal" (Bouchard 22), of universal and unforgettable *Truths*—the philosophy of Plato and those who have written his footnotes. Against such an imposing tide, Foucault imagines a "philosophy of the events that occur on the surfaces of all bodies—all those elements that Platonism rejected as the simulacrum of false knowledge" (22). I want to note the model of inscription or writing that Foucault appeals to at this point. Foucault rejects the limited and positivist world of interiors and exteriors (consciousness-presence-memory) and those grand narratives of origin, depth, telos, totality, and history; he foregrounds, instead, the surface of inscription that, as I have already said several times, is the event and the site of *signification*. As Foucault says of metaphysics, of the philosophy of history, it mistakenly encloses the event in a cyclical pattern of time. Its error is grammatical; it treats the present as framed by the past and future: the present is a former future where its form was prepared and the past, which will occur in the future, preserves the identity of its content. First, this sense of the present requires a logic of essences (which establishes the present in memory) and of concepts (where the present is established as a knowledge of the future), and then a metaphysics of a crowned and coherent cosmos, of a hierarchical world. (176)

To counteract such a metaphysics or static system and its conception of Western Man, embattled as he has been by the human sciences since the nineteenth century, Foucault develops what he calls *counter-memory*, the philosophy of difference, the philosophy of the "phantasm" (169) or "present infinitive" (176) that extends the Deleuzian project of overturning Platonism by perverting the *doxa* of shared memories or "good sense" (183). For Foucault, counter-memory works against metaphysics, against origins and ends, against the (theological) memory that guarantees the phenomenological "space of representation (sensation-image-memory)" (183). Instead of integrating consciousness and establishing resemblances by means of shared memories (Foucault's "good" or "common" sense), counter-memory, which we can think of as one aspect of cultural memory, insists upon a disintegration of the subject and a dismantling of the image/sign and its accumulated associations—a kind of differential remembering that Foucault names "thought as intensive irregularity" (183). This is especially important since it is at the level of memory, as I have been arguing, that power takes its most insidious and effective hold, that the signifier and the signified are bonded together or culturally inscribed as what we can think of as *shared* memories or conventions: memory fixes the arrangements of knowledge, what Foucault calls "the fundamental codes of a culture—those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices—[that] establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home" (xx). But this sense of home, this empirical order, this ideology, and this drive to unification and resemblance (the obliteration of difference, the logic of the Self-Same) rest in the shadows and upon the shifting sands of memory, on the mutable processes of signification: they are the way things *have always been*. In order to change the world, then, in order to ensure that difference will survive, we must closely study this strange ground and the way memory is used to legitimize the present, the way we inscribe the past and the way the past inscribes itself in us. The "recent invention" modern man—whose memory, as Nietzsche reminds us, is as strong as it is pathological—might then one day be "erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea" (Foucault, *The Order of Things* 387). Put simply, counter-memory undercuts the regulation of the past, of memory, by the powerful; it guarantees difference, singularity, decomposition, and disjunction; it rejects all impulses to system, permanence, and totality, even, or especially, the negative totality expressed in the dialectic and the science of history. Counter-memory produces and protects Being as "univocity," as Foucault imagines it: Being in its "singleness of expression, [which] is paradoxically the principal condition which permits

difference to escape the domination of identity, which frees it from the law of the Same as a simple opposition within conceptual elements" (192, 195).

The philosophy of counter-memory that Foucault develops is in many ways coterminous to a theory of cultural memory and to the questions it asks of the past. At the most practical level, a theory of cultural memory opens up the debate about how and what we know of the past. In her Introduction to Philosophical Uses of Historical Traditions, for example, Patricia Cook points out that some of the most interesting work that is done in the name of philosophy today considers how human attachment is made to the past. It is the case, she suggests, that the "inquiries, narratives, and past events held in cultures and in some way handed down are providing the pith of some of the most provocative exercises of current-day philosophical imagination" (1). In Cook's argument, historical traditions along with "literature, art, scientific projects, social theories, and cultural practices as well as philosophical systems" themselves serve as sources for philosophical inquiry precisely because they "no longer necessarily bear their original associations and meanings in current cultural contexts" (1).

Of course, as Cook points out, this rubric "takes more than philosophy's history into retrospective view, and it must not be confused with the philosophy of history. This new enterprise not only takes all dimensions of human history to be potentially revelatory for philosophical reflection, it also reflects on the varying shapes of the many human traditions as well as on the fact of history itself" (Cook 2). Thus for Cook, literary or historical traditions or even history itself can become "illumination or inspiration for philosophy" (2). Even though philosophy *per se* is not our primary concern, Cook's framing of the problem and her foregrounding of philosophy's interest in the presentness of the past nicely stakes some of the ground I am trying to cover in this dissertation. As Cook explains, for the "philosophical thinkers" she has anthologized "history is not limited to past figures who have participated in the genealogy of problems of ultimately Platonic ancestry" (1): these thinkers do not set out "merely to excavate uncoded meanderings of previous moments of civilization. Rather, their implicit view is reminiscent of the ancient Dionysus of Halicarnassus's characterization of history as 'philosophy by example'" (2). As Cook reasons, the philosophers whose work she collects document just such "an undercurrent in recent philosophy" insofar as each uses "cultural memory as a backdrop for defining current situations, and as a vantage point from which to gain perspective on today's endeavors" (3).

Cook locates her project in the wake of a "postmodern philosophical crisis" within the larger "history of philosophy" (2) and argues, following Arthur C. Danto, that in "the postmodern period we face the future without a narrative of the present" (18). This is a familiar claim. But what era or cultural group ever has had a complete "narrative of the present"? That sort of self-description and sense of self-presence, that sort of certainty, to put it bluntly, is one that (modern) man can never quite complete or possess: it is a narrative of temporality, to borrow Ricoeur's terminology, a discursive re-memorizing as White might put it, a "marking" of time, as Huyssen would say, that can be only provisionally accomplished in the aporia between the present and the past. Nonetheless, the essays Cook has anthologized "will show that history, memory, and tradition are at last being reclaimed and resurrected. Introspection and retrospection seem to be reaching for an alliance that will eventually define 'post-postmodernity.' Perhaps it is only that the end-of-the-millennium *Zeitgeist* is upon us. In any case, a narrative of the present is being forged" (18).

I am less certain than Cook that a narrative of the present can ever be formed *in toto* "in the present," that history or memory were ever "lost" in the first place, or that the postmodern itself is close to being finished, to being "posted." And it is fair, I think, to notice a certain apocalyptic rhetoric in Cook's claim for the future of philosophy and for the practice of cultural memory, a claim that is of a piece with various declamations about postmodernism itself as a scene of exhaustion or a site of panic, as a period of aesthetic collapse and of accelerated

consumption of hollowed-out *simulacral*, the "cultural logic" of which can best be described as (a Jamesonian) "loss":

It often has been observed that we find ourselves at the end of this century amid the husks of pragmatism, the rubble of analysis, and the regular litany of moribund pronouncements on the practice of philosophy. . . . What remains of the philosophical enterprise that has not been terminally introverted, wholly effete, or alarmingly indistinguishable from other sorts of enterprises? (Cook 1)

I am not interested in mapping out the future of contemporary philosophy in the West, much less in arguing that a kind of philosophical inquiry named "cultural memory" will cure postmodernity's so-called epistemological ills. Having said that, I however, would point out that despite its latent nostalgia and periodization, Cook's assessment of historical tradition in the postmodern period is useful to my discussion of cultural memory. Cook herself recognizes the presence of self-reflexive thought in postmodern epistemology and historiography, although she sees it as a "terminal introversion" that has hamstrung contemporary philosophy. As she asks in her Introduction: "does postmodernism somehow prescribe a recurrence to tradition in spite of itself?" (3).

For Cook, the post-postmodern promises to recover a philosophical project in which philosophy itself is a form of cultural memory, even though the postmodern seems to be "an exercise in antiquarianism or . . . another strain of romanticism or, indeed, conservatism" (4). Whatever the case, Cook points out that such a theory of philosophy sets out to do emphasize the "profound connection between philosophical reflection and cultural memory" and thus to "explain and defend certain sorts of human attachments to traditions and institutions" (4). Cook reasons:

The symptomatic preoccupation of postmodernism is actually as old as philosophy itself. It is generated by the following reasoning. Without foundations, human knowledge seems to collapse into mere opinion; every knowledge claim is liable to be credited and replaced. We crave the obverse state of certitude where our knowledge is stable and reliable, the outcome of our purposes predictable. Yet a particular foundation—which would be a *sine qua non* for certitude—can never itself be insulated from indictment or replacement. (4)

But is it a *flaw* in postmodern culture or contemporary philosophy that a narrative of the present has not yet been forged? Is such certainty possible? Is it a cultural pathology to be relentlessly critical and pervasively self-reflexive? Once again, I cannot answer these questions fully at this point. But it seems the case that the always already absent present can be only an *uncertain* discursive effect, that "now" and "then" can never be seamlessly or finally linked together. If so, it would be pointless—a metaphysics or mystification, a philosophy of sameness—to blame memory for being inadequate, for failing as the "natural" or "spiritual" cognitive system which can preserve a *certain* connection between the "it-was" and the "it-is." For memory does not provide literal copies of something that was once present but is now absent; memory is not a referential activity, nor is it the seat of self-presence, much less of temporal unity. Rather, memory is a virtual cultural process, an inscription of becoming, of discontinuity, of difference; memories, like the constructs "temporality," "the present," "the sign," or "the self," function in relation to and can never fully apprehend the past, nor have they ever been able to do so. To claim that memory has degenerated in the modern and postmodern is to succumb to nostalgia and to the "authentic" aural logic of self-presence, as opposed to the textual (and visual) logic of inscription.

Such speculation, I hope, makes it clear that whatever the term "cultural memory" might denote it is implicated in the order of things in the postmodern period: in the age of information and in the questions it raises about the image, about the sign, about semiology, about memory, about inscription. Of course, these questions are, as Cook points out, as old as philosophy itself; they were first posed, as Carruthers shows, by the likes of Plato and Aristotle. But if we read a little further into Cook's argument, we must ask where postmodernity has reclaimed and

resurrected history from in the first place? Behind this model lurks the logic of self-presence, origin, and depth, which rejects "depthless" textual logic of the surface: metaphysics (phonology) versus semiology (grammatology). It is impossible for the subject of memory to fully and finally gather its thoughts in present, and it is specious to imagine a "fall" from a pre-capitalist period of organic plentitude and unity: the disunified "cultural terrain" of the present, as John Frow maintains, "cannot be seen from a single perspective" (Frow, *Cultural Studies* 22).

Frow puts it this way: "the concept of the postmodern obeys a discursive rather than a descriptive necessity: its function is that of a logical operator, establishing categorical polarities which then allow—in a tautologous and self-justifying circuit—the construction of fictions of periodization and value, fictions that have no content other than the structure of binary opposition itself" (*Time* 36). Frow's complaint, as we have already seen, is that the postmodern is really nothing new, that it is something closer to the wreckage and attenuated false consciousness of the modern period—a devaluation of subjective experience and social collectivity. For Frow, it is an *imaginary totalization* that gets mistaken as something different than *modernity*. Frow, perhaps not unlike Jameson, sees the postmodern as an untenable social organization that is the result of the impossible (utopian) *amnesia* of the modern—the ostensible refutation of the past: "The force of the concept of postmodernism here lies simply in its imperative to conceptualize both a new configuration of the cultural domain (in particular a blurring of boundaries between high and low culture and between commercial and non-commercial art) and a changed relation between culture and economic production" (45).

In Frow's scheme, this conceptualization amounts to a self-contradictory aesthetic and epistemology, not to mention a flawed teleology: "Within the postmodernist paradigm, time is a closed circle. It leads nowhere, it cannot be broken. The novelty that seems to puncture it is a pointless movement of change which merely reinforces its closure" (56). We can hear echoes of Fredric Jameson's critique of the cultural logic of late-capitalism here, as well as of Lyotard's failed *grands récits* of modernity. In Frow's scheme, the production of information in the postmodern and the "crises" in the "knowledge" system

take the form of the crisis of an obsolescent modernism; a crisis of political representation; a crisis of representation in general, bound up with the commodification and the proliferation of information; and a crisis of the economy of cultural values, in particular, of the relations between high and low culture. The point is that these spheres of crises are fused in a way that is, if not without precedent . . . at least unfamiliar within the history of functional differentiation that has characterized 'modern' or 'capitalist' societies. Postmodernism, a product of this fusion, is the self-fulfilling prophecy of its own impossible autonomy. (63)

In this contradictory "now," memory is called upon to do extra duty—to operate, on the one hand, as a cultural nostalgia and, on the other, as a kind of hypermnnesia. For Frow, this is the logical outcome of an insidious "modernist logic" (36): a "constitutively vague" (21) repetition of the past that Frow sees as one more recourse to structuralist thought and to the periodization hypotheses, both of which work as "mode[s] of historical explanation" (17). More than anything else, it signals the impossibility of repudiating the past, as the moderns once imagined was possible.

But perhaps the postmodern also can be read as a corrective to this modernist logic. My point is that questions about the organization of time, as Frow presciently recognizes, are questions about the organization of memory and knowledge. To be sure, the cultural logic of the postmodern period can look like a motivated repression of the "now" and a fetishization of its undeniable linkages to "then," the goal of which is, indeed, an impossible, "imaginary" totality. But the postmodern is also an era and aesthetic in which information technologies and the mass media, as well as the "facts" of demographics, global migrations, and international travel, refuse such simplistic and imaginary thought and taxonomies. If I have understood Frow's argument, this is why the concept fails in the first place: it is an imaginary periodization, a singular or

"correct" representation of the past and of temporality that has less to do with pressing social problems (let us say "experience" or collective politics) and more to do with specific aesthetic as well as economic agendas—the logic of commodification turned onto, turned into, the sign and simulation. But commodities, like signs themselves, have always been around. Frow's critique of the postmodern as "logically incoherent," as modernity come home to roost, then, might well seem to hollow out the time and place of the postmodern too far, rejecting, for example, the self-reflexive and critical model of postmodern epistemology advanced by Linda Hutcheon.³⁹ But I think that his thesis does help explain the role of memory and temporality in the postmodern and to clear a conceptual space for a narrative of the present *and* absent past in the postmodern period such as the ones that could be generated by a theory of cultural mnemonics: "It is a question of the *linkage* of unequal times in the contingent, shifting, and relatively unstable orderings—political, economic, cultural—which make up our entangled world, and which, while organized as goal-seeking structures, drive towards no predetermined end" (10). I think a theory of cultural memory as a postmodern mode of remembering the past accommodates just such a project—a model of linkages and filiations, of rhizomatic connections and reconnections, of relational and multiple modes of memory-as-semiosis that, like Frow's analysis of the commodity, "rather than being readable as a constant function, is . . . understood as possessing different valencies in different contexts" (10). Perhaps it is sufficient to say that memory, for Frow,⁴⁰ as I have already hinted, can be used in diverse ways in "historical time and space: memory is . . . understood as a reconstructive process which works against the irreversibility of time" (10).

To be sure, memory's reconstructions must be read as present-texts, as signs of life stored up against the "gnawing" of time and the silence of oblivion. Linda Hutcheon, for example, reminds us that the past is only accessible as *traces* or *representations*; perhaps the most distinct aspect of the postmodern and its paradoxical relationship to the past, as Hutcheon points out, is the very notion of the "presence of the past" (*Poetics* 4). The title of the 1980 Venice Biennale, Hutcheon writes, "marked the institutional recognition of postmodernism in architecture" (4), an architecture that is not overtly nostalgic but a critical, ironic and parodic reworking of the past, of history: "Its aesthetic forms and its social formations are problematized by critical reflection" (4). I see this as another expression of the importance of self-reflexivity when it comes to gathering our thoughts of the past, although a critic such as Fredric Jameson sees such architecture as sites where the problematic expansion of the cultural during the postmodern period can be read as a description of "the way we live now" (339) without historical narratives to guide our interpretations and with only the most devalued sense of the past, of memory. One strategy that Jameson devises to counter this placeless amnesia is "cognitive mapping," a memory-work that Jameson confesses is another name for a new form of class-consciousness, one that has become necessary since "the subject has lost its capacity actively to extend its pro-tensions and re-

³⁹ Hutcheon, Frow argues in *Time and Commodity Culture*, "speaks of postmodernist texts in terms of self-consciousness, paradox, provisionality, the subversion of convention: that is, precisely in terms of a recognizably modernist aesthetic" (19). At a more general level, "The yearning right across the political spectrum for a restoration of the certainties of the unified subject, of a History that would be transcendent of its textual forms, and of a stable domain of cultural values, has led many to either espouse a postmodernism which would call a halt to the moral ambivalence, the elitism, the political pessimism of the art forms of modernity, or to desire the postmodern as precisely the obstacle to such a desire" (19).

⁴⁰ Frow is not the only critic to recognize the problem of the past as the problem of the postmodern. As Marshall Brown reasons, "Modernism, it could be said, suffered history in public, and struggled against it in art. Postmodernism renounced or parodied history in public, only to be haunted by it in ethics and conscience. As the past grows lighter, the future grows weightier and more apocalyptic, and thus the whirligig of time brings his revenges. Never but in dreams are we free of history" (Preface vii).

tensions across the temporal manifold and to organize its past and future into coherent experience" (*Postmodernism* 25). It becomes difficult in the postmodern period, Jameson reasons, "to see how the cultural productions of such a subject could result in anything but 'heaps of fragments' and in a practice of the randomly heterogeneous and fragmentary and the aleatory" (25).

Following a similar thread in his paper entitled "Memory, Mourning, Melancholy," Jeremy Tambling argues that postmodernism is an "absence" and a refusal of memory: "Memory, fostered by the museum-culture, has become simulacral; the remembered is prescribed by pre-given codes" (1). For Tambling, there is an "impossibility of memory" in the postmodern period, "and even suspicion to it as the name for a psychic state" (1). Tambling reads this impossibility as an index of the "loss" of a sense of history and the domination by the simulacra. He identifies three stages of the modern mind: "memory," "mourning," and "melancholy," and argues, citing the "virtual" recollection or hermeneutics of Deleuze and the powerful and restorative collective story-telling of Benjamin, that the modern, fragmented subject suffers from the depersonalization of *allegory* and from the loss of experience, and that this loss is inflected by nostalgia and melancholy—the desire for a "lost wholeness" that acts as a "mode of cognition proceeding from a self that thinks itself in split or fragmented terms" (4). This modern epistemology, for Tambling, is a "thinking in terms of allegory [that] both depersonalizes in a way which breaks down the centred subject, and also responds to reification, to turning people into lifeless abstraction" (4), the most horrendous example of which, Tambling suggests, is Auschwitz. Such a waning of "direct" experience worsens in the postmodern as a further emptying and abstraction of "pure" or "involuntary memory," and in the emergence and proliferation of *secular* discourse. For Tambling, "the subject whose presence is assured by memory is already marked by the artificiality of writing [inscription, signification]. A founding moment of western subjectivity—the proclamation of a true memory—is undone" (14).

I doubt that there is such a thing as "pure" memory, and Tambling himself seems to recognize the possibility of a semiological or inscriptive model of memory in his framing of postmodern epistemology and historiography as a "form of liberation" (25). Curiously, however, Tambling wonders about the "return" of "pure memory" and suggests the possibility that memory might well reappear in the postmodern as a response to the so-called displacement of production and of (Benjaminian) experience by simulation, "in a powerful and non-predictable form which is outside the constraints of a memory governed by an ego or a memory positivistically linked to happenings that the self has been through" (14). If the melancholic modern (and postmodern) subject has "let go of the certainties about the ego and about a past memory, that may be a source of loss, but it is also a possible freeing up of ways of articulating the past" (24).

But memory, as I have been arguing, always has been unnatural and artificial. And how is past experience "authentic" in one generation and "false" in the next? Furthermore, what, exactly, is "pure" memory? This is obviously complex theoretical terrain, and I am passing over it swiftly. But what I have been trying to extract from these debates is a sense of how a theory of cultural memory as a postmodern mode of talking about the past and our attachment to it in the present is rooted in well-documented and long-standing attempts to resolve, or at least speak to, the problems of the past, of history, of temporality, of the relation of spirit to flesh, of mind to matter, of difference (or other) to sameness. What is especially distinct about postmodernity, I think, is that it shoulders the burden of these questions and insists that we must think of them self-reflexively, that we must construct temporality and historiography as in-between or mediatory modes of inscribing meaning, as modes of knowing and naming the *present*. As White has asked, "why we ought to study things under the aspect of their past-ness rather than under the aspect of their present-ness, which is the aspect under which everything offers itself for contemplation immediately?" (48). Clearly there is none for White, and I want to keep that unequivocal "No" in mind as we test the parameters of the cultural mnemonics of two novels for the settler-invader society of Australia in the next section. It is not so much a question of a forging a narrative of the

present in the postmodern period, but of imagining new ways of looking at the past in the postmodern present that are self-conscious and that, as I will argue more directly in the next section, are tolerant and generative of difference.

Has memory been lost or emptied in the postmodern period? No, I would say, it simply—or not so simply—operates in different cultural locations and technologies. This key transformation or epistemic rupture, I have said, is hardly recent or decisive, and it can be linked to such cultural technologies as the photograph, the film, television, and the computer. These technologies, too, are prosthetic: they function as tools that help us to “see”—to imagine and invent—our pasts as much as ourselves in the present. Similarly, critical theoretical discourses act, as Terdiman suggests, as prosthetic memory machines: they select and preserve aspects of the past. Postmodern literary texts that figure memory might well read the past more pessimistically than I do, and there is good cause for that: the social and ecological problems, the unlimited violence and degradation of the environment that plague communities on this planet are staggering and depressing. For Arthur Kroker and David Cook, the implosive aesthetics of panic, “hyper-primitivism,” and “hyper-imaging” (*The Postmodern Scene* 15-16) are directly related to these nihilistic “terrors” of the postmodern world. In their view, the proliferation of the sign functions as a form of what we can call *hypermnesia*⁴¹—an aesthetic that is tied to consumer culture and to the (passive) production of virtual reality in the era of late capitalism, and that is frenetic in its search for depth, for meaning, along the plane of the simulacra and the “chain” of the sign. But postmodern texts, Kroker and Cook maintain, can also represent the past in what I suggest are more *amnesiac* terms, as chronic boredom, as irrelevance, and as indeterminacy, conditions of cultural anesthesia, I think, that are close to what Kroker and Cook denote as the “perfect psychological sign of a postmodern (pharmaceutical) culture and society which has embraced the [Nietzschean] will to nothingness as its own, and internalises [sic] the pharmakon as a *forgetting* of ‘time’s it was’” (16). Too much memory, and not enough.

Perhaps not surprisingly, Kroker and Cook await a second Augustine: one whose thinking will help to recover the radical critique of post-structural thought; one who will reinstate “experience” and “embodied” will as expressive tensions in human life, as something other than simply nihilism. As we have already seen, such a critique, in Nietzschean terms, is a kind of anti-humanist, anti-foundational, and *anti-historical* thought that is relentlessly self-reflexive and critical, especially when it comes to thinking the past. Young has argued something close to this in his defense of postmodernity and post-structuralism as the critique of Eurocentric knowledge; Young sees the postmodern as a period in which Europe is confronted, at a discursive level, with its “own cultural self-representation” (*White Mythologies* 174), with its myths and memories. As the editors of *De-Scribing Empire* put it, in the context of colonial and post-colonial discourse, the very boundaries between European Self and colonized Other, which historically have been imagined as rigid and impermeable, turn out to be discursive structures—delusory racist and exploitative narratives based upon an amnesiac logic: the “binary which preserves colonial power” amounts to a particularly insidious “habit” of “careful forgetting, not only of the sites of [anti-colonial] resistance, but also of the possibility of interrogating that binarist critical practice itself as an operation of power/knowledge” (7-8).

I have traced memory to the heart of cultural production: to the event and site of signification. A theory of cultural memory is indeed dodgy. It attempts to account for the secular

⁴¹ A term adapted from psychoanalytic discourse, *hypermnesia* denotes a memory disorder in an individual, a “great mass of memories surging in all directions” (Théodul Ribot, *Les Maladies de la mémoire*, Paris 1881; cited in Roth 57). *Hypermnesia*, Roth continues, is “characterized by both the intensity and the rapidity of memories,” so overwhelming as to disturb in the patient the balance between the past and present (59-60). Memory, which normally “brings order to the present by linking it to the past and signaling possible futures . . . becomes an agent of disorder, overwhelming the present” (Roth 60) and obfuscating the future.

re-location and semiological re-conception of memory in the *modern* and *postmodern* periods, for what Frow, in *Time and Commodity Culture*, calls the "material vestiges" and "technological underpinnings" (223-26) of how we remember and forget the past. By this stroke, I have rejected nostalgic and essentialist theories about the workings of memory and asked, instead, under what conditions do we remember and forget in a postmodern era—an era in which, for some, "computers reify the meaning of memory" (Kroker and Cook i) and, for others, memory is viewed as compensation for "authentic" history, as what one falls back *on* or *into* when nobody remembers how to *do* history properly to begin with. The former claim is close to the argument made by Jean-François Lyotard in *The Postmodern Condition* that the "condition of knowledge in most highly developed societies" (xxiii) is one in which scientific knowledge (which lacks a "tolerant" or performative cultural mnemonic) dominates the performative and interpretive acts of narrative knowledge; the latter is of a piece with the familiar enough accusations that post-structuralism evades history or that postmodernism lacks a politics, a claim that Jameson makes unequivocally in his indispensable *Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*: "It is safest to grasp the concept of the postmodern," Jameson writes, foregrounding the centrality of mnemonics to theory and to historiography, "as an attempt to think the present historically in an age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first place" (xi). Hence we "fall from memory into history, or from history into amnesia" (218). But such a construction of the past, as Frow argues, is problematic because it is profoundly nostalgic—a repetition of the trope of "loss" or "fall" precisely because it ignores both the "technological underpinnings" of memory, as Frow correctly observes, and the semiological or inscriptive aspects of memory, which Carruthers' traces through the Middle Ages back to classical mnemonics and the art of rhetoric. To be sure, one does not have to look hard to see how central the roles of technology and inscription are in the modern and postmodern worlds, in the shaping of modern and postmodern consciousness and memory. How does signification effect our abilities to culturally remember and forget? to know and think? to construct temporality and order the "real"? Indeed, memory as I see it is the *discourse*, the conscious system in which the present and the past coexist, struggle, fold into one another: cultural memory is something else besides the depthless recollection of kitsch or the hyper-consumption of the past as simulacra; it is something else besides the comforting certainties of "deep" Traditions and the narcotic oblivions of postmodern simulacra. In the modern and postmodern worlds, the past can only exist as discourse: there is, to adapt Jacques Derrida's famous phrase, no outside of memory. I dare say that what is distinctly or uniquely postmodern about a theory of cultural memory is the degree to which we embody this post-structural principle, this "suspicious" hermeneutics. In the postmodern period, the remembering subject, the subject-of-memory, recognizes that it is located in the sign system of the social and that it makes the *discursive* choices of what to remember and forget from within these social frames or matrices of signification. To speak about cultural memory, then, is to speak about the past in ways that include history, but also such intertexts as novels, monuments, architecture, and bodies. Hence the importance of re-learning memory, of learning to re-read memory closely and clearly as textual traces.

I want to conclude this already lengthy chapter in which I set out to explore memory and to set up a provisional framework of modern and postmodern mnemonics with a reading of a paradigmatic (postmodern) memory-text in which a subject's memory and its determining social forces are tested: Thomas Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49*. Although the heroine of this novel, Oedipa Maas, has little, if any, connection to post-colonial cultural mnemonics, she stands as a subject-of-memory in the postmodern period—one who lives in and lives out the difficult *in-between* condition of postmodernity. Oedipa is another figure in Pynchon's literary landscapes who experiences memory problems. But, unlike Pudding, who is senile, who cannot help but remember everything as the Great War, and whose coprophagy reads as an ironic form of

Proustian involuntary memory, Oedipa, we read, has convinced herself that, as she puts it, "I am meant to remember" (118). Yet she has difficulty in doing so, or in figuring out precisely *what* it is that she is not supposed to forget. Her quest for *meaning* in the suburban, narcotic, and neurotic social spaces of Pynchon's America is at once comic and absurd, as much as it is potentially tragic and touching. But what is especially interesting about *Lot 49* from the point of view of cultural memory—and all of Pynchon's novels, I think, interrogate the matrix of culture, memory, and meaning—is Oedipa's interstitial position, her fearful and frightening status in-between the past and the future, in-between meaning and meaninglessness in an apocalyptic, post-industrial, soon-to-be-digital America, a place where which she dreads she has become an "excluded middle":

they were bad shit, to be avoided; and how had it ever happened here, with the chances so good for diversity? For it was now like walking among matrices of a great digital computer, the zeroes and ones twinned above, hanging like balanced mobiles right and left, ahead, thick, maybe endless. Behind the hieroglyphic streets there would be either a transcendent meaning, or only the earth. (181)

Oedipa's dilemma is hardly new. We saw it framed earlier as the tension between immanence and transcendence: does the world operate purely by chance or is there design to its vicissitudes? Are the forces of the universe personal or impersonal? Do we possess freewill or are we wholly determined? Are we sentenced to forever make our own meanings or is there a corresponding "Truth" to the universe that each generation comes closer to discovering? Are we consigned to live as hallucinogenic paranoids who fear we will never "know," that we will forget how to remember and become victims of imagined or actual conspiracies, of fundamental religions, or indeterminate quests? Or are we better off oblivious?

These are questions I cannot attempt here, but they flow from the question of cultural memory as a contemporary problematic and show how technology "makes" us as much as we "make" technology: Oedipa feels that she is walking *through* a computer. Her quest for meaning and communication (shared conventions, and codes) is thus a consideration of the ways that knowledge and power necessarily transform from generation to generation, a quest that leads her to search for "transcendent" meaning and to encounter inscribed bodies and material signs. Despite the entropy⁴² and impersonality that seems to be increasingly prevalent in the technosocial in *The Crying of Lot 49*, Oedipa, the remembering subject, is an heroic questor, even if the "universal" meaning she thinks she seeks perpetually eludes her: in a way, her search for meaning and her contact with others in that process in fact becomes the "meaning" she must discover—the "secular miracle of communication" (180) that overcomes the entropic flows of energy and of information in Pynchon's dystopia. Whether via public or private postal systems, telephone lines, VHF or cable television, or, we might add, modern connections onto the world wide web, messages in their gloriously indeterminate forms as "modes of meaning" (182) link senders and receivers together, if only virtually and momentarily. "Keep it bouncing," Oedipa's erstwhile boyfriend and real estate mogul, Pierce Inverarity, once told her; whether Inverarity, whose will Oedipa is executing, was referring to capital or information, or to both—and in the postmodern period the two are increasingly indistinguishable—Oedipa does not know.

At the end of Pynchon's 1973 novel *Gravity's Rainbow*—which explores the amnesiac space of "the zone" (281), of post-war Europe as no-man's-land—we encounter another exhortation to remember and a "bouncing ball." In the novel's final scene, Gottfried utters his last words: "Always remember" (760). Gottfried, of course, is aboard the V2 rocket launched from

⁴² The OED defines "entropy" as a term from physics that denotes "a measure of the unavailability of a system's thermal energy for conversion into mechanical work" or "a measure of the disorganization or degradation of the universe"; it also denotes "a measure of the rate of transfer of information in a message etc." Above all, cultural memory is concerned with the transfer of information about the past into the present.

Germany, and he mutters this phrase at the apex of his presumably tragic journey, high above the earth; his temporary escape from the world, from history, however, is thwarted when his technological ascent (his transcendence or anabasis) is transformed, along the arc of gravity's promising "rainbow," into descent (his return to the underworld or catabasis) onto his target in America at the rate of "nearly a mile per second" (760). To ensure that this mythic pattern is transformed (repeated) into the silicon techno-present, in both comic and serious terms, Pynchon immediately shifts the scene back to the Orpheus Theater in Los Angeles, where "the screen is a dim page" (760) a literal palimpsest upon which even the oldest generation of movie fans cannot quite make out the image that flashes before its eyes for a second after the film breaks or the projector bulb burns out: the image is "too immediate for any eye to register," a brilliant star, a human figure, a modern angel of death (760). In this paratactic scene, as the rocket is about to reach "its last immeasurable gap above the roof of the theater" (760), Pynchon points out that there is just enough time to touch the person seated next to you, or yourself, or perhaps to "Follow the bouncing ball" and in doing so join in a ditty, a hymn "centuries forgotten" that is transposed and "sung to the pleasant air of the period" (760). The hymn itself is an interesting form of cultural mnemonic, as is film—both modes of cultural expression ensure that the past will persist into the present, that the miraculous but secular messages keep getting sent across the bleak nights, skies full of screaming, and silver screens of the postmodern world, that we will "Always remember." More important, though, given Pynchon's recurring interest in the "great" wars of this century as well as in the fragmentary nature of (post)modern society in his fiction, is the novel's closing line, a strange Orphic singing that invokes what I take to be the fatal, but enduring and hopeful, realm of the social: "Everybody join—" (760).

Readers of Toni Morrison's *Beloved* will remember an oddly similar invocation to *join* a community-of-memory: the disembodied voice of Beloved, who states, in truncated sentences and stream-of-consciousness narration: "I need to find a place to be . . . I am not dead . . . I am looking for the join" (213). In the confusing war zone that Tyrone Slothrop navigates in *Gravity's Rainbow* and in the suburban not-quite-hyperspace of central and southern California that Oedipa Maas traverses in *The Crying of Lot 49*, these words rings no less true; Pynchon's protagonists must "remember" the past and find a place in the present, in the strangely amnesic "new" worlds in which time and space seem to be out of joint, in which the modes and conditions of cultural memory seem to be outdated, obliterated by destructive and impersonal technologies, by the "horrors" of slavery or weapons of mass-destruction, by technologies that seem to depersonalize the present. It is especially significant, I think, that the urban landscape of *Lot 49* begins to resemble the grid of a computer's mother board. If Oedipa is indeed "meant to remember" (118), she must learn to do so in a world circumscribed by paranoia and pills, by the presence of too much silicon-based memory and the synthetic-pharmaceutical temptation to none at all. In this scheme, I suggest, Oedipa is *in-between* worlds, on a threshold between the modern and postmodern worlds, and she plays out and registers this disorientation most acutely, most terrifyingly, and most intimately on the level of memory.

Perhaps the most touching example of this occurs when Oedipa is looking for a W.A.S.T.E. postal "can" in San Francisco and stumbles into a rooming house under the freeway. In this urban *underworld*, Oedipa encounters a late-capitalist version of what, in *Gravity's Rainbow*, Pynchon terms the Preterite, "the many God passes over when he chooses a few for salvation" (555). In this unforgettable encounter, Oedipa meets an immobile old man, a sailor with a tattooed hand and a "wrecked face": he is perched, shuddering, on the stairs, holding a letter in his tattooed hand; he, too, is looking for a Trystero postal can; he, too, is trying, we learn, to mail a letter to his wife in Fresno, whom he left, as he says, "So long ago, I don't remember" (*Lot 49* 125). Oedipa asks: "Can I help?" She then agrees to mail his letter for him. In one sense, he is trying to communicate, to perpetuate a social bond and keep the ball bouncing, however futile and belated his attempt might seem to be; but he also functions in the narrative as a spectre of the past and an apparition of Oedipa's future. For she, too, is trying to communicate, trying to

complete the "circuit" between sender and receiver, to connect past and present, to mediate between meaning and meaninglessness—to speak for the dead. Surveying the drunk's surroundings and thinking about the other silent voices and broken lives that have been lived-out and literally passed-over in that hopeless room, Oedipa attempts to bridge the gap, to counteract the isolation that she feels is growing around her: "She was overcome all at once by a need to touch him, as if she could not believe in him, or would not remember him, without it. Exhausted, hardly knowing what she was doing she came the last three steps and sat, took the man in her arms, actually held him, gazing out of her smudged eyes down the stairs" (126).

This is a memorable scene, a scene of memory, of signification: bodies touch; the past "contacts" the present. Most notable, for Oedipa, in this dystopian version of the Republic, in this American Dream-turned-Nightmare, in this rooming house full of Melville's "isolatos" shipwrecked on the California coast, is the tragic, fiery end that Oedipa *imagines* for the old man. She envisions the sailor or one of his friends smoking a cigarette and falling asleep on an old mattress—"that stuffed memory" (128) that will feed the flames of his odd funeral pyre. The mattress, for Oedipa, records the bodily traces and the silenced histories of an absent past—of the poor, the ancient, and the dispossessed. The mattress, in Pynchon's narrative, is a kind of memory machine, a primitive computer, an inscribed and ironic *text* that represents the pasts of the generation of soon-to-be-forgotten, dis-placed, and dis-embodied Americans. Oedipa sees an image of herself and her world in the men in the rooming house, and to them she can only whisper: "I can't help" (126). When the mattress is destroyed, so are the stories that it helps Oedipa to remember: "flaming, secret salts held all those years by the insatiable stuffing of a mattress that could keep vestiges of every nightmare sweat, helpless overflowing bladder, viscously, tearfully consummated wet dream, like the memory bank of a computer to the lost" (Lot 49 126). The "lost" here, the "Preterite," are in danger of being forgotten, of disappearing from the realm of the social, we might say, without leaving a trace. But even as she reads the textual traces inscribed in the mattress and the wallpaper of the dilapidated room, Oedipa cannot seem to find that one "transcendent meaning" (181), that last, magic word to make sense of it all.

The "arthritic" who observes Oedipa's encounter with the tattooed sailor, and who helps her carry the disoriented old man up two flights of stairs to his own room and mattress, comments: "It's a thing he does, off and on" (127). And when Oedipa pulls out a ten dollar bill to give to the sailor, he confesses to her that he will spend it on booze. The arthritic then adds: "Remember your friends" (128). The sentiment of the scene then shifts from compassion to despair, though, when the sailor calls Oedipa a "bitch" for not waiting until the arthritic had left the room; he fears, at best, that he might have to share the windfall or, at worst, that the ten will be stolen from him. Any gesture of kindness or meaning-making is thus undone for Oedipa, who, once again, is forced to see things in this world from the "excluded middle"—in this case as someone who is both "involved" and an "outsider," as someone who must learn to read the present past without the tinted lenses of nostalgia for origins and plenitude, sentimentality, or indifference.

At this point, the old man begs a cigarette off Ramírez, the arthritic, and begins to literally enact the death scene that Oedipa has just imagined him in. She cries: "He's going to die," to which Ramírez responds matter of factly, "who isn't" (128). Increasingly disoriented or "lost" herself, always on the verge of paranoia and panic (or its "other," despair), Oedipa

Remembered . . . the massive distractions of information. So when this mattress flared up around the sailor, in his Viking's funeral: the stored cool years of uselessness, early death, self-harrowing, the sure decay of hope, the set of all men who had slept on it, whatever their lives had been, would truly cease to be, forever, when the mattress burned. She stared at it in wonder. It was as if she had just discovered the irreversible process. (128)

The process she discovers, I think, is the cultural process by which information—the signs of life—are either transferred in-time, stored in perpetuity, or effaced by oblivion and death:

the "stroke" of the sign factored into and through the relentless processes of *entropy*. In this scene, Oedipa beholds what I think is the goal of her quest: the act of meaning-making in the face of meaninglessness. What is especially striking here is that Pynchon makes it clear that in-between the hopefulness of birth (or beginning) and the hopelessness of death (or ending) Oedipa must inscribe her own *meanings* and *memories* in the social and in the present; in doing so she must negotiate her own past and future. She learns this process within the social frames of culture and through the subjects she encounters—subjects whose narratives she must learn to read in order to understand her own "life-story," her own experiences, her own present, her own memories. This, we might say, is the *secular miracle of communication*.

This, I want to conclude, is the sort of reading into memory that a theory of cultural memory can produce. All information exchange in Pynchon's literary cosmos is conditioned by the mediated and arbitrary nature of discourse—by an elusive and illusory and perhaps absent "transcendent meaning." To forget this is to succumb to the twinned alternatives of paranoia and oblivion, two ways of avoiding that *discursive* truth. Oedipa slowly learns this discursive lesson, that to live is to somehow embody or accept the irreversible process of time, of duration, of entropy in a present in which "change can be confronted for what it was" (129) in the "reversible" domain of the sign, of narration. All machines—mechanical, biological, semiological—must pass through time, through this "time differential" (129) or entropy.

What Oedipa is left with is the importance of cybernetics: the inscribed "texts" that return us, perhaps circuitously, to the argument made by Mary Carruthers and John Frow, amongst others, that memory is—and always has been—a reversible technology, a writing or inscription. Oedipa has to learn to read the present past, to take on the personal and social responsibility of information flow—transfer, storage, erasure. She must learn to decode the "ones and zeroes" of silicon-based electronic memory, the inscribed and leaking bodies around her, the stained wallpaper, the ghostly silverscreens, the broken televisions, the neon signs, the disembodied voices on radios, the undelivered letters, the tattooed skin, the ruined buildings, and so forth.

The confusion that Oedipa thus experiences on her discursive quest, the goal of which is meaning itself, is the "crisis" of memory. Oedipa's goal always threatens to disappear into a kind of tautology—into a techno-urban matrix, into a staging of what I take to be modern and postmodern epistemology and ontology, into an indeterminacy that is rooted in the recognition that meaning is something we *make* not *find*. That is, we "invent" the worlds we inhabit in language through shared narratives and memories—the systems of signification that make our worlds intelligible and that make social formation possible in the first place. That Pynchon's heroine is seeking a clandestine postal organization, The Trystero—perhaps mythic, certainly occult—whose stamps symbolize an "archaic" mode of communication, of information exchange, only serves to strengthen this point. Oedipa's inability to remember, her need for contact and completed cybernetic circuits, signals the pressing (postmodern) need to navigate the space between the technologies of communication and the social relations of production, to mediate between alienation and collectivity. But it is also a space of hope. Put simply, the social organization of postmodern power and knowledge have been radically changed: by urbanization, by industrialization and post-industrialization, by modes of electronic information exchange and mass media that seem to be increasingly impersonal, that seem, in one view, to *destroy memory* in the same way that they *destroy* traditional modes of community and communication. But the past can be remembered; it has not been "lost" forever. Whether or not the emergence of the electronic "word" is more cataclysmic than the invention of writing or of moveable type is a good question; to be sure, there are real social and ecological problems to deal with in the postmodern period. Certainly, various forms of writing decisively change the world and alter how and what we remember, but they have not obliterated the past nor made it any less powerful as an and "absent" determinant in the postmodern present. *The Crying of Lot 49* dramatizes some aspects of this transformation: the advent of the Age of Information and of what Baudrillard calls simulation; of "smart" machines like computers, symbolized in Pynchon's novel by Nefastori's box—a machine

that, as Pynchon writes, is governed by "Entropy . . . a figure of speech . . . a metaphor. It connects the world of thermodynamics to the world of information flow. The Machine uses both" (106).

Without reading any further into Pynchon's anatomy of American cultural memory in the age of computerized knowledge, I want to return to my introductory comments about cultural memory and postmodernity. For the "social problems" and sense of incoherence that plague the world of The Crying of Lot 49 force us to ask the question: how do we remember? Or, perhaps even better, as J. Stern asks, "who decides what should be forgotten?" (xvi). Oedipa literally has to distinguish between the worlds of the living and the dead: between a hopeful sense of order and *partial* transcendence and the immanent (under)world she navigates while trying to execute Pierce's will. She has to learn to make meaning in the present by negotiating the past in memory and by projecting memory's other, expectation, into what she thinks will be a *meaningful* future:

And the voices before and after the dead man's that had phoned at random during the darkest, slowest hours, searching ceaseless among the dial's ten million possibilities for that magical Other who would reveal herself out of the roar of relays, monotone litanies of insult, filth, fantasy, love whose brute repetition must someday call into being the trigger for the unnamable act, the recognition, the Word. (18)

The burden of such a creative and self-reflexive quest, of unnamable acts and hopeful recognitions, of the iterated and immanent "word," I will suggest, is the postmodern *mnemonic* condition—a configuration of cultural remembering and forgetting that mediates between nihilism and fundamentalism, between nostalgia and utopianism. I have spent some time considering the cultural mnemonics of The Crying of Lot 49 in order to set up what I take to be the central role of cultural memory in organizing postmodern temporality and knowledge, and to sketch what some of the contours of this world might look like in novels in which memory functions as both *content* and *means*. In an age of technological innovations like computers, which can store and retrieve information in ways that no mnemo-technician could hope to, memory is no less constitutive of the subjective or the social than it was in the age of wax tablets. Despite the proliferation of global (multinational) media and of information technologies, of placeless silicon archives and hypertexts, the question of memory and the persistence of the past into the present is, I think, all the more pressing. The point, as Terdiman wisely concludes, "is not to possess the past, but to understand the force of its claims upon the present without thereby supposing that such a claim is sovereign, or that contemporaneity is simply swamped or displaced by memory" (Present Past 356). What parts of the past are we *meant* to remember?

Section Two

Cultural Memory in Literature

8

Introduction

Is not the space between texts, in fact, the authentic space of memory?

Renate Lachmann
Memory and Literature

I have argued that memory becomes most intelligible when we read it as an aspect of culture, when we re-figure memory not only as a neuro-biological event nor as problem that is purely psychological or phenomenological, but as a socially organized semiological process through which we make meaning, through which we construct and maintain attachment to our "present pasts." It is not that memory does not inhabit these other domains, but, rather, that we must look to memory and its cultural locations in order to understand the contradiction of irreversible time and reversible memories, in order to understand the powerful—if intangible—way determinations of the subject by past events, personal and public, in order to understand how we "make" the societies in which we live as much as they "make" us.

In this section I will change my focus somewhat. I want to set up some parameters within which we can read cultural memory *in* literature, and literature *as* cultural memory. Keeping Renate Lachmann's notion of *intertextuality* in mind, I want first to sketch one possible way that we can imagine memory and culture together in a performative relationship in literary writing, a process in which memory, as Homi Bhabha explains, is "realigned" in the present as a "form of repetition" ("Unpacking" 202). In this view, literature acts as the repository of a culture's past, as the "storehouse" of its signs, but this storehouse is a cybernetically operating system of intertexts not an archive or warehouse of facts: a culture's *intertextual* memory contains data which is continuously re-interpreted when it is retrieved or read. I then want to read into cultural memory in two paradigmatic post-colonial *intertexts* from the settler-invader¹ society of Australia. If my

¹ The questions I want to ask about post-colonial cultural mnemonics in this section are questions about settler-invader society in Australia. Gillian Whitlock's claim that Australia is "white diaspora" in which the settler-invader subject as "both colonizer and colonized occupies a uniquely ambivalent position" rings especially true: "thinking about the movement and power—socially, culturally, politically—of a white diaspora to the various colonies allows us to address particular power relations across and within settler sites. This is not to obscure the different political, cultural and economic contexts of, for instance,

argument holds ups, we can read the presence (or better, performance) of the past and the social organization or frames of memory in the fictional worlds created by Peter Carey in *Illywhacker* and David Malouf in *Remembering Babylon* as instances in which cultural memory is being both troubled and tested. From the post-colonial perspective, memory can be read in settler-invader society as instances in which "the subject of the event as the enunciating 'I' shifts its geopolitical location and rhetorical location" (Bhabha, "Unpacking" 202), as instances in which the "remembered" past persists in the settler-invader present but as difference within a transformative and translational hybrid culture that repeats what Bhabha sees as Walter Benjamin's "ethical and aesthetic imperative: 'the renewal of life' through dislocation, translation and resituation" (200). In the post-colonial metropolitan diaspora, as Bhabha argues, and no less in the ambivalent spaces of the settler-invader community, personal and social identity transform across the "time lag" or the "projective-past" (200), transform in-in the overlapping spaces of incommensurable cultural borders. "For it is precisely there, Bhabha writes, "in the ordinariness of the day-to-day, in the intimacy of the indigenous, that, unexpectedly, we become unrecognizable strangers to ourselves in the very act of assuming a more worldly, or what is now termed "global," responsibility" (202). From this perspective, memory becomes a "wordly" problematic of postcolonial subject formation: in both of the novels I read in this section, memory is foregrounded as both contents and means in just this sort of transformative model; that is, memory or the past is both a subject to be interrogated and a mode in which the colonial past is known in the narrative. In the case of *Illywhacker*, the form of memory that I find most interesting is *architectural*, the built space of the modern prison and the ways that Australia's convict past continues to determine its post-colonial present; in *Remembering Babylon*, memory is *corporal*, it organizes around the body Gemmy Fairley, in his language and on his skin, and the past that is invoked is that of the "colonial encounter." In both novels, however, the past weighs on the brains and bodies of the living—deforming and transforming the subjects-of-memory. To press this one step further, when read as memory-texts in the post-colonial present, these novels enable us to look back at the "absent" colonial past as much as to look at, to reflect upon, our "present" post-colonial selves. In both novels, the problem of the Australia's *penal-colonial*² past persists into the post-colonial

the Maori in New Zealand, the Aborigines in Australia and the Inuit and Indian in Canada. Rather it is to focus on another dimension of race relations: the constructions of whiteness in these colonies, and the ways in which settler subjects were variously constructed in terms of gender, class, and race through the process of inclusion and exclusion, commemorating and forgetting" ("White Diasporas: Joan (and Ana) Make History" 91). Indeed, the "construction of whiteness" is implicated in the complex mnemonic economy of European imperialism: a set of cultural "rememberings" and "forgettings" that have shifted over time and drifted across different geographical places but that have, at least until recently, remained consistently *amnesiac*. We will read into the mnemonics of diaspora, relying as we proceed upon Bhabha's concepts of cultural hybridity, ambivalence, and interstitiality and comparing the metropolitan or new international diaspora to the settler-invader diaspora. In the most general terms, we shall work to understand settler-invader subjects remember a selective and "illusory" *sameness* while forgetting the facts of "actual" and "incommensurable" cultural *difference*.

² By using this construction, I want to emphasize the imbricated or double nature of Australia's past as both "penal" and "colonial." The first term denotes aspects of the founding of "white" Australia that are implicated in the production of European social deviance, that is, in the transportation of 163,000 or so convicts—predominantly English and male, average age 26, approximately 80% of whom were transported for various forms of larceny—from Britain to Australia between 1788 and 1868 (Robson 4, 7-8); the latter term denotes the simultaneous processes by which white settler-invader society in Australia *invented* itself as a colony and subsequently transformed itself into a nation. It is worth noting that though "convict novels" have focused on the horrors of infamous and unforgettable "secondary" punishment facilities such as Norfolk Island, Port Arthur, or Sarah Island, etc., "which were as a rule reserved for prisoners who had committed second crimes while in the colonies" (Hughes xiii), "only a fraction of the men and women transported to Australia spent any time in these 'secondary' settlements" (xiii); most of the convicts were "assigned" to free settlers or the government. Nonetheless, the memorable figure of the convict-as-victim

present, and it does so in the context of the distinct social formations of settler-invader society—a cultural group which, at several levels, but particularly at the level of memory, is in a “uniquely ambivalent position” (Whitlock 91).

I have already noted, following Catherine Hall, that colonialism is one of Europe’s most “uncomfortable memories” (“Histories, Empires and the Post-colonial Moment” 66), a set of “problems” that, as the proliferation of post-colonial writing today surely demonstrates, continue to trouble the West. Consequently, Hall argues it is imperative that the West begins “remembering empires differently” (66). This is a complex and heterogeneous project, to be sure, especially since, as Hall correctly notices, the West remains physically and metaphysically connected to its so-called “peripheries.”³ “It matters, therefore,” Hall writes,

how the Empire is remembered and what kind of historical work is done. A re-read, re-imagined imperial history, focusing on interdependence and mutuality as well as on the patterns of domination and subordination which are always inscribed in the relations between coloniser and colonised, might provide some resources from which new notions of twenty-first century British cultural identities might be drawn. (69-70)

Hall invokes the semiotic mechanism of inscription here, and I want to emphasize that this colonial writing, this resilient memory-trace, is one aspect of what we speak about when we talk about the persistent colonial past as a (memory) problem in the post-colonial present. “Unless the legacy of the British Empire is re-remembered,” Hall argues,

it will continue to disrupt and unsettle our present, in ways that obstruct the development of a new kind of nation. The legacy of empire is all around us and yet there is great reluctance to think about its place in our history. Nostalgia envelops some aspects of it; commodification has provided another way of dealing with it, offering us packaged mementos of an imperial past; yet neither helps us to assess the significance of that legacy in our present. (“Turning a Blind Eye”: Memories of Empire” 31)

Hall proceeds to read chocolate (cocoa), along with other “impure” colonial commodities such as sugar, tea, and coffee, as “products of empire,” ones that have had a particularly lasting purchase (tactile, sensual) in the cultural memories of the English.

The legacy of the commodity, however, involves as much forgetting as remembering in its “colonization of social life” (Debord 29), a point Lukács makes in a different context in a letter to Walter Benjamin: “every reification is a forgetting.”⁴ The colonial past is closely linked to the

of brutal British landed-class administrators, marines, and overseers has had a profound and lasting grip upon Australian imaginations. As Brian Elliott concludes, “On the entire subject of convictism imagination, not knowledge, determined what people thought” (117). Laurie Hergenhan’s *Unnatural Lives: Studies in Australian Convict Fiction* remains the most comprehensive study of Australian “convict” novels.

³ In “Histories, Empires and the Post-colonial Moment” Catherine Hall notices that traces of imperial histories” are everywhere in Britain: in the forms of restaurants, street names, parks, and public monuments, and in *ingested* commodities (sugar, tea, spices, coffee, cocoa, mango chutney, etc.). I point this out to remind readers of the corporeality or materiality of memory, of the mnemonic economy of commodities (66), but mostly of the labyrinthine nature of remembering and forgetting. In “Turning a Blind Eye”: Memories of Empire,” she presses this thesis further, reading, for example, the opening of “Cadbury World” in 1991 and the history of tours at the Cadbury factory in Bournville, along with the transformation of chocolate into a symbol of national “good taste,” as instances of “cultural forms that came out of empire” (28). The “blind eye” Hall deconstructs is a national amnesia, “which refers to the process whereby an individual has access to forms of knowledge but chooses consciously or unconsciously to ignore it” (31).

⁴ Terdiman cites this passage in *Present Past* (13); in *History and Class Consciousness* Lukács argues that “Reification requires that a society should learn to satisfy all its needs in terms of commodity exchange” (91); Terdiman continues: “Essentially, ‘reification’ is a memory disturbance: *the enigma of the commodity is a memory disorder*. . . . The experience of commodification and the process of reification cut entities off from their own history. They veil the memory of their production from their consumers, as from

commodity form, but even more importantly to capitalist accumulation and exchange, to such "unrepresentable" social relations a slavery and genocide. As Hall suggests,

If we are interested in the ways in which history is lived, how it offers answers to the questions as to who we are and where we came from, if we want to know how we are produced as modern subjects, what narratives from the past enable us to construct identities, how historical memories and the shadows and ghosts of memories are internalised in our lives, then "the passions of identity politics" may drive us to ask new questions of old and new sources, fiction may give us necessary tools. ("Histories" 66)

The two novels I read in this section do not link taste to memory, or at least not directly. But both novels are centrally concerned with (European, male) bodies and with the power of the past—with how material and memory can be linked together. In *Illywhacker*, an aging narrator claims to be trapped in a body that refuses to die; in truth, he is confined in a Pet Shop-turned-prison, a site of cultural memory that is constructed of bricks upon which the convict past is literally inscribed; in *Remembering Babylon*, an omniscient narrator relates how the un-settling presence of a "mysterious stranger" effects a colonial settlement in Queensland, and of how the "imagined" and "symbolic" act of eating human flesh is explored as a cultural mnemonic and as part—as a central aspect—of the cultural encounter between Australian Aboriginals and settler-invaders; that is, the incommensurable cultural values of the so-called cannibals seem to contradict the "enlightened" values of the European settler-invaders, whose ritual commemoration of the Eucharist and the larger epistemological-ontological sacrificial economy of Judeo-Christianity is an especially powerful and enduring mode of cultural memory—one we have already seen Nietzsche interrogate in his exploration of memory and morality.

At stake in both texts is, amongst other things, is the European past in the colonial (and post-colonial) present, what Peter Carey in an interview with David Sexton has termed "the meaning of Australia and with being an Australian" (Fletcher 12). The critical moment that I want to arbitrarily organize my readings around is the commemorative event of Australia's Bicentenary in 1988. To be sure, such broad cultural meanings and values as "being an Australian" are typically articulated, however provisionally and problematically, across a wide spectrum, but the "larger social moment" (Turner, "Nationalising the Celebrity" 134) of the Bicentenary is an event in which such meanings—meanings that invariably invoke the past in the present and in doing so make it intelligible—are framed and contested, emplotted within the larger and attenuated historical narratives of European imperialism and colonialism.⁵

In this view, the Bicentenary is a window into the cultural and political life of the post-colonial nation, and a particularly revealing one, for my purposes, given my stated interest in how memory is the mode in which we both construct and conserve the past, in how memory can be read as a reversible cultural technology through which the past is reshaped and re-invented to suit present purposes, and in how cultural mnemonics is deeply implicated in personal and political identity formation. As a national celebration, as Graeme Turner writes in *Making it National*,

the very people who produced them. The process, in Theodor Adorno's terms, created an unprecedented and uncanny field of 'hollowed-out' objects, available for investment by any meaning whatsoever, but organically connected to none" (*Present Past* 12). For a perspective on the commodity and its cultural effects that rejects the "historicism" of the Frankfurt School and the "spectacle" of the commodity developed by Guy Debord as forms of modernist nostalgia see John Frow's *Time and Commodity Culture*.

Regardless of the well-known criticisms of his work as "orientalist," I find Edward Said's definitions of key terms such as "imperialism" and "colonialism" incisive and useful. Following the work of Michael Doyle, Said defines "imperialism" as the formal and informal relations that structure "the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory"; "colonialism" is considered to be a "consequence of imperialism . . . the implanting of settlements on distant territory." If "direct colonialism largely ended" in our time, as Said suggests, "imperialism . . . lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices" (*Culture and Imperialism* 9).

which was published in 1994,

The Bicentenary might be thought of as a set of sites and processes where we can witness the official production of nationalism in Australia for once reaching its limits. These sites and processes are not well defined and their temporal boundaries are probably still to be reached. But the limitations the Bicentenary revealed do seem to be centrally implicated—now, I would suggest, even more than at the time—in many Australians' recognition of the plurality of Australian identities. For this reason the Bicentenary continues to be of interest and to demand analysis and critique as the most exorbitantly and the most contested program of nation formation in Australia's postwar history. (*Making It National* 72)

I doubt that either Carey or Malouf would object to the claim that his novel is of a piece with other (agonistic) cultural projects that coalesced around 1988 and challenged traditionally singular conceptions of Australian national identity. But we cannot draw *necessary* connections between the archive of "Bicentenary" novels I have assembled here and an event such as the Bicentenary⁶; nor should we rely overly much upon neat periodizations and arbitrary categorizations.⁷ What the novels have in common, though, is a *disjunctive* interest in the past, in how the past is *literarily* remembered in the present, in the "field of struggle" that is marked off by post-colonial settler-invader culture. This disjunctive present-past, or past-present, if you will, figured across the "time-lag" in-between "now" and "then," in-between imperial centre and colonial periphery, remains the site where the cultural transformation of the past and the present, of the subject and the social, is both possible and necessary. This is the colonial and post-colonial "memory-work."

We shall explore this ground more fully as we proceed, considering carefully the cultural mnemonics of nationalism, the mnemonic economy of capitalism in its various stages (especially late-capitalism and its global cultural logic), and the complicity of cultural mnemonics with narratives of social and subjective legitimation. I want to think of 1988 as part of the "turn to memory" that, as we have already noted, critics such as Kammen or Huyssen have identified in the political and cultural histories of the West. At no time in a nation's political and cultural life, I think, is the relationship between the present and the past put under pressure more so than during national *commemoration*⁸; as theorists as diverse as Ernest Renan, Benedict Anderson, and Homi Bhabha have noted, a nation itself is a mnemonic construct (and a relatively recent one at that), bound together by arbitrary borders, shared languages, and values that are "imagined" to be held in common.

Perhaps curiously, such an ostensibly "universal" form of community is accomplished, as we shall see, largely by selective rememberings and wilful forgettings of the past *at the level of*

⁶ This question is complicated most obviously by *Joan Makes History*, Kate Grenville's "bicentennial metafiction" (Haynes 60) which was published in 1988 by University of Queensland Press and funded by a grant from the Australian Bicentennial Authority expressly "to celebrate Australia's Bicentenary in 1988" (*Joan Makes History*, copyright page).

⁷ By the 1960s and 70s, as Hughes points out, the convict past or "the system" became increasingly popular as a component of the national past; by the mid 1980s, as 1988 evinced, it became downright fashionable to claim convict ancestry and to "remember" the convict past as an origin myth, a transformation that culminated, at a national and international level, in the contradictory and problematic, in the "monumental" but also "critical" celebration of Australia's Bicentenary.

⁸ "Commemorations," Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes in *Silencing the Past*, "sanitize . . . the messy history lived by the actors. They contribute to the continuous myth-making process that gives history its more definite shapes: they help to create, modify, or sanction the public meanings attached to historical events deemed worthy of mass celebration. As rituals that package history for public consumption, commemorations play the numbers game to create a past that seems both more real and more elementary" (116). Commemoration is a particularly powerful cultural mnemonic, an exercise of power that produces sanitized and clear "facts" and performed beliefs by mobilizing cultural remembering and forgetting.

culture: by repressions of heterogeneity and by projections of an illusory homogeneity; by unificatory "origin" myths past and by idealized and utopian visions of the national future. As Bhabha puts it, "Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realize their horizons in the mind's eye" (*Nations and Narration* 1). Bhabha's central point is that the nation is a particularly ambivalent structure, a mnemonic effect of modernity, one that cannot be understood, Bhabha argues, without a clear sense of the nation as "a form of narrative—textual strategies, metaphoric displacements, sub-texts and figurative statements" (2). This narrative structure is intensely preoccupied with the past and with the "national" narratives of identity to which the past is buttressed; but, at the same time, the nation's "imaginary" status, its "transgressive boundaries and interruptive interiority" (5), haunt it, remind it of its own historical contingency.

Bhabha's conception of the nation as narration is developed from post-structural and psychoanalytic theory. Working particularly from Anderson's notion of the nation as the result of large-scale (mostly disciplinary) cultural systems that preceded it, namely the *religious* and the *dynastic*, Bhabha sees the nation as "one of the major structures of ideological ambivalence within the cultural representations of 'modernity'" (4). Such an interrogation of the discursive or narrative nature of the nation, of the national subject-of-memory, helps to reveal, to articulate, the "margins" by which we have known, by which we know, and by which we shall know, the tangible and intangible construct of the *nation*, located as it is in a "post-colonial" world. This claim is itself open to questions, some of which we have already touched on in our discussion of cultural semiology and memory as discourse in the preceding chapters. For now, let us focus upon the intersections of the nation, narrative, modernity, cultural memory, and post-colonialism; and let us ask how these terms help us to "know" the worlds we live in, the worlds that, as literary critics and theorists, we read.

To question the secular nation and to read it as an effect of discourse or narration, to read it as an effect of memory, Bhabha contends, is a

substantial intervention into those justifications of modernity—progress, homogeneity, cultural organicism, the deep nation, the long past—that rationalize [legitimate] the authoritarian tendencies within cultures in the name of the national interest or ethnic prerogative. In this sense, then, the ambivalent antagonistic perspective of nation as narration will establish the cultural boundaries of the nation so that they may be acknowledged as 'containing' thresholds of meaning that must be crossed, erased, and translated in the process of cultural production. (*Nation and Narration* 4)

Of course, Bhabha's consideration of the nation as a *modern* social formation must be understood in the context of his own interest in colonial discourse analysis and the intersections therein of post-structuralism and psychoanalysis—most notably the ideas of cultural hybridity, interstitiality, and ambivalence. Furthermore, Bhabha's interest in the nation as a (post)colonial social formation is based upon Anderson's now commonplace idea that the nation is the political expression an "imagined community," one that, as Anderson claims in *Imagined Communities*, "loom[s] out of an immemorial past" and "glides[s] into a limitless future" (19). But we could say that nations do not so much glide as lurch backward and forward, or flow like a glacier that eventually grinds down the things that get in its way. Less figuratively, we can see that the narrative nature of the nation can be enlisted for both "conservative" and "liberal" mnemonic ends: to elide historical contradictions or incommensurable cultural differences; to disrupt, in an anti-foundationalist sense, "neat" unities and seamless totalizations. The nation, we might say, lives in/out this contradictory, nostalgic and utopian teleology; its citizens live—somewhat uneasily, perhaps even neurotically—in-between these two mnemonic polarities.

Speaking to this contradictory status, this in-between position, Anderson suggests in *Imagined Communities* that at certain historical junctures in the histories of nations, "antiquity" itself can be considered the "necessary consequence of 'novelty'" (xiv). Anderson argues that "if nationalism was . . . the expression of a radically changed form of consciousness, should not

awareness of that break, and the *necessary forgetting* of the older consciousness, create its own narrative?" (xiv). Anderson concludes that, yes, such ambivalent chronologies produce distinctly national narratives that are, perhaps curiously, structurally aligned after 1820 with modern biography and autobiography, with the end of monotheism and with post-medieval "serial" or "secular" time—Anderson's name for what Walter Benjamin has called "homogeneous, empty time" (*Illuminations* 261). Like biography and autobiography, like the novel and the newspaper, whose "forms provided the technical means of 're-presenting' the *kind* of imagined community that is the nation" (Anderson 25), the modern nation *narrates* itself into existence, inscribes itself and its temporality in a "now" in which the past and the future are simultaneously *present* and freed of the transcendent, synchronic claims of gods and kings—what Kundera's calls the condition of modern *deus absconditus*. Perhaps we can see the roots of an early Australian anticlericalism, set deeper than the assumed nationalist contempt or indifference to religion, especially as it was expressed in the *Bulletin*⁹ of the 1890s, in this modern and secular domain. Less speculatively, the invented or "imagined" form of modern, secular nation necessarily experiences a profound sense of rupture or "break" with the past, with traditional (that is, religious, dynastic) chronologies and epistemologies, and such a break—in a word, *modernity*—puts the cultural memory of the nation in a contradictory position: one that, as I have already hinted, is internally split along the fault lines that cut between the past and the present (and in a certain sense, the present and the future), between "us" and "them." The modern nation, in other words, must *forget* its recentness and diversity and *remember* a fictitious antiquity and unity; the nation must forget incommensurable *cultural* differences while remembering an illusory sameness, a problem that for settler-invader societies, when viewed through the prism of post-colonialism, produces a spectrum of questions about race, class, and gender that *destabilize* the very idea of the nation.

Given the connections between nationalism and colonialism Anderson puts forward in his argument, given the unforgettable violences that have occurred in the name of nationalism, and given the relatively recent development of the modern nation itself, it is not hard to see that the nation labours under a sort of "false consciousness,"¹⁰ a psychic limbo or state of *amnesia* and

⁹ At the end of the nineteenth century, the Sydney *Bulletin* was considered to be Australia's most influential nationalist publication, "inventing" traditions in the 1890s such as the convict-based "bush" or "Up-Country" ethos. Russel Ward traces this contempt back to the convicts who saw clergy as "part of the government machinery of repression" (90); as Russel Ward writes in *The Australian Legend*: "it reflected, and helped to bring into full consciousness, the emerging national mystique" (224). Randolph Bedford writes that the *Bulletin* "was Australia; whereas all the daily papers of Sydney were English provincials" (qtd. in Ward 224). In the issue of 17 June 1893 the *Bulletin* published its "pastoral proletariat" policies—ultimately derived, Ward argues, from the convict past—the several of which I list below are directly relevant to my thesis that an amnesiac "convict unconscious" has shaped Australian national identity. They include:

- "A Republican form of Government.
- One Person one Vote.
- Complete Secularization and Freedom of State Education.
- Reform of the Criminal Code and Prison System.
- A United Australia and Protection against the World.
- Australia for the Australians—The cheap Chinaman, the cheap nigger, and the cheap European pauper to be absolutely excluded. . . ." (qtd. in Ward 224-25).

¹⁰ I invoke this contentious term from Marxist discourse intentionally: I am, however, not concerned with the specific meanings of "false consciousness"; rather, I want to foreground what I see as *related* cultural practices: the willingness—even necessity—of forgetting the past in order to either 1) accept present exploitation and domination as inevitable, absolute, and eventually normative; or 2) to eventually revolt against such domination and to change the future by altering the present. Marx recognizes the centrality of mnemonics to genuine and irrevocable historical change, that is, to revolutionizing the social

anamnesia in which it must invent itself as a "deep" or "antique" and hence *legitimate* social form.

We can begin to see how nation itself is a fundamentally flawed mnemonic construct, one that is open to interpretation like any memory-text. As Ernest Renan puts it in "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?," a lecture delivered at the Sorbonne in 1882: "Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation . . . the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things" (11). If this is hardly news, it is nonetheless an important characteristic of modern nations, which can be read as the product, the effect, of the selective remembering and wilful forgetting of the past, of the agglomeration of specific kinds of "social capital," as Renan observes: "Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute [the] soul or spiritual principle [of the nation]: One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage one has received in an undivided form" (19).

The perpetuation of the past in an *undivided form* is the impossible dream of social cohesion that, as a Bertrand Russell suggests, predates philosophy as we know it and that has occupied Western thinkers since the development of the earliest forms of (Greek) civilization. It also lurks deep in most forms of racism, ethnocentrism, and fundamentalism. As Russell contends in *The History of Western Philosophy*, the pendulum of social formation travels between "those who wished to tighten social bonds" and "those who wished to relax them":

Social cohesion is a necessity, and mankind has never yet succeeded in enforcing cohesion by merely rational arguments. Every community is exposed to two opposite dangers; ossification through too much discipline and reverence for tradition, on the one hand; on the other hand, dissolution, or subjection to foreign conquest, through the growth of an individualism and personal independence that makes co-operation impossible. (21-21)

Russell does not use the terminology himself here, but my interpretation of his argument reads memory and forgetting, tradition and revolution, as the temporal and epistemological poles in-between which the social must perpetually align itself. Such a mnemonic economy and its paradoxical "ties" continues to operate, we can say, by "gripping" the cultural imagination, by holding citizens in "an inherent tension," to adapt the words of the Haitian historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot, between trying, on the one hand, to "escape" history and, on the other hand, to "overdose" on it (*Silencing the Past* xviii).

This is good way to think through an "official" commemoration such as the Bicentenary; it is also a good way to think of the mnemonic economy of the modern nation, "'containing' thresholds of meaning that must be crossed, erased, and translated in the process of cultural production" (Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* 4), a claim that holds up especially well for the advent of the modern nation in Europe and its political and economic revolutions, its industrialization and urbanization, its memory crisis.¹¹ Certainly, the modern period was a period

relations of production and the modes of production.

¹¹ In the modern period, Europe witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented class, a poorly educated, displaced, unorganized, urban, and largely unemployed "social mass": Marx's proletariat, "Samuel Johnson's 'rabble,' Edmund Burke's 'swinish multitude,'" those, as Robert Hughes writes, "from whose discontents in the nineteenth century the English working class would shape itself" (*Fatal Shore* 19). As a result of changing economic and demographic conditions, a growing number of criminals filled the gaols of George III, the majority of which were property criminals. A common perception of this period is that this group comprised a professional class of thieves and criminals. As Patrick Colquhoun claimed in his *Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis* (1797), "there were 115,000 people living off crime in the city—about one Londoner in eight, which constituted a 'criminal class' in itself" (qtd. in Hughes 24). Whether or not this claim is accurate is not a question I can treat here; what I want to point out though is that the new anxiety about order manifested by the growing propertied classes generated a new sense of

of social transformation in which cultural memory was put under what seemed to be unprecedented pressure. As Anderson puts it in his study of the emergence and quasi-religious function of nations and nationalism: "All profound changes in consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias. Out of such oblivions, in specific historical circumstances, spring narratives" (204).

In an essay entitled "The National Longing for Form," Timothy Brennan makes the claim that it is the novel which especially coincides with the rise of European nationalism and the confinement of its "other" enacted by imperialism. Similar arguments have been made by other critics—including Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Firdous Azim—but perhaps Ian Watt makes it most influentially in *The Rise of the Novel*: "The novel is in nothing so characteristic of our culture as in the way that it reflects this characteristic orientation of modern thought" (22), a sense of modern time which foregrounds mutability, duration, individuality and reason, which explores "temporal flux" (23), and which, finally, corresponds to a new, more "mechanical" sense of duration and history. I have traced some of the linkages between this "mechanical" (or I would say secular) model of temporality and memory in Section One; Terdiman, for example, makes a similar claim in *Present Past* when he declares that novels are "exercises in the process of memory" (*Present Past* 25). With its links to emplotment and historiography, to the development of a (secular and bourgeois) reading public and temporality, and to the newspaper, it is the novel, especially in the nineteenth century, "that most organizes itself as a projection of the memory function and its disruptions" by exploring the "past's disjunction from the present" (*Present Past* 25).

I want to think, in this section, of novels as *lieux de mémoire*,¹² as material representations and acts of cultural expression, but not in the essentialist and nostalgic way that that Pierre Nora uses this term to denote places where "memory crystallizes and secretes itself" ("Between Memory and History" 7); rather, I want to read novels as "places" or social modes of

criminality: in the most general terms, the ways that a society defines its criminals signifies what its central concerns and values are, what its perception of itself and of social order is. As the criminologist and doctor of forensic medicine at Lyons Andre Lacassange puts it: "societies have the criminals they deserve" (qtd. in Leps 33). The advent of Peel's police force in 1829, the shifting perception and application of law itself—including the commutation of formerly capital offences—and the cessation of the transportation of criminals to the American Colonies, contributed to a chronic shortage of jails in eighteenth-century England. One interim response to this was the use of old transports and men-o'-war as temporary holding pens or "Hulks" for the burgeoning "criminal class" legislated as statute "16 Geo. III, c.43" or the "Hulks Act" (Hughes, *The Fatal Shore* 41). A more "permanent" solution was to transport these felons to Australia for the terms of seven years or *their natural lives*.

¹² Nora's category of *lieux de mémoire*, which is derived from Halbwachs' Durkheimian model, replaces what he calls *milieux de mémoire*, which Nora sees as the authentic or lived location or "real environments of memory" (7) found in pre-writing and pre-archival societies. These modes of memory are authentic because they are oral and collective. I do not view memory in such a way. As Frow reasons, Nora's mnemonics is romantic and untenable; "it is not a useful tool for conceptualizing the social organization of memory; it provides no mechanism for identifying its 'technological' underpinnings; and it cannot account for the materiality of signs and of the representational forms by which memory is structured" (*Time and Commodity Culture* 223-24). Nora locates memory as if it were in "sacred" places: he describes it in the religious language of "piety, of ritual, and of the relation to ancestors"; in terms of "immediacy," "plentitude," and "presence"; as "organic and holistic," "auratic," and as "plural and concrete" (220-21); and he "evokes a continuity of passage between the living and the dead" (223). Cultural memory, as I see it, does the opposite: it is a category that explains how memory *is* material and how the past is discontinuously re-presented—negotiated—in the present. I like Nora's term for locating memory in a site or place (textual surface) but reject the nostalgia and phonocentrism that ascribes value or meaning to an "authentic" past in opposition to a debased present. Memory, I think, is always a troubling and profoundly ambivalent secular category and "present" event.

organizing cultural memory—literally, as a cultural intertexts, as places where signs are inscribed and where we can observe the relational social “frames” of memory at work, “where memories converge, condense, conflict, and define relationships between past, present, and future” (Starn 3). I have already said that both of the novels I consider in this section “remember” the penal-colonial past—its racist, sexist, economic, and epistemological amnesias.¹³ *Illywhacker*, however, focuses most directly upon the convict past of Australia, a country which, a Robert Hughes notes in *The Fatal Shore*, was “settled as the jail of infinite space” (596). Of course, historians do not agree on the original motivations for establishing this jail, much less on the moral character of the jail’s first white inhabitants, an ambivalence¹⁴ that is well documented in Gillian Whitlock and Gail Reekie’s anthology *Uncertain Beginnings*, most notably in Stephen Garton’s excellent summary “The Convict Origins Debate.” Garton points out that debates about Australia’s convict origins have often tended to ignore

the social meaning of criminal activity . . . The neglect of criminological theory by Australian historians suggests that understanding crime has only been of secondary importance to the convict origins debate. There seems little doubt that assessments of the morality of the convicts have been more integrally tied to debates about Australian national character than crime, influencing historians to turn their attention to uncovering the “true” nature of white Australia’s convict forebears. (51-2)

“Convict novels,” to say the least, have explored the “morality” of the convict past and its linkages to national character in romantic and nationalist (historicist) terms. For example, Laurie Hergenhan writes that

Perhaps the main evidence of continuity offered by [convict novels] is the persistent faith that Australia has a “usable past,” not simply a nationalistic one, but one inviting continued imaginative exploration as a way of defining the present. . . . convict fiction has played a major part in sustaining a dialogue between the past and the present by showing that for Australians the past is not something that exists only abroad but is part of the dynamic of history in which we all share. (*Unnatural Lives* xv)

In contrast, and in less “continuous” terms, Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra argue in *Dark Side of the Dream* that the foundation of the modern Australian state is itself laid upon a “schizoid consciousness” (xvii) produced by an amnesiac and “unjust act of an imperial power whose direct beneficiaries have still not acknowledged that injustice nor succeeded in constructing a viable alternative basis for their legitimacy” (x). This unjust act is compounded by Australia’s history as a penal colony: “Australia was founded upon a double guilt: the dispossession of the Aboriginal people and the excessive punishment of large numbers of British and Irish people, mainly from the poorer classes, for crimes against the property of the ruling class” (117).

Hodge and Mishra contend that this “ignominious” past has produced a fractured or schizophrenic¹⁵ Australian consciousness that undercuts Australian national identity, and that this

¹⁴ Consider the following exchange in the New South Wales Parliament, 1902. A Mr. Dacey inquired whether or not the Colonial Secretary of the time who was editing the public records of New South Wales has the power to “suppress whatever he deems right?” A Mr. John See answers Dacey that he does not know of such emendation, but he will “cause enquiries to be made.” He has heard, however, about Sir John Robertson, his predecessor, who “ordered the destruction of a lot of old records” in the 1870s. A Mr. Fitzpatrick contributes: “He made a great mistake.” Mr. See replies: “I do not think he did. I do not think that the sins of the father should be visited upon the children. I do not think that the children of the men who were sent to this country, perhaps, for taking a halter or a lolly out of an old lady’s lolly shop, should be branded as the descendants of felons for all time” (Legislative Assembly, New South Wales, *Votes and Proceedings* 6 (1901): 946; cited by Barry Anderson)

¹⁵ In *Dark Side of the Dream*, Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra claim that Australia is a “schizoid nation,” that the (white) Australian mind is the product of a schizophrenic or double form of consciousness, following the classical terms proposed by Gregory Bateson in his *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. Hodge and

"major social meaning will occur with massive redundancy throughout particular texts, and across different genres and media" (xvii). Underlying the split Australian "self," Hodge and Mishra assert, is an "acute anxiety at the core of the national self-image, and an obsession with the issue of legitimacy" (x). This fissure runs through Australian consciousness and forms of community: "To no small degree the chains of hebephrenia that still bind many Australians are held together by a wilful refusal to acknowledge the injustices inflicted upon aboriginal people in the past and the present, and to recognize the legitimacy of their aspirations" (218). Both *Illywhacker* and *Remembering Babylon* repeat this major social meaning. *Illywhacker* locates it in an Australian family of patriot salesmen to whom fear and guilt (not to mention *illegitimacy*) are facts of life. Of course, Carey's Australians go to great lengths to cover up their fear and the fundamental instability that they embody as Australians, in the same way that he lies and boasts about his own property crimes. *Remembering Babylon* locates it in a colonial settlement which "experiences" its distance from Europe and its proximity to Australian Aborigines as deep-seated fears. Both novel connect the present to the past in different ways—both are different "places" of memory, but the pathology each reveals must be recognized as a kind of mnemonic perturbation, as an (schizophrenic) consciousness shaped by what Hodge and Mishra have called white Australia's "double" guilt and what we might call white Australia's "double" fear.¹⁶

The past can preoccupy writers of any era or geographic location, not least writers from a settler-invasion society such as Australia, which was first "settled" by Europeans as a penal colony in the late-eighteenth century and which thus lacks a "long" or continuous past and the claims to continuity, legitimacy, or stability. At the risk of conflating personal and national identity, we can say that one result of such a perceived colonial *instability*, such a sense of *illegitimacy*, as many critics of Australian cultural politics have recognized, is a kind of protracted, continent-sized identity crisis, a good deal of which I think is experienced as mnemonic anxiety. Following the work of John Plamenatz, Alan Lawson explains that questions of national identity are questions about how to "preserve," "enhance," "transform," or even "create" cultural identity when that identity is threatened or lacking. Thus the problem of "national identity," for Lawson, is a "structural, colonial one," but also a narrative and mnemonic one:

'Who am I when I am transported?' is an inevitable colonial question and in countries where the climate, the landscape and the native inhabitants did little to foster any sense of continuity, where the sense of distance, both within and without was so great, the feeling that a new definition of self—metaphysical, historical, cultural, linguistic and

Mishra argue that this pathology is concealed by "the Australian stereotype of the feckless, simple-minded inhabitant of what Donald Horne in 1964 ironically called 'the lucky country.' But this stereotype is itself part of the symptomology of the schizoid nation. Bateson refers to two kinds of schizophrenic, the paranoiac who is deeply suspicious of everything and sees hidden messages behind every event and every text, and the hebephrenic who relentlessly ignores anything but the most overt and literal meaning. The 'typical Australian' is an hebephrenic construct, but he is the product of a paranoiac vision . . . the so-called 'typical Australian, and the 'typical' space he occupies, the Australian Bush, or 'outback', [is] a Caucasian adult male, an itinerant rural worker of no fixed address. His values and forms of language and thought are widely claimed to represent Australian authenticity, as a touchstone of Australian identity. . . . One of the paradoxes of this character . . . is the fact that neither his character nor his setting is or has been 'typical' in any useful sense" (xv).

¹⁶ This "double" fear of the "present past" brings to mind Nietzsche's anatomy of cruelty and fear, that pain is a powerful mnemonic. In *Illywhacker*, the narrator is especially patriotic and fearful. In an open letter to Woodrow Wilson, Bertrand Russell comments that The First War has brought out the worst in the community of Europe: "Fear," he writes, "has invaded men's inmost being, and with fear comes the ferocity that always attends it" (*Autobiography* 251).

social—was needed, was, and is, overwhelmingly persuasive. ("The Discovery of Nationality" 168)

The need for a "new definition of self" and "continuity" that Lawson identifies signals a gap between colonial "image and experience," between "here" and "there" (168) but also, I think, between "now" and "then"—a perceived disjunction that *unsettles* cultural identity: "When the cultural identity in question is that of a people transported to a new and strange place, the physical environment assumes unexpected importance and the language undergoes great strain" (169).

Literary texts, I will argue, register this cultural strain, and it is at the nexus of literature and culture, as some critics suggest, that we find the clearest demonstration of how memory operates in and is organized by culture—how culture *is* memory. Consider Yuri Lotman's thesis that culture is a social phenomenon that can be "understood as the *nonhereditary memory of the community*, a memory expressing itself in a system of constraints and prescription . . . insofar as culture is memory, or, in other words, a record in the memory of what the community has experienced, it is, of necessity, connected to *past* historical experience" (213-14). For Lotman, the question of culture as memory immediately raises the

question about the system of semiotic rules by which human life experience is changed into culture: these rule can, in their own turn, be treated as a program. The very existence of culture implies the construction of a system, of some rules for translating direct experience into text. In order for any historical event to be placed in a specific category, it must be identified with a specific element in the language of the organization which is committing it to memory. Then it has to be evaluated according to all the hierarchic ties of that language. This means that it will be recorded; that is, it will become an element of the text of memory, an element of culture. (214)

Lotman's pioneering work on "cultural semiotics" is based upon the idea that "culture appears as a system of signs" (211) and that "languages are inseparable from culture" (212). I have argued in very similar terms in the previous pages that memory and language possess a common semiological mechanism, that *inscription* is fundamentally involved in how we know and think, in how we remember and forget. In "actual functioning," Lotman reasons,

language is molded into a more general system of culture and, together with it, constitutes a complex whole. The fundamental "task" of culture . . . is in structurally organizing the world around man. Culture is the generator of structuredness, and in this way it creates a social sphere around man which, like the biosphere, makes life possible: that is, not organic life but social life. (213)

For Lotman, the notion that culture is a mechanism for "organizing and preserving information in the consciousness of a community" raises two problems: first, the "longevity of texts"; second, the longevity of the code of the collective memory" (215). Since I want to think about the novel as a (post-colonial) intertext, let us set aside the latter for now and most carefully examine the former. In contrast to the "longevity of the code of collective memory," which is "determined by the permanence of its basic structural principles and by its inner dynamism" (215), the "longevity of texts," Lotman argues, "forms a hierarchy within the culture, one usually identified with the hierarchy of values. The texts considered most valuable are those of a maximum longevity" (215). This is a form of the question of canon formation, and a good example of how the social organizes memory: in—and as—intertexts; in—and as—what gets read. Cary Nelson raises the questions of canon formation as a question of cultural mnemonics in *Repression and Recovery*. He argues that canon formation organized the "longevity" of modern American poetry: "The process by which poets like [the famous modern Americans Robert Frost, William Carlos Williams, Wallace Stevens, Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot] are elevated and others marginalized or forgotten is increasingly being questioned and challenged; in part, it has come to be regarded as immensely biased and repressive" (8). This process of selection and repression is a process of cultural memory, of cultural inscription, of "fixing" meanings in time; as Lotman points out, this process works "by fixing certain events which are translatable into elements of the

text and forgetting others, marked as nonessential. In this sense every text furthers not only the remembering process, but forgetting as well" (216).

But culture, Lotman continues, "by its very essence is against forgetting. It overcomes forgetting, turning it into one of the mechanisms of memory" (216). If we pause, momentarily, to think back to the early mythological conceptions of memory and the underworld, as well as to Simonides' art of memory, we can see, once again, the recurrent motif or theme of memory against death or oblivion, of memory against meaninglessness. In *Memory and Literature*, Renate Lachmann argues that it is this very urge to remember against the entropic flow of information toward oblivion that causes cultural groups to form passionate attachments to the past, to "unconsciously" accept received ideologies or cultural narratives, as well as the social forms or "imaginary" communities they bind together, as if they were matters of life and death. As Iser explains, death is equivocated with forgetting and remembering is understood to be "the resurrection of what has irrevocably perished, which, however, can only be resuscitated through the presence of what it is not: an image, a cipher, a sign. Wrestling from obliteration whatever has concerned human beings makes memory into a realm of shades, in which the void of death has been overcome" (Iser xii).

In such a conception, a culture's memory indeed operates as its signs—its signs of life and of death, of value and of meaning-making. In this model, memory's purchase is that cultural space in-between life and death, in-between perception and oblivion, in-between the individual and the group; and this space, I will argue, is as *interstitial* as it is *intertextual*. Of course, some critics might argue that Lotman and Lachmann overstate their case: that memory in the modern period, as Nietzsche and Terdiman have shown, became a pathological cultural preoccupation, a charge that we have already dealt with in our discussion of modern, and postmodern epistemology and ontology, not to mention aesthetics. In this view, as I have already suggested, we can read the problem of the past and of the entropic flows of memory in the "new" nineteenth-century discourses of historicism and of psychoanalysis—Marx and Freud. In less elevated terms, we might look at this a "new" ways to think the past in the present, to see memory as an ambivalent social and psychological process or system: at once creative and destructive, liberating and constricting. As Lachmann continues, "a culture attempts either to synthesize the divergent memory games of semiotic communities that constitute it or, in antagonistic cultures, to eliminate certain memory games" (23). We are close, here, to the configuration of power and knowledge that always cuts through the discourse of cultural memory—through the sign system of the social. What is clear is that memory matters, that its function is ambivalent and indeterminate, as powerful as it is invisible.

A theory of cultural memory such as the one I want to understand in this dissertation is concerned with the present of past things or events. What is perhaps most innovative about such a theory is the idea that both theory and literature are fundamentally mnemonic, and that the cultural frames in which they exist can be studied as systems that organize signs. If memory operates within the expansive field of culture, where we can study its (textual) traces, its matrices of signification, its functions, its effects, and if we can observe its inclusions and exclusions of certain "memory games" (let us call them "rules" or "truths") we can begin to see how a theory of cultural memory will help us to *read* the past in the present. The various mnemonic operations and cultural technologies I have listed in this dissertation, then, operate as a specific social locations or organizations of memory in which the past is reconstructed and recollected *in the present* and *on the level of culture*. Most interesting for my present purpose is the relation between memory and culture that organizes around the cultural production and circulation of literary texts—the "multifarious interrelations" (Iser xiii) between memory and literary texts or what Renate Lachmann calls "the interplay between script and image" or "decipherable signs" or *intertextuality* (*Memory and Literature* 9).

The principle of intertextuality reflects the basic premises of post-structural theory and its critique of metaphysics, essence, and phonocentrism; as Arthur C. Danto puts it, albeit

pejoratively, this is the view that "literary utterances never refer to the world . . . but only to other utterances which it may require considerable erudition and ingenuity to track down" (*Embodied Meanings* 32). This view of the word as dialogic, as situated sign, holds that "every text is a rewriting of earlier texts, but a re-writing in different ways. In a palimpsest a new text is written over an old one which it erases" (Priessnitz 16). Using mechanisms that we have traced to the wax tablet (inscription, trace, palimpsest, erasure), intertextuality operates as a (cultural) memory machine: "each word (text) is an intersection of word [sic] (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read . . . any text is the absorption and transformation of another" (Kristeva 37). This model the principle of (re-)inscription from the classical model of the wax tablet—the primary scene of semiosis, the textual surface upon which the inscriptive nature of our memories is modeled and upon which writing occurs. As Lachmann continues, "It is as if the world writes itself into itself. In doing so, it appears as the bearer of a memory that can only be transmitted by means of matter—but the world appears, once again, to be dematerialized in the process" (3). This paradoxical semiological economy is governed by rules that "indicate the ways of marking" and that "govern the "semantic relationships between that which is to be remembered (the signified) and its image (the signifier)" (5). Thus a "culture ensures its own survival" (4); as Lachmann writes: "Just as the wax tablet, understood in mnemotechnical terms, conceptualizes memory as inner writing and supports the fiction of a mnemotechnical architecture," so the cultural frame which surround language and memory—especially its literary intertexts—acts as "culture against death" (5). We saw this in the Simonedes story: intertexts act as the mechanisms by which cultures remember the past and in doing so "restore a cultural order in which the destroyed [or pre-existent] culture acquires meaning. The orders of conservation and of safekeeping replace the [chaotic] orders of life: mourning replaces feasting" (8). Culture, as Wolfgang Iser suggests, "rests on and arises out of memory, which makes what has passed loop into culture's continual emergence" (xii).

The idea of intertextuality¹⁷ as a theory about the "making of texts" (Lachmann 36) or the *permutation of texts* (especially as developed by Julia Kristeva through the work of Mikhail Bakhtin) involves the mnemonic processes of selection and combination (Lachmann 36) or a "making literature from literature, that is, writing as continuation, writing as rejoinder, or rewriting" (37). For Lachmann, the theory of intertextuality must be traced back to Bakhtin's work on language as dialogic:

Insofar as Bakhtin situates the text in a dialogic relationship with the other text and sees the semantic friction that results from this context as taking place in the text itself, he presupposes a double movement for the text. The text arises from the act of crossing its own borders and at the same time from the movement back into its own domain in which it unfolds the dialogic experience with these other text, so to speak. Such a back-and-forth movement is of course not the object of any textual description but can only be realized properly in a (comprehending) process of reading. (38)

As Bakhtin explains,

Each word (each sign) of the text exceeds its own boundaries. Any understanding is a correlation of a given text with other texts. . . . The text lives only by coming into contact with another text (with context). Only at the point of this contact between texts does a light flash, illuminating both the posterior and the anterior, joining a given text to a dialogue. (qtd in Lachmann 39)

Lachmann further develops the contextual semiology of intertextuality as a theory of

¹⁷ Hutcheon defines intertextuality as follows: "intertextuality replaces the challenged author-text relationship with one between reader and text, one that situates the locus of textual meaning within the history of discourse itself. A literary work can no longer be considered original; if it were, it could have no meaning for its reader. It is only as part of prior discourses that any text derives meaning and significance" (*Poetics of Postmodernism* 126).

cultural mnemonics. "Intertextuality," she writes,

demonstrates the process by which a culture continually rewrites and retranscribes itself, where "culture" is a book culture, a semiotic culture, constantly redefining itself through its signs. Writing is both an act of memory and a new interpretation of (book) culture. Every concrete text, as a sketched-out memory space, connotes the macrospace of memory that either represents a culture or appears as that culture. (16)

I am especially interested in the idea that cultural that the space between texts, not unlike, perhaps, the synaptic space between two neural transmitters and even the aporetic space between the signifier and the signified, is what Lachmann calls the "space of memory" (15). A poetics of intertextuality, which we have only glanced at here in the most cursory way, seems to structurally and symbolically repeat the very model of brain chemistry that contemporary researchers use to explain the dynamic and plastic functions of the brain not to mention the semiotic mechanism that generates meaning in language. I cannot press this curious similarity much further here, but I want to suggest that, following Lachmann, "the space between texts . . . [is] the authentic space of memory" (15). As Lachmann asks,

Does not every text also alter that memory space, by altering the architecture in which it inscribes itself? The space between texts and the space within texts that develops in the experience of intertextual space produce a tension between the extratextual and intertextual and the intratextual that must be endured by the reader [the space of non-meaning or oblivion]. The space of memory is inscribed in a text in the same way that a text inscribes itself in a memory space. The memory of a text is its intertextuality. (15)

In this light, literature is not a representation of cultural memory; rather, it "enacts the operations of memory, thus opening up a means of access to observing how and perhaps even why culture comes about" (Iser xiii). Culture, from this perspective, becomes a looping, "cybernetically operating structure" (Iser xi) *not* an organic collective nor rarified sphere in which the best of what been thought, said, and remembered is recorded. Literature becomes, as Lachmann writes,

the mnemonic art par excellence. Literature supplies the memory for a culture and records such a memory. It is itself an act of memory. Literature inscribes itself in a memory space made up of texts, and it sketches out a memory space into which earlier texts are gradually absorbed and transformed. Texts represent an exteriorized and materialized memory—that is, memory that has been materialized in manifest signs, in "exterior" writing. (15)

In this view, memory is circumscribed by culture; the mnemonic aspects of subjective and social identity formation are performed and inscribed in-between the present and the past, in-between the perpetual flow of information from the social to oblivion. The straining to identify that we read about earlier becomes the subject of culture, of memory; it is, I think, one reason why we read and write—into and against "cultural death" or the apparent "meaninglessness" of the always already past present. To project my argument into the next two chapters, I will say that we can understand some of the importance of literary writing to the field of post-colonial studies, then, as a post-colonial manifestation of the so-called "memory crisis." That is, the settler-invaders in the two novels I read in the next two chapters experience the "insecurity of their culture's involvement with the past, the perturbation of the link to their own inheritance . . . a sense that their past had somehow evaded memory, that recollection had ceased to integrate consciousness. In this memory crisis the very coherence of time and of subjectivity seemed disarticulated (Terdiman, *Present Past* 3-4). The "massive disruption of traditional forms of memory" and thus the "functioning of memory itself" (5) that Terdiman recognizes in France can thus be cautiously translated to the Southern Hemisphere and to the event of the penal-colonization of Australia by European settler-invaders. Of course, Australia's experience of modernity has been much different than Europe's, but this is not our present subject. Rather, we are concerned in this section with the complex mnemonics involved in the settlement of "white" Australia, and the ways that a *disintegrated* and *uneasy* amnesiac consciousness can be traced to

Australia's penal-colonial past via two novels. Like most settler-invader societies, Australia has a lot to forget. And a lot to remember.

Chapter Three
§
Carceral Architecture and Cultural Amnesia
in
Peter Carey's Illywhacker

"No one," Pascal once said, "dies so poor that he does not leave something behind." Surely it is the same with memories too—although these do not always find an heir.

Walter Benjamin
"The Storyteller"

Architecture is said to have been the "privileged domain" for theorizing the postmodern. Its enduring materials and shaped spaces unavoidably "reinstat[e] a "dialogue" with the past," with the "social and ideological context in which architecture is (and has been) produced and lived in" (23), as Linda Hutcheon puts it in A Poetics of Postmodernism. In Peter Carey's Illywhacker, the past persists most obviously on the inscribed surfaces or in the built space of the prison. In this chapter I want to read the built space and "social and ideological context" of architecture in Carey's novel as kind of architectural mnemonic: one that, for some, obfuscates and obliterates the past but that, for others, forces a remembering of the penal-colonial past and its *troubling* persistence into the post-colonial present. The architecture in question is really a *series* of prisons that function as homes for Herbert Badgery, the narrator, and his family; it eventually houses other "typical" Australians. This domestication of the carceral and of Australia's disciplinary past is curious enough in its own right, and we will carefully study the relationship of built space to memory in what follows, beginning with the phenomenological thesis of Gaston Bachelard that the spaces we inhabit structure our thoughts and perceptions and literally "house" our memories—they inhabit us as much as we inhabit them. But in Illywhacker Carey opens out such an exploration of domestic space to include the spaces and discourses of capitalism, nationalism, and tourism. What is perhaps most striking about Illywhacker, and what interests me most in my reading of cultural memory and architecture, is the insight that Australia's carceral architecture produces and preserves memories of a disciplinary past that has so effectively "constrained" personal and national identity in the post-colonial present that Carey's fictional characters seem to enjoy being prisoners. My reading, then, to roughly summarize my argument in this chapter, links memory to the carceral, to capitalist exchange, to debates about national identity, and to tourism. The carceral, as Michel Foucault has shown, cannot be separated from the emergence of capitalist forms of exchange, and as Gillian Whitlock has argued, it possesses substantial and determinant connections to colonialism; tourism, as Graeme Huggan notes, has "its roots in

colonialism" (172), and it obsessively seeks out "cultural origins" (176) and the "Culturally Authentic" (169). By tracing this genealogy in Carey's novel, by testing the novel's architecture as a mode of cultural memory, a particularly critical portrait begins to emerge of the cultural mnemonics of Australia. This is especially the case, I will argue, since the social function of architecture in Carey's fictional world ultimately *fails* to produce "new" or meaningful national narratives in the present; at one level, it does little more than recirculate outmoded images from the past for consumption by international tourists. The Australians in Carey's novel are prisoners: typical and simulacral images (or types) from the penal-colonial past that "sell" well in the era of late capitalism.

In both Australia and Canada, as Whitlock has observed, the disciplinary knowledges and military power that organized British colonies has left a distinct architectural legacy. In "The Carceral Archipelago": Marcus Clarke's *His Natural Life* and John Richardson's *Wacousta*, Whitlock argues that colonists in literature often counteract the threat of what was perceived to be unorganized, *uncivilized* space around themselves by building. This is especially the case, as Whitlock notes, in settler-invader cultures where early architecture functioned as structures of *defense*—monuments to not only the ambition and dreams of the settler-invaders, but also to their anxieties and fears. Whitlock suggests that colonial architecture responded to the "formless" and "empty" spaces of the unsettled colony by importing from Europe a familiar architecture which articulated a "tyrannical ideal of order and precision" (51). In such colonial architecture—and particularly the penal-colony in Australia and the garrison in Canada—an "idea of authoritarian control is worked out in buildings and in relationship to surrounding space" (51) to such a degree that, as Whitlock writes, "the carceral cell has been perceived as a defining characteristic of the national literature" (51).

This defining literary characteristic—the carceral as authoritarian and orderly—is, in one sense, the point of departure for this chapter. As I will explain more fully below, architectural structures such as homes, commercial buildings, and monuments can be read¹ as effects—as representations or signs—of the power relations that order a society: they generate, store, and transfer meaning across generations, and instruct us on how to live in the private and public spaces which we construct for ourselves. It is in this sense that I want to consider the way that Carey uses the built space of the prison in *Illywhacker* to demonstrate how aspects of an *unforgettable* disciplinary power associated with Australia's penal-colonial past have persisted into the post-colonial present in that country; or, in slightly different terms, I propose to think through the ways that certain "uses" of the past have persisted in the cultural history of Australia and how this cultural amnesia produces distinct subjective and social formations. My argument is

¹ In *The Great Museum*, Donald Horne argues that the "rhetoric of monuments" (4) can be read as records of "European power and imagination and the re-presentation, through its monuments, of Europe's history" (4). Given Australia's ambivalent but inexorable bonds to Europe, Horne's rhetoric is not out of place in his own "lucky" country, where it works just as well as a strategy to read the rhetoric of Australian monuments. Consider, for example, the Shrine of Remembrance at Melbourne: at once a pyramid, a ziggurat, a European cathedral, and a hallowed tomb, The Shrine commemorates the landing and slaughter of Australians at Gallipoli on April 25, 1915 and stands as a "manifestation of the people's grief" (cited by Rickard 125); "Anzac Day" itself is a more "schizophrenic" event—at once a solemn commemoration and a boozy celebration (White, *Inventing* 136) that marks a kind of cultural "coming of age" or "racial" proving up in which Australian soldiers or "diggers," known for their self-sacrifice, "resourcefulness, independence, and egalitarianism" (Rickard 125) were transformed in the cultural memory of Australia and, ostensibly, in the eyes of the world, "from larrikins[s] to dead hero[es]" (McQueen 82). The (Nietzschean) solemnity and "religious" aspect of this place of nation-making or national narration has stayed in my memory since my visit to Melbourne in 1995; two things strike me most: the "ark" containing the names of the sacrificed soldiers in the lowest room of the Shrine; the recessed flagstone in the plaza that leads up to the Shrine upon which is inscribed: "Greater Love Hath No Man."

that architecture functions in Carey's novel as a cultural mnemonic, a kind of counter-discursive social practice, if you will, that we can use to *read against* Badgery's amnesiac and authoritarian autobiographical narrative. Counter-discourses,² as Richard Terdiman writes in *Discourse/Counter-Discourse*, function as discursive systems by which "writers and artists sought to project an alternative, liberating *newness* against the absorptive capacity of . . . established discourse" (13). In Carey's novel, built space—and it is worth noting here that Badgery is also a self-styled architect-builder—contradicts the absorptive (and absolutionist) claims of Badgery's "dominant discourse," his curiously, and problematically patriarchal and patriotic narration—the 600 page "confessional" novel we read as *Illywhacker*. Living with, and within, carceral architecture, Carey's contemporary Australians reconcile past and present differently: some, like Herbert Badgery, the novel's 139 year old narrator, go to great lengths to continue to forget the past, most obviously by "lying"; others, however, insist that it is time to remember the past, and the present, in "new" ways.

I am suggesting, then, that *Illywhacker* is a novelistic record of an Australian memory disturbance—one in which convicts and capitalists play inter-connected roles. As such, Carey's novel "disarticulates" a mnemonic anxiety, to use Terdiman's word, a concern with the past that at least for some of Carey's Australians has reached a critical level. Of course, Badgery, as we shall see, is not one of them: he ends up comfortably imprisoned in his family's monumental³ "Best Pet Shop in the World" on Pitt Street in Sydney, a towering edifice of cages that eventually confines and displays not only Badgery and his family but all sorts of other Australian *Homo Sapiens*. As Carolyn Bliss has noted, "Within the Pet Shop, Australian tradition, folklore, and popular history are captured, reified, and offered for evaluative response" (49). Bliss correctly notices the "staged" and commodified nature of the Pet Shop, including the way that images from the past are recycled as grist for the international tourist mill. But Bliss goes on to suggest in her essay, patriating Harold Bloom's "revisioning" tactics, that life is like poetry and that "the strong among us [like Badgery, like Carey, I presume] must misprize and thereby free ourselves of our pasts in order to clear imaginative space for a present which is truly our own and our masterpiece" (53). This rather slack version of Nietzsche's revolutionary but *balanced* forgetting, or for that matter of Oscar Wilde's decadent aesthetics, leaves us cold, however, not least because the idea of each of us "creating" a masterpiece and of "owning" the present (note the metaphysical and capitalist connotations) invokes precisely the ideas of origin, authenticity, and property ownership that *Illywhacker* interrogates. But it also fails to see how every forgetting is also a selective remembering. Bliss's "misprison" is thus not the same as the amnesia advocated

² In his study of symbolic resistance in nineteenth-century France, Terdiman defines "discourse" as the complexes of signs and practices which organize social existence and social reproduction. In their structured, material persistence, discourses are what give differential substance to membership in a social group or class or formation, which mediate an internal sense of belonging, and outward sense of otherness" (*Discourse/Counter-Discourse* 54).

³ Etymologically, "monument" is derived from the Latin *monere*, to remind, connoting "anything enduring that serves to commemorate or make celebrated, esp. a structure or a building" (OED). I see the Badgery family "Best Pet Shop in the World" as an architectural manifestation of the *monumental* lie. Nietzsche's category of "monumental" history, which we touched on in the Introduction, is based upon the fundamental idea that the past is both static and a mirror: "the great moments in the struggle of the human individual constitute a chain, that this chain unites mankind across the millennia like a range of human mountain peaks, that the summit of such a long-ago moment shall be for me still living, bright and great" ("Uses" 68).

by such diverse thinkers as Nietzsche or Wilde or even Themistocles.⁴ Rather, it is of a piece with manipulations of memory that, as Badgery demonstrates, belie a totalitarian fantasy in which political and economic injustices can be effaced in the name of autonomous textuality and imperial power. Of course, there is a fine line between the world and the text, and I do not claim the wisdom—much less desire—to draw it here or there. But it seems clear to me that Carey's fiction does not "ask us to undertake such a programme" (Bliss 53) as much as show us its strengths and limitations, its delusory mnemonic economy; Badgery's narration, after all, must be considered ironic insofar as it reveals to us, especially when read against the counter-discourse of architecture, the difficult and in-between—complicitous and duplicitous—position that remembering and forgetting puts us in as interpreters and readers.

This irony, it must be said, is lost in Bliss's argument, as it is in our salesman-narrator's life-story; Badgery refuses to see how his life has been shaped by Australia's carceral past and its no less restrictive economic present, even though he liberally chastises his countrymen and women for being perpetual prisoners. What is at stake here is indeed *freedom*: in his own extravagant way, Badgery spends a great deal of energy in his life avoiding the constraints of daily life and embracing instead the apparently unlimited potential or "freedom" of fantasy-based and imperialist, racist and sexist "lies." But the proliferation of "hateful" disciplinary values and techniques that are embodied in the carceral architecture of the novel and symbolized—satirized—in the Pet Shop tell another story. Instead of generating freedom, the spaces of *Illywhacker* narrow, they become increasingly confining as the narrative proceeds, culminating, of course, in the Pet Shop itself—an analog for Australia's international identity. This carceral unconscious is most strongly felt in *Illywhacker* within two social formations: the family and nation, both of which in Carey's novel—as in most of his fiction—tend to be repressive structures organized by an exploitative and disciplinary power and controlled by tyrannical patriarchs that can be traced back to the penal-colonial settlement of Australia as well as to what Humphrey McQueen, in a different context, has called "the acquisitive values of capitalism" (*A New Britannia* 4). Badgery, who brags that he is a typical Australian Liar, not to mention a self-styled architect and author, is first and foremost a salesman whose life has been thoroughly conscripted by the twin values of the prison and the market. Life, for Badgery, as we shall see, has been reduced to a series of business deals—what he calls "schemes"—the first principle of which, as he confesses, is "*caveat emptor*" (11).

Buyer beware, indeed. All aspects of Badgery's character—but especially his responsibilities as a father and his role as an author—are subordinated to this disciplinary and capitalist credo, and we are well advised not to nod off as we navigate Badgery's text. For in *Illywhacker* the people Badgery writes about—including his family members—are predominantly prisoners, and the dominant form of community that these cultural emblems⁵ have *imagined* for themselves is a prison, one that eventually becomes an international tourist trap. Most of the Australians in the novel, like Badgery, simply choose to ignore this disturbing fact, even if they have to lie to themselves to do so. It is as if Badgery and the Australians like him cannot remember any other mode of being-in-the-world except as typical prisoners, a mnemonic pathology that takes on metaphysical proportions and that ultimately turns the space of Australia into a perpetual, exhibitionary jail. It is this pathology and its representation in Carey's novel, and particularly the mnemonic element of "the lie" as a form of cultural self-deception, that I am

⁴The Athenian democratic and naval strategist Themistocles (528-462 BC) is said to have "refused to learn the art of memory" saying that "he preferred the science of forgetting to that of remembering" (Yates 32).

⁵I thank Brian Edwards for this insightful concept; his encouraging correspondence on 9 November 1995 on the subject of *Illywhacker* was greatly appreciated.

concerned with here. Recognizing that cultural memory is implicated in both what we know and how we know, in how we have lived and how we will live, we begin to see how the sort of amnesiac "freedom" established at personal and national levels in the novel is not only specious but in fact profoundly restrictive. "No memory is possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections" (43), the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs writes in On Collective Memory, noting that these mnemonic frames or "commandments" (50) are present-day structures of constraint to which we often unwittingly consent: "in our present society we occupy a definite position and are subject to the constraints that go with it, memory gives us the illusion of living in the midst of groups which do not imprison us, which impose themselves upon us only so far and so long as we accept them" (50).

Halbwachs' theory of "collective memory," as I have already shown, is "rooted in a social context" (Coser 23), but it stops short of recognizing memory's social frames as culture itself, as the sign system of the social. In Illywhacker, the deceptive social frames or "mobility and constraint" (Greenblatt 225) within which the Australians live and remember are predominately *disciplinary*, and they can be (architecturally) linked to the development of modern disciplinary power in Australia, that is, to the history of convict transportation but even more importantly to imperialism and its concomitant dissemination of capitalism around the globe, to what Aijaz Ahmad, in his In Theory, has called the "global triumph of imperialism" (21). The Pet Shop, after all, is an architectural monument to the stages of capitalism, especially to late-capitalism and its amnesiac, shall we say *narcotic*, cultural logic; by using the architectural space of the prison to exhibit contemporary Australians who uncritically embrace such disciplinary and capitalist values, Carey fictionally anatomizes Australian national identity: one that is an amalgam of lies, schemes, self-imprisonment, and futility. As M. D. Fletcher puts it, economic domination by British, American, and then Asian corporate interests form a sort of "economic history" (16) of dependency in the novel, one that has infected all aspects of cultural production and that demonstrates, I think, a perpetual colonization that the majority of Carey's Australians have been unable to escape, or forget.

A novel in the form of a fictional autobiography, Illywhacker is a sprawling family history from the "Australian bush saga tradition" (Turner, "Nationalising the Author" 135) that chronicles the life of an unreliable, picaresque narrator, Herbert Badgery, and his dysfunctional family. Badgery's textual motivation appears at first to be confessional, just as his life-long ambition appears to be to a monomaniacal insistence upon making a "place in this rotten lonely world" (489). Simple enough. But both of these agendas are specious. Badgery, I will argue, writes to "con" or convince his readers that he is indeed a "kind man" (600), just as he builds homes in which he confines the people around him. Badgery's deceptive archi/textual constructions are simply not what they appear to be: they are well-wrought *lies*, narrative cages in which Badgery confines his collected Australians. Within this carceral context, Carey poses larger questions about cultural identity: what does it mean to be Australian? how do Australians live with the present past? To briefly anticipate my argument, at one point the narrator has begun to renovate his son's Pet Shop, exposing bricks that were manufactured by convicts at Brickfields in the nineteenth century. These bricks literally embody the past: *inscribed* in them are the thumbprints of the convicts who manufactured them. "How do you reckon that affects you?" (542) Badgery inquires of his son, asking, in effect, how Australians live *with* their disciplinary heritage. Of course, Badgery provides no answer to what appears to be a rhetorical question; ironically, at this point, he is a prisoner in a cage in a country which was "settled as the jail of infinite space" (Hughes 596).

I will return to this key moment of architectural inscription, of the memory-trace, and of national deconstruction shortly, when I deal with Badgery's place-making and the cultural

implications of his carceral architecture. Here, I want to turn my attention to what "the lie"⁶ as a form of cultural amnesia, one without which it is impossible to understand Carey's use of the prison.

Badgery's unwillingness to see how he and the people he collects in his homes are prisoners is a symptom of a cultural politics of deception. Early in *Illywhacker*, Badgery warns his readers: "I am a terrible liar and I have always been a liar. I say that early on to set things straight. *Caveat emptor*. . . lying is my main subject, my specialty, my skill" (11). Having unburdened himself thus, Badgery tells us—if we believe him—that he was 33 years old in November 1919,⁷ but more importantly that as an author/autobiographer he has finally found a new and acceptable use for his lying: writing. Not only does writing allow him to satisfy one of his vainest desires—"being written up has been one of my weaknesses" (11)—it supposedly cuts him loose from his past. As he puts it, "I have not always been proud of my activities. But now I feel no more ashamed of my lies than my farts" (11).

Coming clean, as it were, the self-styled narrator proceeds to relate his life-story, "bamboozling" (541) his readers with his flatulent poetics and his convoluted and deceptive confessional narrative, which conceals as much as it reveals, which is as boastful as it is incriminating. Yet Badgery, as Carey has noted in an interview, was not always a master dissembler. As he worked on Book I, Carey avers:

I was sitting in the doctor's office one day waiting, and I suddenly thought, "Damn it, I'll make him a liar." So I wrote what's pretty much the opening of the book sitting in the doctor's waiting-room. That meant I could have the first person, I could have the third person, I could have whatever voice I wanted, because he was a liar. But also by then I had established him as a confidence man, and I was starting to deal with what I regarded

⁶ Helen Daniels considers the "Australian New novel" to be the "home" of the Liar: "it possesses a prismatic play of mind, ludic and absurdist, a fabric of hazard, paradox, contradiction, instability. . . objects, things are surfaces behind which there is an absurd or fantastic reality. . . In the Australian New novel, character has not yet lost its place of honour, though the space it occupies is the subject of territorial dispute. . ." (*Liar* 21). Daniel suggests that the Australian New novel is more of a piece with South American fiction than with the French *nouveau roman*. It is, however, the words of an American, Mark Twain, that Carey has chosen as one of the epigraphs for *Illywhacker*: Australian history "does not read like history, but like the most beautiful lies; all of a fresh new sort. . . It is full of surprises and adventures, the incongruities, and contradictions, and incredibilities; but they are all true, they all happened" (*More Tramps Abroad*). For more in-depth discussions of "the lie" see notes 8-12 below. For a sense of how important "the lie" is to the formation of social groups see Nietzsche's "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," in which Nietzsche outlines the delusory use of the "necessary lie" as an origin myth and traces it back to Plato: the children in the first generation of a new society, Nietzsche explains, should be "taught that they had all formerly dwelt asleep under the earth, where they had been kneaded into shape by nature's workman. Impossible to rebel against a past of this sort. Impossible to go against the work of the gods!" (118-19).

⁷ If Badgery's figures can be trusted—and they probably can't—he was born in 1886 (*Illywhacker* 12) and is 139 years old at the time of narration, which, according to events in the narrative that coincide with historical dates, would be the year 2025 AD. But the novel's chronology is, in one way, a trap: it tempts readers to assign a chronological order to the novel, to make the text adhere to the time—and space—of the "real" world. One critic who takes the bait, I think, is Anthony Hassall: in *Dancing on Hot Macadam*, his study of Carey's fiction, Hassall assumes that Badgery is 139 years old in 1985, the year that *Illywhacker* was published (*Dancing* 82-3). Hassall conflates the publication of Carey's novel with the writing—the time of narration—of Badgery's life-story or, in other words, confuses the author with the narrator. The point is admittedly puny; however, it highlights the necessarily active and arbitrary role that the reader must play in self-reflexive texts—assigning meaning, inventing interpretations, constructing order.

as lies we have been told in history about Australia, the lies we've told ourselves. These different aspects of lying all really arrived in a big tangle, if you like, all at once. (Tautsky 32)

If we are convinced by this epiphanic moment, Carey's decision to recast his narrator as a liar served two related purposes: first, by including metafictional elements⁸ in his text, Carey foregrounds the arbitrary status of narrative truth or falsehood and challenges traditional expectations and reading strategies in confessional novels;⁹ second, and most important for our purposes, by exploiting the artifice of the Lie¹⁰ and the inescapable logic of Epimenides' Liar Paradox ("All Cretans are Liars"¹¹) Carey establishes mnemonic linkages between the penal-

⁸ In Linda Hutcheon's words, a metafiction is "concerned with its status as fiction, narrative, or language" ("Postmodernism" 612), it "includes within itself a commentary on its own narrative and/or linguistic identity" (*Narcissistic Narrative* 1). Such a novel, in Robert Alter's words, is a "self-conscious novel," one that "systematically flaunts its own condition of artifice and that by doing so probes into the problematic relationship between real-seeming artifice and reality" (*Partial Magic* x). It is important to point out, however, that it is Carey, not Badgery, who is concerned with the theoretical status of the text. In fact, most of the narrative's self-reflexivity or metafictional examination of the story-telling process occurs, simply put, over Badgery's head, a point of potential confusion since Badgery's text is ostensibly autobiographical. Hutcheon describes postmodern fiction in the novel genre as "historiographic metafiction": "those well-known and popular novels which are both intensely self-reflexive and yet paradoxically lay claim to historical events and personages" (*Poetics of Postmodernism* 5). Historiographic metafiction is inherently contradictory, it subverts and abuses the very literary conventions it employs, and through its "theoretical self-awareness of history and fiction as human constructs . . . is made the grounds for its rethinking and reworking of the forms and contents of the past" (5).

⁹ Shirley Neuman recognizes the linkages between confessional autobiographical narratives and social discipline in the West. One of the aims of confession, she writes, "whether practised in the church or by means of one of its avatars in childrearing, tutoring, or medical consultation . . . is to manage the body, to make it conform with public and cultural values" (Neuman 138). The aim of Badgery's confession, I maintain, is to make his textual body conform with public and cultural values, even if Badgery has to manipulate his audience to do so.

¹⁰ Helen Daniel considers *Illywhacker* a metafiction: "*Illywhacker*," she writes in *Liars*, "is a play on truth, fiction, lies . . . [it] is about the calibrations of the Lie and so about the calibrations of truth" (167-8). As such, it is what she calls a "new" novel: The New novel is working along new salients—which is not an isolated literary phenomenon, but part of the change in ideas about the relationship between man and the universe, related to general intellectual movements in science and metaphysics, as well as in art, film and theatre." In the New novel, Daniel writes, "the centre of gravity is outside the self, in time and space and in the field-relations among things, in the laws of large numbers and in the incoherence of things. This shift in the centre of gravity represents a change in the old notion of man as a self-determining being at the centre of things, a notion which is premised on a logic of cause and effect. . . . The logic of fiction has changed. Instead of the principles of integrity and unity, within which movement and dynamics take place, the New novel has a logic of contradiction and antagonism, of the dynamic contraries of experience that can cope with uncertainties, inconsistencies, double premises, paradoxes" (15). Curiously, I think, Badgery is trying to write a traditional, "self-determining" text, a novel in which he is quite literally, at the centre of things. For more sophisticated treatments of *Illywhacker* as a metafiction see also Brian Edwards, "Deceptive Constructions" in *Australia and New Zealand Studies in Canada* 4 (1990): 39-56; or Wenche Ommundsen, "Narrative Navel Gazing" in *Southern Review* 22 (1989): 264-74.

¹¹ Readers of *Illywhacker* are, in one sense, trapped in an inescapable logical loop, commonly known as Epimenides' Paradox, or the Liar Paradox. It states: "All Cretans are Liars." As Robert Wilson notes in "Theory as Template: The New Australian Novel," a review of Helen Daniels' *Liars*, "the paradox should be attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, a Megarean philosopher who is said to have been the teacher of Demosthenes. Epimenides, a character, is Eubulides' creation" (173). The paradox, quite simply, presents the inevitable self-referentiality or "recursive self-reference" inherent in systems (Wilson 161).

colonial past and the post-colonial present: the "lies we have been told in history about Australia, the lies we've told ourselves." If it is difficult to collect evidence to support these claims, it is because Badgery has billed himself as a honest liar, making it all but impossible to know when to trust—or mistrust—his narration. Even more troubling is the fact that there is no escape from his narrative trap, a point that Badgery would rather conceal. In fact, Badgery exploits the logical aporia inherent in the oxymoronic representation of himself as an "honest liar" in order to avoid what I will call the (domestic) responsibilities that come along with his claims of being a patriot, a salesman, a father, and an author. By using the deceptive characteristics and tangled logic of a textual "Strange Loop,"¹² Badgery attempts to divert attention from his past and his dissembled life-story at the same time that he wants to entrap and control his readers. The larger purpose of his narrative, though, is to authorize a convincing self-transformation: an amnesiac process, I will argue, that Carey establishes as an analog to the transformative national lies and motivated cultural forgettings of Australian history.

I have already noted, following Ernest Renan, that modern nations have a lot to forget, and this is especially the case for nations in which settler-invaders "dispossessed and overwhelmed the Indigenous populations" (Ashcroft et al, *The Empire Writes Back* 25) they displaced by means of systematic racism, genocide, ruthless territorial acquisition, and economic exploitation. When we add to this ignoble history what has been called the "convict stain,"¹³ it is

Boiled down, the paradox can be seen as a "one-step Strange Loop" that, according to Douglas Hofstadter, can be demonstrated by the statement "I am lying" that, however stated, "rudely violates the usually assumed dichotomy of statements into true and false, because if you tentatively think it is true, then it immediately backfires on you and makes you think it is false. But once you've decided it is false, a similar backfiring returns you to the idea that it must be true" (*Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid* 17). This sort of "loopiness" in human thinking, as Hofstadter implies, is inescapable. Wilson, however, refutes Daniels' treatment of the theory of "new" novels because of its "lexical slackness" (168), its "conflation of story-content with narrative technique," (169), its isolation and myopia, its conception of "reality," but especially because of its "uncertain handling of the Liar's paradox" which, as he writes, "illustrates a continuing problem throughout *Liams*: the shift from comments upon text (its conventions and other purely textual features) to comments upon the fictional world it evokes, and thence to comments upon the actual, extra-textual world. The argument displays a large amount of tangledness, but no hierarchy" (163). Perhaps the most clear-eyed critic of epistemological self-deception is, once again, Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche writes: It is only by means of forgetfulness that man can ever reach the point of fancying himself to possess a 'truth' . . . Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions" ("On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense" 890-91).

¹² In *Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid* Douglas Hofstadter argues that the "Strange Loop" or "Tangled Hierarchy" represents a temporal conflict between finity and infinity, the sort of thing that the Dutch artist M. C. Escher graphically represents in his work. As Hofstadter writes: "Implicit in the concept of Strange Loops is the concept of infinity, since what else is a loop but a way of representing an endless process in a finite way? (15). The "Strange Loop phenomenon occurs whenever, by moving upwards (or downwards) through the levels of some hierarchical system, we unexpectedly find ourselves right back where we started" (10). In one sense, Badgery is wrestling in his text with the problem of finity and infinity, with life and death, with self-inscription and oblivion, and we can think of remembering and forgetting as two central foci in this discursive loop.

¹³ In *The Fatal Shore*, Robert Hughes notes that the "idea of a 'convict stain,' a moral blot soaked into [Australia's] fabric dominated all argument about Australian selfhood by the 1840s and was the main rhetorical figure used in the movement to abolish transportation" (xi); the legacy of the convicts, Hughes suggests, did not so much bequeath to Australian national character a "sturdy, skeptical independence" but instead "an intense concern with social and political respectability" (xi) that can be read as a kind of cultural anxiety. The biological notion of a "convict stain" or the fear "that the British stock might have degenerated in Australia" (Hirst 217) is linked to ideas of Social Darwinism, or the "misapplication of Darwin's ideas" to theories of social order so as to justify "ruthless competition, between individuals,

not hard to see that Australian national identity is founded upon substantial fault lines. Put another way, Australia has a great deal to forget in its past, a point that Robert Hughes confirms in *The Fatal Shore*, in which he seeks to unearth "the voices of the convicts themselves" (xiv), when he suggests that a "desire to forget about [Australia's] felon origins" (xi) has shaped a national consciousness so thoroughly that "amnesia seemed to be a condition of patriotism" (xii), a "national pact of silence" (xii). Although *The Fatal Shore* has been criticized for an overly simplistic view of the convicts as victims (Hergenhan, *Unnatural Lives* xiii; Carroll, "Australian Foundation" 181-92), Hughes's assessment of the patriotic amnesia of Australian cultural history is revealing. Such an "obsessive cultural enterprise," Hughes writes, aimed to "forget [the convict past] entirely, to sublimate it, to drive it down into unconsulted recesses" (596). Perhaps this is not surprising, given the stigma attached to the production of social deviance¹⁴ in the West at the end of the eighteenth century, or for that matter the no-less indelible "stain" that marks modern criminals. At least, we can begin to understand some of Badgery's behaviour with this information: Badgery, who is quick to brag about his patriotism, and even quicker to lie, has a lot to forget about in his past, a lot to "drive down" into "unconsulted recesses." For Badgery, the lie is a technology of forgetting.

In one view, Badgery comes by this tendency to dissemble *honestly*. One of the cultural by-products of this Australian "quest for oblivion" (597), as Hughes explains, was a "defensive optimism" based upon "a longing for amnesia. And Australians embarked on this quest with go-getting energy. They wanted to forget that their forefathers had ever been, or even rubbed shoulders with, government men; and, before long, they succeeded" (597). The desire to forget the "government men"—a euphemism for convicts—betrays an implicit and typically nineteenth-century fear of genetic and social contagion, a legacy that Australians, at least until the 1960s,

classes, nations, and races" (White, *Inventing Australia* 69), which suited the expansion of Empire, the pseudo-scientific justification of genocide, as well as the nationalist notions of racial and social purity based upon fear of colonialism's "other" and of the "degeneracy" implicit in the production of criminality or deviance. A familiar (literary) proponent of the idea of biological degeneracy is Charles Dickens' Pip, the hero of *Great Expectations* (1860-61). Pip is ironically re-invented as a gentleman by the capital of the transported convict Magwitch; Pip aspires to gentility and embodies a widely held view of his time that the criminal was a degenerate and an inferior. When Magwitch returns to London and it is revealed that he is Pip's anonymous benefactor, Pip cannot help but recoil. He sees in Magwitch "that from head to foot there was convict in the very grain of the man" (361). Pip, of course, refuses to remember his own lowly beginnings and grainy defects. See also Edward Said's treatment of Dickens' text as a paradigm or fable of how nineteenth-century imperialism used culture as a "protective enclosure" (*Culture and Imperialism* xiv-xvi). Carey's 1997 novel *Jack Maggs* reverses this pattern, insofar as the Australian convict Maggs remembers his criminal past in London.

¹⁴ In *Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of Deviance in Nineteenth-Century Discourse*, Marie-Christine Leps considers the history of criminology and the work of criminologist Cesare Lombroso, the Italian psychiatrist and prison doctor who published *L'Uomo delinquente* (1876). Leps writes of Lombroso: "he described the criminal as an atavistic throwback to prehistoric man. This theory, originally sparked by the discovery of an enlarged middle occipital fossa and an overdeveloped vermis in the skulls of 383 criminals, was elaborated through various means, including batteries of anatomical, physiological, psychological, intellectual, and moral tests, the development of analogical correlations with the vegetable and animal worlds, historical studies of the evolution of crime and punishment, as well as ethnological, linguistic, and social studies measuring certain groups for their relative proneness to criminality. The end result was the production of the *born-criminal type*, characterized by a set of hereditary physical, intellectual, and moral stigmata impervious to any kind of reform: Lombroso believed that the discovery of this type in criminals should lead either to execution or to permanent seclusion from society. . . . there was wide consensus among medical doctors, government, prison, and police officials, sanitation experts, and philanthropists as to the existence of a separate kind of criminal beings, a primitive, degenerate, and immoral race which needed to be controlled and segregated from the rest of the community" (30-35).

generally tried to forget.¹⁵ Of course, the success of such selective remembering is questionable; in fact, it could be argued that the penal-colonial past has never been, nor could it ever be, wholly forgotten in Australia, that recent rememberings of it such as those invoked in the Bicentenary, and certainly in novels like *Illywhacker*, show just how "varied and numerous" (Whitlock and Reekie 1) depictions of the past, from a post-colonial perspective, can and must be. So, not unlike Patrick White's 1976 novel *A Fringe of Leaves*, which fictionally re-locates aspects of Judeo-Christian mythology in the antipodes in the nineteenth century at the same time that it re-evaluates the roles not only of women in the European settlement of Australia but also of convicts and Australian Aborigines, *Illywhacker* destabilizes the originary "lies" of Australian history by acknowledging the complex power relations and the amnesiac cultural processes that authorized European settlement in Australia in the first place, and the subsequent "displacements" of post-colonial guilt that have occurred in the name of Australian national identity. "I shall remember" (*Fringe* 293) says Ellen Roxburgh, the shipwrecked Welsh heroine of White's novel, to Jack Chance, the escaped convict who has guided her through the bush to the edge of the settlement, promising to remember his assistance and, we can presume, the assistance that she has received from Australian Aborigines.

But no sooner is Ellen rescued and the "onslaught by the present on accumulated memory" (303) begins. Ellen's reintegration, we learn, will require a certain amount of forgetting. It is precisely this sort of colonial (and eventually national) amnesia that Carey explores in *Illywhacker*, most obviously through the architecture of the prison but also in the moral and narrative implications and imbrications of "the lie" and of history. Pontificating about the lies of Australian history, Badgery cites the work of the so-called historian "M. V. Anderson":

'Our forefathers were all great liars. They lied about the lands they selected and the cattle they owned. They lied about their backgrounds and the parentage of their wives. However it was the first lie that is the most impressive for being so *monumental*, i.e., that the continent, at the time of first settlement, was said to be occupied but not cultivated and by that *simple device* they were able to give the legal owners short shrift and, when they objected, to use the musket or poison flour, and to do so with a clear conscience. It is in the context of this great foundation stone that we must begin our study of Australian history' (456, emphasis added).

A simple device. And an effective one, I think, for controlling national narrative, for writing not only the convicts but also Australian Aborigines out of Australian history. This, we can say, is the double "white" lie upon which Australia has been built, and to which, Carey suggests, all subsequent "nationalist" lies—and liars, like Badgery—must be linked. As Anderson's comments

¹⁵ "It was not until after the Second World War that Australians could speak levelly and without shame about the convict origins of their country. Now [1983] people are pleased to find a convict ancestor" (Hirst 217). By the time of Australia's Bicentenary, a half-decade later, Australia's convict past was a lucrative fund of positive images for exporting around the world and for luring in international tourist dollars, although, as Hirst points out, "our emancipation is not yet complete. More often than not, our understanding of convict society is still based upon the assumptions of its enemies" (217). At a critical level, Hughes notes that "From the 1960s onward, when Australian historians—inspired, though slowly at first, by Manning Clark's *History of Australia* and L. L. Robson's *The Convict Settlers of Australia* (1965)—began to draw the [Convict Transportation] System out of folklore and into the light of inquiry, they focused on the majority of convicts: those in assignment, not those on Norfolk Island. It was from them, not from the double-damned incorrigibles, that one could learn the actual workings of colonial society, the often-exotic ways in which convicts claimed rights and functioned as a class in relation to the free The book that best conveys this, and has rightly become a landmark in recent studies of the System is J. B. Hirst's *Convict Society and its Enemies* (1983)" (xiv). Carey's novel, as well as this chapter, are not so much concerned with the Convict Transportation System, per se, as with the contemporary effects or cultural legacy of the System—the way that the system has been "unsuccessfully" forgotten.

make clear, "the lie" is a form of cultural amnesia that has been used to transform the ground upon which "white" Australia is built into a suitably empty space, to sustain a stable sense of national identity and a clear national conscience.¹⁶

I shall have more to say about deceptive buildings and "empty" spaces shortly. What interests me here are the ways that the "monumental lie" is built into Australian history, and that this kind of amnesiac cultural identity—lies built upon a repression of remembrance—has ultimately (or for this thesis, architecturally) *failed*: it does not absolve Badgery and his countrymen and women of their pasts, as Badgery seems to think it does, nor does it provide answers to the question "What does it mean to be an Australian?" that do not in some way or another recycle typical images of prisons and prisoners. Despite its inventive energy, "the lie" has failed as a form of forgetting that would simply erase the "truths" of penal-colonization and social injustice from Australian cultural memory. Badgery, though, continues to brag about his lying: "It was no trouble to lie," Badgery writes, "I always lied about snakes. I always lied about women. It was a habit. I did it, in both cases, charmingly. I was so enthusiastic that I could convince myself in half a sentence" (27).

Or in 600 pages, we could add, which is the length of his *magnum opus*, but even then the job is at best unconvincing. We are left wondering what, precisely, Badgery and his countrymen and women have to hide? Quite a lot, it turns out, and we will deal with some of these "truths" in a moment. For now, it is Badgery's propensity for convincing self-deception—his *habitus* of the lie as both cultural practice and costume—that concerns us, especially the ways that "the lie" has been used *unsuccessfully* to forget the past. For undercutting the delusory "white lie" of Australian history are histories of actual imperial violence and systematic colonial repression, ones that Badgery and his compatriots have refused to acknowledge, but ones that nonetheless have uneasily persisted in the cultural memory of Australian settler-invaders.

Badgery learns to lie early in his life. First, from his tyrannical salesman-father, who lies to cover-up his mean origins. An "Imaginary Englishman" (38, 126), Badgery Sr. pretends that he and his family are not Australian. Badgery says of his father:

who I always imagined to be an Englishman, who made such a thing, as long as I knew him; of his Englishness, who never missed a chance to say, "I am an Englishman" or "as an Englishman" that I was surprised to find out he was born in York Street, Warrnambool, the son of a shopkeeper. Yet for all that, I must carry his lie for him. For he made himself into an English man and my first memory of him is being chastised for the way I spoke.

"Cahstle," he roared at me, "not kehstle." He did not like my accent. (38)

Nor does Badgery Sr. seem to like the Australians Aborigines who inhabit the countryside around him and who, it must be said, are in the process of being systematically displaced by European settler-invaders. In fact, Badgery Sr., "a man who saw threat everywhere . . . as cold to his children as he was charming to his customers" (39), makes his living traveling the country selling cannons to xenophobic European settlers. Badgery tells us little more than this about his father, except that he blames him for his mother's unexplained absence and for his own chronic placelessness and paranoia: "it was not much of a childhood," he reports, "moving as we did

¹⁶ In "Inscribing the Emptiness" Simon Ryan has noted that the seemingly innocent cartographic practices by which the imperial powers first signified their "new" territories were subtle lies. For Ryan, European cartographic practices *lied* about the lands they signified, emphasizing the epistemic violence as well as the actual violence of European settlement in Australia: "representing the unknown as a blank does not simply or innocently reflect gaps in European knowledge but actively erases (and legitimizes the erasure of) existing social and geo-cultural formations in preparation for the projection of and subsequent emplacement of a new order" (116).

through threatening visions of Russians, Lascars, Jews, Asiatics, Niggers and other threats to our safety" (39).

This paranoid, greedy, and racist legacy is visited upon Badgery, and perhaps we can forgive him some of his behaviour because of it: let us call it the Sins of the Father, a colonial inheritance from a bigot who capitalizes upon greed, manipulates his audience, and disseminates terror: "I have seen him," Badgery recalls of his father "at table with fat mayors and musclegutted squatters, laughing, telling jokes, playing them as sweetly as if they were his own violin, warming them up, getting their pores open before he hit them with the icy blast of fear that was his specialty" (39). It is not difficult to see the limits of this sort of vision, or for that matter how our narrator, too, will eventually become a specialist in fearful dissembling in order to cloak his own exploitative values and abusive character. The Badgery model of family, and community, we see, is subordinated to sacrosanct business deals and presided over by "Matilda," the Australian "Goddess of Fear."¹⁷

In this "Oedipal" conflict, Badgery claims to kill-off his abusive biological father, but not before he inherits his colonial and capitalist values, including the importance of "the lie" to a salesman, the "value" of racism and paranoia, and the priority of a customer to a child. His tutelage in deception is then continued by another fearful salesman-father: his Chinese foster father Goon Tse Ying, who, in the 1890s, sells produce in Melbourne to white Australians who fear and hate him because he is Chinese. Goon teaches Badgery many things, but, most importantly, he teaches him how to make himself invisible, an immigrant's trick Goon perfected to survive violent confrontations in the gold fields—at places like Hanging Rock (1852), Bendigo (1854), Buckland River (1857), or Lambing Flat (1861)—with bigoted Australians who thought "it was all their country, all their gold" and were willing to "Kill John Chinaman" (215) to prove it.

We can think of Badgery's birth-father as a representation of the ambivalent relationship of Australia to its British heritage in the nineteenth century, and Goon as a representation of the equally ambivalent relationship of "white" Australia to its (much closer) Pacific neighbours in the twentieth. From both of these "fearful" salesmen-fathers, our Australian Oedipus learns "the lie" as form of legitimation: he learns to give his customers the lies that they want to hear, hence his "salesman's sense of history" (343) and his equally deceptive poetics. Badgery comments, for example, upon the factory at Melbourne that he has conjured for Jack McGrath, with an eye to building an *Australian* aeroplane with McGrath's capital: "You call it a lie, I call it a gift" (34). The "generous" Badgery, of course, puts these life skills to use many times in his career—usually

¹⁷ Badgery prays to "Matilda" (*Illywhacker* 325) presumably to assist him in his illywhacking; his confession, here, comes on the heels of an argument with his lover, Leah Goldstein, about whom his daughter Sonia, who wants to learn how to "disappear," should pray to: she prays to Jesus but Badgery boasts that he prays to Matilda. The origin of the term "Matilda" is obscure, but it is a woman's name that has come to refer—in ironic and erotic terms—to "a swag," which at the level of English slang refers, in the early nineteenth century, to a thief's "booty" or "plunder"; by the mid- and late-nineteenth century "swag" refers one's "legitimate belongings," most likely "a pack carried by the traveller, usually some essential belongings rolled in a blanket" (Wilkes, *A Dictionary of Australian Colloquialisms*). Badgery, of course, is fittingly placeless, and we can draw some parallels between Badgery's life-story as an itinerant salesman and the story of the infamous and anonymous swagman of Banjo Paterson's famous poem: the "nationalist" frames in which both are set turn upon the question of property and involve theft and violent encounters with landholders and police. But there is also a potentially "carnavalesque" element in Australian culture where accepted social and family hierarchies are often overturned," write Dorothy Jones and Barry Andrews in *The New Penguin Literary History of Australia*, and in which we can observe an Australian reverence for larrikins like the swagman or Badgery, part of "our fertile tradition of admired outlaw figures" who defy the "forces of authority represented by squatters and troops" (66).

to sell Ford automobiles or to seduce women¹⁸—but the most noticeable result of this *marketed* life is that he learns to be a chameleon, to change his outward appearance in order to manipulate his “audience”: to give them what they want so that he can “take” what he wants from them.

A more distressing truth is that Badgery is too self-centred and vain, too avaricious and opportunistic (and often too violent) to be trusted—whether with a friend’s sixteen year-old daughter, a customer’s wife, a partner’s investment capital, or even his own children. Hidden beneath his pleasing chameleon salesman’s exterior lurk a multitude of flaws: an aggressive individualism, a pathological narcissism, a compulsive sense of sex-as-conquest, and a chronic sense of guilt and inferiority, not to mention a violent temper. In what appears to be a rare moment of self-recognition, Badgery confesses:

It was the trouble with the world that it would never permit me to be what I was. Everyone loved me when I appeared in a cloak, and swirled and laughed and told them lies. They applauded. They wanted my friendship. But when I took off my cloak they did not like me. They clucked their tongues and turned away. My friend Jack was my friend in all things but was repulsed by what I really was. I admired and loved him . . . but he could only like the bullshit version of me. (78).

Eventually, the transformations that Badgery achieves with his lies become permanent: Badgery becomes the “bullshit” version of himself that he projects. But this is an Australian “double hook”—a form of self-invention that is also a form of self-destruction, a kind of self-imprisonment in which Badgery willingly becomes a helpless and aged prisoner in his son’s Pet Shop. Once there, of course, he re-invents himself as an kindly author and enthusiastic patriot, as a “bullshit” artist who controls his dissembling text like a carnivorous spider or greedy gaoler.

Poets have been called liars since the time of Plato, so it is perhaps not surprising that Badgery decides, near the end of his life, to become an author. I am suspicious of Badgery’s lies, though, not so much because they are “copies” of copies but because they are deliberate and one-sided obfuscations and manipulations that might indeed be “beautiful” gifts but that, I think, must also be seen as attempts by Badgery to coerce his audience-victims into forgetting. After a life-time of having his seductive schemes and dreams of a owning property frustrated, Badgery feels he has no choice but to learn writing as a technique *par excellence* for accomplishing his schemes: for controlling the people around him, for orchestrating his carceral agenda, but, ultimately, for selling an image of himself. Penniless in his cage in the emporium, with no one left to impress, the deceptive salesman decides to solicit a new audience: “There was nothing left for me,” he writes, “but to teach myself to be an author. It was the only scheme left” (548).

This transition to authorial or textual deception occurs at the end of Badgery’s long life, but at the “beginning” of his narrative, and it is worth noting that it is in Rankin Downs prison that the once illiterate Badgery learns how to read and write, how to “immortalize” himself in language. But, once again, *caveat emptor*: the first principles of Badgery’s archi/textual aesthetic, like the touchstones of his business ethic, are cheat and steal, when necessary, and lie perpetually

¹⁸ For Badgery there is little, if any, difference between commercial and sexual economies, reflecting his inability to understand the complex social relations of human community in anything but the most crass and self-serving commercial terms. For example, here is Badgery’s record of his thoughts and actions on his way to sell a Ford to the impoverished O’Hagen family: “I wanted the O’Hagens to stay outside so I could have a chat with Mrs O’Hagen. It was because of Mrs. O’Hagen, I admit it now, that I was arriving early on this day. . . . I shifted the position of my balls in my underpants, adjusted a penis I imagined had a life of its own, and drove north towards the O’Hagens with my erect member pointing optimistically upwards” (62).

to ensure that no one will recognize his rather conventional "acquisitiveness." Such an ethic helps Badgery appear kind, sympathetic, and helpless, not to mention possessed of a clear conscience. But we should not be fooled by the cloak Badgery hides behind in order to manipulate people and to accomplish his schemes. For example, for most of his life Badgery is illiterate. He confesses: "until I was in my late fifties I could only recognize ten words in print and two of those made up my name. I was ashamed of it. The ingenuity and effort, the deception, the stories, the bullshit, the lies I used, just to persuade people to read me the paper aloud, all this was far harder work than learning to read" (12).

Eventually he learns not only how to read, but how to write. As an author, Badgery attempts to disperse himself into his text, but only because, I think, he believes that writing is a form of domination¹⁹ that will enable him to become omniscient and omnipotent, not to mention immortal. Badgery's retreat into a confessional text, then, must be seen as an act of *defence*, as the last ditch effort of a liar and a thief who takes refuge in the one place where he believes he has the last word: his narrative. Such a retreat is a complex event—variously motivated to say the least. In Badgery's case, it amounts to a shift of focus and energy from building the prison-like homes to his final transformation in his "own" textual cage (the novel *Illywhacker*), a cage in which he will eventually confine everyone who figures in his life-story, in which he believes he can con his readers into thinking that he has been a kind man. As an author, part of Badgery's agenda, I believe, is to invent a loveable image of himself. As he puts it on the last page of the novel, "I am, at last, the creature I have so long wished to become—a kind man" (600).

The truth, however limited our access to it is by Badgery's unreliable narration, is that when Badgery says that he has become kind, he is in fact almost dead. Badgery writes of himself in his cage: "I'm like some old squid decaying on the beach. They flinch when they look at me and they could not guess that there is anything inside my head but gruel, brain soup sloshing around in a basin. My voice is gone, so they could not know what changes have taken place in me: I may even, at last, have become almost kind" (12). I have my doubts about this claim: I read a *seemingly* harmless and disembodied Badgery who will say anything to convince us that his transformation is genuine, who is trying to confess himself into oblivion. Thus we would be wise to weigh the "kindness" of this Australian Scheherazade against a life-time of contradictory evidence, a trail of unkind acts and of carceral architecture that literally leads to Badgery's writing desk. Whatever else they do, Badgery's grandiose and patriotic lies fail to absolve him for a life-time of self-centred and often violent acts, in the same way that the lies of Australian history have failed to absolve contemporary Australia of its penal-colonial past. The five most important events that I think Badgery would like us to forget are: 1) his culpability in the "scheme" that results in Jack McGrath's death by snakebite (1919); 2) his negligence in the death of his young daughter Sonia in a mine shaft at Clunes (1934); 3) the blow to the head that partially deafens his son Charles (1934); 4) his attempted robbery and his assault of his foster

¹⁹ In many ways, Badgery's experience of writing is informed by the rather sobering observations made by Claude Lévi-Strauss upon the introduction of writing to the Nambikwara population recorded in *Tristes Tropiques*. For Lévi-Strauss, the appearance and subsequent use *and* corruption of writing is connected to the domination and exploitation of man, especially with the development of cities, of colonial empires, of slavery, and of architecture. As Lévi-Strauss notes, writing "seems to favour rather the exploitation than the enlightenment of mankind. This exploitation made it possible to assemble work people by the thousand and set them tasks that taxed them to the limits of their strength. . . . If my hypothesis is correct, the primary function of writing, as a means of communication, is to facilitate the enslavement of other human beings. The use of writing for disinterested ends, and with a view to satisfactions of the mind in the fields either of science or the arts, is a secondary result of its invention—and may even be no more than a way of reinforcing, justifying, dissimulating its primary function" (qtd. in Latimer 35).

father Goon Tse Ying, whose *Book of Dragons*, Badgery believes, possesses ancient Chinese business secrets (1937); 5) his implicit role in his son's suicide (1961). And if this is not enough to convince a jury to reasonably doubt Badgery's claim that "changes have taken place in me," both the Pet Shop and his text symbolize the kind of malignant kindness and misguided love—not to mention economic exploitation—we have come to expect from our petty tyrant.

Confession, of course, is an ambivalent mnemonic performance: as Terdiman writes, "Confession is a quintessential form of mnemonic performance," an "act of memory that seeks to neutralize memory: in confession one remembers in order to forget" (*Present Past* 76-77). As Badgery's "last words," *Illywhacker* is an attempt to expiate its author and to help him neutralize the unflattering parts of his past—to come clean at forensic and textual levels. Badgery confesses after the loss of his daughter:

I remember the case of Mrs. Chamberlain who was condemned for murder, almost certainly, because she did not show adequate grief for her lost child. She did not howl and pull out her hair in tufts. She was therefore universally derided as an unnatural mother and a monster.

I can only pray that my jury, unlike hers, possess imagination equal to their task, because I will not shriek and groan before you.

Instead, let me tell you:

It is alleged I hit my son and caused him lasting damage to the ear.

There was a funeral with no coffin.

At the funeral there was a small upset we need not dwell on. As a result of this upset my friend Nathan Schick drove me to Sunbury where he placed me in the care of doctors. Perhaps he imagined grief was medical. (361-2)

Perhaps Badgery imagines that forgiveness is primarily textual. The problem is that Badgery's recollected confession, even though it recalls events for which Badgery seems to be contrite, fails to convince us that he is genuinely interested in becoming a kind man, much less a penitent one. Instead, we see a man who cannot live with his past and who has conjured a textual habit behind which he can hide and thereby avoid acknowledging—or redressing—his culpability in any of the injustices he has committed in the name of his own self-promotion. Badgery, I think, has too often been unkind, and his retreat into a text can only be seen as a final gesture of control, an illywhacker's trick in which a narrator who refuses to die cloaks himself as an honest liar in order to annul his past—a paradoxical form of self-reference that readers quite simply can neither accept nor refute. Hence, he instructs his readerly "jury" not to look too far into his case, "not to waste your time with your red pen, to try to pull apart the strands of lies and truth, but to relax and enjoy the show" (11).

This metafictional advice is tempting: *Illywhacker* is quite a show. But we must be suspicious: what is it that Badgery does not want us to see? Two things, I think: 1) the unflattering aspects of his life that I have already listed; 2) the fact that, despite his grandiose efforts and omnipotent rhetoric, he remains a prisoner, trapped, as Anthony Hassall says, in the prisonhouse of his own fiction.

In *Dancing on Hot Macadam*, Hassall claims that in the Pet Shop Carey's Australians are portrayed as a nation of prisoners entrapped in self-imposed cages—what he calls "the prisonhouse of the fictions they create" (90). For Hassall, the Pet Shop becomes a "human zoo" (88),

the last and most graphic example of the linked prison and animal images which run throughout the book connecting the public imprisonment of the country with the private incarceration of its inhabitants in family and sexual narratives of loss and of love betrayed into hatred.

For all its humour, it is a bleak vision of a timid and fearful nation trapped in an untrue version of itself. (88).

It takes Badgery over a century to perfect this last "untrue" identity, although I am less certain than Hassall that there are such things as wholly "true" or "false" identities. Perhaps a better way to put this is to say that all identities are at once *both* true and false, and we are better off inquiring about the specific function and effects of them than we are inquiring about their essential or "true" natures. The important question, then, becomes how such "untrue" identities restrict Australian cultural identity and expression, how they uncritically repeat elements from the past that "entrap" contemporary Australian in the present. It is this deceptive and delusory carceral mindset that limits the forms of community these Australians can imagine for themselves. As Hassall recognizes,

Badgery is one of a long line of narrative protagonists who see themselves as alienated but still trapped within a brutal and oppressive power structure . . . *Illywhacker's* climactic image of Australia as a theme park, a colony of the Japanese tourist industry, brilliantly visualizes the bleak sense of powerlessness and imprisonment that continues to haunt the European Australian consciousness, and it offers little hope for a genuinely post-carceral and post-colonial future. (116)

Hassall's criticism is more or less accurate, except that the Pet Shop in my reading is, finally, a *hopeful* mnemonic structure—one reminds Australians that the ghosts, and the guilt, of the past cannot be dispatched simply by telling each other "beautiful lies"; there are "few things so dangerous," writes Ronald Wright in his study of Western historiography and European imperialism in Meso America, "as believing one's own lies" (*Stolen Continents* 8). At best, such a model of self- and social-deception produces deluded and "powerless," though contented, prisoners.

Of course, the figure of the convict is a compelling and enduring feature of Australian literature,²⁰ and one, I think, that has benefited greatly from "the lie." In *Dark Side of the Dream*, for example, Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra recognize convictism as a "potent metaphor" (142) within Australian literature that "allows forms from that past to function powerfully into the present" (137) as "schizogenic processes" that confirm racist and paranoid constructions of "white" Australian national identity. Similarly, Graeme Turner argues in *National Fictions* that the figure of the convict, patterns and images of imprisonment, and even a sense of carceral built

²⁰ The narrative representation of the convict body in early Australian convict novels has always been heavily over-determined, invested with melodrama, brutality, suffering, and all manner of markings and procedures: brands, wounds, scars from floggings, hangings, malnourishment, disease. From the point of view of literary studies, however, the figure of the innocent and brutalized convict, wrongly convicted and transported to Australia, does not coincide with the fact that less than ten per cent of the 163,000 or so transported convicts ever spent time at a secondary confinement facility—infamous places like Port Arthur, Sarah Island, or Norfolk Island. While there is no doubt that convict bodies were thoroughly, and often brutally, inscribed with the power of the sovereign and state, the imaginative impact of this inscription persists at a level that is incommensurate with historical records: "On the entire subject of convictism," Brian Elliott writes, "imagination, not knowledge, determined what people thought. . . . The convict of fiction is clearly a lie" (117). Lie or not, when the veneer of morality is scraped off of the convict legend—which holds, quite simply, that the convict was a good-hearted, long-suffering victim of a brutal and unjust (British) regime—its discursive circulation as a national narrative shows that it is upon the body of the criminal subject that the state marks its power: negatively defining itself and rationalizing capitalist modes of production: "the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; . . . its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection . . . the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body" (Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 26).

space in Australian narrative project images of a powerless and defeated *national* selfhood, one that marks an Australian habit of presumed inferiority which "negates the value of individual action and legitimates powerlessness and subjection" (9-10). For Turner, "powerlessness" (65) is at the core of such a "consoling cultural mythology" (74), a "politics of subordination" (143) that naturalizes an uncritical remembering which creates "a position that undermines the individual's prospect of playing any active, individualized role within society" (82). "The concern," he writes,

tends to be more often with denial than with the possibility of social change. The resistance to social change and its implication for a sense of personal political powerlessness . . . has undoubted ideological consequences, encouraging conservatism and an unquestioning acquiescence in existing social conditions. Such acquiescence in the present is the subject of Gramsci's theory of hegemony—his description of the ways in which a subjected people can be persuaded to assent to their own domination. (82-3)

It is certainly true that Herbert Badgery is the first to condemn such passive behaviour in his "defeated" countrymen and women, even if, at the same time, Badgery proudly denies the ways that he, too, has assented to his own domination. Perhaps the worst effect of such a "politics of subordination," though, is the cultural "reluctance to enquire too closely into the structures, the experience, of life itself" (83). Such a "carceral" or "convict narcosis," translated to the level of cultural identity, produces a sense of subjection and guilt in Australian narrative, a "don't-show-me" mentality, that "proposes the futility of individual action against the status quo" (84). Images of imprisonment, of exile, and of alienated individuals, for Turner, are dangerous because they are amnesiac, because they come to seem "natural" or

productive metaphors for Australian existence. As reproductions of an ideological positioning of the individual within Australian society they are accurate dramatisations of the way in which a politics of survival and acceptance manages to win the assent of the culture—posing as the 'natural' structure of existence within an Australian context. (84).

Turner recognizes such familiar images of "isolation, entrapment, and the failure of community" (139) in most of Carey's fiction, and points out that Carey is usually working at "stripping" away the varnish of power that would make such imprisonment—such unnatural lives—seem natural. It is this ironic dimension of the *Pet Shop*, I think, that Carey uses to critique Australian identity politics; in the final stage of the *Pet Shop*'s development, we see how it is a house of lies in which Badgery has collected contemporary prisoners who love their fates, who accept their Australianness as if it were an "alibi for impotence" (Turner, *National* 143-4).

The conditions and history of this impotence are obviously too great to be treated in this already lengthy chapter, and Badgery, with his remarkable "dick . . . as scabby and scaly as a horse's" (*Illywhacker* 11) would no doubt be offended by even the mention of the word; it is this "Australian" impotence and its determination of his own life that I think Badgery the prisoner most wants to forget.

As a prisoner, Badgery is a late twentieth-century "reminder" of the spectacle of brutalized, tortured, and diseased bodies of convicts in early Australian fiction, the most memorable examples being Rufus Dawes in *His Natural Life* or the eponymous hero of *Ralph Rashleigh*. Dawes and Rashleigh are unforgettable "types" of fictional convicts because they are "innocent and manly"²¹ victims who suffer at the hands of brutal colonial administrators and depraved convicts alike, but who, in the end, are inherently resilient and resourceful. Remaking himself as such a romantic prisoner-victim is a soft sell for Badgery: he exploits an enduring national fascination with, and fear of, the figure of the victimized convict that, as Laurie

²¹ Humphrey McQueen cites G. A. Wood's 1922 comment in his revised *A New Britannica* (129). McQueen does not provide bibliographic information about Wood's text, but Laurie Hergenhan in *Unnatural Lives*, citing George Rudé's *Protest and Punishment*, documents Wood's article entitled "Convict" as follows: *Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society* 8 (1922): 177-208.

Hergenhan writes in *Unnatural Lives*, has developed into a powerful and "continuing preoccupation in literature and the popular arts with convictism as a time of great communal suffering which was somehow survived" (173).

But the conditions of this survival as martyrs or victims do not accurately reflect the settlement-invasion of "white" Australia; rather, they function as a kind of cultural amnesia—"lies" that have been transposed into an origin myth, into a rich fund of "typical" Australian images in literary texts²² and later on in touristic representations²³ that underwrite the development of the "national type": an amalgam of physical, racial, moral, and psychological characteristics that evolved in the nineteenth century and were influential in the writing of Australian history and literature at least until the 1950s (White, *Inventing* 64). But something has gone wrong in Badgery's case: the seductive—and destructive—logic of "the lie" cannot conceal the fact that instead of being powerless, Badgery is, in one sense, most powerful—most dangerous and deceptive—when he plays the part of being a helpless old "model" prisoner. For example, when he is incarcerated in the much-feared Grafton Gaol in 1937, for assaulting his foster father Goon, Badgery boasts of his ability to convince the warden to transfer him:

I spent no more than one soft month in Grafton during which time I made myself into a nice old man. I shuffled and tottered and you would not recognize the fellow who came cycling up from Nambucca a week before so cocky about his life . . . Oh, you would not believe what a brown nose I was, a smiling snivelling wretch of a thing. I bent my spine and let my dentures clack when I smiled.

I got my transfer. (409)

The transfer Badgery is referring to here is to Rankin Downs Prison, "a sort of Promised Land for prisoners" where he will spend the next decade. As Badgery explains, Rankin Downs is a new kind of prison: "There were no locks on the doors and you could get an education" (410). Badgery, by this time, has begun to have "some understanding of the power of lies" (375); but his education is hardly enlightening or liberating.²⁴ Rather, it enables him to expand his web of lies and to perfect his protean manipulation of people. Thus he cannot wait upon his release from prison to, as he puts it, "unleash my learning" (518).

Badgery's new knowledge is powerful, and he will use it in this finishing school for deception to accomplish his exploitative and carceral schemes. In prison, the chameleon

²² See Laurie Hergenhan's *Unnatural Lives: Studies of Australian Convict Fiction*; Brian Elliott's "The Convict Novel and Australian Literature: The Progress of a Myth"; Barry Andrews' "More Sinned Against Than Sinning: A Note on the Convict Legend"; and Gillian Whitlock's "The Carceral Archipelago: Marcus Clarke's *His Natural Life* and John Richardson's *Wacousta*." One of the most influential—though no longer uncritically accepted—accounts of the "important" "convict influence on Australian society" (15) as the source of elements of Australian national character, such as egalitarianism, class solidarity, anti-authoritarianism, resourcefulness, and self-reliance has been Russel Ward's *The Australian Legend*.

²³ Gillian Whitlock recognizes how convict novels like Marcus Clarke's *His Natural Life* are active in the present insofar as they perpetuate carceral images and identities: The 'legacy of the carceral archipelago' remains alive long after the architecture itself has decayed into the blandest spatial fiction of all, the soft-sell of the tourist brochure: 'The scars left by British justice on this island have not only been able to heal but to become a big selling point. . . [y]ou're liable to find a brutal overseer serving in the optometrist's store, or see a fine lady from one of the gentry's houses on Quality Row driving a tourist bus. . . ' (64).

²⁴ Reinventing his incarcerated narrator as an academic with a Bachelor's Degree from the University of Sydney—a metamorphosis for which our brown-nosed narrator earns the name "The Professor"—Carey satirizes the liberal notion that the prison is a place of rehabilitation, that a University is not an ideological State apparatus, and that a professor is not one more "bullshit" salesman.

accumulates possessions—"Feltex on the floor, six bookshelves, a chair, a desk" (453)—that a prisoner does not easily come by. Badgery brags:

I did not get this stuff by violence or bribery or dobbing-in my fellow prisoners. I got them by using frailty and decency. This is a very potent combination. It does things to screws who you would otherwise describe as heartless and before they can help themselves they are running to fetch you a square of carpet from their own house and smiling at you like a mother when you have it. (454)

It is this docile behaviour—being frail and decent—that enables Badgery to survive, to transform the conditions of imprisonment in Rankin Downs into a semblance of freedom, an analogical process, for Carey, to the sorts of transformations and *servile* identities that Australia has invented for itself in its development—or lack of development—from a penal-colony into a modern nation (not to mention a tourist destination for the rest of the world). In addition to knocking the liberal theory that modern disciplinary techniques reform prisoners, and in addition to making a mockery of "actual" victimization, such a performative transformation enables those given to self-delusion, like Badgery, to remain permanently foisted upon their lies and imprisoned within the prisonhouses of their fictions. Such self-invention, even Badgery sees, is not without a price: "I got this sort of treatment at some cost, for making yourself into a frail man is a dangerous thing and much of it is not reversible. I lost an inch in height during my ten years at Rankin Downs and I have had trouble with my sciatica ever since. My skin never recovered its tone" (454).

Images of disease and frailty²⁵ permanently disfigure Badgery's body, if we believe him. Perhaps he is simply aging. Certainly, his transformation is not yet complete: by the end of the novel he will have become an hermaphrodite nursing his already grown grandson and taunting his countrymen and women. But I am jumping ahead of myself here. What is clearer is that the lies Badgery lives by are powerful: they transform his carceral environment into what appears to be a comfortable space, at the same time that they help to transform Badgery and Australians like him into long-suffering victims. This is, perhaps, the greatest lie of all: Badgery, by textual prestidigitation, attempts to sell a version of himself as a *prisoner-victim* that will elicit a calculated response from his audience, whether "screw," tourist, or reader.

The figure of the prisoner that Badgery invokes thus hooks something deep in the cultural memory of his warders and fellow prisoners, something potent enough to motivate them to participate in his schemes. It is this use of "the lie" that, Carey suggests, in the era of late capitalism has produced a nation of Australians who uncritically believe the "bullshit" versions of

²⁵ There is little *painful* corporal punishment administered directly by the state in Carey's novel. The stakes are different in *Illywhacker* than they are in nineteenth-century convict novels such as Ralph Rashleigh (1845-50) or *His Natural Life* (1874), where romanticized convict-heroes are ritually punished, or even later in convict novels such as Hal Porter's *The Tilted Cross* (1961) or Thomas Keneally's *Bring Larks and Heroes* (1967) where the deviant convict body is still being spectacularly punished (in fact, put to death). Such bodies are obviously the sites of a complex and memorable inscription of imperial power. In *Illywhacker*, the central characters are prisoners who consent their own domination, contemporary Australians who have not been transported, flogged nor hanged, and whose punishment, if you will, is to do little more than to comfortably exist in a state of pathological denial. One implication of this for my study of *Illywhacker* is that the space of the prison displaces—or replaces—the victimized convict body in national narrative: architecture replaces archetype. This is, in part, because brutalized fictional figures like Rashleigh or Dawes are no longer supposed to exist, or never did, and because the system of property or ownership that coincides with the development of capitalism has successfully reinvented (re-spatialized) the world in such a way that what matters most, what "offends" authority, is the transgression of property—even in its latest avatar, information.

themselves that they have invented—a nation of contented prisoner-pets²⁶ who refuse to examine the national narratives they tell themselves. “I took the lies and held them gratefully,” Badgery explains at one point, listening to the lies of Dr. Ernest Henderson:

I wrapped them round me and felt the soft comfort a child feels inside a wollen rug. And this, of course, is what anyone means when they say a lie is creditable; they do not mean that it is a perfect piece of engineering, but that it is comfortable. It is why we believed the British when they told us we were British too, and why we believed the Americans when they said they would protect us. In all these cases, of course, there is part of us that knows the things is not true, and we hold it closer to ourselves because of it, refusing to hold it out at arm's length or examine it against the light. (186-7)

The interplay of light and dark, of visibility and invisibility, is a central technology of modern discipline: visibility is the mechanism by which the modern prison and its carceral architecture functions; it is also the antithesis of “the lie” and the *sine qua non* of omniscient narration, not to mention imperial historiography. Badgery, indeed, “wraps” himself up in his and his country's lies—he tangles and ties himself up in them, I would say. At one point, near the end of his life, Badgery the author/gaoler places his grandson Hissao on his “Danish Deluxe” (545) desk in the uppermost window of the Pet Shop where he is a prisoner—the desk where he looks back at, and writes up, his life—and makes the “interminable journey” (545) down to Pitt Street to apprehend himself. In a moment that seems genuinely self-reflexive, our vain narrator recognizes his ambivalent, tangled position:

I was using him, of course, but not in any way that was harmful to him. I was looking at him, but imagining myself as a passer-by and looking up to see ME in there. The question is: how would you take me, sitting there in my chair, neon lit, surrounded by these swirling signs? Am I a prisoner in the midst of a sign or a spider at its centre? (545)

The answer, no doubt, is “both,” but the question, I think, is intended to mislead us. Badgery is certainly determined by language, trapped in a Australian Tower of Babel of his own making; but he is, at the same time, entrapping others there. It might be more accurate to say that his imprisonment, his powerlessness, is an affectation that allows him to accomplish his deceitful and cowardly “schemes.”

Badgery disperses himself into his “luminous” text (which is anything but luminous) because he has failed to create for himself, to own, a truly “felicitous” or “free” space. In the 139 or so years before he becomes an author, Badgery has been obsessed with making a place for himself in the world: “All I ever wanted,” Badgery tells us, “was a fire and slippers” (538); “I did not doubt that my passion for building was shared by everyone,” Badgery confesses, “that my ruling love was for human warmth, for people gathered in rooms, talking, laughing, sharing stews and puddings and talk” (198).

Such a vision of community sounds inviting, but Badgery's oxymoronic “ruling love” covers over a lie, a reality of confinement that at least a few Australians resent. In fact, the places that Badgery builds throughout his life become increasingly prison-like, culminating in the family Pet Shop-turned-Prison in which both Badgery and his family are wilfully confined. The final

²⁶ The working title of *Illywhacker* in 1981 was *Pets*. I am grateful to the librarians and staff at the Fryer Library, University of Queensland, for granting me access to the collected Carey papers they hold, including the eight boxes of manuscripts, drafts, research notes, and documents that contain the genesis of *Illywhacker*; as well, I would like to thank them for kindly obtaining permission from Peter Carey to photocopy index cards 1-3 (Box 5, bundle 4 *Illywhacker*) upon which are inscribed some sketches of the fictional Pet Shop.

stage of the Pet Shop perpetuates "the lie" insofar as it symbolizes an Australia that continues to count on the economic protection of Japan without holding that relationship "against the light." To understand some of the mnemonic implications of this carceral architecture, let us briefly consider the genealogy of the modern prison and its linkages with capitalism, an especially important connection since Badgery brags about his ability as a salesman and since the Pet Shop itself becomes an Australian business with disastrous cultural implications.

The prison in *Jillywhacker* is an ambivalent place: a place of remembered punishment and of present protection, not to mention comfort and commerce. As a literary theme, prisons and imprisonment are nothing new. To be sure, the theme of imprisonment is so prevalent in the West that, as Ioan Davies argues, "it is impossible to understand Occidental thought without recognizing the central significance of prison and banishment in its theoretical and literary composition" (1). As Davies writes, images of the prison have been used "metaphorically to refer to many other features of life from language to sex, from the family to war. Certainly the metaphor is a major feature of our understanding of ourselves" (4).

What this says about "us" westerners is not necessarily flattering. In the most general terms, the prison in literature bluntly contradicts the equally prevalent impulse of men and women to imagine themselves "free," even though they are, as Rousseau once said, social creatures who are "everywhere in chains" (*The Social Contract* 49). It is within memory, I will suggest, that some of the strongest links of these so-called chains are "forged." But what makes the prison such an *unforgettable* place is precisely its implicit and explicit role in the construction—or should we say destruction—of personal and social identity, particularly the pervasive sense of discipline that is symbolically and actually perfected in the architecture of the modern prison and the way its disciplinary techniques have permeated modern culture. Such a carceral order, as we shall see, is based upon the pre-modern medical techniques of exile and isolation, and upon the architectural adaptations of these techniques to modern techniques of surveillance and exhibition.

Carey's use of the metaphor of the prison, then, including its advent as a international business, is consonant with what Davies has called the "ideational dominance" of the prison for literatures of the Occident, insofar as the prison accurately represents how order—how knowledge and power—is exercised upon subjects. The prison is a threshold, a place where the illusions of social freedom encounter the concrete facts of modern social discipline and exchange; in the context of post-colonial writing the history of colonialism and European imperial expansion has been a history of confinement and discipline in which the prison and other related structures of confinement—and there is no shortage of them: garrisons, forts, reservations, plantations, slave ships, barracoons, the Black Line,²⁷ apartheid, townships, churches, missionary schools, colonial offices, and even great Trading Companies—have played central roles.²⁸ What

²⁷ In 1830 Colonel George Arthur, lieutenant-governor of Van Diemen's Land (now Tasmania) and his Committee for Aboriginal Affairs attempted to "expel the aboriginal tribes from the settled areas of the island, where they had become such a menace to Europeans, and bottle them up in the Tasman Peninsula . . . where they could be imprisoned forever by a small garrison at either end. This operation was called the Black Line. . . . It took the form of an immense pheasant drive," Hughes writes, that lasted over seven weeks, and in which "the whites kept slaughtering the blacks, women and children usually first, with musket and fowling piece, cutlass and axe" (*The Fatal Shore* 418-20).

²⁸ Barbara Harlow recognizes how the rhetoric of discovery and empire contradicts the carceral reality of colonialism in *Barred: Women, Writing, and Political Detention*. Harlow uses the following passage from C. L. R. James' *Spheres of Influence* as an introductory epigraph to her first chapter to demonstrate this central contradiction. James writes: "British colonial officials have understood nothing about the development of colonial peoples. They have stood in the way of their forward movement from colonial status to freedom. The people who understand this had to go to jail. Gandhi and Nehru went to jail

is unique in *Illywhacker*. I think, is that Carey uses the prison itself as an ironic monument to undercut the rhetoric of imperial expansion and national identity in Australia. The pathological willingness of Carey's Australians to continue to act like prisoners long after the system of transportation ceased, then, is the result of a carceral mentality so thoroughly circumscribed by disciplinary values and techniques that it is impossible for these Australians to act as anything but displayed prisoners who (mis)construe imprisonment as freedom.

It is true that some of the actual carceral architecture from Australia's penal-colonial past remains, in various states of ruin or repair. Places like Port Arthur,²⁹ Norfolk Island, Sarah Island, Maria Island, and even the Old Melbourne Gaol are popular places for tourists to visit. This is not a particularly "Australian" phenomenon; places like The Bastille, The Tower of London, Alcatraz, the Soviet Gulag, Robben Island, and Devil's Island, to name but a few, all come to my mind as infamous disciplinary sites in the cultural memories of the West (and in some cases tourist destinations), and we can add to this list carceral facilities from World War II, such as Buchenwald, Dachau, and Auschwitz, sites that as we have already noted play key roles as places where postmodern memory is organized and where postmodern time is both "anchored" and contested. Such places command both fear and fascination, and it is a disturbing reflection that what these places have in common, what makes them memorable, is that they either were, or were designed to commemorate, places of great pain and suffering—places where power is symbolically and actually concentrated, places where the world, to recall Elaine Scarry's words, is "made" and "unmade" (*The Body in Pain* 19-23).

This is a broad claim, and one that confirms Nietzsche's assertion that "pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics" (*On the Genealogy of Morals* 61), as well as Connerton's claim that it is, finally, our body that knows or "understands" (*How Societies Remember* 95). The modern carceral is built on this principle: as Nietzsche reminds us, the "cruel" festivities of Western justice and morality—in fact fantasies of mastery and revenge—partake in one of the oldest mnemonic systems: "Punishment as the making of a memory" (*Genealogy* 79). Nietzsche insists that memory inheres in the contractual relations of exchange, in the accumulation of capital and in the relationship of creditors to debtors; the idea of "legal subjects" is linked to "the fundamental forms of buying, selling, barter, trade, and traffic" (63):

When we contemplate these contractual relationships, to be sure, we feel considerable suspicion and repugnance toward those men of the past who created or permitted them. . .

. . . It was here that promises were made; it was here that a memory had to be made for those who promised; it is here, one suspects, that we shall find a great deal of severity, cruelty, and pain. To inspire trust in his promise to repay, to provide a guarantee of the

for any number of years. Nkrumah went to jail. Dr. Hastings Banda went to jail. Nyerere went to jail. All of them, and that priest from Cyprus, went to jail also. So you notice that they didn't learn about democracy in British schools, they learnt it in the jails into which the British had put them; and from these jails they taught the population and taught the Colonial Office what were the realities of independence."

²⁹ The irony that these same buildings have recently been converted into tourist traps blackens to the point of tragedy and despair when we remember that a lone gunman shot and killed 35 people at Port Arthur on Sunday 28 April 1996. Without attempting to reconcile life and art, it is important to note that *Illywhacker* is very much concerned with tourism and the production of cultural values; it is also important to remember that when the Port Arthur gunman was sentenced, the judge pronounced he be "sentenced to imprisonment for the term of his natural life on each 35 counts of murder." Although no direct reference was made to Marcus Clarke's famous 1874 novel *His Natural Life*, the gunman himself did say that Port Arthur must be the most violent place in Australia and therefore was the appropriate place to do what he'd done. Despite the gunman's obvious depravity and psychotic indifference to human life, the Port Arthur Massacre hooks something in the cultural memory of Australians which has persisted into the present, long after the last convicts were transported to Western Australia in 1868. I am indebted to Alan Lawson for, amongst other things, this quotation. See also John Frow's "In the Penal Colony."

seriousness and sanctity of the promise, to impress repayment as a duty, an obligation upon his own conscience, the debtor made a contract with the creditor and pledged that if he should fail to repay he would substitute something else that he "possessed," something he had control over; for example, his body, his wife, his freedom, or even his life. (64)

Western conscience, Nietzsche argues, is modeled on exchange, on the equation of remembering and obligation, on the personal and social implications of the unforgettable "economy of sacrifice" and guilt (Derrida, *Gift* 114). We can begin to see a curious convergence, here, of memory, property, and discipline, in the context of Australian national identity, that illuminates the architectural space of Carey's Pet Shop and helps to explain Badgery's behaviour. As John Frow writes in "In the Penal Colony," developing the argument of Robin Evans from *The Fabrication of Virtue: The English Prison Architecture, 1750-1840*, the architecture of the prison is directly linked to modern mnemonics, to the question of how the human subject remembers and how this activity determines or controls behaviour; to, in other words, the creation of *responsible* souls and citizens:

This question brings into play that mobilization of architecture in the service of virtue that Evans describes as underpinning the strategies of nineteenth-century prison reform, and which addressed two related sets of problems in existing regimes of punishment. The first was the psychological problem that "impalings, burnings, flayings and dismemberings could only serve to exacerbate the passions and increase the culprits' hatred of God. The problem was to describe a punishment that did not alienate in this way. The solution was to put mental anguish in the place of physical tortures." Memory thus becomes the instrument of moral conversion, and its effects are to be heightened through an enforced solitude which will necessarily promote introspection. The cellular prison comes stand at the centre of a "technology of salvation" employed by the State rather than the Church (III: 4)

Badgery's architecture, of course, has little to do with salvation, and what it says about the Australians it confines and about Australian national narration is damning. Curiously, under the administration of the state, the carceral architecture of places of secondary confinement like Port Arthur, at the end of the twentieth century, also become tourist destinations, national parks where salvation or reformation is not so much on the agenda as is conspicuous cultural production and consumption and the translation of the mental anguish of the disciplinary past into the present, into the sphere of tourism which "re-collects" the past and reproduces it as a place to visit. But such remembering and obligation also involves a certain amount of cultural prestidigitation; as Frow clearly explains, the kind of cultural amnesia that Hughes has identified in Australia is coded into the "singular" and "official" narrative of such *lieux de mémoire*, to use Pierre Nora's terms, as Port Arthur and, by association, Carey's fictional Pet Shop: they involve as much forgetting as remembering, if not more, and the interesting question becomes *who decides what should be forgotten?* The production of Port Arthur as a tourist destination and a symbolic site of Australia's past, as a moment of origin, "softens" the reality of discipline, exchange, and cruelty that the place stands for. This "mediated structure of commemoration" (Frow IV: 4) demonstrates a "hermeneutic fullness" (IV: 4) that has little to do with the past and more to do with present political agendas and amnesias, not least the fact that the violences of Australia's colonial past and the violences of its post-colonial present, including the brutal massacre authorized by Martin Bryant at the "Broad Arrow Café" at Port Arthur in April 1996, are both continuous and discontinuous:

To singularize the past and to isolate it in its pastness is to reduce this complexity to a single story, to sever a monumental time of national origins from the generational times which continually modify it. This means in part the continuing institutionalized forgetting of that system of penal exile and civil death which has been rendered so bland, so quaint, so much a period costume drama in the national imaginary. (V: 1)

This forgetting is troubling enough when it is used—abused—to underscore national narrative; it becomes especially intolerable, though, when we see through it and its “easy” commemorations to what it covers over, what it erases: in the case of Port Arthur, and symbolically in the Pet Shop, the European invasion of Australia is *re-presented* as an “endpoint to the British empire rather than as a series of beginnings for modern Australia” (Flanagan 38; qtd. in Frow V:2), beginnings that, as Frow reminds us, involve the dispossession and extermination of whole tribes of Australia’s Aboriginal inhabitants.

It is not hard to apply these structures of discipline and of national amnesia to *Illywhacker* and its carceral architecture. For the “broad cultural patterns” (Hergenhan, *Unnatural* xvi) of incarceration and discipline remain encoded in the material of the prison, expressing the “abstract knowledge and conviction or belief” of colonial society. As Whitlock has noted, following Michel Foucault, the colonial garrison and prison are implicated in disciplinary history of the West, “produced by a military dream of society which developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and was the product of an industrial age” (50). Buildings such as Carey’s prisons can thus be read as indices of the problematic penal-colonial past, matrices where identity is made and unmade, where the underlying fears and anxieties, hope and aspirations, as well as economic practices, are literally *inscribed*.

Despite his specious rhetoric of transcendence and his similarly deceitful passion for “opening out” (*Illywhacker* 532) restrictive built spaces, the truth is that Herbert Badgery is most comfortable when he is confined—and when he confines others—within elaborate and deceptive cages: whether in *textual* ones like his so-called autobiography or in *architectural* ones like the homes he builds for his families. “I always built a place of my own when I could,” Badgery confesses,

You could say I was obsessed with houses, but I was not abnormal. My only abnormality was that I did not have one. I had been forced to leave my houses behind me, evicted from them, disappointed in them, fleeing them because of various events. I had left them to rot and rust and be shat on by cattle on the land of the so called legal owners who were called squatters because they’d done exactly what I’d done. (33)

Badgery the perpetual trespasser must continually confront a landscape into which he can never “fit.” Like his settler-invader ancestors, who were faced with the problems of “exile . . . of finding and defining home, [and] physical and emotional confrontations with the ‘new’ land and its ancient and established meanings” (Ashcroft, Griffith, and Tiffin 27), Badgery wanders through Australia for more than a century trying to make a place for himself. He is never able, however, to come to terms with the “established meanings”—much less the property values—of the country that his European ancestors have “stolen,” an especially ironic fact if we remember that the settlement of “white” Australia itself began with the exile of British convicts, a good deal of whom were property criminals to begin with and whose “abnormality” was the result of not owning or having access to property or wealth in the first place.³⁰

When we first meet Badgery, he is forced by a faulty magneto to land his Morris Farman airplane (upon which 500 pounds is owed to the RAAF) in Ernie Vogelnest’s paddock near Baillaing, in 1919. Badgery is not only running from his creditors, but also fleeing a “nice girl

³⁰ As Humphrey McQueen puts it in *A New Britannia*, where he rejects Russel Ward’s thesis that an egalitarian “class” solidarity typified the convicts, the “principal error” of the convicts in England was “the lack of opportunity” (130), which can be translated roughly as a “footing” in society. The convicts, for McQueen, were for the most part “déclassé small proprietors, dispossessed laborers and professional criminals who had shown their active acceptance of the ideology of capitalism—individual acquisitiveness” (130). It is more convincing, I think, to trace Badgery’s genealogy through this ideological position than it is to read him as a wholly “innocent” victim, although there is no evidence in the text that “connects” the Badgery clan to transported convicts.

from the Co-op" at Bacchus Marsh, a town where he owes fifty pounds for building materials. "It was one of the nicest little houses I ever built," Badgery boasts of his residence at Bacchus Marsh, made as it was of "wire netting and mud" (*Illywhacker* 24). The Co-op girl disagreed:

"It's mud," she said.

"It'll outlast you," I said.

"It's not your land," she said. It's Theo Craigie's and you're trespassing."

I was thirty-three years old and nothing was working out. (24)

The Co-op girl is the first of a line of women who contradict Badgery's imperial and patriarchal place-making, his eroticization of property and commodification of women. Here, in his crucifixion year, Badgery, the would-be patriarch, attempts to compensate for his anxious dislocation and sense of impermanence³¹ by stealing land and building homes that he thinks will guarantee him a sense of permanence, ownership, and authority.

This pattern is repeated at Maribyrnong River, near Melbourne, where Badgery builds an even more restrictive structure for his second wife, Phoebe. Only this time his house consists of "rows of cages [which] radiated like the spokes of a wheel" (201). Here, the 37 year old ersatz imperialist appears to have enjoyed being imprisoned, although the 139 year old narrator, looking back, years later, comments upon the painful experience in an unusual moment of self-reproach:

Here: the photograph of the taxi driver's picnic on September 23rd, 1923. I am trapped in the heart of Phoebe's poem, teetering at the apex of my empire. . . . The grass was freshly mown, already fermenting, and I was a sexton happily asleep in a fresh-dug grave, my hands muddy, the smile of a fool upon my face.

My house was full. All rooms were occupied. (201)

Unwittingly echoing the idea of Adolf Loos that architecture begins with the space of the grave,³² Badgery blindly builds on, convinced that he is more sinned against than sinning. But it is Phoebe, the poetaster—who parrots the bohemians she reads about and who leaves Badgery and her two children for her former teacher, Annette Davidson—who recognizes how her husband's agenda of a hearth, slippers, and progeny turns their home into a prison and herself into a prisoner. When she escapes, Badgery, as embarrassed as he is blinded by self-pity and rage, fails to see how his idea of a home-place entrapped Phoebe. He can only project blame onto his absent wife: "She had me rhyme a cage with a room, a bird with a person, feathers with skin, myself with a warder, herself with the splendid guileless [king parrots] who had preened themselves so lovingly on the roof . . ." (205).

The "splendid guileless creatures" Badgery names here, in 1923, will eventually fill the Pet Shop in Sydney, the brainchild of Badgery's son Charles, who at this point is an unwanted infant who survives a botched abortion and spends the first years of his life with caged rosellas and king parrots. Apples fall close to the tree. Of course, Badgery has stolen this land too: "the

³¹ The earliest architecture in Australia was impermanent because the brick and mortar construction that the Europeans were accustomed to required lime in the mortar, the only source of which in the new colony was burned oyster shells gathered by convict women. Buildings other than Government House were constructed without mortar and instead used a mixture of sheep's hair and mud that was easily washed out by rain. Writing of the first buildings built at Sydney Cove by the convicts, buildings that were impermanent, Hughes concludes that they were psychological expressions of a strong desire to leave Australia: "Architecture signifies permanence; it announces the desire to stay" (*The Fatal Shore* 90-1).

³² Consider Adolf Loos' response: "When walking through a wood, you find a rise in the ground, six foot long and three foot wide, heaped up in a rough pyramid shape, then you turn serious and something inside you says: someone lies buried there. *That is architecture.*" (cited by Denis Hollier in *Against Architecture* xxi). Badgery himself uses the image of a coffin to describe and to condemn confining built spaces more than once, although his behaviour after his incarceration in Rankin Downs suggests that once he has invented himself as a prisoner he is most comfortable in a morbid carceral architecture.

people of Melbourne understand the value of a piece of land. . . . And this makes it very difficult for a man with no money to take possession of his necessary acre. . . . but I am proud to say . . . I found my land, and took it, although its legal owners (the Church of England) were not aware of it at that time" (157). Once again, Carey's text articulates an anxiety about "legal ownership," a point that reminds us of the debate about the convict origins of "white" Australia and the central role that private ownership plays in the production of modern deviance. What Badgery cannot remember, here, is that the legal owners of this piece of land have also "taken" it from its previous "owners": Australian Aboriginals. As for Phoebe, Badgery tells us: "she spent the rest of her life putting all her wiles and energies into being kept . . . It is of no importance that she would reveal herself to be self-indulgent, selfish, admiring herself like a budgie in a cage" (205).

I suspect that something similar could be said of Badgery at the end of the novel—textually admiring himself in his son's cage. I also suspect that Phoebe,³³ like the rest of the women the Australian Narcissus tries to make a place with, resists his possessive energies and he resents her for it. In many ways, she beats Badgery at his own games: "She was a liar," Badgery states, "but who cares?" (205).

I think Badgery cares a great deal. He levels the same charge, years later, against Leah Goldstein, his next lover and traveling show partner. Leah extends the pattern in the novel of women who exceed the carceral structures of our lying trespasser-narrator. At Bendigo, when he first meets Leah, in 1931, Badgery beds her and once again his thoughts turn to establishing empires. But Leah does not share his passion for building. Waking up the next morning, Badgery states: "The flesh of the morning was pink and tasted of mud like a rainbow trout, and I was the Prince of the Bedroom, the King of Liars. The urge to build was on me already and I looked at the world through imaginary windows and possible doorways" (304).

The equivalence here between Leah's body and property—"the urge to build"—reveals Badgery's obsession with, and confusion of, ownership, architecture, and sex. Leah, the disenchanted wife of socialist activist Lenny Kaletsky, recognizes his phallic claim immediately and states: "You sleep with me once and you think you own me." Badgery replies: "No . . . Just making a place" (306). Leah's response is telling. She states:

"This is not your place and can never be."

"It's public land," I said. "It's reserve, and if I take out a mining lease I'm entitled to build a hut here . . ."

"There you go, land-house, house-land, you can't help yourself, can you, Mr. Badgery? . . . You think you can put up some shanty and that makes it your place, but you can't, and it never will be . . . The land is stolen. The whole country is stolen. The whole nation is based on a lie which is that it was not already occupied when the British came here. If it's anybody's place, it is the blacks'. Does it look like your place? Does it feel like your place? Can't you see, even the trees have nothing to do with you." (306-7)

Leah's objections remind us of the words of Badgery's mentor, M. V. Anderson, who insists that Australian history must begin with its "monumental lie" and the haunting fact that this lie works to elide: the land is stolen. Of course, it will be several years until Badgery encounters Anderson's work—at this point he is still illiterate. Nonetheless, as Leah's critique makes clear, Badgery's anxious place-making perpetuates the appropriation of land begun by the European settlement of Australia at the same time that it works to forget the legacy of alienation and illegitimacy produced by this invasion—a contradictory project that is bound to fail. As Goldstein

³³ Badgery claims to be an extravagant patriot-liar, but his actions and agendas are rather traditional. Here is the pregnant Phoebe's complaint: "I am big and heavy like a bloated slug and I am so bored . . . No, I am not disenchanted with H. He works hard and loves me, but I am bored . . . he does love me, Annette, and I know I can make him so happy yet I did not, even for a moment, guess that what he wanted was so ordinary: a fat wife with a dozen children and cabbage and stew every night" (190).

concedes, confessing to Badgery that she lacks the "revolutionary" consciousness of her socialist husband Lenny and feels like a "tourist" in her "own" country:

"Movement," she said, displaying her white feet. "I admit it. I am really the one dancing on hot macadam, not you: town to town, dancing, writing letters. I cannot stay still anywhere. It is not a country where you can rest. It is a black man's country: sharp stones, rocks, sticks, bull ants, flies. We can only move around it like tourists. The blackfeller can rest but we must keep moving." (323)

Such displacement has plagued Badgery all his life, and he has set out to counteract it by building with an imperialist's determination; it is the central problem, or so Badgery would have us believe, that he has faced in his lifetime and that he relates in his life-story. Such an anxious movement through the landscape, such dislocation, Leah recognizes, contrasts the *location* or *homefulness* of the Australian Aborigines. It is in Badgery's architectural schemes—in his "usual type of structure" (158)—that the clearest traces of these "tourist's" values—not to mention fear and anxiety—can be found. After an argument with Leah—an argument about Badgery's chronic placelessness and continuing obsession with "making a place" for himself (306)—a temporarily conciliatory Badgery states: "I was much affected and stepped down from my drum, with my own confession tumbling from me. I admitted I could not read and the landscape had, indeed, always seemed alien to me, that it made me, in many lights, melancholy and homesick for something else, that I preferred a small window in a house, and so on." (308).

Where Badgery's ellipsis would lead is a good question. I dare say that for Badgery it leads back to a barred window in a cell, to a portal in the Pet Shop where Badgery, the observer-author, the spider-prisoner, finally feels comfortable, where he can deal with the "threat"³⁴ of Australian space. What built space does here is frame—include/exclude—that which Badgery finds threatening and over-whelming: the *stolen* space of Australia, the people he so dearly wants to love him.

It is Leah Goldstein who recognizes this carceral unconscious most clearly. She is, in one view, Badgery's nemesis in the text: a socialist, a writer, a part-time Labour Party activist, and the one voice in the novel that Badgery cannot co-opt, insofar as she continually resists his textual reign of terror and his authoritarian, editorial clamp-downs.³⁵ This, though, only fans the flames of Badgery's passion for Goldstein, whom Badgery can never seem to fully "possess," a passion that will contribute to this capitalist's eventual conviction for assault and decade-long incarceration. For it is after Leah dumps him and returns to her idealist husband (who is now in a wheel chair, which, to Badgery, adds further insult to his wounded ego)—that Badgery, whose life is once again in turmoil, attempts to steal his foster father's business secrets and in doing so tears off Goon's index finger.

³⁴ The threat of space is not limited to Australia. Oscar Wilde, another author who has spent time in prison, writes: "If nature had been comfortable, mankind would never have invented architecture, and I prefer houses to the open air. In a house we all feel proportions. Everything is subordinated to us, fashioned for our use and our pleasure. Egotism itself, which is so necessary to a proper sense of human dignity, is entirely the result of indoor life. Out of doors one becomes abstract and impersonal. One's individuality absolutely leaves one. And then Nature is so indifferent, so unappreciative" (*The Decay of Lying* 58). Wilde's anti-romantic sentiments are shared (in part) by Herbert Badgery, an egotistic and agoraphobic advocate of the art of lying and "personalized" built space.

³⁵ Leah, at one point, complains that Badgery is not only a liar but a thief who has stolen from her writing. Book 3, Chapter 54 is ostensibly composed of Leah's intrusive notes. Leah admits she found Badgery's "unpardonable" notebooks while looking for his pyjamas. Badgery, after all, is in the hospital with "half of his brain" collapsed" (548). Jealous of Leah's writerly talent, Badgery accuses her of possessing a "liar's lump, the callus where her HB pencil fitted against her finger" (552).

Badgery is sentenced to a decade in prison for his crime: he serves his time in Grafton Gaol and then Rankin Downs Prison, as we have already seen. During his incarceration he perfects the role of being a "model" prisoner. It is not an exaggeration to say that after this internment Badgery's buildings, along with his writing, become even more carceral, that the function of inhabiting the "infelicitous" space of the prison is indelibly engraved upon his mind-body. It is in Badgery's architecture, then, where we see most clearly the "failure" to generate a "new" Utopian narrative, a mode of being an Australian father or author that is not mired in the carceral, that is not, as Badgery says, a "confusion of love and hurt" that "every prisoner knows, where even the best things in the world come slashed with our own bitterness and jealousy" (396). But as Whitlock puts it, the "carceral cell is unable to produce a next generation free of its own curse; it can only reproduce itself, or types of itself" (59), which helps to explain the Badgery legacy of carceral behaviour we have traced—a penal-colonial tendency, we might say, to transform traditionally free or "felicitous" spaces into "hostile" or confining but ultimately *amnesiac* ones.

Of course, Badgery's imprisonment occurs *after* another brief dalliance on the way up to Grafton through Nambucca, where he meets Shirl "THE GIRL FOR FRUIT & VEG" (527) and volunteers to renovate the milk bar she owns, to "open that bloody coffin of a shop" (530) in very much the same way he will arbitrarily "open out" his son's Pet Shop in 1951. When Badgery convinces the widow to put him up in exchange for his labour, they close the deal by hitting the sheets, in his mind establishing a place for himself sexually and architecturally: "by three o'clock" of the day he arrived, Badgery brags "we'd made a mess of her clean sheets and I was lying on my back with her hair in my nose, thinking how much nicer the room would be if we could lift the roof like the latch on a ferret box" (530). Once again, Badgery conflates sex and property, and is unable to think of enclosed spaces as anything but cages and of the human inhabitants of these spaces—including himself—as anything but pets.

When Badgery is released from Rankin Downs Prison in 1949, he decides, as he puts it, to head for Sydney and take "a place . . . inside that wonderful building of my son's" (516). When Badgery arrives at the Pet Shop to rejoin his extended family, though, we should not mistake this for a prodigal father's "celebration of freedom" (491). It is Leah Goldstein, Badgery's former lover, who confronts him there: "'You fool' she said. 'You moron. You want to be a pet' . . . you are out of one prison, and making another one" (537-8). As Goldstein recognizes, Badgery's behaviour perpetuates a pattern of confinement, the trajectory of which we have traced from Badgery's itinerant past with his authoritarian father, through his "sexy" homes, to his carceral present in the Pet Shop, a structure, as I have said, in which Carey compresses the carceral and capitalist history of Australia.³⁶

³⁶ In his "Preface" to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Michel Foucault notes that a quotidian "fascism," that which "causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us" (xiii), is coded into the very means and methods of capitalist exchange and the societies organized around them. According to Deleuze and Guattari, an "oedipal" figure of power exists in such socio-economic structures, an amalgam of paranoia, schizophrenia, and an ethic of absolute (ego-centric) competition that, as Mark Seem writes, has been "injected into the unconscious" (xx) as a belief: "it is what gives us faith as it robs us of power, it is what teaches us to desire our own repression" (Seem xx). If the "schizoanalysis" of Deleuze and Guattari holds up, the Pet Shop is a logical expression of just what can go wrong with social structures as the State or the Family when conscripted by the values of capitalist exchange and "profit": not only are present repressions justified by

A towering edifice of galleries and cages on Pitt Street in Sydney, the Badgery family "Best Pet Shop in the World" is an architectural manifestation of the monumental lie: the lie-as-monument. Formerly "the old Stratford Arcade" (480), the Pet Shop evolves into a national prison: first, under the ownership of Charles Badgery, Herbert's son, it contains Australian fauna such as cockatoos and goannas; then, under the direction of Charles and his American partner, Nathan Schick, it becomes a "joint promotion" (505) that exports pets all over the world and in which the entire Badgery family lives in cages; finally, in the hands of Charles's son, Hissao, who reluctantly takes over the Pet Shop after his father's suicide, and who, in an attempt to acquire investment capital, sells the Pet Shop to Mitsubishi of Japan for "one million dollars (US)" (596). Under Hissao's direction, the Pet Shop is transformed into a theme-prison for international tourists to visit; collected and displayed therein are not only the Badgerys but other Australian *pets*: an agoraphobic illegal Chinese immigrant who plays imaginary baseball, "shearers . . . lifesavers, inventors, manufacturers, bushmen, aboriginals," even a "Melbourne Jew" (599). Badgery is attracted to this structure for many reasons: he sees it as a home and as a "scheme"; as Badgery confesses: "damn it, I had a weakness for grand buildings and I liked the sound of his shop. It was not merely a building with a tower. It was a tower" (489).

In this tower, in this human zoo, the Badgerys feel comfortable and protected: like their countrymen and women, they love their cages. "It was the inner sanctum," Badgery observes of this dystopian home as he watches his daughter-in-law and grandson, "in which they were both, mother and son, loved and cared for, protected from the world, and they felt themselves to be circled by so many loving defences, walls, moats, and drawbridges that it was a shock, sometimes to look up . . . (498). Such a shock, I think, is the result of a complex colonial agoraphobia in which the "schizophrenia" that Hodge and Mishra identify, the linguistic and topographical dislocation that Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin recognize, and the "politics of subordination" that Turner detects in Australian cultural expression, are identifiable elements. In an earlier article, Turner named this a "colonised subconscious" (440) and argued that the "most basic structural situation" of Carey's fiction is "enclosure, entrapment . . . as material forms; he seems drawn to examine their complexity, their symmetry, their completeness" (Turner, "American Dreaming" 435). Whether at the level of the family or the nation, Carey "depicts isolated individuals or fragmented communities confronting an exploitative system. This system is usually powerful, inscrutable, and insensitive to the indigenous culture it has colonised" (436). As even Badgery recognizes, the inability of Australians to acknowledge this alienating and isolating entrapment, their "don't-want-to-see-it, don't-want-to-know-about-it attitude," is an imagining of community based upon "an old pattern of self-deception" (Illywhacker 505).

Whether or not such a pattern can be altered comes close to being the central question or theme of Carey's novel, a question that Carey's poses in the space of the prison. Perhaps the most innovative aspect of Carey's text, however, is its insistence that the space of the prison embodies not only the complicit structures and mechanisms of an emergent modern European social discipline but also the closely related spirit and techniques of developing capitalism, particularly private property, commodity fetishism, and reification, without which Europe's imperial expansion and colonialism in the nineteenth-century would have been unimaginable.

In *Discipline and Punish*, his account of the development of the modern prison in the West, Michel Foucault writes that the "growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of submitting forces and bodies, in short, 'political anatomy,' could be operated in the most diverse political régimes, apparatuses or institutions" (221). This is another way of saying that the triumph of capitalism as "a hierarchically structured global system in which locations of particular countries are

the past but perpetual subjection and discipline are seen as "normal" cultural values and practices: hatred is disguised as love, docility is re-invented as action, confinement is dressed up as freedom.

determined" (Ahmad 312) could not have been accomplished without disciplinary structures based upon the ideas of private property and of the accumulation of wealth, a system of exploitation of "the world's resources—from minerals to agricultural raw materials to the unpaid labour of countless millions" and of global incarceration that in the most general terms refashioned the world into what Ahmad has called "the nursery for European capital" (315).

Foucault, of course, is concerned with the genesis of the modern prison in France, and his "history" has been much criticized for its Eurocentric generalizations and its fatalistic "narrativization" of the "cage-like quality" of the world and "bleak sense of human entrapment in the [overlapping] Discourses of Power" (Ahmad 131). Of course, Ahmad's beef with Foucault is that he refuses to posit an "origin" or "purpose" to his history, a "modes of production" analysis (like Jameson's "untranscendable horizon" or "political unconscious") which "can give us an adequate account of the mystery of the cultural past" (Jameson, *Political Unconscious* 19-20). Such a politics—or lack thereof—drives orthodox Marxists such as Ahmad to pull out their collective hair, though Ahmad himself criticizes Jameson for his "idealized," "first world" "rhetoric of otherness" (Ahmad 95-122). My interest in the alignment—or perhaps we should say "conflation"—of the market and the prison, of exchange and entrapment, if we can use these rather imprecise terms to refer to the Pet Shop, is in the fictional intersection of systems of property, discipline, colonialism and architecture, or, in other words, how Carey uses the prison as an *ironic* cultural mnemonic in his writing to bring these components of Australian national narrative together and to demonstrate their "failure" to explain the present past of that "lucky" country, to construct "stories to live by" (Turner, "American Dreaming" 441).

Foucault's theories about discourse, discipline, and order, about power and overlapping "webs" or networks of control, then, are useful tools for interrogating *Illywhacker's* carceral architecture:

the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital . . . cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital. At a less general level, the technological mutations of the apparatus of production, the division of labour and the elaboration of the disciplinary techniques sustained a very close relationship. (221)

Crucial for my purposes is the "close" relationship posed between the production of wealth and the construction of carceral social formations, the way that "discipline," as Foucault writes, "proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space" (141). The key term here is property: by the end of the eighteenth century, punitive practice, implicated as it had become with property, was no longer seen as the arbitrary response of a sovereign taking vengeance upon the perpetrator's body in the form of torture, whipping, mutilation or even death—forms of ritual violence intended to display the sovereign's power.³⁷ Instead, discipline became implicated in a

³⁷ Foucault argues that the body as "the major target of penal repression disappeared" (8) at the end of the eighteenth century and was replaced with a new site of concern: the mind or soul. The criminal's body was no longer "punished," as it was in public executions, but it became an "instrument or intermediary: an effect. If one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and a property" (11). So "in the old system," Foucault writes, before the advent of the modern prison, "the body of the condemned man became the king's property, on which the sovereign left his mark and brought down the effects of his power" (109). But in the new system, the mind or soul of the prisoner is ostensibly the object of concern; it is the "essence" being shaped, examined, transformed, or rehabilitated. Instead of pincers or whips or nooses, the soul is controlled by disciplinary techniques such as penal intervention, segregation, surveillance, or isolation, one

new system of imprisonment and restraint, a system of discipline based upon enlightenment techniques of examination-observation-normalization which ostensibly respected the "humanity" of the prisoner as it aimed to produce a "normal" or docile body. Unlike the shadowy space of the medieval dungeon or tower, the modern prison became a "luminous" (Deleuze, *Foucault* 32) environment, an "apparatus intended to render individuals docile and useful, by means of precise work upon their bodies" (*Discipline and Punish* 231).

The modern prison, or what Foucault calls "penal intervention," thus took on a new historical and social meaning at the beginning of the nineteenth century.³⁸ In the most general terms, I think, it amounts to a *spatialization* of discipline (perhaps a precursor to the "aesthetic" spatialization that Jameson argues for in the context of postmodernism and his "cognitive mapping," which is undertaken by disoriented subject-bodies within the social spaces of late-capitalism) the architectural figure of which, as Foucault sees it, is Jeremy Bentham's proposed or "fictional" eighteenth-century prison, the Panopticon.

Bentham's prison employs traditional (medical) techniques of exile and isolation³⁹ within its modern and "luminous" disciplinary architecture, a "simple idea in architecture," as Bentham notes, in which a building becomes "an artificial body" (*The Panopticon Writings* 3, 108) wherein an inspector gazes and speaks. But this is no ordinary prison; "if we were to realize this idea," as Miran Bozovic states, "by faithfully following Bentham's plan, we would produce,

form of which is convict transportation. The new mechanisms of power perfect what Foucault calls the internalized "exercise of power" (*Discipline and Punish* 206).

³⁸ The "micro-physics" of this "cellular" or *penitentiary* power composes "the genealogy of the modern soul." Foucault recognizes "the historical reality of this soul, which, unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, supervision and constraint. This real, non-corporeal soul is not a substance; it is an element on which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power. On this reality-reference, various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc. . . . The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. . . . The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body" (29-30).

³⁹ In *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* Foucault establishes a genealogical connection between modern social discipline (the space of the penitentiary) and the medieval medical techniques of *exile* and of *isolation*. Exile, on the one hand, was directed at the diseased leper (a "common" constituent of medieval society) in order to maintain a "pure community" through rituals of separation, rejection, exclusion and marking; isolation, on the other hand, was used to contain contaminated citizens in disciplinary projects constructed around plague-stricken medieval towns in order to control the spread of the "Black Death." The leper undergoes separation; the plague victim undergoes segmentation or quarantine. Both techniques aimed to create "pure" and "healthy" polities by techniques of social discipline based upon "rational" or empirical analysis of man as an object of an emerging medical science, as opposed to treatment based upon theology, superstition or fear. Europeans thus combated the chaos of disease by classifying the social body according "rational" disciplinary structures (195-200). Eventually, both leprosy and the plague disappear from history, but the legacies of surveillance and separation imparted by these diseases do not. According to Foucault, the punitive techniques of surveillance and segregation merge around the beginning of the nineteenth century, roughly coincident with the apogee of European imperialism and at organization of Europe itself into "nations" or "states" based upon new political rationality and administrations of power, based in part upon linguistic, geographical, and racial homogeneity. Exile and isolation, too, are paradigmatic structures not only for modern penal intervention but, I think, for understanding Europe's imperial expansion, not least the transportation of convicts to Australia. As Edward Said notices, "colonial possessions—quite apart from their economic benefit to metropolitan Europe—were useful as places to send wayward sons, superfluous populations of delinquents, poor people, and other undesirables" (*Culture and Imperialism* 190).

so to speak, at the same time as the building itself—which we have built out of bricks, iron, glass, etc.—*God as well*" (19). God, in this "scheme," is an effect—at once fictitious and real, the effect of an all seeing gaze, the product in a prisoner's mind of "the impression of the inspector's omnipresence and the idea of constant surveillance" (Bozovic 15).

Frow's point about modern prisons, mental anguish, and memory as modes of reformation or "salvation," as well as Proust's mnemonic, come to mind. Perhaps not surprisingly, Bentham opposed the transportation of criminals to Australia: the utilitarian philosopher reasoned that it was an "unconstitutional," costly, and ineffective punishment and hence not a deterrent to criminals, and besides, without a glut of prisoners in Britain it would be unlikely that his revolutionary prison would get built (Hirst 11; Jackson 42-59). Its specular power, the inspector-god as "omniscient anatomist" (Bozovic 20), however, was already "built into" carceral architecture and the epistemology of the West at a fundamental level: the perceiving-subject dominates the perceived-object, an inequitable power-relation that we shall study in more detail in the next chapter. Such inequitable and disciplinary power knowledges are built into the architecture of Carey's Pet Shop, and it is little wonder, then, that Badgery is so excited about his new home, for it is here that he will finally re-invent himself as an omniscient and immortal—that is, "god-like"—warden-author.

In the Panopticon, built space itself become a machinery, an apparatus, the task of which is to work on the mind and soul of the prisoner by means of calculated control of the space occupied by the prisoner's body. The Panopticon is the mechanism or machine that perfects the configuration of segmentation, partitioning, and surveillance enacted in modern penal discipline, enabling a "constant division of between normal and abnormal, to which every individual is subjected"; it marks "the existence of a whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal" (*Discipline and Punish* 199). Foucault describes it as follows:

at the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells. . . . All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker, a school boy. (200)

Such a spatialized technique of social discipline, according to Foucault, penetrates every aspect of contemporary society, every detail of individual life, every square foot of built space in a world organized by the borders of private property. The Panopticon is thus both the machine that perfects the modern disciplinary organization of space-as-private-property and, for Foucault, its emblem. Panopticonism, Foucault argues us, relies upon

a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals [or peoples] in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centres and channels of power, of definition of the instruments and modes of intervention of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons. Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must be imposed. (205)

In this "cruel, ingenious cage" (205) a "multiplicity" of individuals can be collected and contained. If we extrapolate from Bentham's fictional prison, through Foucault's "sumptuous" history, we might say that the "task" imposed on the Australian prisoners in the Pet Shop is that they behave as "normal" Australians—passive and contented, never looking "too far into" things or too far out of their "windows." In this way, the Pet Shop architecturally reduces a multiplicity into an amnesiac, "frail and decent" nation. Whether as the ancestors of transported convicts, as economically and imaginatively dependent consumers of American culture, or as commodified artefacts owned by a Japanese multinational and exhibited for international tourists, the lesson imposed upon the perpetual prisoners in the Pet Shop is to act like Australians—to be "the exotic

possessions of others" (Adam 8), to be prisoners, we might say, who are comfortable because they cannot imagine, cannot remember, any other forms of knowledge or community.

This is not to equate the Pet Shop with the Panopticon but to suggestively—cataphorically—super-impose one structure upon the other in order to foreground structural and functional similarities. Curiously, Foucault notes that Bentham might have been at least partly inspired in his project by Le Vaux's menagerie at Versailles:

At the centre was an octagonal pavilion which, on the first floor, consisted of only a single room, the king's *salon*; on every side large windows looked out onto seven cages (the eight was reserved for the entrance), containing different species of animals. By Bentham's time, this menagerie had disappeared. But one finds in the programme of the Panopticon a similar concern with individualizing observation, with characterization and classification, with the analytical arrangement of space. The Panopticon is a royal menagerie; the animal is replaced by man, individual distribution by specific grouping, and the king by the machinery of furtive power. (203)

It would not be unfair to think of Badgery, omniscient in his authoritarian cage in the Pet Shop, as a self-imposed monarch. He uses such imperial language and collects specimens of Australian fauna himself: in a photograph he considers at the end of Book 1, recalling his estate at Maribymong River, he recognizes himself "teetering at the apex of my empire" (Illywhacker 201), which at this point "pushed out and grew—rows of cages radiated like the spokes of a wheel" (84).⁴⁰

The parallels between the Pet Shop-turned-Emporium and the menagerie-turned-Panopticon are striking, but what is most important is that both share a common function—the deployment of a "furtive power" that, in addition to producing objects of tourism and manufacturing pleasurable optic responses or "marketable myths of authenticity and exoticism" (Huggan 176), "induce[s] a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power" (Foucault 201). In this national space, a community of typical Australians live who are so used to being displayed that, like animals caged in zoos, they accept this state of being as natural: they know or remember no other way of life. Hence the major effect of the Panopticon, like the human zoo in *Illywhacker*:

that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. (*Discipline and Punish* 201)

Under the "illusion" of constant surveillance, Badgery's prisoners enact their own commodification, thoroughly internalizing the prisoner-roles they submit to playing for the gazing warden/tourist. As Badgery notes, "Everyone comes. Name a country and I will have met someone who travelled from it just to see us" (599). Ever modest, Badgery also states: "Naturally they come to see me, not just the men with calipers and bottles, but the ordinary visitors. They journey up the aluminum walkways, they brave their vertigo, they grasp the rail, they tremble to

⁴⁰ As "laboratories" of European power, colonies were organized around an Imperial, omniscient centre; as Edward Said suggests, British rule can be conceived of as an "irreducible supervisory imperial authority" (*Orientalism* 215). The point here is that the imperial mechanics of this objectifying gaze helps to convert *inferior* spaces and subjects into commodities that support a wide range of British interests. The panoptic structure of Britain's empire was recognized in the first decade of the twentieth century when the Orientalist Evelyn Baring Lord Cromer referred to the British Empire as a machine that exists to harmoniously govern "subject races." Said explains Cromer's vision of the British Empire as constructed around a central authority, a "seat of power in the West, and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority and yet commanded by it" (44).

see what a human being can become" (598). What these human beings have become, I think, is indeed "image-things," commodities, hollowed-out types, nostalgic and deceptive characters who consent to their own present-day domination and who do not need to question themselves or their "authentic" cultural identities—past, present, or future. Perhaps this is why Badgery's "pets" appeal to Australian and international "tourists."

It remains to be said that for some Australians, at least, the pets are not appealing, that something within the "protective" architecture of the Pet Shop has gone wrong. "There are all sorts of noises in the night," Badgery says, "and I don't mean the keening of an aboriginal woman or the grumbling of a mason, but rather noises in the street outside where the enemies of the emporium have set up their camp. I have never seen them, but anyone can hear the sirens, the shouting, sometimes the drumming of police-horse hooves (*Illywhacker* 599-600). Thus, the Pet Shop is not just the "bleak" final or "dystopian" image that critics such as Anthony Hassall or Ian Adam suggest, but a more positive—albeit "hated"—mnemonic structure. Even Badgery, at the end of his novel, sees that the Pet Shop functions by "sucking rage and hatred towards itself" (*Illywhacker* 600).

And it is, I think, ultimately, a "rage and hatred" against the "politics of subordination" that, as Turner suggests, has won assent in Australian national narrative as the "defining element" in "a conservative and comprehensive assent to the prevailing historical conditions" (*National Fictions* 143). It is this ironic reversal, I have been arguing, that is coded into Carey's carceral architecture, culminating in the final ambivalent image of the Pet Shop. Like Jameson's image of the postmodern (social) labyrinth, which might well be a gulag or a shopping mall, the Pet Shop stands as a cultural monument, teetering at the end of one era but enduring into the next: the disciplinary space of the "modern" prison is overlaid upon, it mutates into, the—shall we say "postmodern"—tourist-prison and Australian emporium, the luminous space where Carey satirizes the latest, or late-capitalist, commodification of Australia, what Jameson has called elsewhere the cultural logic of late-capitalism: "the consumption of sheer commodification as a process" (Jameson x).

This ironic reversal turns upon the question of material space, of the social organization of memory and its traces and inscriptions, and it can be re-phrased as the question of how, in the era of "late" or "multi-national" capitalism,⁴¹ the space of the prison—which one would usually think of as repulsive or threatening—becomes a deceptively "felicitous" space. To read this space, let us return to the thesis of Gaston Bachelard in *The Poetics of Space*. Bachelard maintains that human value invests lived spaces according to two extremes—felicitous or hostile (xxxi-xxxii). Although there are, no doubt, subtle distinctions between felicity and hostility, Bachelard usefully identifies the "house" as an example of the former, and hence an ideal place for "housing" our memories. "A house," Bachelard writes, "constitutes a body of images that give mankind proofs or illusions of stability" (17):

At times we think we know ourselves in time, when all we know is a sequence of fixations in the spaces of the being's stability—a being who does not want to melt away,

⁴¹ For Jameson, late-capitalism began in America in the 1950s after the post-war deprivations had been "made up" (xx) and is distinguished by a "new international" division of labour that features transnational business, international banking and stock exchange, media interrelationship, computers and automation, the "flight of production to advanced Third World areas," the "crisis of traditional labor, the emergence of yuppies, and gentrification on a now-global scale," but above all, an increasingly "tendential web of bureaucratic control" and a collusion of "government and big business" at an international level so ubiquitous as to seem inescapable (*Postmodernism* xviii-xix).

and who, even in the past, when he sets out in search of things past, wants time to "suspend" its flight. In its countless alveoli space contains compressed time. That is what space is for. (Bachelard 8)

Echoing Proust's salvationist mnemonics and the idea that space is more permanent and ordered than being and memory, Bachelard asserts that space guarantees stable identity; in much the same way, I presume, space is said to stabilize memory in classical mnemotechnics: memory "does not record concrete duration . . . memories are motionless, and the more securely they are fixed in space, the sounder they are" (8).

Bachelard calls "the systematic psychological study of the sites of our intimate lives," including the localization of our memories, "topoanalysis" (8), the end of which is to "determine the human value of the sorts of space that may be grasped, that may be defended against adverse forces, the space we love" (xxxii). The spaces that Carey's Australians love are restrictive, confining spaces in which time, indeed, seems suspended and compressed and anchored. At one level, such a synchronic gesture is of a piece with a nostalgic "consoling cultural mythology," with the collected types that Carey has assembled in the Pet Shop who, it is clear, will not play an "active, individualized role within society."

But we have already seen that places of pain, too, function as effective mnemonics, that not only felicitous but hostile spaces are profoundly memorable. A more useful conclusion might then be that we use architecture itself—its grainy, gritty materiality—to "inscribed" our pasts; the more pressing question we must ask when it comes to architecture and memory, then, is how we as individuals or as a society use different kinds of buildings to "store" or "mark" our temporalities, and to what ends? In the case of *Illywhacker*, such a topoanalysis reveals, on the one hand, a wilful carceral-capitalist amnesia, and on the other, the need to think past dependent cultural identities. The answer to Carey's question "What does it mean to be Australian?" then, requires a "balanced" remembering and forgetting of Australia's penal-colonial past in which not only European men and women, but also Australian Aboriginal and Asian people must be *figured*.

And this, finally, is the mnemonic "task" of the Pet Shop. "If I were to be asked to name the chief benefit of the house," Bachelard writes, "I should say: the house shelters daydreaming, the house protects the dreamer, the house allows one to dream in space" (6). Badgery, the deluded warden-author, dreams of control and of self-transformation. But, to greatly simplify things, we could say that Badgery grew up in a prison, and that he can imagine no other life for himself than the life of a prisoner, that he can build no other spaces for his family than prisons. Perhaps Badgery has lived in prisons—both real and imagined—too long. As Bachelard writes, by remembering houses and rooms that we "learn to 'abide' within ourselves . . . the house images move in both directions: they are in us as much as we are in them" (xxxiii). Indeed, Bachelard continues,

the house we were born in has engraved within us the hierarchy of the various functions of inhabiting. We are the diagram of the functions of inhabiting that particular house, and all other house are but variations on a fundamental theme. The word habit is too worn a word to express this passionate liaison of our bodies, which do not forget, with an unforgettable house. (15)

The "passionate liaison" of Badgery to his prisons, the "fundamental theme" of incarceration and subordination that has been "engraved" upon Badgery's mind and body in the unforgettable prison—and once again note how the image of the wax tablet is used to explain how individual identity and consciousness is formed at the material site or mechanism of inscription—contradicts Badgery's grandiose rhetoric, his "opening out" (*Illywhacker* 532) of restrictive built and textual spaces. And Badgery is the perfect prisoner—one who insists he is free when, in fact, he is "everywhere in chains." The function of inhabiting we observe in the Pet Shop might "repel" certain Australians, but Badgery is not one of them. He remains a prisoner—happily caught up in a "power situation" in which he bears the burden of his own subjection.

Badgery and the rest of Carey's prisoners are thus thematically and chronologically linked to the "humble prisoners" (5) of David Ireland's 1971 satire of economic colonization, The Unknown Industrial Prisoner. Ireland's prisoners are contemporary labourers who are soon to be replaced by machines at the "British-European" "Puroil Refining, Termitary and Grinding Works," where they have wilfully confined themselves within a corporate structure whose function is to systematically exploit their labour power and to symbolically reduce ("refine") the past into something palatable and profitable. The "docile" and "useful" bodies of the labourers/convicts are not so obviously—nor spectacularly—marked by the power of the state, but rather they are "trained to captivity" (21) and, I believe, mnemonically, somatically, linked to Australia's penal-colonial past even though their "gaoler" is a late-capitalist multinational corporation. Most of the labourers at Puroil, Ireland writes, "remembered the lash of the past" (17); "Most stooped unthinkingly to scratch the inch-wide residual scar of chains passed down from father to son, from ankle to ankle for half a dozen generations, their legacy from the bloody and accursed empire" (2).

Like Ireland's refinery, the Pet Shop has become a domestic space of "protected" intimacy" (Bachelard 3), an enclosed commercial venture based upon collusive economic and carceral interests and the consensual imprisonment of its inhabitants. In Ireland's novel, this form of domination clamps down upon Australia's future. Puroil "was only an experimental plant; there would be more plants built and new and tougher wires extruded to hold and cage more securely these men who came daily to the blue gates offering their lives in return for the means to continue them. . . . They were comfortable prisoners" (62). Perhaps this is not surprising, given the insidiously "tendential webs" of late-capitalist society, and particularly the way that Australia has been snared in them. Badgery, sitting in the middle of his web-text, has simply adapted to his environment. And the same thing can be said of the rest of the prisoners, who seem comfortable in the space of the prison—amnesiacally endorsing its disciplinary values as a national identity while using Australia's penal-colonial past as a malignant justification of an ideological and economic "colonisation" in the present. Whether or not this is, simply, an innate desire *not to melt away* is a good question; "I would say," Badgery speculates at one point, "that we Australians are a timid people who have no faith in ourselves" (518).

What is clearer is that Badgery's specious domestic dream of a hearth and slippers is a militarily-inspired dream of European society, elicited to no small degree by a fundamental colonial fear. The carceral cell, Whitlock continues, "represents the house translated into hostile space; if 'all really inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home', then to 'tremble behind thick walls' is the mark of expulsion and alienation. The garrison and the prison are the spatial representations of the gap between ancestral home and present location" (54). Or, we might say, the architectural antidotes to the larger problems of colonial dislocation and the "failures" of imperial or "European" configurations of power and knowledge, of language and cultural memories, in the antipodes. We shall see in our discussion of Remembering Babylon that indeterminacy or "in-betweenness" itself is a threat to Europe's discursive supremacy, one that is keenly felt by settler-invaders who, to different degrees, armed themselves with the faith that "the carceral cell overwhelms all opposition" (Whitlock, "Carceral Archipelago" 61).

In the context of post-colonial literature, the authors of The Empire Writes Back have recognized that the theme of built space is a "powerful metonymic force" insofar as "the construction or demolition of houses or buildings in post-colonial locations is a recurring and evocative figure for the problematic of post-colonial identity . . ." (28). In Illywhacker, the problematic of post-colonial identity in built space must be seen as a series of complex linkages between the past and the present, or, in other words, the ambivalent racial and economic linkages that have developed between Australian settler-invaders and Australian Aboriginals, between Australian settler-invaders and Europe, between Australian settler-invaders and America, and, most recently in the 1980s, between Australian settler-invaders and Asia. The carceral space of the Pet Shop, then, stands as a metaphor for Australia itself—a "defensive" or paranoid national

built space or "human zoo" in which a particularly attractive fantasy of power—a vision of the world as a series of cages, of human community as an Australian animal farm—developed into a full blown national identity. The genealogy of this vision, I have suggested, must begin with market exchange, and include the shifting modes of modern social discipline. The prison then is a perfect place to "house" such disciplinary memories, such imperial identities; as Conway and Roenish state, "Architecture provides the environment for our lives. Buildings are not just places of physical shelter, but places where our social rituals are enacted. . . . The meaning of buildings evolves and becomes established by experience and we in turn read our experience into buildings" (23).

The social ritual that I have foregrounded here is imprisonment, a ritual that, at least for Georges Bataille, constitutes the basis of modern Western architecture. Architecture, as Bataille writes, is essentially authoritarian, it is the expression of

the ideal soul of society, that which has the authority to command and prohibit, that is expressed in architectural compositions properly speaking. Thus great monuments are erected like dikes, opposing the logic and majesty of authority against all disturbing elements: it is in the form of cathedral or palace that Church or State speaks to the multitudes and imposes silence upon them. It is, in fact, obvious that monuments inspire social prudence and often even real fear. The taking of the Bastille is symbolic of this state of things: it is hard to explain this crowd movement other than by the animosity of the people against the monuments that are their real masters. (cited by Denis Hollier, *Documents* 46)

Whether or not Bataille's assessment of Revolutionary France is accurate, it makes clear the central role of architecture as an embodiment of authority, as a cultural force that determines how—and what—societies remember and forget. Or who will be silenced. When Herbert Badgery, for example, "opens out" the Pet Shop during its penultimate renovation, he picks up one of many bricks upon which thumb prints have been impressed. In this revealing act of national de(con)struction, Badgery literally confronts Australia's disciplinary past as it is inscribed (literally built) into Australia's present: "I sat on my pile of bricks and tried to work out a simple lift. I picked up a brick and started to scratch a plan on to it with a nail. It was then I noticed the thumb print in the corner. This is common enough with bricks of this age, produced by convicts down at Brickfields, but I had never been so struck with it before" (542).

At this site of palimpsestic memory and of and intertextual interpretation, at this reading of the "stroke" of the sign, Badgery proceeds to interrogate—or in his mind to educate—his son on this ineluctable piece of Australian history.

"You see this brick," I said. "You see the thumb print. You know how that got there? Some poor bugger working at Brickfields a hundred-and-fifty years ago did that. He turned the brick out of the mould and, as he did it, he had to give the wet clay a little shove with his thumbs, see. This one, and this one. They've all got it. So there you are. All around you, in your walls, you've got the thumb prints of convicts, How do you reckon that affects you?"

We, both of us, looked around. It was a big building. It was a lot of thumb prints to consider. (542).

The silence is telling. What is not said, at this point, is that if Badgery seems to feel comfortable—to feel free, as I said before—when he is imprisoned, he also seems to feel culpable for his involvement in his, and his country's, past. We can thus read Badgery's willingness to use the convict past as an *excuse* as a dystopian legacy—as a reason for Badgery to see himself as a helpless victim of international circumstances, to invent himself using national images of the convict which function as excuses to do nothing about complex cultural and economic problems in the present.

In this way, the monumental Pet Shop-turned-prison fictionally interrogates the mnemonic links or social organization of memory that bind Australia's penal-colonial past to its

so-called post-colonial present, not to mention its as yet undetermined future. "[T]here was not yet an Australian architecture," Badgery's grandson Hissao states at one point, "only a colonial one with verandas⁴² tacked on" (586). Hissao, of course, has been tutored in Australian architecture by his patriot grandfather, who claims he cannot tolerate anything that smacks of colonial deference. Leah, who is "sick to death of trying to decide what it meant to be Australian" (586), and who is rather drunken at this point, argues with Hissao that "there never could be an Australian architecture . . . because there was no such thing as Australia or if there was it was like an improperly fixed photograph that was already fading" (586). It is Badgery, though, who most clearly retreats into built space in order *not* to melt away: "An architect," like any good Australian salesman, Badgery tells his grandson, "must have the ability to convince people that his schemes are worth it" (547). But the "architects" who built Australia, according to Badgery, were unable to do so: hence, Australia is an unconvincing invention in which no one can believe. Sydney, as Badgery shows his grandson, is an "imitation Europe" (Wright 13) and as such was full of trickery and deception. If you push against it too hard you will find yourself leaning against empty air. It is never, for all its brick and concrete, quite substantial. . . . I bought him a blue book with underlined pages, I had him do drawings, of buildings that lied about their height, their age, and most particularly their location. There was not one that did not pretend itself huddled in some European capital with weak sun in summer and ice in winter. (547).

What seems to irk the patriot Badgery most is the very first principle of his own architecture and text—the use of artifice to conceal the past. In one sense, Badgery's objection is conditioned by a fear that his country—like himself—is *insubstantial*, built upon lies and stolen land, compromised by "trickery and deception." Indeed, at Martin Place, Badgery shows Hissao "the granite facing on the Bank of New Zealand" in Sydney, the "city of illusions" (Illywhacker 597). He was keen, he tells us, to make his grandson "see that the granite was only a face, a veneer, and that behind this makeup was a plain brick building, but when I dug around with my pocket knife I discovered that the granite was not granite at all but terracotta tiles, clever forgery by the Wunderlich Brothers" (547).

One could do worse than call Badgery's autobiography a "clever forgery." Certainly Goldstein, part-time utopian socialist, levels this charge when she claims that Badgery has been unfair and "barbarian" in the way that he has been stolen from her notebooks or deliberately forgotten" (550) aspects of their shared pasts. Behind such a deceptive national (and textual) veneer, behind such insubstantial and dissembling surfaces, lurks a reality of confinement and convicts, of masters and victims, of subjection and imperial deference, of theft and racism that continues to affect Carey's Australians—a spectre of anxiety and self-disgust.

It is Leah Goldstein who sees most clearly how the cultural imperialism of Australia's economic history is built into the urban spaces of Australia:

⁴² Hissao uses term *veranda* pejoratively. This contradicts Bill Ashcroft's more positive, post-structural theorization of it as a place of in-betweenness and excess and thus a unique and meaningful Australian space in the development of post-colonial consciousness. Ashcroft follows David Malouf's idea from *12 Edmonstone Street* that "verandahs are no-man's land, border zones that keep contact with the house and its activities on the one face but are open on the other to the street, the night, and all the vast unknown areas beyond" (20). Ashcroft writes: "It is the bifocal orientation of the verandah which gives it its resonance . . . and it is precisely this ability to maintain the ambivalent link between the 'house' and the unknown world which gives post-colonial language its peculiar agency. . . . The verandah is that penumbral space in which articulation takes form, where representation is contested, where language is supplemented. The post-colonial lives on the verandah because this is the space where the provisionality of language and the reality of experience can coincide" ("Excess" 42).

architecture, she thought, was no better than bird-smuggling. . . . The new buildings of Sydney cowed her and seemed, in their intentions, no better than the old ones she wished destroyed. They seemed merciless and uncaring, like machines of war. They rose in disciplined ranks and cast shadows in the streets while the night sky was all abloom with their alien flowers. And this, because it was the only architecture that seemed to matter, was the only architecture she could see. She therefore interrupted Hissao to demand that he confront the path he was choosing, that he admit the companies he worked for . . . would almost certainly have *values* that were against the interests not only of fish and birds, but also of marsupials and mammals, human beings included. (585; emphasis added)

But Goldstein herself, no fan of the amnesiac and agonistic glass and steel of the International Style, remains imprisoned in the building she so despises—is entrapped in a web of her own failed idealism, self-loathing, and desire. She is, nonetheless, correct to note how the history of "white" Australia has been a series of cultural and economic sieges, maintained in part by modern architectural "machines of war" whose logic is tyranny and whose "rituals" inspire "social prudence" and "fear."

Badgery, on the other hand, is oblivious, or at least capable of seeing and hearing only what he wants to. He is so thoroughly conscripted by competitive (or market) values that he can only see his son, and then his grandson, as much as his wife or lover, as beating him at his own game, as authorizing schemes the success and scale of which dwarf his own. It is, of course, ironic that Badgery comments upon Hissao's contradictory defense of his father Charles—a very "dangerous innocent" (561)—and his ecologically destructive pet export business, imagining that that "this crass aggression can co-exist with an ability to draw very fine moral distinctions and to see, very objectively, the damage his father's business was doing to the fauna of the country he loved and that, further—like real estate for instance—it was one of those great Australian enterprises that generate wealth while making nothing new" (561).

Most of Badgery's schemes, despite the fierce patriotism of their rhetoric, "make nothing new" for Australia, and Badgery's decision to become an author might be better conceived as a strategic rear-guard decision to regroup—to retreat into the prisonhouse of fiction—the one place where his discursive supremacy cannot be challenged. What is clearer and more to the point is that Hissao—the next generation of "fatally flawed Badgerys" (553)—takes the Badgery carceral legacy of building and of business to its *hateful* extreme, exposing the delusory nationalism and "crass aggression" of his grandfather and the naiveté of his father in the final phase of development of the Pet Shop as a Japanese-owned cage.

Certainly, Hissao's transformation of himself and of the Pet Shop at the end of the novel are acts of hatred and rage, of personal and national revenge. Under Hissao's direction, the Pet Shop grows increasingly unpopular with Australians who resent having their natural resources exploited, and who, we can presume, resent the hollowed-out images Hissao exports. After the suicide of his father (which might be one index of just how "confusing," how futile and fatal, the personal and public space of the prison becomes for Charles and his generation), Hissao decides to give up his career in architecture—his grandfather's favorite subject—and run the emporium, now owned by the "Yanks" (580). He does so out of a sense of family loyalty, and due to no small amount of coercion from his own caged mother, Emma, who blindly insists: "My boy will look after me" (580). Hissao, it is clear, is none too happy with this primogenital career change; as he puts it: "I am directed to become a smuggler" (583). The turning point for Hissao is a benevolent but ill-fated attempt to smuggle "the last recorded gold-shouldered parrot" (587) out of Australia in the crotch of his pants in 1971. The smuggled parrot, which symbolizes both the exotic and the "authentic," and which Hissao is taking to Europe to breed, is crushed by the pelvis of Rosa Carlobene, the amorous (and certainly agile) woman in the seat next to him on flight QF4 to Rome. When the parrot is killed, Hissao turns the rage and shame he feels about his complicity in the systematic exploitation and destruction—the "selling-out"—of his country back upon his

family, back upon the Australians that uncritically endorse it, back upon his grandfather. Hissao "had loved his country more than he had pretended," Badgery writes, "and had tried to make something fine out of something rotten," and it was "because of this incident, with his guilt, with his contempt for himself, that his hate unleashed itself" (593). It is more likely that the contempt Badgery speaks of here is contempt for the Badgery clan and their passive compatriots. "He blames us," Badgery observes of his embittered grandson,

[a]nd it is I, Herbert Badgery, he blames most of all. He comes after midnight and sits beside my bed drinking brandy. There are all sorts of noises in the night, and I don't mean the keening of an aboriginal woman or the grumbling of a mason, but rather the noises in the street where the enemies of the emporium have set up camp . . .

Our conferences, mine and Hissao's, are not remarkable for their wit or elegance. He pours himself a cognac and insults me, sometimes in Japanese, sometimes in English. His face has become coarsened and is showing the effects of all this alcohol. He has become red-nosed, a little pudgy.

"Why don't you die, you old cunt?"

That is the standard of debate . . . (600)

Of course, Badgery, we know, won't die, he has some sort of perverse authorial investment in overseeing his last, greatest "scheme." Badgery claims it as his own, and in many ways, as I have already mentioned, it is an architectural analog of his restrictive text. But this is Hissao's *magnum opus*.

He built like a jazz musician. He restated and reworked the melody of the old emporium. The creaking galleries were gone now, but you saw them still, in your imagination. He built like a liar, like a spider—steel ladders and walkways, catwalks, cages in mid-air, in racks on walls, tumbling like waterfalls, in a gallery spanning empty spaces like a stainless Bridge of Sighs. (597)

In its final advent, this "jazzed-up" prison, in which improvisation and the ability to appear "free" are undercut by a stricter carceral rhythm of control, displays the cultural hybrid Hissao, his family, and his Australian countrymen and women for what they have become: sighing, defeated prisoners caught in the web of corporate spider-like masters:

Oh, what a game they had, what a sweet lovely perversion it was. You could feel the rage. You could feel the whole building, the actual building, shimmering with it until it was a violin filled with parrots, fluttering, panicked in their cages, and the fish in terror, swimming round and round in their bubbling tanks and some timid possum, illegally trapped, in the boss's office, lying mute with fear while its heart, no more than half an inch across, drove itself into a red and dangerous frenzy. It was wrong, of course it was. (497)

If we keep in mind that Carey wrote his novel in 1985, while his countrymen and women prepared to celebrate Australia's 1988 Bicentenary, the Pet Shop becomes an even more significant site of Australian cultural memory, of "authenticity" and "origin": its products, learned futility, pessimism, and passivity, are collected and displayed as the social "meanings" of Australia in a theme-prison for tourists to visit. The Pet Shop-turned Prison would not be out of place as a pavilion at the most recent Expo. As for the prisoners, such behaviour, in an era of late-capitalism and expositions, enables the production, commodification, and sale of Australia as a tourist destination at a global level. Instead of prisoners who are convicts, or even labourers, the Pet Shop is filled with prisoners whose only job is to act like Australians. This carceral mentality endorses a comfortable victim position that, indeed, teaches "It paid to be weak, cunning and gutless" (*The Unknown Industrial Prisoner* 22), and that legitimizes, in the words of Badgery himself, a population whose "great passion would be normality" (*Illywhacker* 433).

Thus Badgery, ever blind to his own complicity in this offensive monument, says of the Pet Shop:

Its whole function was entrapment and its inhabitants could happily while away afternoons and years without any bigger scheme, listening to the races on the radio, reaching out for another oyster, worrying only that the beer glasses were free of detergent and kept, cold and frosted, in the fridge. They discussed the quality of harbour prawns, got drunk, and crunched the prawns' heads, imagining themselves free and happy while all the time they were servants of the building. It made them behave in disgusting ways. (581)

This "disgusting" national behaviour comes close to what I call the "cultural logic" of the Pet Shop, an international spectacle where tourists will pay to see human pets, a nation of "servants," a continent of contented consumers called Australians who happily re-invent themselves as prisoners. Of course, if we believe Badgery, the people entrapped in his Pet Shop/Penitentiary/Text are grateful for being exhibited. Badgery tells us that he and his "monstrous"⁴³ grandson are treating these people "kindly." As Badgery boasts of the inhabitants of the emporium:

you can say it is simply hate that has made Hissao put so many of his fellow countrymen and women on display. Yet he has not only fed them and paid them well, he has chosen them with great affection. There is a spirit in this place. It is this that excites the visitors. The shearers, for instance, exhibit that dry, laconic anti-authoritarian wit that is the very basis of the Australian sense of humour. They are proud people, these lifesavers, inventors, manufacturers, bushmen, aboriginals. They do not act like caged people. The very success of the exhibit is in their ability to move and talk naturally within the confines of space" (599).

We are left, finally, with the feeling that the walls are about to be pushed in on the Pet Shop. There are a growing number of Australians, Carey insists, who refuse to perpetuate the quest for oblivion their forefathers—and mothers—set out upon; a street-level protest that threatens to break into the Pet Shop at any time, enemies "shout [Hissao's] name in the street" (600). Of course, Badgery is no Scopus: I doubt he could recite the names of the Australians he has entombed in his family cage. Yet despite Badgery's unreliable narration, and despite his poetics of victimization, *Illywhacker* brings to light the internecine linkages and interstitial times and spaces between the "lies" of the past and the equally deceptive "truths" of the future. As a "despised" cultural mnemonic, as an Australian "house of memories," teetering at the end of an era, the Pet Shop, albeit through its eventual destruction/deconstruction, signals that there might in fact be, as Badgery writes—and these may be the truest words he has written, though he has probably stolen them from a Chinese proverb—"interesting times ahead" (600).

⁴³ Hissao, Badgery brags, was "his grandfather's grandson and unkindness was his strongest card. . . . What more can a man want when his grandson is all afire with a scheme? He was my flesh and blood, my creature, my monster. I loved him . . ." (596-7). This allusion to *Frankenstein* and the destructive nature of the relationship between Victor Frankenstein and the Being he creates convinces me that Badgery is in fact proud of his hate and lack of kindness.

Chapter Four
§
Colonial Encounters and "In-between Creatures":
Cultural Mnemonics in David Malouf's
Remembering Babylon

We tremble in that strange repetition that ties an irrefutable past (a shock has been felt, a traumatism has already affected us) to a future that cannot be anticipated.

Jacques Derrida
The Gift of Death

In the George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures delivered at Cambridge University in 1961, the historian Edward Hallet Carr noted that the enduring fascination of the Robinson Crusoe myth is "due to its attempt to imagine an individual independent of society" (37). Carr uses the figure of Crusoe to demonstrate the impossibility of anyone—whether "great man" or "dim" historian (42)—to exist independently of society. As the Crusoe story shows, that conception of the world breaks down: "Robinson is not an abstract individual, but an Englishman from New York; he carries his Bible with him and prays to his tribal God. The myth quickly bestows on him his Man Friday; and the building of a new society begins" (37).

Carr does not comment further¹ upon the construction of Crusoe's "new" society and its mostly "Carib" citizens; yet as Crusoe says of a group of "savages" who arrive on his island: "tis certain I was superior to them" (*Robinson Crusoe* 232). To be sure, the configuration of race and class on Crusoe's island empire is of a piece with the world he leaves behind. As Carr suggests, Crusoe is not so much isolated from European society as thoroughly enmeshed in it—he is not about to forget who he is nor his universal social position, and the text he carries with him, his codex of cultural memory, as much as his ledger-journal, is perhaps his strongest reminder of his

¹Carr argues that history is driven primarily by economic and social forces, not great intellects or wills. History, Carr suggests, is no more the record of the lives of "great men" who acted in vacuums than it is the testament of objective (transcendent) historians who imagine themselves independent of the social contexts in which they write. To ignore the contextual element of history is to take a "jack-in-the-boxes" (Carr cites this phrase from V. Gordon Childe's *History* 43) view of the world in which great men work *outside* or *above* history and impose themselves upon it—a model that was, Carr claims, especially prevalent in the imperial nineteenth century. For Carr, "history is to a considerable extent a matter of numbers" (61).

cultural inheritance. Thus Carr sees in Defoe's novel a false opposition between individual and society, one that he claims has endured as a modern myth. As Carr puts it: individuals are "at once a product and an agent of the historical process, at once the representative and the creator of social forces which change the shape of the world and the thoughts of men" (68).

It is not my purpose here to dispute Carr's assessment of the popularity of Robinson Crusoe, especially since his recognition of the *bifurcated* nature of modern individuals as both the product and agent of social forces, I think, can be aligned with the sense of "split" modern consciousness, the perturbed cultural memory, of modern Europeans that Richard Terdiman has identified in Present Past. Rather, my interest in Crusoe in this chapter is prefatory and comparative: instead of interrogating a fictional autobiography that narrates the "surprising incidents" [sic] and "new adventures" (Crusoe 299) of an ostensibly isolated individual, I want to explore the "border" life of another figure whose tale is told by an omniscient narrator and whose life is *memorable* precisely because it is inextricably implicated in both European settler-invader society and Australian Aboriginal society in mid-nineteenth-century Queensland, Australia. Crusoe, the proto-imperialist, on the one hand, surveys his world with an unwavering gaze, and he writes about his colonial encounters with the *certainty* of a colonist whose imminent return to his privileged and secure position in the metropolitan "middle state" (Crusoe 28) is a divine right; Gemmy Fairley, on the other hand, the feckless hero of David Malouf's Remembering Babylon and the subject-of-memory in this chapter, is an orphaned and abused child-labourer turned arsonist-murderer who stows away on a ship in order to escape his fate and *uncertain* place in Great Britain. Malouf's novel elliptically follows Fairley's career from his lowly factory beginnings, through his tenure as a street-wise apprentice to a rat-catcher and his stint as an adolescent seaman, and then, after he is put overboard, as a European who washes ashore and spends the next sixteen years with Aboriginal Australians before finally returning to "white" society.

It is hard to imagine a figure more unlike Crusoe than Fairley. Yet both figures, by virtue of their distinctive "colonial encounters," experience curious colonial memory effects. To put it simply, on his island Crusoe cannot let himself forget his European past but he employs a kind of "imperial amnesia" when he returns to "civilization" and attempts to come to terms with his colonial past; Fairley, in contrast, is less fortunate: he can hardly remember his past life—including his mother tongue—and his "colonial encounter" with the Australian Aboriginals puts him at risk, at least from the point of view of the Queenslanders, to all sorts of "abominations." But Remembering Babylon is not so much about Fairley as about how he *affects* the settler-invader society he attempts to re-enter, how he perturbs the settler-invaders and their cultural memory. As Lee Spinks suggests, "The ambivalent attitude of identification and disengagement that Fairley's presence provokes in the townspeople is significant because his body will become the site of a struggle for mastery between a range of identifying discourses" (168). Pressing this further, my thesis is that Fairley, who is the object of dispute in a complex colonial encounter—a dispute, as Spinks nicely puts it, played out most obviously at the level of colonial discourse—is also a kind of post-colonial "cultural mnemonic": a disfigured and ultimately ambivalent body-of-memories whose uncanny presence and garbled language *reminds* the settlers of their own tenuous epistemological and mnemonic claims to "civilization" and to their own "absent" British past. In doing so, Fairley makes them remember the untenable binaries of colonizer and colonized, of white and black, of pure and impure, of civil and savage. This remembering—which is also a kind of forgetting—profoundly *un-settles* the political and discursive—not to mention psychological and spiritual—terrain of the white settler-invader world, at a level, we might say, that is at least as deep as language and as submerged as ritual and myth. Fairley's presence in the isolated and un-named community, I am arguing, perturbs settler-invader society and provides, from the dual perspectives of post-colonialism and cultural mnemonics, a fictional window into colonial civilization in Australia: its greatest ambitions, its worst nightmares, its most intimate fears. In this view, Fairley becomes a paradigmatic figure of

what I will provisionally call "colonial hypermnnesia"—a ghostly *rememoration*, to use Toni Morrison's term, of not only the Australian Aboriginals who populate the territory around the settlement and who have been *unsuccessfully* written out of the histories of the West, but also of the "unheimlich" *incorporative* mnemonics of Western epistemology and civilization itself, at the centre of which, ironically, we find the institutionalized and ostensibly sanitized remnants of Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian sacrificial rituals, what Derrida has called the "*mysterium tremendum*, the terrifying mystery, the dread, fear and trembling of the Christian in the experience of the sacrificial gift" (*The Gift of Death* 6). From the perspective of cultural mnemonics, the "painful" commemoration of this mystery in the Christian Eucharist is first and foremost a symbolic *reminder* of Christian responsibility: of the self-as-subject and of the self as recipient of the sacrificial gift of death, one that has come to us, Derrida reasons, through the "orgiastic" and "irresponsible" mysteries of the pre-Platonic world from which "Plato tried to deliver philosophy" (7), though the Platonic (idealist) "responsibilities" of the Hellenic and Roman worlds, which incorporate the mysteries of the "orgiastic" past and merge them with "new" cultural meanings, and arrive as a neo-Platonic configuration of the "secret" Christian "soul" that does *not* so much incorporate the past but rather represses it—that is, tries to forget the "mysteries" of spirit and matter, of the disorderly past. But this repression, which results in a kind of sacred "secrecy," is in fact a form of selective remembering. As Derrida points out, this repression is rather specious: "What one keeps inside at the very moment that there comes into play a new experience of secrecy and a new structure of responsibility as an apportioning of mystery, is the buried memory or crypt of a more ancient secret" (5-9). Derrida's argument about the genealogy of modern, European *responsibility* as a form of deferral pivots upon the paradoxical idea of self-sacrifice as a *gift*; perhaps surprisingly, Derrida links the theological tradition of Christian responsibility and sacrifice to the semeological processes of inscription and meaning-making as well as to the concept of the gift, particularly through the work of Marcel Mauss and Lewis Hyde. My interest here lies not so much in these traditions nor in Derrida's scholarship on the gift and temporality in *Given Time* but in Malouf's post-colonial adaptation and relocation of them; that is, Malouf interrogates Western epistemology and ontology and reads anthropophagy at two levels in his novel: one, as a powerful cultural mnemonic in which the story of the "sacrificed" body of Christ, symbolized in the Eucharist, resonates with the cultural and political meanings of European civilization; two, as a source of anxiety and paranoia insofar as the settler-invaders assume that the Australian Aboriginals that inhabit the landscape around the settlement have participated in all sorts of "abominations" but particularly in the eating human flesh. The (ironic) tension between the symbolic and the actual/imaginary, here, becomes a fault line in the cultural memory and the social organization of the settler-invader society, one that Malouf fictionally exploits. His purpose, as I see it, is to examine settler-invader culture from the point of view of a "colonial encounter" with what Malouf calls an "in-between creature" and to show how such an encounter can trouble the (selective) cultural memory of the colonial settlement. The roots of this religious and I will argue economic forgetting cut to the core of European colonialism: they amount to a deep-seated cultural forgetting or *amnesia* that has proven to be rather useful in colonial exploitation and its institutionalized and bureaucratized blindness, not to mention in the concomitant emergence of capitalist modes of exchange and accumulation. It is this cultural amnesia and the location of the "responsible" soul/self out at the edge of empire that I want to read into as effects of memory in *Remembering Babylon*.

Memory plays a central role in the fictional careers of both Crusoe and Fairley, as it does at a more macrological level in all acts of European cross-cultural domination: one of the things that binds social units such as nations together, as Ernest Renan has shown us, is the ability to remember and forget selectively; in addition, one of the central mechanisms of capital accumulation is the formation and circulation of reified commodities. In the case of Crusoe, it is

the repression of memory and the "resistance" to remembering the past, to use Freud's terms for the wilful forgetting and transformative remembering in dreams,² that enables him to *forget* about the specific conditions by which his fortune has been increased and to thereby write himself "up"—to textually remember himself, as it were—as a consolidated European. Peter Hulme has addressed this subject superbly in his *Colonial Encounters*, where he argues that Crusoe is an emblematic figure of the anxious colonial encounter of Europe with its "Other." In Hulme's reading, Crusoe is doubly encoded: the "composed" prototypical British colonist/mercantile capitalist³ and the potentially schizophrenic antithesis of this inviolate figure, one who must come to terms on his island Utopia both with himself and with his colonial "Other." As Hulme puts it, *Robinson Crusoe* is a paradigmatic text of colonial encounter in which "the complex matter of the European/native relationship must be negotiated" (211).

But Crusoe's colonial past is bloody and exploitative, which is difficult for him to reconcile to the genteel present of the "middle state" to which he returns at the novel's close; instead of negotiation we read a monological and unabashedly one-sided act of self-composure. But within Crusoe's mind—let us say, within his memory—this chronological and moral "gap" is nonetheless felt sharply, if only as a kind of momentary sting, a temporarily crippling sense of colonial illegitimacy and guilt. Perhaps Defoe's paradigmatic hero does embody a distinctly modern consciousness, insofar as his identity (and his ultimate salvation) as an "individual"⁴ is

² Freud argues that the "forgetting of dreams is inexplicable unless the power of the psychical censorship is taken into account"; such states of amnesia, Freud suggests, can be extrapolated from dreams, for repression (or, more precisely, the resistance created by it) is the cause both of the dissociations and of the amnesias attaching to their psychical content" (*The Interpretation of Dreams* 555-60).

³ See Anthony Brewer's *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey* (1-24). Brewer usefully identifies the following stages of capitalism and roughly establishes their corresponding periods: "mercantile" capitalism (ca. 1500-1800) during which time European commerce and trade in largely "luxury" items, not to mention slaves, came to dominate much of the world; "classical" capitalism (ca. 1800-1900) during which time intensive industrialization, the employment of free wage labour in privately owned businesses, and the accumulation of capital developed concurrently with political revolutions in America and France; and "monopoly" or "imperialist" capitalism (ca. 1900-), during which time the "export" of capital from Europe increased in an effort to exploit—to "control"—the "few remaining areas not already brought under colonial control"; finally, the era of "late" or "multinational" capitalism, as articulated by Fredric Jameson in *Postmodernism: The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, designates the organization and flow of capital across international borders and a "new international" division of labour that features transnational business, international banking and stock exchange, media interrelationship, computers and automation, but above all, that incorporates an increasingly "tendential web of bureaucratic control" and a collusion of "government and big business" at an international level so ubiquitous as to seem natural, inevitable, and inescapable (xviii-xix). See also Aijaz Ahmad, who argues that "global" or "advanced" capitalism coincides with (and eventually overrides) post-war decolonizations and expanding socialist revolutions; for Ahmad, "global" capital denotes the "unprecedented growth, unification and technological power of capitalism itself, with fully globalized circuits of production and circulation, without colonial divisions and with increasing modernization of travel, transport and communication technologies, with far-reaching consequences for the international division of labour, not to speak of the technologies and effectiveness of subsequent imperialist wars—of destruction, and of prolonged encirclement—against the emerging socialist states and movements in the backward zones" (*In Theory* 20). The basic point here, especially obvious in the descriptive passages from Jameson and Ahmad, is that the accumulation of capital in any era or zone is deeply implicated in the social relations of production, including how the past is used in the present, in how (and what) societies remember and forget.

⁴ In his 1957 *The Rise of The Novel*, Ian Watt reads *Robinson Crusoe* as an early realist novel which sets "the seal of literary approval on the heroes of" an emergent modern "economic individualism" (62). To be sure, the fictional world Defoe created in *Robinson Crusoe* is linked in complex ways to the social and economic context in which it was first published and circulated: England in 1719. During this period, the novel was developing as a new and popular form of printed narrative (arising, critics have argued, out of such diverse sources as romance, fantasy, newspapers, or ballads) for a new "reading"

determined by the flow and accumulation of capital. The *unforgettable* Gemmy Fairley, in contrast, is much less "successful" as a colonist than Crusoe, and his "failures"—that is, his "questionable status" (*Remembering Babylon* 28) and eventual exile from settler-invader society—though tied, at one level, to the flow of capital are, at another level, implicated no less deeply in the "monochromatic" epistemology of the West: in the Manichaean and, I think, amnesiac construction of mind-body that underwrites the Judeo-Christian tradition and that Derrida traces back through Platonism. From the post-colonial perspective, Fairley does indeed demonstrate how the "complex matter of the European/native relationship" must be negotiated; but we can take this one step further and suggest that at the level of cultural memory Fairley stages the on-going negotiation of identity formation in settler-invader society in Australia, and of post-colonial identity formation in general, along the porous and un-settled cultural borders that run between Europe and its colonial others. In doing so he forces the settler-invader community he enters to re-think the embodied memories of its past and the ways that this past can be said to be implicated in the "painful" metaphysical *negations* of Western knowledge in a geographically and epistemologically "dislocated" colonial present.

To consider the rhetoric of memory in settler-invader society in *Remembering Babylon*, then, is also to consider how Europe's colonial past has persisted uneasily into the post-colonial present—how this persistence extends past the point where History or Tradition can adequately explain the colonial order of things. If we accept that cultural memory is a particularly postmodern response to the problem of representing the past and of historiography, a mode of self-reflexive remembering and forgetting that locates memory within the sphere of contemporary culture and social organization, and if we think of the impact of four centuries of colonialism and its "heterogeneous practices" (Loomba xiii) as an intervention into the post-colonial present at the level of cultural semiotics in its complexities, complicities, and contradictions, perhaps then we can read Fairley as an avatar of colonial cultural mnemonics. We have already noted, following Catherine Hall, that colonialism is one of Europe's most "uncomfortable memories" (66), a set of "problems" that, as the proliferation of post-colonial writing today surely demonstrates, continue to haunt the West. In this sense, Hall argues it is imperative that the West begins "remembering empires differently" (66). This is a complex and heterogeneous project, to be sure, and one that we cannot encompass here, not least because, as Hall correctly notices, the West remains intimately and ineluctably connected to its so-called "peripheries."³ Yet to begin to change these connections between the past and the present, to imagine (and eventually attain) a future that is not conscripted by the (colonial) past, to ensure the possibility of "new" collaborative cultural identities in the present in places like Australia or Canada, New Zealand or South Africa, or even the United States, we must get to the root of what Robert Young has called the totalizing "white mythologies" that underwrite Western knowledge: an incorporative and negative knowledge that imagines itself transcendent and that is "always centred in a [European] self even though it is outward looking, searching for power and control of what is other to it" (*White Mythologies* 4). The representation of "in-between" figures in literature like Fairley, who live on the borders between Europe and its Other, between the myths of the past and the post-colonial discourse of the present, embody the anxieties and difficulties of living in "in-between" or "border" lives at the same time that they provide fictional explorations of these "new" spaces and modes of being

public. With its roots in the Renaissance, the rise of capitalism, Protestantism, and the industrial revolution, the "cult of individualism" that Crusoe stands for is emblematic, for Watt, of the modern era, and, we might say, a harbinger of the "mnemonic economy" of modernity.

³ In "Histories, Empires and the Post-colonial Moment" Catherine Hall notices that traces of empire are everywhere in Britain: in the forms of street names, parks, and public monuments, and in ingested commodities (sugar, tea, spices, coffee, cocoa, mango chutney, etc.). I point this out to remind readers of the corporeality of memory, of the architectural modalities of memory, of the mnemonic economy of commodities (66), but mostly of the labyrinthine nature of remembering and forgetting.

in the world and challenge the re-membering that underwrites Western civility. As Hall has argued, this fictional interest in the past and in the questions of (cultural) memory—in the “internalization” of power and in the endurance of ideology—might well give us the “necessary tools” (66) to understand the post-colonial present.

This thesis, in its efforts to understand memory as a cultural problem that intersects with post-colonialism, is an attempt to ask one or two such new questions. From the post-colonial perspective, novels like *Robinson Crusoe* and *Remembering Babylon* reveal the impossibilities and uncertainties that mark the legacy of Europe's imperial expansion, including the sense of mnemonic disturbance or crisis that I have suggested is inherent in the idea and experience of empire: of chronological, geographical, and epistemological dislocation, of new “places” and “old” languages and (cultural) memories. In the case of Defoe's novel, as Hulme explains, the celebrated success of Crusoe's colonial encounter—including his knack for accumulating capital—is undercut by the larger (if latent) moral and epistemological problems arising from the fact that Crusoe's wealth, in the end, has been violently extracted for over thirty years from the labour power of slaves. This “dirty” racial truth, Hulme suggests, is one that the body and mind—not to mention narrative—of the benevolent capitalist-despot can not handle: when Crusoe discovers the extent of his profit he falls into a swoon, and his narrative passes over this problem in a sentence. Of course, this “horrible” success, this “literal excess” (Hulme 222), does little to address the problem of the *silent* slaves whose sweat and blood has literally enriched Crusoe; Crusoe, we could say, must *forget* this fact. Perhaps fittingly, then, at a more symbolic level, we notice that Crusoe's Man Friday conveniently “disappears” from the narrative at the end of the novel when he and Crusoe return, as Crusoe puts it, “to the centre of my travels” (*Crusoe* 296). In this view, I think, *Robinson Crusoe* dramatizes a specifically colonial mnemonic pathology—a wilful amnesia or drive to repress and edit “un-settling” aspects of the colonial past.

If Defoe's text, as Hulme contends, obliquely answers but does not pose “the ultimate colonial question” (Hulme 222), it is because the specific conditions and abuses committed in the name and practice of accumulating imperial capital—what Crusoe calls his “rise by enterprize” (*Crusoe* 28)—are best *forgotten*, or better yet, *never remembered*.⁶ Confession, as I have already stated, signals the uneasy persistence of the past into the present in individuals as much as in nations, in “autobiographical” texts as much as in religious and psychoanalytical confessional practices. At stake is the possibility—or impossibility—of narrating a coherent and consolidated “self” that can annul the past, or at least reconcile it to the present and thus project itself into an unlimited future. In (confessional) *colonial* novels, the persistence of the past as a problem and its refusal to be annulled or repressed is a recognizable trope: think of Marlow's indeterminate

⁶ This is the case, at a textual—or intertextual—level, at least until the publication of J. M. Coetzee's novel *Foe* in 1986. Coetzee retells Defoe's famous novel from the point of view of Susan Barton, who in the early eighteenth century in fact meets with a writer named “Daniel Foe” and relates her story of an island exile with a man “Cruso” and his mute slave “Friday.” Barton's quest to preserve her memories of colonial encounter is fraught by complex textual questions invoked by modern historiography, not to mention the overt sexism of both Foe and Cruso. At one point on the island she asks Cruso: “Is it not possible to manufacture paper and ink and set down what traces remain of those memories, so that they will outlive you; or, failing paper and ink, to burn the story upon wood, or engrave it upon rock? We may lack many things on this island, but certainly time is not one of them” (17). Cruso doesn't share Barton's concern: “Nothing is forgotten” said he; and then: “Nothing I have forgotten is worth remembering.” (17). Barton, of course, disagrees with this bit of “loopy” patriarchal logic, and eventually translates her need to remember into a complex (inter)text that dislocates both author (Defoe) and character (Crusoe) from the privilege and security of *Robinson Crusoe* and relocates—remembers—them in a contemporary metafiction in which the “mastery” of both is problematised, as are the relationships between writing and speech-as-self-presence, between literature and history, between races, and between genders. Susan writes, as she puts it, “lest I forget” (17); she continually “troubles” both Cruso and Mr. Foe with her own “ultimate” colonial historiographic and fictional question: “do you remember?” (48).

confession in Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness or the three "penitent" narrators of Rodney Hall's Yandilli Trilogy. Crusoe's sojourn in the Caribbean can be read as an instance of the problematic of the colonial past, as a symptom of a distinct mnemonic pathology or the effect of a colonial memory disturbance, one might say, in which disjunctive "colonial" identities form in the aporetic spaces in-between metropolitan centre and colonial margin, in-between "us" and "them." In this colonial encounter, in this interstitial space and the disjunctive chronology, in this "space" of cultural contact, of the time-lagged stoke of the (confessional) sign, identities become increasingly unclear and indeterminate.

The mnemonic resonances of such encounters dramatize and problematize the complex linkages between Europe and its colonies, as well as between (unified and coherent) self and (marginalized) other. At the heart of this staging is an uneasiness, a "crisis" in knowing, we might say, that *compromises* the imperial self at the same time that it attempts to *consolidate* its modern colonial identity, including its most "uncomfortable" colonial memories.⁷ Thus Crusoe, the benevolent despot, cannot ask "the ultimate colonial question—the question that asks by what right land is taken away from those living on it, the question that asks, in other words, why there is a need for a rift to exist between moral economy and productive economy, justice and violence, labour and capital" (Hulme 222) because, as Hulme hints, Crusoe knows the answer too well. Indeed, as I have been arguing, the overwhelming amnesic *need for a rift to exist between* the past and the present is one of the epistemological preconditions of European imperialism, one grounded, as Young suggests, in the social relations of capitalist production and in the oldest formations of Western epistemology. In the most general terms, fictional figures like Crusoe or Marlow demonstrate the complexities and contradictions involved as Europe attempts to forget—or at least remember selectively—that which is "excessive" and disturbing about its colonial past. It would not do to have every colonist fainting.

It is my purpose in this chapter, then, to explore the cultural mnemonics of the liminal space denoted by Hulme, this *rift between*: between moral economy and productive economy, between justice and violence, between labour and capital, but also, to expand the frame of this debate, between unknown and known, between dark and light, between colonized and colonizer, between past and present.⁸ This is the space of the colonial present, of cultural memory. More precisely, and with the help of several guides, I want to consider from the post-colonial perspective the cultural mnemonics of the *border* as an interstitial space, a place where cultural

⁷ Like Malouf's settler-invaders, whose agendas are clearly acquisitive and commanding, Crusoe is *paranoid* and *defensive*. The "living" fences that Crusoe constructs around his "fortress" (*Robinson Crusoe* 77), as he puts it, are set up with the purpose in mind of "securing my self against either savages, if any should appear, or wild beasts" (76). In "The Carceral Archipelago: Marcus Clarke's His Natural Life and John Richardson's Wacousta," Gillian Whitlock argues that structures such as fences, forts, and even prisons, as we have already seen, are techniques by which settler-invader culture extends its ideal of cultural authority, "a tyrannical ideal of order and precision" that is intended to preserve colonial identity by regulating movement across cultural borders in order "to reduce multiplicity to a unitary, vertical, hierarchical order" (50). This sort of carceral or "garrison" mentality (51), Whitlock suggests, following Foucault, is founded upon "military dreams" of a disciplined, institutionally regulated society that would prevent horizontal cultural engagement—the possibility of in-between, indeterminate border lives, like Fairley's. Citing the work of Michael Hurley, who develops Michael Ondaatje's idea of "border blur" and Marshall McLuhan's "break boundaries," Whitlock concludes that the borderline is a threat precisely because "the borderline is an area of spiraling repetition and replay, of both inputs and feedback, of both interlace and interface, an area of 'double ends joined', of rebirth and metamorphosis" (58).

⁸ It is tempting to read this list as a series of binary oppositions; the point of reading *Remembering Babylon* as a manifesto of "in-betweenness," as a remembering of what the West would rather forget, however, is to collapse such arbitrary structuring and to understand the "in-between" as a non-threatening and collaborative position. When it comes to being in the world, when it comes to memory, we are perpetually in the *middle* of things.

contact occurs between European settler-invaders⁹ and Australian Aboriginals in mid-nineteenth-century Queensland. Speaking for the Australian Aboriginal tribe,¹⁰ Malouf's narrator calls Fairley an "in-between creature" (28): in-between two worlds, in-between two knowledges, even in-between remembering and forgetting. As such, Fairley lives in/out the sort of cultural hybridity articulated by Homi Bhabha, whose work on the location of cultural, on the mnemonics of the time lag, and on the interstice we have already considered. For Fairley, whose patronymic itself conjures up at least the hope of a better world than the *unfair* ones into which he is endlessly cast, forces the settlers to look at themselves and to question the meanings and values of their "civilization," to doubt their (chronologically, epistemologically) *dislocated* and *amnesic* colonial selves. Fairley is thus both a "product" of colonial processes and an "agent" of post-colonial change—a disturbing "sign" of a new kind of identity, an hybrid social being that has entered the colonial world in the most inauspicious and painful way, but that might indeed help to *change without violence* the shape of the colonial world and the thoughts and desires—the cultural memories—of women and men.

Unlike Robinson Crusoe or Captain Marlow, Fairley, the central character of Malouf's 1993 novel, is kicked out of European society. A veteran of sawdust pits in Britain at age five or six (147), Fairley becomes "Willet's Boy" (148): fetching ale, lacing boots, greasing skillets, and catching rats in the ponds at Regent Park or in the sewers for his abusive master. Fairley, we are told, remembers little of his past life, except that one night when he is eleven or twelve, when he grows tired of the rat bites, his master's kisses, the "frigging," the razor strop, when "some darker nature has begun to emerge in him" (151), he sets fire to Willet's room while Willet is passed out, and flees. After two or three years at sea (153) in which he is "often bullied, or worse" (154), Fairley becomes ill and is put overboard the *Pamukale* off the coast of Queensland, Australia. When he is washed ashore, Fairley is found by a tribe of Australian Aboriginals. He spends the next 16 years with them, until, "One summer in the middle of the nineteenth century" (1) three white children mimicking wolf hunters on the Russian steppes discover him *perched on a fence* at the edge of their Queensland settlement.

This moment marks Fairley's *unsuccessful* attempt to re-enter white society, as well as the novel's departure from more familiar narratives of adventure and romance¹¹ in which

⁹ The authors of *The Empire Writes Back* identify three persistent problems that they see reflected in the literatures of settler-invader societies such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and (perhaps problematically) the United States. The three major issues they recognize "highlight some of the basic tensions which exist in all post-colonial literatures," such as "the relationship between social and literary practices in the old world and the new; the relationship between the indigenous populations in settled areas and the invading settlers; and the relationship between the imported language and the new place. In critical practice these are often inextricably interwoven" (135). This tripartite framing foregrounds the fundamental relational or "in-between" nature of settler-invader society, and foregrounds, for my purposes, the disjunction between past and present that works itself out as a problem of cultural memory in post-colonial fiction.

¹⁰ In "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Gayatri Spivak notes the "discontinuous" or double sense of "representation": 1) "political representation" in which subjects are spoken for in forensic/state formations; 2) aesthetic re-presentation, in which subjects are spoken for in philosophical and artistic subject-predication (70). Spivak's point is that the two different senses of the word can be used to cancel out both the specific ideological processes by which subjects-as-multiple are constructed and to efface the powerful "self-knowing" positions of intellectuals and artists who would re/present Europe's Other. With these parameters in mind we can see that Malouf's hyper-omniscient narrator toes a fine political and aesthetic line.

¹¹ Generically, as Peter Hulme has noted in *Colonial Encounters*, *Robinson Crusoe* can be considered a "colonial romance" (208); following the work of Northrop Frye, Hulme points out that the

"colonial encounters" occur between fictional Europeans and the indigenous inhabitants of their "new" worlds. Most obviously, the novel focuses less on Fairley's encounter with Australian Aboriginals (this period of his life is dealt with in a dozen or so pages) than on his subsequent return to the Queensland settlement. From the settler's point of view, two things happen in this paradigmatic moment of colonial self-apprehension: first, the settler-invaders sense that something has happened to Fairley during his colonial encounter with the Australian Aboriginals that transforms (that deforms) him forever, at corporal, linguistic, and spiritual levels; second, in apprehending the deformed, wraith-like creature before them, the settler-invaders see something of themselves, something that they can neither embrace nor abject—a "thing of darkness" that they cannot quite acknowledge "mine." In this way, Fairley's encounter with his so-called countrymen and women is more like an *unsettling* nightmare: a protracted haunting that produces paranoia and doubt and an *inactive* and bovine (non-Nietzschean) wilful amnesia in most of the settlers' minds, but that eventually causes some to learn how to *remember*.

Fairley's colonial encounter¹² with the Australian Aboriginals can be called collaborative—a process of cultural engagement not (military, religious, economic) cross-cultural domination. But it is the perception of this collaboration between white and black society and its transformative effects, I think, that ultimately threatens the settler-invaders the most, because it leads to a sense of self and civic *doubt*, because it leads to a more ambivalent and less certain transformative cultural identity. That is, in the settler-invader community, Fairley's "return" is unacceptable precisely because of his in-between or indeterminate status, because of his cross-border, cross-cultural *lives*. Instead of acceptance, Fairley's presence invokes paranoia, fear, and the will to repress in his countrymen and women: fear of contagion, of violence, of territorial warfare, of depravity, of illegitimacy, but especially—and I think this is most important for my argument about Fairley as a disturbing body-of-memory—of *meaninglessness*.

We will unpack this epistemological colonial baggage in due course. For now, let us turn to Fairley's transformative experience in Australian Aboriginal society. We read that he "was accepted by the tribe but guardedly; in the droll, half-apprehensive way that was proper to an in-between creature" (*Remembering Babylon* 28). Curiously, the tribe imagines that he comes from a "thinner world of wraiths and demons that he had escaped, though never completely" (118). When Fairley takes his place at the edge of their nomadic society, in with "the loose mob of old folk, women mostly, who straggled in the rear" (25), at first, "they left a good space around him" (25), until it becomes clear that Fairley is "not to be got rid of" (25). "When they came to a halt at last and made camp, he claimed a place for himself in the second or third ring from the fire, and his neighbours, though wary, made no dispute" (25).

Eventually, Fairley is accepted well enough to become part of the tribe's oral traditions: a triumph, we can say, of cultural translation over what would seem to be insurmountable cultural differences. The tribe recalls, for example, how

when they found him he had still been half-child, half-sea calf, his hair swarming with spirits in the shape of tiny phosphorescent crabs, his mouth stopped with coral; how, ash-pale and ghostly in his little white shirt, that long ago had rotted like a caul, he had risen

dominant structural elements of romance include the projection of idealized human forms—beautiful or virtuous heroes and heroines and equally simplistic but debased villains (such as cannibals)—and resemble the simplified and *nostalgic* wish-fulfillment dream (208-9). "The romance form is useful to the colonial enterprise precisely because it *reduces* (in another sense of that key word) a potentially embarrassing cultural complexity to the simplicity of the essential romance terminology: heroes and villains" (211).

¹² In an Afterword to the novel, Malouf acknowledges that: "The words Gemmy shouts at the fence in Chapter 1 (the seed of this fiction) were actually spoken at much the same time and place, but in different circumstances, by Gemmy Morril or Morrell, whose christian name I have also appropriated; otherwise this novel has no origin in fact" (202).

up in the firelight and danced, and changed before their eyes from a sea-creature into a skinny human child. (27)

The process of becoming-human that Malouf renders here stands in sharp contrast to the dehumanizing treatment that, as we shall see in a moment, Fairley receives at the hands of the white townsfolk. At this point, though, Fairley, whose identity is represented as a *process*, a *becoming human*, does not struggle with his hybrid status as much as he does with basic material needs, in much the same way he did in Europe. He

began his life with [the Australian Aboriginals], doing what he had always done. It was all he knew. Since he had found his way into the world, his object, like any other creature's, was to stay in it and by any means he could. He had a belly to be fed. In the days that followed he winkled out a place among them, made himself small, scouted about for this or that one he might attach himself to, looked droll, looked pathetic, and when he could not get what he wanted that way, would dart in under the half-playful, half-timorous cuffs, grab what he wanted and gobble it down before he was topped. He was not put off by the occasional bruise. (25)

has learned this curious "self-making" (a form of self-effacement), Malouf's narrator implies, in the factories, ale-houses, and rented bed-rooms of the metropolitan centre. There seems to be very little that is "fair" about our protagonist's former life; indeed, Fairley's lack of property, his utter inability to accrue wealth, and even his lack of proficiency in English all signal that instead of the lofty ruminations of a "self-composed" imperialist such as Crusoe we are witnessing here a performance on the theme of how to "get by" in-between two worlds.

Fairley's arrival in the indigenous community thus can be read as a fortunate physical, social, and spiritual "rebirth" that "miraculously"¹³ takes place at the edge of the sea: a paradoxical and parodic moment of transformation and becoming, one might say, that evokes pivotal scenes from both Christian soteriology and Darwinian evolution—not to mention Foucault's Western Man and his modern episteme.¹⁴ It is no metaphysical problem, for example, that this new form of life has come to the Australian Aboriginals from

some other world, or life, out of which the creature, whatever it was, sea-calf or spirit, was still emerging. They started, expecting as they watched to see some further transformation. The eyelids drooped and flickered. Now, they thought. It is letting go of that other life. It sees us. Now. The mouth opened revealing a swollen tongue. But no change occurred. (23)

Fairley, who is identified here as a hybrid sea-creature/human child, is about fifteen years old,¹⁵ and the process of his socialization slowly begins once it is clear that he is no longer "emerging." In order to survive, he relies on a child's instinct and mimicry to adapt to his new life: "he was a child, with a child's quick capacity to take things in and the street child's gift of mimicry" (25-6). First he "made himself small" (25), "[r]elying on a wit that was instinctive in him and had been sharpened under harder circumstances than these, he let himself be gathered into a world which, though he was alarmed at first by its wildness, proved no different in essence from his previous one" (26). Again, Malouf's narrator does not spell out this "essential" similarity, and such a claim

¹³ I use this term here in the secular and imperial sense that Thomas Pynchon uses it in *The Crying of Lot 49* to denote the "intrusion" of one world into another.

¹⁴ The evocative ending of Michel Foucault's *The Order of Things* suggests that the recently invented "European man" and his "profound history of the Same" would be "erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea" (387), by new arrangements of knowledge. One way to look at colonialism and its post-colonial legacy, then, is as a prolonged period of just such epistemic rupture, a period in which "European man" is contested and redrawn by confrontations and altercations with his or her other. The face in the sand evoked by Foucault might be re-drawn as the ambivalent, amphibious Gemmy Fairley: "Lying half in salt and the warm wash of it, half in air that blistered" (22).

¹⁵ Fairley is "eleven or twelve years old" when he kills off Willet (151); he then spends "Two years . . . at sea. Or three" (153).

should raise the hackles of critics who might already be wary of a narrator whose unlimited omniscience smacks of imperial historiography. But we get a sense, nonetheless, of the prohibitions and taboos that conscript Fairley's "new" world:

No woman, for example, would have to do with him, and there were many objects in the camp that he was forbidden to touch. Their life was a cat's cradle of rights and restrictions; they all had objects, people too, they must not look upon; but the restrictions on him were his alone, and the separation he felt, his *questionable status*, kept alive in him what he might otherwise have let go. (28 emphasis added)

We shall consider in detail what Fairley remembers from his past: what he does not let go and what does not let go of him, most obviously *language*. Here, we get a sense of the social discipline of the Australian Aboriginal society, how categories of purity and impurity also order the world of the "blacks." As the anthropologist Mary Douglas has suggested, such boundaries are attempts to create "unity in experience," attempts to "positively" order our environments and to make them "conform to an idea" (*Purity and Danger* 2). This is, in one view, the same argument that Hulme has made around the figure of the cannibal in European colonial discourse and the way it has been used to justify distinctly Western psychic and ideological borders, a problem we will return to at the close of this chapter when we get to the heart of the matter and ask what bothers the settler-invaders most about Fairley, when we see that the European settler-invaders insistence upon purity¹⁶ conceals a deep-seated colonial anxiety about their own "impure" identities and knowledges. For now, Fairley's arrival in the Australian Aboriginal community clearly transgresses such ideas of an exclusive, "unified" community. But whereas Fairley's return to European society is impeded by paranoia, in Australian Aboriginal society his presence is tolerated, albeit grudgingly, as a kind of accumulative beginning: a process of hybridity or *becoming-human* in which diversity and cultural transformation/translation are not only possible, but expected. Fairley, we read, remembers his past; and to the Australian Aboriginals he is a living question: "What was it? A sea-creature of a kind they had never seen before from the depths beyond the reef? A spirit, a feeble one, come back from the dead and only half reborn?" (22).

In contrast, in the settler-invader community Fairley is considered to be, at best, half-dead—a wraith-like creature who haunts the Queensland community but who cannot be included within its "pure" and "dead-certain" geographical or chronological order. To be sure, Fairley inspires questions in the European settlement, but the mood of these questions is one of crisis and threat. It is fitting, then, that the settler-invaders discover Fairley sitting on a fence—an actual and symbolic barrier. At first, the children who discover Fairley perched there deny that he is human and assume he is part of the landscape they warily inhabit: "In the intense heat that made everything you looked at warp and glare, a fragment of ti-tree swamp, some bit of the land over there that was forbidden . . . had detached itself from the band of grey that made up the far side of the swamp . . . a shape more like a watery, heat-struck mirage than a thing of substance, elongated and airily indistinct . . ." (2). The children conclude he is a "black" (2), which for them is tantamount to saying he is non-human; his indeterminate status, they have been taught early on, still belongs to nature, and failing that to the dark and *immoral* realm of the "savage" and "supernatural":

¹⁶ Although Mary Douglas disagrees with the idea that categories of "purity" and "pollution" imply rigidity and suggests that they are attempts to "create unity in experience" and are examples of the positive re-ordering of our environments" (2), she does recognize that "It may seem that in a culture which is richly organized by ideas of contagion and purification the individual is in the grip of iron-hard categories of thought which are heavily safeguarded by rules of avoidance and by punishments. It may seem impossible for such a person to shake his own thought free of the protected habit-grooves of his culture. How can he turn round upon his thought-process and contemplate its limitations?" (*Purity and Danger* 5).

its flamelike flickering, was not even, maybe, human. The stick-like legs, all knobbed at the joints, suggested a wounded waterbird, a brolga, or a human that in the manner of the tales they told one another, all spells and curses, had been changed into a bird, but only halfway, and now, neither one thing nor the other . . . It was a scarecrow that had somehow caught the spark of life . . . (2-3).

At a certain level, the response of the children to the unknown colonial apparition in this aporetic space—"all spells and curses"—is a familiar trope for dealing with the colonial other in English literature, one that reaches back at least to *The Tempest*.¹⁷ Fairley, however, turns out to be white and to speak English. His first words when the children come upon him are "Do not shoot," "I am a B-b-british object!" (3). Ironically, Fairley's malapropism articulates his status in the settler-invader community precisely, and it foreshadows the *dehumanizing* treatment he will receive at the hands of the Queenslanders. For Fairley is a threat to the Enlightenment rationality that underwrites their imperial project of territorial possession and civilization; he is an unknowable "object" that will not be nurtured nor allowed to transform in-time into a *human* "subject."

Perhaps the best way to think through this response is to see it as a kind of inscription-conscription, a closing down of indeterminate spaces and a paralysis (a freezing of time and its discursive lagging) of the minds of the settlement's youngest inhabitants that takes place around the idea or "sign" of the "human" and that, fittingly, occurs most clearly in a text. We have already noted that Fairley's transformation in the Australian Aboriginal society is a process of *humanization*: of gradual inclusion and incorporation into the changing world of the tribe, and even into a dynamic "human" body. From the colonial point of view of the Queenslanders, however, Fairley is a discomfiting object whose trans-cultural and corporal mobility has "infected" his once healthy and consolidated (British) body—a stigma that the settlers cannot see past, a potential pathogen from which they wish to quarantine themselves. Hence the settlers feel compelled, at one level, to "freeze" Fairley in this moment of encounter on the "boundary fence" (2): in-between the non-collaborative and synchronic order of the "white man's authority," guaranteed by shotguns, Lands Offices, and the Law (9), and the "Absolute Dark" of Australian Aboriginal culture, the swampy, chaotic "abode of everything savage and fearsome . . . of nightmare rumours, superstitions" (3).

The settler-invader's *dehumanizing* treatment of Fairley is grounded in a racist *humanism*¹⁸ that, as Young has shown in the context of European colonialism, consists of

¹⁷ In "This Thing of Darkness I Acknowledge Mine" Paul Brown explores *The Tempest* as a "limit text in which the characteristic operations of colonialist discourse may be discerned" (68), including the fundamental, rationalist *negation* of the colonial other who displays, as Brown suggests, "the absence of those qualities that connote civility, for example, no law, no government, no marriage, no social hierarchy, no visible mode of production, no permanent settlement" (56). Brown points out that this "negative formula" is an example of "the production of *tabula rasa*"—a point that I want to emphasize given its mnemonic connotations in classical mnemotechnics. The other, here, is produced as an empty, forgettable body-space "to be inscribed at will by the desire of the colonist" (Brown 56). In "Exporting Oblivion in *The Tempest*," Jonathan Baldo argues that the legacy of modern European colonialism amnesia or the "collective memory" in those places colonized by Europe has been, to say the least, difficult to maintain (1-2). "*The Tempest*, a hybrid production, both script and performance, of a culture poised between its oral past and print-dominated future, mediates between European and native, though apparently [as Prospero's machinations clearly show] for questionable motives of totalization and control" (15).

¹⁸ In "What is Enlightenment" Michel Foucault has noted that humanism is a "set of themes that have reappeared on several occasions, over time, in European societies; these themes, always tied to value judgments, have obviously varied greatly in their content, as well as in the values they preserve. . . . From this we must not conclude that everything that has ever been linked with humanism is to be rejected, but that the humanistic itself is too supple, too diverse, too inconsistent to serve as an axis for reflection. And it is a fact that, at least since the seventeenth century, what is called humanism has always been obliged to

"universal essential features which define the human" and which "mask over the assimilation of the human itself with European values" (*White Mythologies* 122); put in other words, the mercenaries, missionaries and merchants who were the agents and actors of European imperialism exported a version, and vision, of "Man" around the world that, as Michel Rolph Trouillot puts it, was male and white. Such a figure, Trouillot contends, preoccupied both artists and philosophers (and I would add historians to this list) and the "more European merchants and mercenaries bought and conquered other men and women, the more European philosophers wrote and talked about "Man" (75).

Trouillot's text attempts to break the silence of History in Haiti. To begin to remember. In a similar sense, perhaps, we can begin to see how Fairley's "in-between" life, his "dis-integrated" or doubled self, destabilizes the universal or static (binarist, amnesic) epistemological foundations upon which the West, and Western Man, has been built; perhaps we can even begin to see how he functions as a distinctly colonial cultural mnemonic—a body-of-memories and inscribed signs that, in the terms of Western historiography, has "gone native." But Malouf's interest, here, is not so much in the hybrid creature or errant European as in the colonial settlement to which this "repressed" figure returns. The central problem in Malouf's novel is that the settler-invaders can only see the "human" as white and European, and their "civilization" as an outpost of such an "enlightened" world view—one, I would add that is keenly aware of its marginality and hence in need of defense. We will return to this defensive, paranoid ordering, to these *static* institutional and taxonomic claims, represented in the novel by the minister Abbot and by the teacher Frazer, below. For what is at stake in their humanist effort to "know" Fairley, as we shall see, is not only their sense of "enlightened" civilization but their sense of a coherent and autonomous "self." As Simon During explains, in the context of Enlightenment humanism "human beings have a unified self in which consciousness determines behaviour and in which thought and feeling can, at least potentially, mesh into a harmonious whole" (*Foucault and Literature* 18).

It is one of the fundamental assumptions of this dissertation—not to mention a good deal of contemporary critical and literary (and especially post-colonial) theory—that this equation must be reversed: as I have already argued, following the logic of Marx and Raymond Williams, "social being determines consciousness" (Williams, *Marxism and Literature* 75); culture—or for our purposes cultural memory—is the system of signs and values of the social that directly and indirectly effects the on-going "shaping of societies and the shaping of human minds" (17). Hence traditions, rituals, commemorative objects, language, knowledge, and even skin colour might seem to convey from the past a consecrated and completed image of Enlightenment Man—at once European, White, Male, Self-Identical, and static—but out at the edge of empire the cultural transmission is, at best, weak and open to interference, resulting in the appearance, the apparition, of figures like Fairley. Fairley's arrival in the settlement, then, can be seen as a paradigmatic and unforgettable moment of colonial encounter: of "ghostly" colonial (and post-colonial) subject-formation *in-between*, of cross-cultural engagement and contamination, of the "latent potential of actual self-other cultural encounters" (Slemon, "Everest" 21). The position of the human subject *in-between* the Self and the Other, *in-between* the past and the future, as described by Bhabha, is suspended between a developing consciousness and material social processes, *in-between* mind and body. The "human subject," Bhabha writes, "is neither Inside (the psyche) nor Outside (in the social). Identity is an intersubjective, performative act that refuses the division of public/private, psyche/social. It is not a 'self given to consciousness, but a 'coming-to-consciousness' of the self through the realm of symbolic otherness—language, the social system, the unconscious" ("Unpacking" 206).

lean on certain conceptions of man borrowed from religion, science, or politics. Humanism serves to color and to justify the conceptions of man which it is, after all, obliged to take recourse" (45).

Unlike the Aboriginal Australians, most of the settler-invaders in Malouf's novel are incapable of such transformational, such hybrid or fluid identities; most of the settler-invaders have divided their conscious and material worlds and set up actual and symbolic fences to prevent such permeable selves or "border lives." It is not an exaggeration to say that most of the settler-invaders are given to a form of colonial authority and imperial consciousness that clamps down on such intersubjective or performative acts of hybrid identify-formation and cultural collaboration. Several of them, however, as a result of coming into contact with Fairley, as I will show, do begin a process of "coming-to-consciousness" that undercuts the static certainties of Cartesian consciousness and civility. But the tenacity of the settler-invader's defense of their "timeless" European cultural values becomes almost comic in the novel, as the settler-invaders attempt to prevent any more cross-cultural encounter, any more spread of contagion, by first pathologizing Fairley and then, quite literally, by trying to *figure him out*. Such is the moribund politics of purity and danger, of inclusion/exclusion, of European or Western Man's identity-as-defense. But figures like Lachlan Beattie, his cousin Janet Melvor, and even his uncle Jock Melvor are "touched" by this strange creature, or, we might say, untouched by the *rigor mortis* of Eurocentrism, hinting at the possibility, at the inevitability of cultural translation. For them, Fairley's presence in the settlement perturbs the settlement, altering the settler-invaders' perception of themselves and their social organization; he forces them to consider a sense of "myself" as more multiple and transformative, as mysterious, hybrid, and in-between, as open to the land and peoples around them in the antipodes—an alternative to Europe's anxious and thanatic "constitution of Other as the Self's [deadly] shadow."¹⁹

Fairley's *interstitial* and *indeterminate* place in the settler-invader community, then, to use several terms from Bhabha's theoretical lexicon, initiates those acts of cultural translation that promise to open up/out the settler-invader community, acts that signal the possibility—indeed the necessity—in settler-invader societies like Australia of what Derek Walcott has recognized in the Caribbean context as the "monumental groaning and soldering of two great worlds" ("The Muse of History" 370). It hardly needs to be said that, whether in the metropolitan centre or on the colonial periphery, this process has proven to be a slow one. At the close of the novel, some fifty years after Fairley arrives at the settlement, he is, really, little more than a memory. But this is the whole point: such complex joinings, such hybrid or border lives, such interstitial spaces of cultural contact and translation, at least in their fictional advents, are examples of the process by which "newness," to corrupt and re-contextualize Mr. Rushdie's apt phrase, *slowly* and *unforgettably* enters the settler-invader world.

One of the first effects of this "strange repetition" or re-entrance seems to be the implosion of colonial authority and its amnesiac demands of "identity" and "stasis" (Bhabha, *Location* 86). Indeed, Fairley's comic presence, from his first moments upon the fence to his later antics as he relates his life-story and re-acquires English, parodies the officious and ruthless settlers whose "real" business, as we shall see, though cloaked in the "habit" of civilization, is the

¹⁹ Spivak uses this phrase in "Can the Subaltern Speak?" within the context of her critique of the individual and transparent "S/subject" and what she sees as the totalizing and self-referential concepts of power and desire in the work of so-called radical "western" intellectuals like Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze (75). The larger debate here involves the epistemological and political conditions in which the S/subject is "curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations" and in which representation (in the double sense of the word) occurs; to say the least, Spivak's generative filiations between deconstruction, Marxism(s), and Feminism(s) and her skepticism of displaced intellectuals who claim to speak of—to speak for—resistance is exemplary and helpful, especially her recognition of the need for a theory of ideology to account for the equivocation of knowledge with consciousness in the West, and the political implications of this conflation for "speaking." In a thesis about memory as a manifestation of ideology, Spivak's work speaks directly to the problem of how subjects use memory, and how memory is used in the formation of subjectivity.

accumulation of capital. For example, the first thing that Lachlan Beattie, the boy who "discovers" Fairley, does is point a stick at him, as if it were a gun. Beattie has been out playing on the paddock, "all clay-packed stones and ant trails," imagining it to be a "forest in Russia" where, in his mind, he has been racing through the snow "on the track of wolves" (*Remembering Babylon* 1). Beattie's playful mimicry, on the one hand, parodies the actions of the fearful adult males in the embattled community and, on the other, reveals how out of place, disconnected, and inadequate the European intertexts (or cultural memories) that the settler-invaders have transported to Australia in fact are as narratives to "explain" the times and spaces of the Australian landscape.

Beattie's parodic repetition of transported cultural narratives or intertexts reveals the fragile cultural margins of the settlement, as well as the need for "new" narratives in a "new" world. It is significant, I think, that Malouf locates this cultural translation and transformation in the settlement's youngest citizens. For it is through the eyes of children that the comic nature of Fairley's arrival is captured: "One or two of the children laughed and clapped their hands over their mouths, all eyes. The smallest among them, their young faces very grave and intent, looked up to see how their parents would take it and, when no protest appeared, wondered if some new set of rules was in operation, and this blackfeller's arrival among them was to be the start of something" (14-5). Clearly, though, for *most* of the settler-invaders, the old rules remain firmly in place and nothing particularly "new" begins with the arrival of Fairley. Just as the Australian Aboriginals "narrated" Fairley's arrival in their world, the settler-invaders try to "explain" Fairley to themselves:

The details of his story were pieced together the following afternoon from facts that were, as he told them, all out of their proper order, and with so many gaps of memory, and so much dislocation between what he meant to convey and the few words he could recover of his original tongue, that they could never be certain, later, how much of it was real and how much they had themselves supplied from tales they already new, since he was by no means the first white man to have turned up like this after a spell with the blacks. (16)

But there is something about Fairley that disturbs the equation, that "camouflages" his identity and frustrates the authoritative drive to fix the image of Fairley and to claim him as "one of us,"²⁰ something that makes his "spell with the blacks" especially difficult for the settlers to comprehend. As Spinks suggests, "his presence, as a figure of cultural otherness, demands at once to be *reclaimed* by the discourse of colonial order and established as a fixed point *outside* the enlightenment narrative which reciprocally establishes the nascent identity of white Australia as the domain of civilized values" (169). The problem, though, is that whereas the Australian Aboriginals set out to narrate a process of becoming-human, the settlers need to stop such a potentially transformative or ambivalent (molecular, rhizomatic, deterritorialized) identity. Their colonial knowledges and textual imaginations demand isolated "points": beginnings and endings. As the narrator asks on behalf of the community, in the fittingly "in-between" point of view of the

²⁰ The settlers cannot forget that the disfigured young man before them, as Marlow says of Jim in *Lord Jim*, "was one of us" (38). Not unlike Fairley, Jim has existed on both sides of the cultural fences of the West, and the social and psychic codes of colonial identification that are reiterated in Conrad's novel unearth the in fact *unstable* spaces of colonial culture, demonstrating, as Bhabha explains in *The Location of Culture*, that the obsessive repetition of the phrase "He was one of us" reveals the fragile margins of the concepts of Western civility and cultural community put under colonial stress; Jim is reclaimed at the moment when he is in danger of being cast out, or made outcaste, manifestly "not one of us" (174). Fairley induces a similar stress, I suggest, in colonial Australia, though he is never reclaimed in any lasting way. Not unlike Jim in Malaya, he challenges the alignment of cultural structures according to the binaries of white/black, civil/savage, colonizer/colonized. For the settlers, after all, Fairley, is both "one of us" and "not one of us"; he lives a double or hybrid life that, I think, is analogous to the metropolitan "double lives" that are "led in the postcolonial world, with its journeys of migration and its dwellings of the diasporic" (Bhabha, *Location* 213).

second person, "where *could* you start with an odd, unsettled fellow who, beyond what the boy Lachlan had heard him shout, had not a word you could make sense of in the English tongue; a pathetic, muddied-eyed, misshapen fellow, all fidgets, who seemed amazed by them—as if *they* were the curiosities here . . ." (7).

In contrast to the "synchronic panoptical vision" (Bhabha, *Location* 86) of the settler-invaders that enables them to "see" and "know" the world around them, Fairley belongs to a more indeterminate, marginal world. This indeterminacy is central to my argument that Fairley unsettles the cultural memory of the Queensland community by parodying and performing, and thus transgressing, the inadequate *transported* cultural meanings and values that the settlers ferociously cling to. For Fairley's "mimicry" of the settler-invaders he sees and hears in the settlement threatens the authority of colonial discourse and post-Enlightenment civility. As Bhabha writes:

colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. The authority of that mode of colonial discourse that I have called mimicry is therefore stricken by an indeterminacy: mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that itself a process of disavowal. Mimicry is, [sic] thus the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which 'appropriates' the Other as it visualizes power. Mimicry is also the sign of the inappropriate, however, a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an immanent threat to both 'normalized' knowledges and disciplinary powers. (86)

Hovering between the "black" world of the Australian Aboriginals and the "white" settlement, Fairley initiates a sense of indeterminacy, of slippage or splitting, of non-self-identification in the community that does not merely "rupture" the colonial discourse and imperial identities of the Queenslanders but transforms the very idea of the European colonist across the site and moment of colonial encounter and into "an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a 'partial' presence . . . both 'incomplete' and 'virtual'" (Bhabha, *Location* 86).

I want to emphasize the chronological and spatial as well as mnemonic disjunction implied by both of Bhabha's terms: "incomplete," "virtual." For their part, the settlers counter this fear of "incompleteness" or "virtuality," of process and unknowability, with their concept of authentic, imperial *civilization* and its "white writing."²¹ The swampy world of the Australian Aboriginal Australians which surrounds the isolated settlement is immanently threatening because it is unnamed and unknowable, because it is the domain of superstition and indeterminacy which challenges the very language and project of imperialism, because, at the most practical level, the settlers do not know what to do with it or how to "be in" it. Situated at the very edge of Empire, the nascent settlement itself is so recent that it has no local past nor traditions, much less proper nouns of its own, to fall back upon:

It was not yet a street, and had no name.

The nearest place, Bowen, was twelve miles off, but twelve miles meant they were only lightly connected to it, and even more lightly to what it was connected to: the

²¹ This phrase is cribbed from the title of J. M. Coetzee's critique of literary culture in South Africa, and it connotes not only the myth that English "naturally" developed as "a language in which there is no split between signifier and signified" (*White Writing* 9) and was possessed by a special class who spoke it correctly in southeast London, but also the sort of arguments made about colonial discourse and particularly textuality as modes of colonial power and authority made by, amongst others, Gauri Viswanathan in *Masks of Conquest*, Peter Hulme in *Colonial Encounters*, or the editors of *De-Scribing Empire*.

figure in an official uniform who had given it his name and the Crown he represented, which held them all, a whole continent, in its grip. (*Remembering Babylon* 5)

Curiously rendered as Queen Victoria's grip, culture in the settlement is conceived "as a source of identity, and a rather combative one at that" (Said, *Culture and Imperialism* xiii), a "protective enclosure" (xiv) that seals off the settler-invader's "legitimate" social body. But in truth, the settler-invaders have *weak* cultural legs to stand on. At the very edge of Empire, the incorporative logic of the Crown and its techniques of colonial possession prove inadequate; the settlers feel *disconnected* and *un-settled*:

Out here the very ground under their feet was strange. It had never been ploughed. You had to learn all over again how to deal with the weather. . . . And all around, before and behind, worse than the weather and the deepest nights, natives, tribes of wandering myalls who, in their traipsing this way and that all over the map, were forever encroaching on boundaries that could be insisted on by daylight—a good shotgun saw to that—but in the dark hours, when you no longer stood there as a living marker with all the glow of the white man's authority about you, reverted to being a creek-bed or ridge of granite like any other, and gave no indication that six hundred miles away, in the Lands Office in Brisbane, this bit of country had a name set against it on a numbered document, and a line drawn that was empowered with all the authority of the Law. (*Remembering Babylon* 9)

The elusive topography, the diurnal instability, and the nomadic transgressing of the "blacks" all undercut the "glowing" authority and "permanent" inscriptions of the white settlers. The Australian landscape and its inhabitants are unreadable, resistant to the fixed colonial values of property and possession and the "lawful" structures of Empire: Crown, Prime Meridian, Text. Anxious to "settle" their environment, the settler-invaders have enlisted such structures and techniques to shore up their sagging defenses, to maintain a connection between themselves and other dispossessed Europeans—"living markers"—who would make the world over in the "enlightened" image of Great Britain.

This civilizing agenda of accumulation, acquisition, and inscription, however, is perpetually haunted by the implicit realization of its own futility—a sense of impermanence and self-deception that undermines the settler's personal and social identities, not to mention their territorial mapping.²² Such a form of power and knowledge, as Young has shown, must negate what it does not "know" in order to incorporate it and thereby perpetuate the illusion of a totalizing knowledge and mastery. The problem is that this totalization is delusory and temporary:

Most unnerving of all was the knowledge that, just three years back, the very patch of earth you were standing on had been on the other side of things, part of the unknown, and might still, for all your coming and going over it . . . have the last mystery upon it, in jungle brakes between paddocks and ferny places out of the sun. Good reason, that, for stripping it, as soon as you could manage, of every vestige of the native. (10)

In a passage that recalls the terror that Friday's *vestigium* or footprints²³ strike in Crusoe's heart, it is clear that a sense of mystery, of incomplete or partial knowledge, prevails upon the ground that the settlers *illegitimately* inhabit—ground that they would desperately remake, *re-inscribe* "just a bit like home" (10). In this light, Fairley stands between the settlers and their goal of territorial and cultural domination as an unwelcome reminder: an alternative to the settler's combative cultural practices and an indictment of their cultural amnesia and concomitant blindness to spaces

²² In "Inscribing the Emptiness," Simon Ryan shows how even at the level of "mapping"—the textualization of landscapes—is not an innocent inscription: the cartographic practice of "representing the unknown as a blank does not simply . . . reflect gaps in European knowledge but actively erases (and legitimizes the erasure of) existing social and geo-cultural formations in preparation for the projection and subsequent emplacement of a new order" (116).

²³ The etymology of the term "vestige" is *vestigium*, Latin for "footprint" (*OED*).

and beings "beyond" themselves.

The very idea of endless transformations and of unknown and unknowable forms of life and social positions—of "strange repetitions"—compromises the colonist's static, self-identifying logic. Not the least disturbing, as I have already said, is Fairley's mimicry. Mimicry, as Gareth Griffiths points out, is part of the arsenal of the subaltern subject: a discursive feature "founded not in the closed and limited construction of a pure authentic sign but in endless and excessive transformation of the subject positions possible within the hybridized" ("Myth of Authenticity" 76). In the ambivalent world of Fairley's colonial encounter, then, in the hybrid or *interstitial* time and space that Fairley inaugurates in the community, we witness the splitting of words and the slippage of meanings; in a paradigmatic moment of colonial encounter such as Fairley's, we witness, as Bhabha puts it in a different context, how "Black skin splits under the racist gaze, [and is] displaced into signs of bestiality, genitalia, grotesquerie, which reveal the phobic myth of the undifferentiated whole white body" (*Location* 92).

Even though (or perhaps especially since) Fairley is "white", the racist cultural practices of the settler-invaders are revealed as anxious and fearful; they frame the (impossible) colonial question: is Fairley in fact "one of us"? The myth of the whole white body—and mind, I would add—is a myth that, from the post-colonial perspective, the modern, much less postmodern, world cannot support. As Young argues, the very idea of the postmodern in the West can be seen as "Europe's cultural awareness that it is no longer the unquestioned and dominant centre of the world" (*White Mythologies* 19). Fredric Jameson has made the same point in slightly different terms in his *Postmodernism*, where he recognizes the "dizzying" fact of global demographics in the late-twentieth century and the "premonition that the more people we recognize, even within the mind, the more peculiarly precarious becomes the status of our own hitherto unique and 'incomparable' consciousness or self" (358). Such a recognition, Jameson suggests, due to sheer mathematics, electronic information technologies, and global tourism, is of a piece with "the undermining of a very fundamental form of false consciousness or ideological self-deception" and leads us to "anticipate the immanent collapse of all our inward conceptual defense mechanisms, and in particular the rationalizations of privilege and the well-nigh natural formations . . . of narcissism and self-love" (358). Even more pressing, I think, is the purchase of these "natural" mechanisms in the cultural memories of the West. Jameson's suggestion reveals that the "demographic" aspect of late-capitalist consumer culture forms an "existential hypothesis" in which repression or "oblivion and forgetfulness" is itself a culturally *useful* form of "self-deception that does not want to know and tries to sink ever deeper into a willful involuntarity, a directed distraction" (358).

Obviously, the Queensland settlement cannot be "cognitively mapped" as a postmodern, late-capitalist *space*, but it is the case that the imbricated global histories of capitalism and imperialism have *both* deployed and benefited from the sort of "self-deception" or "directed distraction" that Jameson articulates. My point is that identity is much more un-settled than the settler-invaders imagine, that it is a memory effect that is produced at the deepest (ideal and material) levels of subject and social formation. But in the context of settler-invader culture, we can say, the collapse of the "whole" white body or self is part of a larger cultural phobia: a "fear of a fear," a Jameson rightly notes, that is manifested in feelings of an impending "collapse" and fear of the Other that is coded into Western epistemological and economic privilege. Hence, as I have been arguing, the importance of oblivion and forgetfulness as capitalist-colonial strategies: technologies by which the "facts" of imperialism as a form of global territorial appropriation and racist identification can be forgotten, disguised.

In *Remembering Babylon*, however, we witness the *rememoration* and *strange repetition* of a ghostly "white" body and of some of the unsaid—the "unhomely"—elements of colonial Western epistemology, especially as they are refracted through two central foci which are increasingly merged in the novel: the figure of the cannibal in colonial discourse and, at an even more abstract and submerged *mnemonic* level, the "sacrificed" body of Christ. This latter figure, I

am suggesting, functions as the dominant symbolic register for Malouf's antipodean, post-colonial messiah, Fairley. An in-between creature on "the top rail of the fence, hung there, it's arms outflung" (3), Fairley reminds us of another sacrificed body, especially since Fairley is, I think ironically, abjected from "white" society because of his allegedly "uncivilized" behaviour: because of the fact that his presence touches off a sense of the "inappropriate" or "profane"; because of the fear that he has participated in all sorts of "black" abominations, not the least of which is *anthropophagy*.

Let us now unpack some of the implications of this colonial encounter for my reading of bodies and memories in *Remembering Babylon*, a novel in which Fairley himself functions as an unlikely (secular) messiah. Fairley, a mysterious stranger, shows up on the edge of the settlement when he is around thirty years old. Just shy of his "crucifixion" year, Fairley

was a man who had suffered a good deal of damage. There were scorch marks on his chest where he had rolled into a camp fire, and signs that he had, at one time or another, taken a fair bit of knocking about. One of his eyebrows was missing . . . It gave his face a smudged appearance. He had the baffled, half-expectant look of a mongrel that has been often whipped but still turns to the world, out of some fund of foolish expectancy, as a source of scraps as well as torments. (7-8)

Fairley's colonial *imitatio christi*, however, is more comic than tragic:

His joints were swollen and one leg was shorter than the other and a little twisted. When he got excited he jerked about as if he was being worked by strings, one or two of which had snapped. He screwed his face up, grinned, looked interested, then, in a lapse of courage or concentration, went mute and glanced about as if he did not know, suddenly, how he had got there or where he was. (8)

The introspection Fairley inaugurates and the anxiety his parodic presence touches off troubles the civic, racial, and spiritual identities of the settlers, who no doubt have asked themselves the same questions a time or two. Indeed, who works the strings? But it is Fairley's language skills that seem to trouble them most of all. As the narrator observes, presumably through Fairley's eyes,

It was as if the language these people spoke was an atmosphere they moved in. Just being in their proximity gave him access to it. He breathed it up out of the air between them, snatched the words like buttons off their shirts, or hairs out of their beards. 'B-b-beard' he yelled—again, it was with him now, and would not go away—'foot', holding one up and dancing awkwardly on the other; then, with an appeal to what he knew was the comic side of things, 'arse', and slapped his meagre buttocks. (14)

As a distinctly ironic way to remember, parody, as Mikhail Bakhtin has noted, introduces the "permanent corrective of laughter in the form of a critique on the one-sided seriousness of the lofty direct word" (*The Dialogic Imagination* 55). And the children's laughter at Fairley's "aping," at the puppet-like gestures he makes with his disfigured body as he awkwardly re-enters the "atmosphere"—Bakhtin's term is *logosphere*—of the settlement, force the settlers to witness, as it were, a staging of their own absurd and "incomplete" arrival and presence, not to mention the increasingly terrifying slippage in their equivocation of the English language with English civilization. The comic or carnivalesque presence of Fairley undermines the "serious" or "direct word" of colonial civilization and its cultural imperative to "forget."

To push this a little further, the very appearance of a child-like figure, who is apprehended by children at the edge of the colonial settlement, signals not only a fictional preoccupation of Malouf's but also a thematic "un-settling" of the "Mediterranean" narratives of identity of the West. In "Describing the Waterbabies: 'The child' in Post-colonial Theory," Jo-Ann Wallace explores the contradictory construction of "the child" and how the figure of "the child" circulates in colonial and post colonial discourses. As a "necessary precondition" (176) of imperialism, the relatively recent invention of "the child" and childhood helped the West to imagine—to order—its colonies. The "idea of childhood," Wallace writes,

together with mercantile imperialism, began to emerge in the early Renaissance, the "Age of Discoveries"; it was honed by the Enlightenment emphasis on individual development through empiricism, reason, and training; it reached its apogee by the middle of the nineteenth century with the consolidation of an enormously contradictory discourse surrounding "the child" as, on the one hand, a sentimentalized wisdom figure and, on the other, national human capital, responsive to careful husbanding and investment. This construction of "the child" coincides with the apogee of English colonial imperialism; indeed, it was an idea of "the child"—of the not yet fully evolved or consequential subject—which made thinkable a colonial apparatus officially dedicated to, in Macaulay's words, the improvement of colonized peoples. (176)

But in Malouf's fictional landscapes, the figure of "the child"—the inconsequential subject—does not so much make "thinkable" nineteenth-century "English colonialist imperialism" as it makes possible the "re-thinking"—the re-membering—of post-colonial subjects who live along the borders of a colonized world, figures like Fairley. As Wallace also suggests, in post-colonial discourse, such figures help to make thinkable "many twentieth century forms of resistance to imperialism" (171).

Of course, Fairley is hardly a child when he turns up on the margin of the settlement, but he is, for the most part, pre-literate: he lacks "civilized" gestures and habits, and it is only through the eyes of one or two other children that his important potential is "seen" and felt in a lasting or consequential way. Fairley is thus not so much a "necessary precondition" of imperialism in Malouf's novel as its *inevitable consequence*—a body over which incommensurable cultures struggle, a site where past and present overlap, a "text" where memories are stirred up, where social signs are inscribed, and where (some) minds are "opened out." Fairley, after all, is a kind of cultural amphibian who straddles the worlds of colonizer and colonized, of here-there, and in doing so disturbs and destabilizes the cultural borders between the settlers and the Australian Aboriginals who inhabit the landscape around them. Like Kipling's Kim, Fairley is white and European, and his "incomplete" body and language make him especially perturbing to the settler-invaders²⁴ who explain "Fairley to themselves by infantilizing him.

Even though he is chronologically an adult, Fairley is seen as an "in-consequential subject" in the colonial world: he is fractured and flawed, never seamless nor consolidated nor completed, and he is certainly never self-composed. But as Wallace reminds us, childhood is a contradictory discourse, one that is capable of containing such a figure: "'the child' represents potential or futurity, both of which need protected spaces in which to flourish, and a subjectivity and corporeality in need of discipline" (Wallace 173). Yet it is precisely such a lack of (bodily) discipline that the settler-invaders find fearsome in the creature they see before them, a becoming-human, we might say, the "explanatory and emancipatory potential" (Wallace 183) of which eludes settler-invader adults.²⁵

²⁴ The contradictory construction of "the child"—at once a dependent and independent—is an especially provocative figure in post-colonial discourse. In the case of Gemmy Fairley, his liminal position confirms, in a curious way, what Wallace calls the "parent-child logic of imperialist expansion" (175), a logic, it should be noted, that resembles the structurally inequitable relationships (and epistemologies) of Judeo-Christianity, not to mention capitalist relations of production. For the Queensland settlers, the child-like Fairley possesses a "futurity" that is too other-worldly, a lack of social discipline that is too primitive, an aura or energy/knowledge about him that is too super-natural, a pre-literacy that flies in the face of civilization, and an apparent lack of moral and bodily control.

²⁵ Keeping in mind Fairley's interpellation in Britain—"Uneducated, poor, and unable to remember if he ever had parents—"Before Willet there is only darkness, his life as a maggot, the giant legs of machines" (147)—and the fact that the former child-laborer belongs *nowhere* in the industrialized and urbanized social spaces of nineteenth-century Britain, Fairley becomes an especially significant figure in post-colonial studies, not least because of the current exploitation of children (not to mention other un- and under-paid labourers) in the so-called third world by multinational corporations. The figure of Gemmy

Readers familiar with Malouf's fiction will recognize a continuing thematic interest in the mnemonic *possibilities* and innovative cultural significations of border lives and boundary-crossings, of "questionable" or "inconsequential" beings such as children whose "discontinuous subjectivities"²⁶ and marginal locations in language populate worlds in between the known and the unknown. In his 1978 novel *An Imaginary Life*, for instance, Malouf fictionally treats Ovid's exile and death beyond the edge of the Roman Empire. Ovid, as the narrator recalls, has been "relegated—that is our nice word for it—to the limits of the known world, and expelled from the confines of our Latin tongue" (26) by Augustus. Beyond the edge of the fields and seasons of civilization, Ovid, the classical chronicler *par excellence* of transformations, encounters a wild Child.²⁷ The wild Child initiates an ironic *metamorphosis*, a transformation or change in identity, in the Roman poet that begins to trouble the dyads of Nature/Culture, Civil/Savage, Citizen/Barbarian, Present/Past—the binary logic, we can say, upon which Ovid's existence has hitherto been based. As a result, Ovid begins to experience—to see and to sense—the world and beings around him in new ways, a change that for Ovid results in feelings of elemental connection, of chronological disjunction, and of spatial expansion that exceed the political and social boundaries of the world circumscribed by Latin.

In this fictional account of Ovid's exile to Tomis, Malouf makes the reluctant Roman live out the very "changes" that were in his previous life little more than "the occasion for dazzling literary display" (Afterword, *An Imaginary Life* 154). Curiously, the figure of Ovid, or more precisely, Ovidian *metamorphoses*, figures in Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*, where international migrancy and cultural transformation take on the properties of a post-colonial metaphysics. As Bhabha has noted, "the fate of the migrant" in Rushdie's novel can be understood in

the classical contrast between Lucretius and Ovid. Translated by [Chamcha's landlord] Sufyan, for the existential guidance of post-colonial migrants, the problem consists in whether the crossing of cultural frontiers permits freedom from the essence of the self (Lucretius), or whether, like wax, migration only changes the surface of the soul, preserving identity under its protean forms (Ovid). ("Newness" 224)

For Malouf, the former sort of transformation is inadequate. It is upon the body or the "surface of the soul" that the identity of the migrant is partially preserved but also protean—re-inscribed and strangely repeated but never wholly erased nor original. As we seen in *An Imaginary Life*, Ovid disappears into—is relocated within—a foreign landscape; but he does not so much "free" himself as change into *something else besides*. Something "new." As he does so, Ovid becomes part of the elemental forces that inscribe and underwrite the times and spaces of the seasons, as much as the politics and posturings and the linguistic the borders and boundaries of Roman

Fairley seems an especially memorable emblem of the dehumanizing and divisive social relationships underwritten by imperialism, in any of its developmental stages or locations.

²⁶ Lee Spinks writes that "Malouf frequently explores this process of destabilization by employing images of metamorphoses or rebirth, as his characters slowly awaken to a new or buried life stirring within them that cannot be explained by the careful causal connections they seek to establish between their previous and current existences" (170).

²⁷ Hayden White writes that "the notion of 'wildness' (or, in its Latinate form, 'savagery') belongs to a set of culturally self-authenticating devices which includes, among many others, the ideas of 'madness' and heresy as well. These terms are used not merely to designate a specific condition or state of being but also to confirm the value of their dialectical antithesis, 'civilization,' 'sanity,' and 'orthodoxy,' respectively. Thus they do not so much refer to a specific thing, place, or condition as dictate a particular attitude governing a relationship between a lived reality and some area of problematical existence that cannot be accommodated easily to conventional conceptions of the normal or familiar" (*Tropics* 151); White suggests that these terms express a libidinal or projected image of desire, a repressed vision what man might look like outside the social frames or discourses that both protect and constrain him. This relationship, this "particular attitude," I argue, is amnesiac.

civilization. In this sense, Malouf literally pulls Ovid off the bookshelves and out of his classical intertexts and into the elemental *and* spiritual worlds he has written about: once again, mind and matter seem to come into contact in memory, in the in-between spaces of culture, in the matrices of signification, in the fold between past and present. For Malouf's Ovid, this experience is an "opening," a palimpsestic writing in wax, to recall Socrates' model of memory, but also a physical and metaphysical transformation that exceeds anything he has previously known or written. This does not, of course, settle the question about transformation posed above, a question, I think, that can be re-framed as a question about the *past*: how do colonial and post-colonial migrants negotiate the threshold between their pasts and their presents, between "old" and "new" worlds? How, indeed, does newness enter the present?

An Imaginary Life novel closes near the end of Ovid's life; his death is figured as one final, elemental, transformation. Still, Malouf does not offer us any obvious answer to this question, except perhaps to say that cultural transformation is a slow and difficult process, that cultural hybridity and personal and political transformation must occur at levels on as well below the "waxy" surface of the "soul." If this is as close as Malouf can get to the mystery of cultural translation and cultural hybridity in and around the Roman Empire, it is, then, perhaps not surprising that Malouf returns to this theme in Remembering Babylon, pressing his interrogation of cultural transformation even further in the figure of Gemmy Fairley. Like the wild Child, Fairley, too, is a kind of interstitial guide who mysteriously inspires metamorphoses in several members of the Queensland community. Most notably, Fairley initiates a transformation in consciousness in Janet McIvor, one of the children in Remembering Babylon who first discovers Fairley perched on the fence. For the rest of her life, Janet strangely affected by her encounter. Tabling the spiritual, even supernatural, aspects of these changes for now, it is safe to say that Fairley changes the way Janet sees the world and its inhabitants, like Fairley and his adoptive tribe. Thus Fairley, like the wild Child, inaugurates new *subjectivities* and *responsibilities* that force at least some of the settler-invaders to begin to imagine new, collaborative social spaces in Malouf's literary landscape: he touches off something in the people he encounters that takes them *beyond* the annihilating logic of the Selfsame, beyond the border of their "imagined" community, beyond the confines of the English tongue, even beyond, we can say, the figure of European "Man."

It is precisely this sort of transformation, however, that the settler-invader community resists. When it becomes clear that Fairley is, or was, "British," the settler-invaders seek to rehabilitate or "complete" the boy/body whose cross-cultural mobility they perceive as a threat and whose plural identity somehow renders him unknowable—unfit to be a stable British subject. Fairley, after all, has infiltrated physical and psychic boundaries that the settler-invaders rely upon to safeguard identity. For the settlers, this is, in part, a problem of logic, of cause and effect: "What had brought [Fairley] to them?" the narrator asks,

Even after weeks in which he had become a familiar sight around the settlement, they continued to put the question to one another, or, more darkly, to themselves.

Was he in league with the blacks? As infiltrator, as spy? Did he slip off when they were not watching—they had work to do, they could not always be watching—and make contact with them. Did they visit him secretly at night? Maybe they did not even come in the flesh but had other, less visible ways of meeting and passing information that a white man would not recognise because it was not in a white man's mind to conceive of it. Even those who were well-disposed to the fellow found him unnerving. (38)

The military images are clear in this passage, as are the supernatural or magical ones, disclosing the settler's embattled and paranoid self-perception and their political answer to the "ultimate colonial question": colonial settlement is a battle fought over an antipodean "no-man's-land."²⁸

²⁸ Malouf uses this term to denote the "swamp" world around the Queensland settlement

One of the most un-nerving aspects of the Australian Aboriginal community is its elemental connectedness; in contrast, the settler-invader society is characterized by paranoia and disconnection. We are, of course, walking a narrow path here: I do not want to ascribe to the Australian Aboriginals an "authentic" position or voice, much less succumb to a romantic nostalgia for a unified, essential pre-modern "mind" or "self." But Malouf's settler-invader community clearly confronts Fairley as a new and unwelcome "sign" of the human: a repetition of identity and a reversal of logic that forces the remembering of what has been forgotten, that refuses the kind cultural narcosis that enables "white" Australians to forget that they coexist with Australian Aboriginals and that the metropolitan centre is a long way off. But such a colonial forgetting must be made visible, Bhabha contends, for "forgetting" or "disavowal" itself "creates an uncertainty at the heart of the generalizing subject of civil society, compromising the 'individual' that is the support for its universalist aspiration" (*Location* 10).

There are two especially amnesiac modes of "dealing with blacks" in the settlement, and both are genocidal: first, there is the "hard" method, the spokesman of which in the novel is the belligerent Ned Corcoran: "'We ought to go out,' he insisted, controlling the spit that flooded his mouth, 'and get rid of 'em, once and for all. If I catch one of the buggers round my place, I'll fucking pot 'im'" (62). The second alternative is the "softer policy"; the

milder members of the settlement . . . looked forward to . . . a settled space in which they could get on with the hard task of founding a home, and maybe, if they were lucky, a town where in time all the civilities would prevail. If they got the preliminaries right, the natives too might be drawn in, as labourers, or house-servants. They had secretly, some of them, a vision of plantations with black figures moving in rows down a field, a compound with neat whitewashed huts, a hallway, all polished wood, with an old grey-haired black saying "Yesser", and preparing to pull off their boots (all this in the future, of course, maybe far off . . .). (62)

The vision of American slavery here is an eerie echo of a Crusoe's suppressed past, not to mention an early example of "American Dreaming"—one symptom of the colonial identity-crisis in Australia and its endorsement of (and dependence upon) American capital and cultural imperialism we saw at work in *Illywhacker* (Turner, *Making it National* 93-5). Yet if the systematic enslavement of Africans over five centuries was not repeated in the antipodes, the genocidal treatment of "blacks" in Australia, not to mention the racist doctrines of "White Australia" (McQueen 268) were made possible not only by the complicity of corporate and national interest and by implicit and explicit imperialist assumptions about Anglo-Saxon superiority—the *inability*, we might say, to recognize the "sign" of the human as indeterminate or as anything other than "European." We have already seen how Crusoe tried to "forget" the memory of slavery in his own past, a forgetting that, as Trouillot suggests, has been a commonplace of Western historiography. It is Fairley's presence, though, his challenges to "all the civilities," that makes him a ghostly chameleon—one that augurs the necessity of culture as interrogation and negotiation and not domination or exploitation.

(*Remembering Babylon* 3). I want to foreground the military image and mnemonic resonance that this *modern* term carries. "No Man's Land," as Paul Fussell points out in *The Great War and Modern Memory*, was a zone between the front-line trenches and the enemy trenches—anywhere from fifty yards to a mile away (41). This "sharp dividing of the landscape into known and unknown, safe and hostile," Fussell writes, "is a habit no one who has fought ever loses" (79). This zone falls in-between the "insistent polarities" (92) of Us and the Enemy: "What we can call gross-dichotomizing is a persistent habit of modern times, traceable, it would seem, to the actualities of the Great War" (75). I would look back further than the Great War or nineteenth-century imperialism to a construction of knowledge that, as Robert Young points out, is inherently binary and "in which the same constitutes itself through a form of negativity in relation to the other, producing all knowledge by appropriating and subsuming the other within itself" (*White Mythologies* 13). "War," Young writes, "is another form of the appropriation of the other, and underpins all ontological thinking with its violence" (13).

The dangers of racist and genocidal fantasies, of "pure" forms of community, are obvious enough; functional alternatives to them have proven to be more difficult to envision. Yet if we can say that Fairley poses a solution to such polarized thinking, if he can teach us something "in-between," something on and beyond the border, we might say, it is in, and on, his "incomplete" body and in his re-construction as an ambivalent or "in-between creature." As such, he is most memorable.

Fairley's interpellation in the settler-invader society begins at the level of language; it is a distinctly textual inscription that is meant to inoculate the settler-invaders from Fairley's indeterminacy and contagion—to possess him and to "know" the indeterminate features of his body and the "discursive" meanings of his skin.²⁹ In contrast, with the Australian Aboriginals Fairley learns that

There was no way of existing in this land, or of making your way through it, unless you took into yourself, discovered on your breath, the sounds that linked up all the various parts of it and made them one. Without that you were blind, you were deaf, as he had been, at first, in their world. You blundered about seeing holes where in fact strong spirits were at work that had to be placated, and if you knew how to call them up, could be helpful. Half of what ought to have been bright and full of the breath of life to you was shrouded in mist. (65)

Fairley's learns a new language and a new mode of being in the world that we can think of in terms of memory. To be sure, there is an "essential" and auratic aspect to this presence in the landscape; but Malouf attempts to connect the ideal or essential to the material and the social; he embeds them in and refracts them through language-as-social-activity or the sign. In one view, this re-stages the perennial philosophical (and mnemonic) problem of mind-body, of ideal-material, but it also comes close, I think, to what Raymond Williams in *Marxism and Literature* has called the "constituting" and "constitutive" processes of language that refuse to privilege speech or writing and instead sees them as social processes, ones that produce the "changing practical consciousness of human beings" (43-44). Keeping in mind the novel's title and the disciplinary and linguistic history of the Judeo-Christian story of the Tower of Babel, which we shall consider shortly, we might call these changes *memory effects*. Less speculatively, we get a sense of how important it is for Malouf, from the post-colonial perspective, to maintain language as *both* an "interior" and "exterior" activity, a social activity that is inseparable from memory. As Williams continues:

The usable sign—the fusion of formal element and meaning—is a product of this continuing speech-activity between real individuals who are in some continuing social relationship. The 'sign' is in this sense their product, but not simply their past product, as in the reified accounts of an 'always-given' language system. The real communicative 'products' which are usable signs are, on the contrary, living evidence of a continuing social process, into which individuals are born and within which they are shaped, but to which they then also actively contribute, in a continuing process. This is at once their socialization and their individuation: the connected aspects of a single process which the alternative theories of 'system' and 'expression' had divided and dissociated. (37)

Such an active "social language" can be recognized in post-structural theories, as Williams hints and as I have already argued at some length in the previous pages; post-structural

²⁹Invoking the spirit (and text) of Frantz Fanon, Terry Collits reminds us that "the sheer cultural opposites of Black and White are nothing more than powerful constructs, mind-forged masks"; "Skin is not just assumed like a mask: it is god-given even if its meanings are social, discursive. What skin and masks have in common is that they mark the interface between the self and the world; they are the border. And it is this spatial positioning that both share with language: all three work together in the theatre. . . . Both skin and masks can identify and they can hide ("Theorizing Racism" 66).

theory seeks to mediate—to collapse—binarist or structural models of knowledge and power, those anachronistic theories of binary “systems” and essential or transcendent “expression” that refuse to acknowledge how language itself is, in Williams’s phrase, a “lost middle term” (37). Whether or not we can extend Williams’s model³⁰ to fully include Malouf’s “in-between creature” is a good question: despite his impressive re-consideration of the “forgotten” elements of the Western epistemology and his fictional re-location of Mediterranean culture, Malouf seems to me privilege an “authentic” and “auratic” spiritual-natural world; his use of narrative omniscience, a question we posed earlier, is a case in point. Such “apotheoses” remind us of the totalizing subject-object predication of imperial perception and self-presencing, precisely the “order of things” that Young critiques in *White Mythologies*. Such “imperial” histories and fictions, to use Paul Carter’s phrase from *The Road to Botany Bay*, are a “fabric woven of self-reinforcing illusion” (xv-xvi); its “primary object,” Carter writes, “is not to understand or to interpret: it is to legitimate” (xvi).

We do not need to repeat here the argument put forward by Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra in *The Dark Side of the Dream*, namely that the foundation of the modern, European “consciousness” in Australia is “schizophrenic” precisely because of the its historic *illegitimacy*, and its confusing “double messages”—hebephrenic and paranoid—about power and identity. Such national narratives, Hodge and Mishra assert, bind Australians together in the form of a “wilful refusal to acknowledge the injustices inflicted upon Aboriginal people in the past and present, and to recognize the legitimacy of their aspirations for the future” (218). But Fairley’s story, I think, can be read as an attempt to “join” Australians who possess incommensurable cultural differences, to remember the *subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite*. Fairley’s re-acquisition of English, then, is not only a “soldering” of two worlds but a refusal of the very categories of “English” or “human” as universal and absolute: a fundamental mnemonic shift at the colonial and post-colonial levels in how knowledge and power are conceived, in how human subjects or “living evidence,” like Fairley, are *artificially* constituted along borders, in how culture continually utilizes memory to construct individuals and the human communities they comprise.

Fairley’s narrative thus records the twin process of deconstruction and reconstruction, of repression and recovery. In what I take to be a central scene in which the materiality and interiority of language is modeled, and in which language and memory generate identity, we observe Fairley being figuratively torn between two “linguistic” worlds—worlds that are, in part, “contained” or connoted in the inscribed or material *signs* of language. In Australian Aboriginal society, Fairley, we are told, believes “in one part of himself, the part that belonged to their tribal life,” in his presence as it is narrated; but in “some other part he did not. There was a different story . . . which was his alone and secret: which had another shape and might need, for its telling, the words he had in his mouth when they first found him, and had lost; though not, he thought, for ever” (27-8). As Fairley grows into his new world, he becomes aware of his own incoherent and *split* self, a secret, *remembered* version of himself that exists at a different time and place, in a different language and world: “In time, his coming among them became another tale they told and he would listen to it with a kind of wonder, as if what they were recounting had happened

³⁰Raymond Williams’ efforts to elaborate a theory of culture within the larger scope of Marxist analysis of history remain central to my understanding of human consciousness in this thesis. The role of memory in subject-formation as a trace-record of human consciousness in time seems to me to be in-line with Williams’s assertion that a theory of cultural materialism articulates the specificities of material culture and literary production within “historical materialism” insofar as it resists the reduction or abstraction of such “connected practices” as language or labour and negotiates the “middle ground” between the ideal and the real, the spiritual and the material, the superstructure and the base, the subjective and the objective. For Williams, “practical consciousness” (54) is the dialectical process by which human consciousness is understood to change and transform *through time*.

ages ago, in a time beyond all memory, and to someone else" (27). At the personal level, Fairley, who is haunted by his half-remembered, half-forgotten past, lives in/out the specific conditions of a difficult and dialogic ambivalence. We read that he doesn't sleep well in his new world: "the others had their own explanation of these midnight hauntings. He was a tormented spirit. The cries he uttered in his sleep, the terrors that assailed him, were proof that although he had the look of a man, he was not one, not yet. A day would come when, fully arrived among them, he would let go of the other world" (28).

That day does not come. It is arguable, in fact, that what Fairley needs here is for the "other world" to let go of him: a part of him remains locked in the past, in a previous land and language, the traces and inscriptions of which, indeed, have determined his "practical consciousness."

Marx writes in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" that "the beginner who has learnt a new language always translates it back into his mother tongue, but he has assimilated the spirit of the new language and can produce freely in it only when he moves in it without remembering the old and forgets in it his ancestral tongue." (595). This forgetting, we have seen, is key to new forms of consciousness and being, to knowing as an active and Nietzschean "forgetting." At the level of language or dialogue, as Bakhtin argues, by virtue of the fact that it is always already spoken, language carries its past within it; at a political level, as Marx's statement makes clear, language can authorize a mindless repetition of history as tragedy then farce if the past is not critically revised, both actively forgotten and socially remembered. We have already seen how important—and how controversial—the ability to "actively forget" is to modern man; the point here is that such transformations occur at the deepest levels of consciousness and language-acquisition. In memory.

So when rumours of "spirits" to the south enter the Australian Aboriginal community, Fairley himself is overcome by a curious persistence, a desire to re-establish some of the linguistic "circuits" or grammars, we might say, that are "hard-wired" into his mind and body. He first encounters some material objects that remind him of his past, a gradual re-patriation that reminds us of the Proustian theory of "involuntary memory" and its countless fictional avatars. But Fairley is no Marcel at Combray, nibbling on "petites madeleine"; he is no Brigadier General Pudding eating human excrement at "The White Visitation"; he is no Colonel Aureliano Buendia remembering his discovery of ice in the tropics while facing the firing squad; he is no Saleem Sinai gobbling mango chutney or pickles and trying to make sense of his national past.³¹ Rather, Fairley is re-entering European civilization, as much as his own past, through the English language.

On the one hand, as the nameless narrator claims, Fairley is

Young enough to learn and to be shaped as if for the first time, he was young enough to forget. He lost his old language in the new one that came to his lips. He had never in fact possessed more than a few hundred words that were immediately needful to him, to fill his belly or save his skin, having heard little in his short life but commands, curses, coarse endearments, the street talk he had learned to spit out like the rest, and such bits and pieces of something lighter—jokes, riddles, the words of a penny-gaff tune . . . (26)

But even this small sampling, this crude interpellation amongst overseers, sailors, and drunks, has

³¹ At an elemental level, physical objects can trigger certain (reconstructed) memories of the past. What we do with these memories, how they function in our lives, remains, for me, in this dissertation, a more pressing (and more manageable) question than the ones posed by the psycho-biological processes of recollection. A theory of cultural memory treats the processes by which the past persists at the macrological level of culture, and includes the more micrological level of mnemonic "objects" that are used as tropological *triggers* for novelists who want to explore the past through character's memory, even to the point of recuperating, or consolidating, a sense of lost or fragmented "self." Proust remains the high priest of this cult.

taken hold in Fairley's memory and shaped his body and mind. Little wonder, then, that Fairley accepts and even expects the sort of abuses he has experienced in his past. Nonetheless, this past persists in his body and mind: in the language he seems to have forgotten, in the words from it that leak into his new life, in the memories from it of objects that *haunt* him. This chaotic and multiple presence is a process of contamination, one that underwrites cultural hybridity:

Occasionally some object out of his old life would come floating back and bump against him. He would see it clearly enough, feel his hand clasping the handle of the jug or smell the dark stained leather, but no word was connected to them, and when his mind reached for it, the object too went thin on him. He felt a kind of sadness that was like hunger, but of the heart, not the belly, and could only believe, since these things came to him only in fragments, that they belonged to the life of some other creature whose memory he shared, an which rose up at moments to shake him, then let him go. (27)

One of the first material "objects" or "inscriptions" from his past that Fairley discovers is "tracks of a kind that utterly puzzled him, then, in the middle of the path, a line of droppings, big, round, golden dark with a sheen to them, about the size of a buzzard's egg, unlike the pellets of local creatures" (29). Fairley is curious about the horse shit, and when he smells it "a kind of clattering fills his head" (29). The mental images (*imagines*) that fill his mind are triggered by a scent; a "noise" fills Fairley's head as he begins to remember his "European" past. He then touches a red blanket that is hanging on a line, and "dances" around the rest of the hanging laundry, weaving his body into the "signs" of this artificial "crowd" (32). His "fearful curiosity" (29) is finally piqued by a settler swinging an axe:

He was amazed. A kind of meaning clung to the image in the same way that the clothes he was wearing clung to the man, and when the blade flashed and jarred the wood, it struck home in him. *Axe*.

The word flew into his head as fast and as clear as the flash and whitels of its breath. *Axe. Axe*. Circles of meaning rippled away from the mark it blazed in the dark of his skull. (30)

In this epiphanic moment, Fairley's European life is recalled, re-cognized, re-presented: forgotten meanings and the social frames they are embedded are fixed to the words, to the signs, that are "inscribed" in the language centres in his mind; the arbitrary and random process of mnemonic association is played out in his memory but always in connection to the social, always as a form of dialogism. Of course, Fairley's competence as an English speaker is, at best, marginal. But in this primal scene of semiosis in which "language declines to be stable, refuses to settle down and serve as the docile carrier of unambiguous meanings" (Terdiman, *Present Past* 135), Fairley is *both* known to himself and estranged, displaced and dispossessed by the "otherness" conferred upon him by language, or languages, by the so-called "malevolence" of the deferred sign, by the double-voices of two languages and the material histories, the inscribed signs that encircled him in this moment of cultural translation. Fairley, we might say, is not unlike "signs" themselves, which, as Terdiman suggest, "never equate absolutely to their referents" but rather "live in their difference from what they represent" (278).

The process in which Fairley's bilingual self is constituted (split and re-presented) as a presence-absence continues shortly thereafter when Fairley *hears* his first English words in sixteen years and tries, unsuccessfully, to imitate the sounds he hears: "Cluck cluck cluck" [sic] (31). Ironically, the woman Fairley observes making these sounds is feeding chooks. The stage is set for Fairley's return to the West, but at a sub-human level, when he crams some of the food the woman casts to the birds into his own mouth. The sensual material triggers material memory-images, embodied signs of the past, and a lexicon of socially shared meanings:

The taste of it, the strangeness, the familiarity, dizzied him. The creature whose dreams he shared came right up to the surface of him. It fed on the saltiness of the stuff, and for a moment entirely took possession of him. He saw things through its eyes in bewildering flashes, and found himself shaken with sobs, but where the tears came from so suddenly,

and why, he could not tell. (31)

Despite the overt organicism of Malouf's model, Fairley's split- or doubled-self emerges in *and* attached to language, and in one sense this scene can be productively read against not only a Freudian model of the return of the repressed but also as a Lacanian model of subject formation and of the role of language in the conscious and unconscious mind: "Language places the subject in the chain of words which binds it to one gender or another, but the force of the unconscious can subvert that definition" (Wright 110). Perhaps more useful for my present reading is the question of memory's relation to language itself, a question that I have suggested can be answered, in part, by thinking about culture as the sign system of the social and language as, perhaps, the most sophisticated expression or component of that system. Words, like memory-images, are inscribed in our minds, and this inscription is a "fixing" of meaning. As Malouf's text dramatizes, it is language that most powerfully exerts its grip on Fairley's unconscious—the rest of the senses are powerful but secondary. This "recovery" of the past, this recollection of his violent and abuse-filled life in Britain, signals the difficult and controversial scene of psychoanalysis in which representations of the past are recalled, re-covered. Terdiman has called this "mnemo-analysis" "our culture's last Art of Memory" (*Present Past* 240)—the most famous and first practitioner, of course, being Freud.

In his discussion of how memory works in Freud's paradigm as a limit-case of modernity's memory-crisis Terdiman argues that for "psychoanalysis, memory is the heart of the matter. Memory constitutes us and undoes us simultaneously. In therapy, the exercise of memory is intended to heal the traumas whose capacity to disrupt our existence memory has itself perversely sustained" (241). But as Terdiman suggests, Freudian maieutics and psychoanalytic criticism in general might well have carried forward the "modern" idea that memory does not ground us but rather undermines our sense of stability or consolidated identity (285-293). I have touched on some of this ground in Section One, and I will not repeat my sketch of Terdiman's modern memory crisis or its purchase in psychoanalysis here: at this point, it greatly exceeds my training as a literary critic, even though it points to what might well be the next logical step in an interrogation of culture and memory. Nonetheless, Malouf's presentation of this scene certainly reproduces the problem of the past for the analysand, at personal (repressed memories and sublimated trauma) and cultural levels (the hermeneutic or representation dilemma, in which memory-as inscription-interpretation is made to bear the burden of "meaning" and in which culture functions as the sign system of the social). We have already noted the complexities of confession and the dangerous temptation to think about ("white") bodies as being "complete" or "whole"; and we have briefly considered how the sign acts as an inscription of meaning in memory and language, how the sign is a kind of materials-memory for language, how dialogue registers and translates the cacophony of its always already absent past to the iterated present, a claim that underwrites the deconstructive and semiological models of writing, memory, and identity developed by Bhabha, Carruthers, and Frow, and that we can trace to the earliest models of writing and to their most recent avatars in postmodern epistemology and cultural production. What is perhaps more pressing, at least for my reading of Gemmy Fairley, is that both aspects of memory (personal and cultural) result in paroxysms that "disrupt" his already disrupted existence; as Fairley recollects his past, better yet, as he reads the representations of the past he recalls within his present social frames—in-between two worlds and two languages—a figure emerges from his past that haunts him. It is clear as he touches and tastes the food that he is afraid: "A stranger, a child it might be, who had never wept, was weeping in him. He looked with wonder at his hands and at the remains of the pulpy mess. Wiped it off, a little afraid of its power, and out of habit muttered syllables that were a formula against bad magic, though he did not think the magic was bad" (31). In this disjunctive moment, in this suspended temporality, Fairley's miraculous transformation in Australian Aboriginal society begins to reverse: it is clear that in the "white" settlement he will not enjoy his "questionable status" but suffer because of it.

Fairley's re-entrance to settler-invader society coincides with his remembrance of his

own "Oedipal" past. And as he is literally *interpellated* by his past, by his former language, Fairley begins to perceive of himself, to be constituted, as a fundamentally split subject. If Fairley was once unaware of his "in-between" status, he now begins to recognize himself as double, as a hybrid creature whose *incoherent* selves and incompatible languages are linked by traumatic memories (or we might say body-of-memories), including the painful and guilt-ridden memories of his tenure with Willett. The image of a pair of boots, for example, out of place in the Australian Aboriginal landscape Fairley has grown accustomed to, unexpectedly triggers a mental picture in Fairley's mind that re-presents his life with his abusive master, including the way Fairley murdered him. Bound by this painful and un-settled past, Fairley fully expects to encounter Willett's spirit:

One day, he thought, I will turn around on some track deep in the scrub and *he* will be there, making fast towards me, not ghostly, in no way ghostly, and I will wait there for him to catch up, open and place for him to step into, and we will go on. He did not ask himself where.

In the meantime, he was here, though where here was, and why he was in this place rather than another, was a mystery to him. (28-9)

Whether or not Fairley seeks some form of metaphysical absolution is not as important a question as the fact that Fairley's memory is inhabited by this symbolic "European" man, a figure who, we might say, haunts Fairley even in death. Fairley hears Willett call him in his head: "Ah, boy so that's where you've got to" (153). Of course, confessional techniques are, in a certain sense, institutionalized forms of forgetting, the aims of which usually involve some form of absolution and a concomitant social discipline. For Fairley, however, there is no escaping the past, even in the remote Queensland colony; there is no priestly cult to validate his forgetting: "A world from which Willett had entirely disappeared was inconceivable" (153).

Fairley, Malouf insists, cannot escape his past; to push this further, we could say that there is no getting around or away from memory. Curiously, Fairley does not know exactly where he is. Trapped in-between the present and the past, between two "undecipherable" worlds and languages, what Fairley wants most of all is not so much a return to a "whole" white body or language as a sense of "joining," a way to suture or "solder" two worlds together, to invoke both Toni Morrison and Derek Walcott. At one point, in a scene clipped out of *Frankenstein*, Fairley creeps up to one of the settlement houses: "From an opening between the slabs, yellow light poured forth . . . He stepped round the edge of it, then squatted and very gingerly extended his hand so that the brightness crept up his arm, but there was no warmth to it" (32). Later,

He crept closer and crouched under the sill. From within came voices, and though the words made no sense to him. save for one or two of them, the sound did, the his, the buzz.

He put his shoulder to the rough slabs, believing that if he could only get near enough, the meaning of what was said would come clear to him, he would snatch the words clean out of the speakers' mouths. If he could get the words inside him, as he had the soaked mush, the creature, or spirit, or whatever it was, would come up to the surface of him and take him. It was the words he had to get hold of. It was the words that would recognize him.

He did not want to be taken back. What he wanted was to be recognized. (32)

In this paradigmatic moment, the narrator spells out Fairley's desire for recognition, for what I have called re-cognition or remembrance, a "joining" of or "being-in" community, that we can presume includes the hitherto polarized worlds of the European settler-invaders and Australian Aboriginals. Less speculatively, Fairley's return reminds us of the ghost, and "ghostly" women, who live at 124 in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, marginal but unforgettable figures of social life who are also restlessly "looking for the join" (213). Fairley himself is "living evidence" of the possibility of such a hybrid creature, such a "joined" "border life."

In one view, Fairley is negotiating the conflictual "space" between what Lyotard has

called "scientific" and "narrative" knowledges, the former consisting of the "verifiable" and "denotative statement," the "direct" word that is always self-legitimizing (23-27); the latter a mode of knowledge that is performative and tolerant, and that circulates in the realm of the social under the mark of "that strange temporalization," that "golden rule" of narrative knowledge: "never forget" (The *Postmodern Condition* 22). Of course, both forms of knowledge have as their purpose the legitimation, and it is the triumph of the latter, I think, at least insofar as it can subsume and co-exist with other competing "knowledges" and insofar as it forms social bonds, that Fairley has experienced in the Australian Aboriginal community; conversely, it is the failure of the *certainties* of "scientific" or Enlightenment knowledge to account for the world around the Queensland settlement that terrifies the settler-invaders. At a personal level, though, our "split" hero is simply trying to negotiate the distance between two worlds, two temporalities, two languages, and two kinds of knowledge:

So, when next day he began to run towards the boundary fence and the paddock where the three children stood staring, he had no notion of abandoning the tribe, even less of breaking from one world to another. It was a question of covering the space between them, of recovering the connection that would put the words back in his mouth, and catch the creature, the spirit or whatever it was, that lived in the dark of him, and came up briefly to torment or tease but could be tempted, he now saw, with what these people ate and with the words they used. (32-3)

This "covering" is indeed contingent and provisional, incomplete and virtual, but it is an important gesture of "connectedness," from the post-colonial and cultural mnemonic perspectives. It is, then, revealing that this "in-between" creature re-enters the English language and begins, once again, to stutter: "It was the stammer. It belonged to someone he had thought was gone, lost, and here it was on his lips again. It had come back at the moment, up there on the fence, when he first found words in his English tongue" (14). De-formed and re-formed, we might say, on the border between the two worlds, the stuttering Fairley sends pulses of chaotic but generative energy—disruptive waves—through the social fabric of the settlement, through the minds and bodies of the settler-invaders: past, present, and future.

If the predominant ethos of the Australian Aboriginal society in the novel is an elemental and spiritual *connectedness*—a kind of joining that refuses the division of spirit and matter, and that extends beyond *Homo Sapiens* to other living creatures and even to material "objects," through language—Fairley learns to live with this *order of things* not only in the social relations around him but in the landscape he inhabits and in the breath and bodies of living creatures. For instance, as he hunts for food he partakes of the "joined" world:

Watching out for it, and for himself, he got into his mouth as much of its fat and flesh as he could manage, its names too, its breath. What kept you alive here was the one and the other, and they were inseparable: the creature with its pale ears raised and stiffened, sitting up alert in its life as you were in yours, and its name on your tongue. When it kicked its feet and gushed blood it did not go out of the world but had its life now in you, and could go in and out of your mouth for ever, breath on breath, and was not lost, any more than the water you stooped to drink would cease to run because you gulped it down in greedy mouthfuls, then pissed it out. (26)

At a cellular level, this makes good sense (even if the thought of being ingested by Fairley does nothing to perpetuate my dreams of immortality); such an ethos and its *incorporated* knowledges and memories contradict the absolute division of spirit and matter that has nagged at the (theological and philosophical) unconscious of the West and underwritten its taxonomic epistemologies at least since Plato tried to reconcile Idea to Matter, to rescue philosophy, as Derrida argues, from the "orgiastic mysteries," and certainly since the pre-Christian and Christian Gnostics tried to reconcile divine *gnosis* to human flesh, most obviously, perhaps, at the council

at Nicea, which tried to *politically* ensure the divinity and humanity of Christ.

If Malouf is tempted by a kind of nostalgic organicism in his text as he tries to undermine the divisiveness that such knowledge produces, his contradictory position is perhaps understandable: "What philosophy," asks Michel Foucault, "has not tried to overturn Platonism?" ("Theatrum Philosophicum" 166). But man, the great amphibian, the *in-between creature*, both profane and sacred, mind and matter, capable of remembering and forgetting, remains a problem. My reading of *Remembering Babylon* as a paradigmatic post-colonial memory-text hinges upon the idea that to think about colonial encounters we must learn to *tremble in that strange repetition that ties an irrefutable past . . . to a future that cannot be anticipated*. We must do so in order not to give in to an uncritical amnesia or wilful blindness—to the fearful repression of difference. What is of paramount importance is that "becoming" human in *Remembering Babylon* is a transformative and translatable process—a mnemonic and textual mediation between spirit and flesh, idea and matter, consciousness and bodies, present and past, even "black" and "white"; this is a "becoming human" that entails a kind of alterity, to use Bhabha's term, a non-negative and differential connectedness.

Fairley embodies both poles of this anxious cultural engagement and earns a curious name for his transgressive hybridity: "the black white feller" (39). As seen in this oxymoronic nomination, Fairley cannot be neatly categorized by the settlers. His giggling and antics as he re-learns English convince the settlers that he is at best "simple" (38), or at worst:

there were some among them for whom the phrase ["simple"], light as it was, suggested something darker: that even when he was there, in full sunlight, refusing to meet your gaze but engaged, so far as he was capable of it, in conversation, he was halfway gone, across a line, like the horizon, that was not to be fixed in real space, and could begin anywhere. (38)

The cultural and geographical ground that Fairley inhabits—he is *halfway gone*—unsettles the rational discursive and geographic domains of Empire—"real space" as the narrator puts it. By suspecting Fairley is mad, the settlers enact a familiar cultural negation, defining themselves as *rational* and therefore *normal* sovereign subjects whose being is guaranteed by the knowledges such sovereign subjects construct to protect the epistemological order of things.

The apostles of such a "white mythology"—of culture as a border patrol and of "scientific" or non-narrative knowledge—in the novel are, not surprisingly, the minister Mr Frazer and the schoolmaster George Abbot. Frazer and Abbot are charged with "writing up" (16) Fairley's re-incorporation into the settlement. But even their documentation of the event is fraught with difficulties that stem from the fact that Fairley is a "new" form of life, a "new" human sign. Frazer, on the one hand, seems to only see and hear what he wants to: he infantilizes Fairley and projects a religious sentimentality onto him that confirms his, Frazer's, vision of the adolescent as a lost, white, uncivilized (and incomplete) soul. Abbot, on the other hand, is younger and resents the clerical role that Frazer casts him in. Out of boredom and no small degree of vanity, Abbot introduces "into what he had just set down a phrase or two of his own":

Hidden away in Mr Frazer's orotund periods, they were an assertion of independence, of his refusal to be a mere tool. He waited to see if Mr Frazer would notice. . . . The thought of this scrap of mis-truth, deliberately introduced among so much that was mere guesswork on the minister's part, not to say sentimental fantasy, appealed to his sense of the absurd; he delighted in it, even if he was the only one who would ever know it was there. In this way he appropriated a little of the occasion to himself, stepped in and concealed himself, a sceptical shade, at this and that point of the minister's Colonial fairytale. (19)

Frazer the self-styled scientist goes on to benefit at a taxonomic or discursive level from Fairley's hybrid knowledge. But even his colonial discourse cannot *account* for Fairley's "joined" identity, not the least reasons for this being Frazer's own myopic and patronizing vision.

For his part, the illegitimate Fairley seems relieved, at first, that the "magic" (20) of these

"seven closely-written pages" (20) of colonial discourse will contain the differential cultural meanings—the intangible presences—of his life-story. His first reaction as his life gets transcribed is thus relief, that finally "He was known" (*Remembering* 20). But a greater fear lingers, beyond the black and white characters on the page, that his life, his past, his cross-cultural experiences, could be reduced by such totalizing knowledge to "what a man could hold in his hand and slip into a pocket" (21). Such a reductive appropriation might suit the accumulative textuality of colonizing cultures, but even Fairley seems to recognize that he has lived something bigger, something beyond such finely drawn textual lines. Fairley, we read,

hugged himself. What came back to him was the strong smelling, earth-smelling black stuff he had caught a whiff of when he held the papers to his nose.

Was that the smell of his life, his spirit, the black blood they had drained out of him? No wonder he felt weak.

All the events of his life, all that he had told and not told, and more, much more, now that it had begun to stir and move, which he was just beginning to recall, had been curled up in him like an old-man carpet snake. It was awake now. Lifting its blind head it was emerging coil on coil in the sun. (21)

As a cultural icon, the snake has done extra-duty in the cultural memory of the West; I am not interested, here, in its over-determination as malevolent or evil. The striking feature of the image of the snake in Malouf's novel, as in Carey's *Illywhacker*, however, is its function as a model of memory. At the level of popular or folk wisdom, the snake, despite its ability to shed its skin, to begin again, as it were, is ostensibly invested with a Nietzschean resentment, with the inability to forget injustices in the past. The cultural history of this belief would, no doubt, be interesting. Of course, the same thing has been asserted about elephants, and whether or not this is the case is not a question I want to spend much time thinking about. More interesting are the residual mnemonic effects of "pain" and "injustice" that, despite repressions and apparent forgettings, resonate with a life of their own.

Fairley's troubled past makes such remembering especially risky; and Fairley is wary of the power-relations that are implicit in Frazer's "Colonial fairytale," a writing that masks a larger, and lingering, phobia or nightmare in which the arbitrary discursive certainties and possessive textuality of Empire threaten to cancel out ambivalences and indeterminacies. But the failure of colonial culture to *interpellate* or ideologically constitute Fairley as a "fully" recognizable subject, as much as the inability of colonial discourse to "know" and name the fearsome geography of the "swamp" (3) world around the settlement itself, are recorded as moments in which the authority of colonial discourse and its "direct" word *stutter*. Fairley, no less than the Australian landscape, cannot be stuffed into a tweed pocket nor contained/cultivated by Europeans whose culture operates a line of *defence*, as a justification for treating the world and its inhabitants as property. The cultural arrogation of the settlers' imported "knowledge" is ironically prophesied in the novel—albeit in the infantilizing terms of colonial discourse—in the following entry from Frazer's journal:

We have been wrong to see this continent as hostile and infelicitous, so that only by the fiercest stoicism, a supreme resolution and force of will, and by felling, clearing, sowing seeds we have brought with us, and by importing sheep, cattle, rabbits, even the very birds of the air, can it be shaped and made habitable. It is habitable already. I think of our early settlers, starving on these shores in the midst of plenty they did not recognize, in a blessed nature of flesh, fowl, fruit that was all around them and which they could not, with their English eyes, perceive, since the very habit and faculty that makes apprehensible to us what is known and expected dulls our sensitivity to other forms, even the most obvious. We must rub our eyes and look again, clear our minds of what we are looking for to see what is there. . . . The children of this land were made for it . . . We must humble ourselves and learn from them. (130)

It remains to be said that the "humility" Frazer seems to advocate in this passage fails to "cover" the distance between the two worlds, to "fix" Fairley or his story forever. The settler-invaders, for their part, are anxious to conserve their white European pasts and fail to see in Fairley anything "new." In the end, it is easier for them to forget their own cultural contingency, to refuse to see that they, too, are nomads and migrants: wandering Caucasians "traipsing this way and that all over the map" (9). As a "black white feller," though, Fairley disrupts this imperial amnesia, transgressing the neat polarity of settler culture and in doing so hooking the sublimated feelings of illegitimacy and fear of indeterminacy that haunt the community. Fairley, the narrator acknowledges, had "started out white. No question. When he fell in with the blacks—at thirteen, was it?—he had been like any other child, one of their own, for instance. (That was hard to swallow.) But had he remained white?" (40).

Apparently not, but the burden of that question depends upon what it means to be white, to be "one of our own," to *become* human: "The fact was, when you looked at him sometimes he was not white. His skin might be but not his features. The whole cast of his face gave him the look of one of Them. How was that, then?" (40). Informed by nineteenth-century "scientific" theories of the *born* criminal and of racialism, the settlers can only see in Fairley an unexplainable deviation from "normal" that reminds them of the presence of the "abnormal" Australian Aboriginals around the settlement. The "fictions" of blackness³² that the settlers have invented, like their narcissistic "fictions" of whiteness, are revealed as contingent, learned behaviours, as arbitrary epistemological structures, as a form of "colonial desire" that effaces a *common* humanity shared by settlers and Australian Aboriginals and that in fact works to "keep races separate" (Young, *Colonial Desire* xii, 25).

The settlers have learned this racist configuration of power and knowledge as children; as the narrator notes, even if it wasn't Fairley "you were scared of" (*Remembering Babylon* 42), it was the idea of being overwhelmed by blacks—by your other—at any moment:

It brought you slap up against a terror you thought you had learned, years back, to treat as childish: the Bogey, the Coal Man, Absolute Night. And now here it is, not two yards away, solid and breathing: a thing beside which all you have ever known of darkness, of *visible* darkness, seems but the merest shadow, and all you can summon up to the encounter, out of a lifetime lived on the other, lighter side of things—shillings and pence, the Lord's Prayer, the half-dozen tunes your finger's can pick out on the strings of a fiddle, the names and ages of your children, including the ones in the earth, your wife's touch on your naked belly, the shy, soft affection you have for yourself—weakens and falls away before the apparition, out of nowhere, of a figure taller perhaps than you are and of a sooty blackness beyond black . . . (42-3)

On "the lighter side of things," in the enclaves protected by "white mythologies," culture cannot conceive of its learned negative, the Black Man, existing in the "same space, the same moment with you" (43) in terms that are non-threatening, just as it cannot perceive both "positive" and "negative" existing into one hybrid creature, like Fairley. "It was the mixture of monstrous strangeness and unwelcomed likeness that made Gemmy Fairley so disturbing to them, since at any moment he could show either one face or the other" (43). Fairley, in this light, is an

³²This echo of Frantz Fanon's argument invokes the complex problem of race as the problem of a global inferiority complex that is confirmed by the double processes of economic exploitation and the "internalization—or, better, epidermalization" of a set of inequitable power relations. "White civilization and European culture have forced an existential deviation on the Negro . . . what is often called the black soul is a white man's artifact" (*Black Skin, White Masks* 11-14). From the post-colonial perspective, the problem of European racism, as Terry Collits writes, can be examined not as "a thing-in-itself but as a dense system of ideological practices over time entwined with history, language, gender and class-relations, and problems of representation and interpretation" ("Theorizing Racism" 64).

ambivalent and "inappropriate object" whose identity"—at once resemblance and menace" (Bhabha, *Location* 86)—unsettles settler culture at its most intimate levels. Fairley, after all, "was a parody of a white man. . . . He was imitation gone wrong, and the mere sight of it put you wrong too, made the whole business somehow foolish and open to doubt" (39).

It is *doubt*, finally, that threatens the settler project, that shows up the boundaries of settler culture as so many lines in the sand. Civilization, in this case equivocated with language and race, is no "pretty thing" but rather organized paranoia. The settlers

looked at their children, even the smallest of them chattering away, entirely at home in their tongue, then heard the mere half-dozen words of English this fellow could cough up, and even those so mismanaged and distorted you could barely guess what he was on about, and you had to put to yourself the harder question. Could you lose it? Not just the language, but *it*. *It*. (40)

Again, Malouf's elliptical, interrogative, prose foregrounds an unsayable limit of settler culture—what I take to be *civilization* or *whiteness*. The numerous interrogative sentences I have cited from *Remembering Babylon* in this chapter reflect the doubt that eats away at the imperial project. The answer that the settler-invaders are afraid of is: yes, anyone of them could be Gemmy Fairley; yes, anyone of them could lose their language, their culture, their whiteness, and be reduced to what they see as the "abominations" of blackness, to a "double" and unknowable life.

Jock McIvor is one of the only adult settlers who seems to see something more in Fairley than a *visible darkness*. Fairley stays with the McIvors on their farm for a year, during which time the community begins to close itself off, isolating Jock and his family, especially when Fairley is visited by several Australian Aboriginals who converse with him for a short time and give him a stone wrapped in bark as a gift. McIvor is not a social philosopher, much less a theorist of interstitiality, but he begins to see the limits of European culture—and of the hearts and minds—of the men around him:

It was as if he had seen the world till now, not through his own eyes, out of some singular self, but through the eyes of a fellow who was always in company, even when he was alone; a sociable self, wrapped always in a communal warmth that protected it from dark matters and all the blinding light of things, but also from the knowledge that there was a place out there where the self might stand alone. (106-7)

Through the shifted consciousness of McIvor, Malouf hints at a micro-politics of *responsibility* that would prevent culture from being used as a system of mass inclusion/exclusion. Individuals like Fairley or Jock McIvor or his daughter Janet inhabit hopeful—if lonely—sites of tolerant yet differential models of cultural survival beyond the "warmth" of Western self-recognition. As for the paranoia of inclusive/exclusive cultural systems, Malouf pulls no punches: the superstitions and fears that are foisted onto the Australian Aboriginals and onto Fairley (he fell in with the tribe when he was "thirteen") are compressed into the seemingly benign talisman of the stone, which incenses the community precisely because of its ambivalent cross-cultural linkage—a banal symbol of elemental Australia but more so of what seems to be the potent, chthonic "magic" of the Australian Aboriginal *enemy* that the settler-invaders cannot comprehend: "Fairley and the fears he evokes had brought them to the very edge of it; of a world where what was cleared and fenced and in Jock's own terms reasonable—all their education, their know-how, yes, and the shotguns they carried—might not be enough against—against what?" (105).

This uncertainty at the very heart of the settler's agenda reveals the confusion and doubt that perpetually threatens the settlement. Beyond Fairley's material presence, the settlers suspect an undisciplined, immoral, and unknowable presence lurks, possessing a mode of power/knowledge that the settler's associate with the "absolute" black skin of the enemy. Faced with such indeterminacy and intangibility, the settlers project their metaphysical fears onto the figure of "blackness," an enemy possessing a potent connection to the land that the dispossessed settlers lack. This superstitious projection justifies all sorts of cultural prophylaxis in the minds of the white settler-invaders, whose colonial enterprise is fraught by the suspicion that the

Australian Aboriginals could resist white settlement in uncanny—"un-nerving"—ways. Such a confrontation is played out along cultural borders, it disturbs "secured" identities, and it partakes of what Julia Kristeva, in a slightly different context, calls *abjection*: "what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite" (*The Powers of Horror* 4).

It is thus both a moral and epistemological duty to reclaim Fairley from the *unreal* and *unreasonable* spaces he inhabits:

Poor bugger, he had got lost. . . . It was a duty they owed to what they were, or claimed to be, to bring him back, as if it was feasible, to being a white man. But was it feasible? He had been with them, quite happily, it appeared, for more than half his life: living off the land, learning their lingo and all their secrets, all the *abominations* they went in for. Were they actually looking at a man, a white man, actually putting a knife into his hands and passing him bread, who had—. (*Remembering Babylon* 39)

The ellipsis, here, is telling: I read it as a paradigmatic moment of *doubt*, of colonial culture's fear and fascination the figure of the cannibal, which, in the context of post-colonial studies, is located at the very edge of Western civilization. The settler-invaders do not name the figure nor practice of anthropophagy here, but it is clear that they are both afraid of and fascinated by Fairley's ambivalent, over-determined body and by his "unknown" Aboriginal past: in the most literal sense, his presence as and parodic repetition (or re-staging) of the "cannibal" figure reminds them of (forces them to re-cognize) something "unmanageable" and "unfathomable" in their colonial present.

Malouf's representation of the cannibal belongs to a large body of creative and critical work on "cannibal figuration" (Slemon, *Bones of Contention* 164) that I will not incorporate here. But I am interested in how Fairley's presence in the settlement and his imagined or actual cannibalistic "past" functions in the text as a paradigmatic and problematic cultural mnemonic, as a moment of memory disturbance. That is, the over-determined figure of the cannibal in colonial discourse and its various tropes in post-colonial writing can be read as perturbations of colonial and post-colonial cultural memory. As Stephen Slemon writes, following the argument of Michel de Certeau, "the discourse of cannibalism, especially in the context of European travel literature, functions primarily for Europe in the material production of *words*: 'the discourse that sets off in search of the other with the impossible task of saying the truth returns from afar with the authority to speak in the name of the other and command belief'" (*Bones of Contention* 166). As Slemon continues, "Semantically, cannibalism connotes a body that consumes another human body; discursively, cannibalism enables mobility for the imperial subject and permits the political production of *meaning*" (166).

This meaning, when read in the context of the discourse of "othering" says as much, if not more, about the construction of the (paranoid) settler-invader self and its tenuous and "out-of-place" colonial cultural memories as it does about the so-called cannibals—in Malouf's novel, the Australian Aboriginals that surround European the settlement and with whom Fairley has spent at least half of his life. These ostensible cannibals are especially disturbing to the settler-invaders for at least *three* reasons: first, because they connote a "semantic" and superstitious fear of subsumption; second, because they "discursively" remind the settler-invaders of their tenuous links to their "civilized" past and of what we might call their political and territorial *illegitimacy*; third, because anthropophagy reminds the settler-invaders, in an uncanny and parodic way, of one of their own sacrosanct mnemonic rituals, the Christian Eucharist, figured in the passage above as shared "bread." In this way, the figure of Fairley-as-cannibal, as someone who has consumed human flesh, is especially un-settling: he is an unwanted—profane and disgusting—reminder of what lies on and beyond, of what does not respect, the borders of the settlement and of (European) civilization.

Peter Hulme puts it this way in *Colonial Encounters*: "Human beings who eat others human beings have always been placed on the very borders of humanity. They are not regarded as

inhuman because if they were animals their behaviour would be natural and could not cause the outrage and fear that 'cannibalism' has always provoked" (14). For Hulme, the term "cannibalism" has no real "application" outside of colonial discourse and the context of Europe's encounter with its Other. In fact, the idea of the cannibal as much as the term "cannibalism" itself "has gained its entire meaning from within the discourse of European colonialism" (86); the term cannibal has "nothing to do with social practices at all" but instead functioned as a cultural border, a term "meaning, say, 'the image of ferocious consumption of human flesh frequently used to mark the boundary between one community and its others'" (86).

Regardless of "the anthropological or sociological 'facts' behind the various practices of anthropophagy" (Slemon, "Contention" 164), the discursive location of the cannibal helps us to focus the question of Fairley's status as a liminal being or hybrid creature—as an un-wanted cultural mnemonic and fragmented colonial subject—sharply:

cannibal representation within colonialist management thus entails a profoundly split figuration—at once a regulatory mechanism and a pathology—and I think this helps to understand why it is that the cannibal encounter within colonialist representation is always so burdensomely *staged*. As a regulatory mechanism for colonialism, the cannibal moment is already displaced across an impossible location in the present and the past. As a colonialist pathology, the cannibal feast is in actuality celebrated elsewhere, within the disavowed economy of a sovereign imperialist subjectivity itself. (168)

The cannibal is perhaps the most terrifying of "in-between" figures, then, precisely because of the failure of colonial (self) regulation and of the discursive rupture and mnemonic fragmentation that it causes when it is encountered—discursively or otherwise—by colonists: not only because of its imputed gustatory and ritualistic activities but also because of its refusal to be classified according to the (Manichaean) certainties of Western thought. Considering the (under)representation of the cannibal in colonial and post-colonial writing, Slemon points out that

Whatever the specifics of its deployment . . . the discourse of cannibalism assists in the taxonomic regulation of cultural difference through a politics of *control*, splitting the field of human relation by space and by time, and enabling the self/other tropes of European modernity to inhabit the comforting binary oppositions of civilization versus savagery. ("Bones of Contention" 166)

It is, ultimately, the failure of such "comforting binary" certainty and of taxonomic regulation in the Queensland settlement that Fairley's presence in the settlement augurs. Like the figure of the cannibal, Fairley is a hybrid but silenced liminal creature—a body-of-memory that, in the context of post-colonial tropology and "figurative resistance" (Slemon, "Bones" 173), remains silent, off stage, and elsewhere, even after his return to civilization. Fairley, too, suffers "constant deferral at precisely the moment of [his] paradigmatic grip" (173); he is a figure whose "in-betweenness," whose "strange repetition," to use Derrida's phrase, of his European and Australian pasts indeed causes the settler-invaders to "tremble."

It is upon this discursive and cultural—this mnemonic—threshold that we must make sense of Fairley as a colonial memory-effect. It is a central irony of the text that the idea of Fairley eating human flesh disturbs the settlers when, in fact, an idealized (albeit sanitized) version of this anthropophagic act is part of the central *mnemonic* ritual of the Christian Eucharist. Judeo-Christian history and theology, of course, is centred in *Jerusalem*, which, along with Athens, is one of what John Carroll calls the "two primordial sites" of Western culture ("Australian" 229) and cultural mnemonics. This sacred commemorative ritual and the wounded body it re-presents helped distinguish Christians from pagans in Europe, and later on (and no less forcefully), Europeans from their colonial Others. So powerful was this cultural ritual and the "responsible soul" this threshold of meaning created, that this "sign" signified, that the word "cannibalism" itself is usually absent in "discussions of the Christian communion. Even to have 'cannibalism' and 'Christian communion' in the same sentence seems indecorous" (84). But as Hulme rightly notes, "the Christian communion consists of eating the [transubstantiated or

symbolic] flesh of a man" (84).

It is at this point that a profound mnemonic ambivalence is visible in the discourse of the "whole" white European body and in its civilizing mission. We cannot spend much time dwelling upon the theological and historical meanings of the Eucharist either, but as Hulme goes on to show, the double meanings of the "cannibal" in colonial discourse say more about "the collective fantasies" (35)—and I think fears—of European culture than about any of the cultures Europe contacted and colonized. At a theoretical level, the cannibal—like the madman and the deviant or criminal—is situated on the very border between rationality and irrationality, and no matter how thoroughly these figures are abjected from the community they remain in the backs of the settler-invaders' minds as fearsome challenges to the absolute epistemological and ontological borders they rely upon for self- and social-identification. As Hulme suggests, these figures exist on the borders between Self/Other, between Civil/Savage, and they form a threshold of identity that "white" Europeans should not cross. The problem is that the settler-invaders imagine the Australian Aboriginals around participating in a "profane" version of anthropophagy in contrast to the "sacred" celebration of the Eucharist and its function as a powerful *mnemonic* ritual. The colonial blindness or cultural hypocrisy of such a denial, of such a cultural amnesia, if you will, reveals, among other things, a kind of "schizoid" or paranoid colonial consciousness. And such a tenuous *self-composition*, to use Hulme's terminology, out at the edge of the empire, both demands and justifies racial and linguistic "purity." But according to such circular logic, Fairley, who is white and who speaks English, should be *included* within the settlement. In a figurative sense, though, he never really makes it over the fence. In this light, the figure of Fairley, like the figure of the cannibal, marks "those who do not belong" (86) in the comprehensive project of "forging a European identity" (86). As Hulme notes:

The *pattern* is important: boundaries of community are often created by accusing those outside the boundary of the very practice on which the integrity of that community is founded. This is at one and the same time both a psychic process—involving repression and projection—and an ideological process—whereby the success of the projection confirms the need for community to defend itself against the projected threat, thereby closing the circle and perpetuating it. (85)

I would add to Hulme's insightful comments the notion that repression and projection are, at least within the discourses of psychoanalysis, mnemonic acts: communal identities, like individual identities, as we have noted, are "invented" out of the inscriptions and traces of memory and in bodies that *understand*, out of the identities of the past and within the social frames that organize meaning in the present.

Connerton puts it this way: "we preserve the past by representing it to ourselves in words and images" (*How Societies Remember* 72). Connerton distinguishes between "inscriptive" mnemonic practices, which privilege texts and writing, and "incorporative" ones, which utilize non-textual or non-cognitive modes of transmission, such as the body, ritual, and performance as sites where the past is preserved from corrosive doubt or oblivion:

Both commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices . . . contain a measure of insurance against the process of cumulative questioning entailed in all discursive practices. This is the source of their persistence as mnemonic systems. Every group, then, will entrust to bodily automatisms the values and categories which they are most anxious to conserve. They will know how well the past can be kept in mind by a habitual memory cemented in the body. (102)

Connerton's model of social memory, derived from Halbwachs, as we have seen, privileges somatic and auratic modes of social memory which preserve the past in (social) performances while dismissing "inscriptive" or textual mnemonic practices because they isolate the (reading/writing) subject of memory from communal acts of memory, because they fail to account for the "conventional expectations" and social legitimations (frames) that govern memory in the first place, frames that, as Halbwachs has shown, are "acts of transfer that make

remembering in common possible" (34-39). Even if Connerton fails to recognize how bodies, too, are inscribed surfaces, how signs, how language, how each *word* carries with it the record of past "performances" (utterances) and contexts, and how rituals themselves are complex narratives or arrangements of signs, his anatomy of incorporative mnemonics is nonetheless helpful, especially if we keep in mind the material nature of the interpreted sign and the social organization of memory as well as the "incorporative" logic of Western epistemology, what Young, as we have already considered, sees as the "annihilating" binary logic of the dialectic: a constitution of knowledge that "works according to the structure of a subject perceiving an object, as same/other dialectic in which the other is first constituted by the same through its negation as other before being incorporated within it" (*White Mythologies* 6). In one sense, this is the "annihilating logic of colonialism, and it is the logic that Malouf fictionally anatomizes in *Remembering Babylon*.

Connerton certainly recognizes how bodies, too, preserve the past, but he prefers to read them as privileged and organic sites of (mnemonic) presence. Despite this, Connerton usefully reads the Eucharist and the figure of the cannibal from the perspective of cultural mnemonics and inscription: "The fact of the crucifixion is symbolized in each sign of the cross: itself a condensed commemoration, a narrative made flesh, an evocation of the central historical fact and the central religious belief of Christianity" (Connerton 47). This "performance" is no less powerful if read as an event of cultural inscription or semiology. In other words, the "vocation of the Christian is to remember and commemorate the history of that intervention" (46) in every moment and gesture of his or her life. What is especially striking is that such an *incorporative* mnemonic is that it has been translated into Western Christianity, at least in part, as a textual narrative or inscriptive form of memory; furthermore, it "joins" the sacred and profane in and upon the body through a mysterious *sacrifice*, a written and performed reminder for Christians, an "inscribed" ritual that organizes the social and psychological, the ethical and political, and that attempts to mediate that enduring philosophical problem of spirit/mind and matter: as Connerton puts it, "divine revelation has assumed a human form" (46).

This question of the connection between the spirit and matter is a central question of memory: we have seen it posed in various forms in the earliest classical models, in medieval mnemonics, in the "psychological" models of memory advanced by Bergson or Freud, and in the semiological or social (secular) model of cultural memory that I am advancing here. It is an understatement to say that the (sacrificial) event of God becoming Man, of the "Word" becoming "Flesh," has proven to be one of the most significant and passionately held cultural memories in West. But at the centre of it remains the ambivalent human body: palatable and decreescent, capable of remembering the past and imagining a infinite (timeless) future. It is the body, as Connerton writes, that functions as "the point of linkage between" social control and self-composition, between "civilizing" practices and the "undisciplined" life of the so-called "savage." Such divisions are arbitrary, but as Connerton notes in his discussion of Western table manners as a set of mnemonic bodily practices, when it comes to bodily practices and behaviours in general, including things like manners and gestures, one must look to see what sort of *moral* value is being invested, what sort of power is being perpetuated:

What is being remembered is a set of rules for defining proper behaviour; the control of appetite in the most literal sense is part of a much wider process which will appear, depending upon our vantage point, either as structure of feeling or as a pattern of institutional control. These vantage points are reciprocally enlightening since the whole process has to be understood as occurring at two interlocking levels. There is the formation of a type of person whose sensibility is attuned to the more exacting and meticulous promptings of decorum; and there is the formation of a type of society whose control over its members is more stratified and more centralised. (*How Societies Remember* 83)

In slightly different terms, Friedrich Nietzsche makes a similar point in *On The Genealogy of Morals*, a point that we have already considered several times in this dissertation.

Nietzsche argues that a *conscience* and an awareness of responsibility was created for "human animals" by means of *memory* (indeed, the terms memory and conscience are in one view synonymous) and that memory and its social uses are inextricably bound to pain:

'If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to *hurt* stays in the memory'—this is a main clause of the oldest (unhappily the most enduring) psychology on earth. . . . Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices of the first-born among them) the most repulsive mutilations (castration, for example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults . . . all this has its origins in the instinct that realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics. (61)

Nietzsche continues this line of anti-humanist reasoning and concludes that "The worse man's memory has been, the more fearful has been the appearance of his customs" (61). This last point seems especially incisive in the context of European imperialism, insofar as the social discipline of Europe's other was accomplished, in part, by the "fearful" cultural mnemonics, the "bad conscience" (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 62) of Western "civilization": "Ah, reason, seriousness, mastery over the affects, the whole somber thing called reflection, all these prerogatives and showpieces of man: how dearly they have been bought!" (62).

Indeed, if we loosely translate Nietzsche's phrase into an interrogative sentence, we can refine and pose our own "ultimate colonial question": how much blood and cruelty lie at the bottom of all "good colonial things"? An unforgettable amount, post-colonial texts from settler-invader societies reply. If Malouf can be said to re-write, to re-locate, one of the sacrosanct rituals of Christianity in nineteenth-century Queensland, in much the same spirit, for instance, of Patrick White's modernist patriation of Judeo-Christian mythology in *A Fringe of Leaves*, Malouf hints that the *blindness* of Western eyes to the mutilated and forsaken body in the Christian sacrament is of a piece with the Occidental idealism that prevents those same eyes from seeing humanity in anyone but themselves, certainly not in in-between creatures like Fairley or in the "meaningless" bodies covered by the "absolute black" skin of the Australian Aboriginals.

Less speculatively, this religious re-vision is extended in the characterization of Janet McIvor, who was one of the children who saw Fairley on the fence when "he was up there . . . before he fell" (194). As Lachlan Beattie, one of Janet's playmates that day, puts it, near the end of the novel, Fairley "had touched off" something in them that they were "both still living" (197). The exact nature of Fairley's effect on these children of the Queensland settlement is not specified in the novel. I think, though, that it comes down to an altered sense of *perception* and of the body-of-memory that would enable Australians like Janet or Lachlan and the generations they influence to *see* and *engage* the places and the peoples around them in non-combative, non-totalizing, culturally collaborative ways.

And once again, we see that Malouf invests his hopes for a collaborative future in children, whose "undisciplined" natures and comic spirits, not to mention their linguistic flexibility, playfully transgress and mimic the highly serious world of the colonial authority. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, in *Remembering Babylon* we first look through children's eyes at Fairley. Janet remembers Fairley up on the fence where

the creature, unrecognized and unnamed as yet, that had launched itself out of the unknown world towards them, that the landscape itself had hurled into their midst, a ragged fragment of itself, or of its history or their own, some part of it that was still to come, had hung there against the pulsing sky as if undecided as yet which way to move, upward in flight into the sun or, as some imbalance in its own body, its heart perhaps, drew it, or the earth, or the power of their gazing, downward to where they stood rooted, its toes meanwhile hooked over the peeled bark of the fence rail, the muscles of its stringy feet tensed, its stick-like arms flailing. (194)

For Fairley, this might not mean much: he disappears into the mists and myths of legend,

presumably, as one rumor has it, the victim, along with eight nor nine other black men, women, and children, of a "dispersal" by a "group of cattlemen and two native troopers" (196). If a rather messianic aura surrounds his absence in the text, we can presume that he would be the sort of culturally transgressive messiah who would be found not only in Jerusalem but also beyond the epistemological and geopolitical boundaries of the West—in places like Babylon.

The weight of this fabled place in the cultural imaginations of the West is not a subject we can broach at this point, in this already lengthy chapter. But we can say that the use of "Babylon" (the Hebrew name is "Babel") in this novel—signaled in the epigraph from William Blake's *The Four Zoas*, "Whether this is Jerusalem or Babylon we know not"—reminds us of the complex linkages between memory, language, and (racist) knowledges as much as of the limits of religious fundamentalism and the excesses of disciplinary histories of imperial cultures; it also undercuts the *obsessive* need for certainty, for revelation, for Truth, that underwrites such modes of social organization. But the colonial world that Fairley inhabits, as much as the cosmography that Blake has created, does not fit into the grid of such epistemic certainty. That is, when it comes to memory, just as when it comes to temporality, to geography, to politics, or even to theology, we are *in-between*, in the *uncertain* world of dialogism, of discourse, of re-cognition, re-memory. And it is the need to re-think, to re-member the binarist polarities of Self-Other, of Us-Them of Jerusalem-Babylon that Malouf is fictionally advocating and interrogating. In one sense, Jerusalem must "join" Babylon, its fearsome and hated Other,³³ just as the settler-invaders must learn to "join" with the Australian Aboriginals, and it is at the level of cultural memory where the foundation and framework for such a joining, for such hybrid or border and un-certain lives will be fashioned and re-cognized. In Blake's post-Enlightenment universe, this time and space is figured as a liberating and indeterminate *anti-confession*, a cosmic tear that rips through the fabric of the certain universe: "we know not."

Whatever the case, Fairley's effect upon Janet is lasting: she remembers Fairley and his appearance as a moment in which, as she puts it, "I have never seen anyone clearer in all my life" (194). If her account of Gemmy and his effect is, in the end, informed by an elemental transcendence, it nonetheless points out the necessity of seeing differential cultural identities *clearly*.

Of course, the childish eyes of Janet become, perhaps problematically, those of Sister Monica, and it is her theological vision that concludes the novel. She says of her memories of Fairley's "legacy of 'love'" (199), of the Australian Aboriginal inhabitants, and of the soon to be Federated continent around her: "All this was a kind of praying . . . Let none be left in the dark or out of mind" (199). Whether or not her inclusive politics, her gospel of "love," (199) "gathers back into the dreamtime of the land itself" (196) is a good question. The plight of Australian Aboriginals, not to mention the horrors of the First World War (including the "unforgettable" sacrifices of the ANZACs at Gallipoli in 1915) suggest that violence and (racist) hatred, to say nothing of fear, will not easily loosen their grips on the cultural memory of the West. Too, Sister Monica seems unable to conceive of a "spiritualized" vision that does not depend upon the morally and spiritually overdetermined binarist constructions of light and dark, white and black, good and evil, natural and cultural. And it is hard not to think that the narrator Malouf has employed to tell the story of Fairley "knows" like a god. But as Sister Monica looks out over turn-of-the-century Australia and remembers her encounter with Fairley, as she watches her country, as the narrator puts it, she sees it "rise towards us" (200) in the moonlight, a mood of possibility and cultural transformation lingers in the text, if only for those who have, in one sense, just read Fairley's story.

³³ As I write this, the impassioned and fundamentalist rhetoric of both Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein once again clogs the media. My post-structural and post-colonial musings will do little, I suspect, to prevent "actual" casualties in this next "scene" in the Gulf War. It truly is time, as Malouf suggests, to "remember" Babylon and "places" like it in new ways.

It is this potential, then, that gathers in readers' minds; it is this potential that forces us, too, to begin to remember. Like most settler-invader societies, Australia has not been particularly collaborative or hybrid, nor open to the idea of interstitial negotiation in the past: Fairley, like the Australian Aboriginal tribes in the novel, remains disturbingly silent. Nonetheless, Malouf hints, we must look past the morbidity of "original" identities and rigid cultural boundaries to "border lives" in order to recognize new subjectivities and models of human community, however contingent or provisional. At a certain level, the figure of Fairley is "rememorated" in Janet's and Lachlan's memories: a body-of-memory, a story of how cultures begin to engage one another—slowly, unevenly, and incompletely. Perhaps this is the kind post-colonial "salvation," partly expressive and accomplished under the sign of lunar illumination and elemental transformation, that Janet prays for. What is clearer is that colonial encounters of the past and the post-colonial reality of interstitial spaces and in-between creatures in the present demand such clear-eyed interrogations and (apocalyptic) interventions. As Homi Bhabha implies, following Martin Heidegger, borders are places where presencing begins, where unitary notions of whole minds and consolidated bodies are displaced and where "living evidence" of difference must be considered. Such "border lives" and "in-between creatures" possess the potential to take us beyond ourselves, to an "un-settled" continent and self that might one day become "in touch with its other life" (*Remembering Babylon* 200).

Conclusion
§
Speaking of Cultural Memory

Somewhere hidden within me I too have some fragmentary sense of form, some appreciation of beauty as a species of perfection; and the involved sentences of my book on dreams, bolstered up on indirect phrases and with sidelong glances at their subject-matter, have gravely affronted some ideal within me. And I am scarcely wrong in regarding the lack of form as a sign of an incomplete mastery of the material.

—Sigmund Freud, 1899, Letter 119
on finishing *The Interpretation of Dreams*

When we set out to think of culture and memory, of representation and interpretation, of the present past, we set ourselves up to experience a theoretical *crisis of plenty*. But as Michel de Certeau reminds us, "nothing gives itself up" when it comes to the functioning of a "cultural aggregate," "everything has to be seized, and the same interpretive violence can either create or destroy" (*Heterology* 135). The spirit of this dissertation, I hope, has been intentionally creative; I set out to understand the social organization of, the function of significance in, and the linkages between memory and culture in theory and in literature. It hardly needs to be said again that there is no last word when it comes to the past much less the present. I have tried to *figure* cultural memory and to generate some questions about theory and literature as aspects of cultural mnemonics, about how cultures remember and forget, about how subjects re-construct, re-collect, re-cognize the past—celebrate it or suffer it, transform it or become deformed by it—but never in direct access to positivist facts or experience.

To remember is to re-work, to re-present, to re-collect the always already absent past. To speak about cultural memory is to attempt to understand the ways in which the social frames and cultural contexts we inhabit "shape" or "make" the past present as inscriptions, as signs that stand for something else because the past is *always already* absent. I have argued that this paradoxical absence and presence, this ambivalence, this indeterminate and reversible textuality is a fundamental feature of memory, and hence a feature of what Hannah Arendt calls the "human condition": "the conditions of human existence—life itself, natality, mortality, worldliness, plurality, and the earth—can never 'explain' what we are or answer the question of who we are for the simple reason that they never condition us absolutely" (11). I would add memory to this list, and suggest that it is through the mediated relationships of *discourse* and *representation*, through the sign systems of the social that we record the disjunction between mortality and immortality as the "non-perishable" (or at least less-perishable) "traces" (Arendt 19) that men and women leave behind. The Latin root of "past," the past participle of "pass," is *passus* and *pandere*, from "pace" or to stretch. Memory, in this view, is a record or "writing" of the

stretching and looping of being and of consciousness in time, of the irreversible and reversible linkage of now to then—what Augustine calls distention and what Jameson terms protension/retension.

Memory is a gathering in the present of past social life or experience, a record of a present that is no longer present as the present; memory is the name for the contradictory modes and inscrutable flows of information—the entropies and exchanges, the interpretations and elisions, the storages and retrievals—that underwrite and overdetermine each aspect of our lives; memory is the process we associate with the endurance of the past and with its ephemerality, with its disappearance, with the ostensibly permanent reproduction and the bewilderingly impermanent representation of information that occurs *in-between* the social and the subjective, *in-between* oblivion and meaningfulness, *in-between* life and death. In its protean modes and textual traces, memory connects and disconnects; it binds and disperses; it orders and disorders the time and space we inhabit *in-between* birth and death, *in-between* being and non-being. Martin Heidegger puts it thus in *Being and Time*:

What seems “more simple” than the nature of the “connection of life” between birth and death? It consists of a succession of experiences “in time.” If we pursue this characterization of the connection in question and above all of the ontological assumption behind it in a more penetrating way, something remarkable happens. In this succession of experiences only the experience that is objectively present “in the actual now” is “really” “real.” The experiences past and just coming, on the other hand, are no longer or not yet “real.” Da-sein traverses the time-span allotted to it between the two boundaries in such a way that it is “real” only in the now and hops, so to speak, through the succession of nows of its time. For this reason one says that Da-sein is temporal. The self maintains itself in a certain sameness throughout this constant change of experiences. (342)

I would not say that *nothing* seems simpler than this model for understanding the question of being-in-time, but I think that remembering and forgetting register not only the “certain sameness” of Being but also its fundamental differences, the incontrovertible ambivalence or disjunction (non-identity) that is produced by “change” or “duration” or “experience” in-time. It is a commonplace to say that this disjunctive temporality organizes the social in the modern and postmodern worlds: it orders the aporetic time and social spaces between the “always already now” and the “no-longer-now” (*Being and Time* 388). As a socially organized or cultural process, memory mediates the conscious “hops” or the discursive shuttling back and forth along the inexorable links between the past and the present, between meaning and meaninglessness. The subject-of-memory inhabits makes and re-makes itself as much as it is made and re-made by its social determinants, not the least of which is language.

The path I have tried to follow in the preceding pages has been neither straight nor well-marked: culture and memory are concepts that are as abstract as they are omnipresent, as intangible as they are material. But I have tried to explore—and to explain—some of the parameters of cultural memory in this thesis. The goal—or I should say goals—of this interrogation has been to think through the connectedness of the subject and the social in memory; at a more general level, I have tried to organize memory *in* and to read memory *against* some of the related concepts that are inherent in contemporary critical and literary theory. To this end, I have approached cultural memory as a problem from two positions: in “Cultural Memory: In Theory,” I set up some of the discursive boundaries of cultural memory and question the purchase of memory in theory—an admittedly ambitious task—by isolating some of the historical and theoretical configurations of culture and memory and by using them as frames for questions about cultural production and about the function of semiosis or signification in the context of memory’s own rich history. I test the category of cultural memory by figuring it *in* and *as* cultural theory, as an “operating system” or “memory machine” that, as Terdiman puts it, “like most of the mechanisms which determine the materiality of contemporary life . . . geared up in the nineteenth century” (“Deconstructing Memory” 13). In this view, memory is a cybernetic cultural

system, a component of ideology, and theory is one of its arrays, one of the ways in which "our society has devised to produce and sustain its forms" (13), one of the ways in which we order things and organize such broad concepts as time and space. Theories "organize what we notice, and thereby what we recall. They model representation and determine its field of referentiality—even those theories most reluctant to credit a relationship between discourse and its referents" (13). Following Richard Terdiman's claims about modern memory in the context of French literature and psychoanalytic theory, and following the arguments made by Fredric Jameson, John Frow, Mary Carruthers, and Andreas Huyssen, amongst others, about postmodern cultural mnemonics, I argue that the central problematic, the critical lynch pin, if you will, that holds a theory of cultural memory together is that memory can be read as a semiological or technical system, that memories too are signs—secular *re-cognitions* or *re-presentations* of the past in the modern and postmodern present.

In the second section, "Cultural Memory in Literature," I shift my focus from theory to literature. I set up a limited archive, in the Foucauldian sense (though a Borgesian labyrinth might be a better metaphor) of two contemporary Australian novels that I read as paradigmatic texts for understanding post-colonial—and more precisely—*settler-invader* cultural mnemonics. By reading memory closely in these texts, I set out to understand what a novel might look like as a site or place of cultural remembering, how a culture's literary *intertexts* operate, as Renate Lachmann has argued, as its memory. Like cultural theories, literary texts operate as memory machines—they re-present past social life. To be sure, the problem of the past in contemporary Australia is directly implicated in the mnemonic economy of Australian cultural production, in the national intertwining of amnesia and anamnesis. The idea of memory-as-intertext that Lachmann develops as a model of culture and that I consider in the "Introduction" to Section Two certainly deserves more careful study: its theoretical pedigree includes the materiality of language, the inscriptive or palimpsest memory of the sign, Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, and the conflictual and uneven emergence of culture as a cybernetic system that establishes and organizes the relations of inscribed signs or Baudrillardian simulations "whose references are either erased, disfigured, or transcoded" (Iser xiii).

Memory, once again, situates itself somewhere between "presence" and "absence," between life and death, and literature as a cultural mnemonic records this "marking" of time and "fixing" of meaning. Literature opens up, as Wolfgang Iser argues, "a means of access to observing how and perhaps even why culture comes about" (xiii). But this is no moment of "pure" origin or inspiration, no creation out of nothing. As Starn reminds us, we must apprehend memory through its functions, not the least of which being, as he continues, the way our obligation to remember the past can be formulated, following Nietzsche or Derrida, in models of the covenant or of credit. Starn, however, goes so far as to implore us to "remember truly" (5) because "other generations live on in our very blood and descend from our own. To forget the past willfully [sic] is to threaten the fragile links that, however tenuously, guard us from oblivion" (5-6). I have argued that it is impossible to remember "truly," that we must self-consciously and critically—that is, self-reflexively and rigorously—gather our thoughts of the past in the present as textual inscriptions mediated by intention and desire. From the post-colonial perspective, nonetheless,

literature remains important [because] it counteracts, on the one hand, the impersonality and the instability of public memory and, on the other, the determinism and fundamentalism of a collective memory based on identity politics. Literature creates an institution of its own, more personal and focused than public memory yet less monologic than the memorializing fables common to ethnic or nationalist affirmation. (Hartman 85)

Cary Nelson puts it this way in *Repression and Recovery*, his study of modern American poetry and canon-formation as a model of cultural memory:

Literary history, then, is deeply implicated in the ideological formulation and obliteration of cultural memory and in the process of establishing our current rhetorical and political

options . . . Both what we remember and what we forget are at once interested and overdetermined. Properly speaking, an absolute distinction between full recall and mere forgetfulness is impossible, since they are inextricably linked to each other. It is the collaboration between literary history and canon formation that makes this whole process of cultural recollection and forgetfulness seem seamless and uncontradictory. (50-52)

But memory is always contradictory and contestatory, a tropic process of selection and repression, of condensation and displacement; culture itself is an "in-between" and overlapping field of struggle and incommensurable value in which subjects must learn to "write" themselves and to "read" (to re-member, to narrate) their "others" in "new" or "non-negative" ways—which is more or less Young's thesis about history and postmodernity (and post-structuralism) in *White Mythologies*, which is the dominant principle informing Homi Bhabha's work on cultural relocation and subjective and social hybridity (or the ways in which we must learn to become "unrecognizable strangers" to ourselves), and which is, crudely speaking, David Malouf's leitmotif in *Remembering Babylon*. In this way, I have argued, the post-colonial is an area of critical thinking to which a theory of cultural mnemonics can contribute a great deal: memory mediates the re-cognition, the re-interpretation, the inscription of the sign and of the (past) event as much as it mediates the construction of the *subject* and of the *other*. Theoretical and literary writing as meta-discourses, as memory-machines, I believe, both facilitate and interrogate this paradoxical and ambivalent meaning-making, this degree-zero of writing and remembering that occurs in language and at the level of the social.

Having said this, and in a spirit of conclusion, I would like to suggest some more directions that I see future work on cultural memory taking, some of the directions in which my own interest in memory might proceed and in which the questions I have raised thus far seem to point. It would be misleading to claim that at any point in this dissertation I have completely discerned the subject-of-memory: this thesis is a record of an attempt to think through cultural memory and to understand the category of cultural memory in the overlapping contexts of theoretical and literary writing; it is a wandering in the *labyrinth* of the discursive past, we might say. At a personal and professional level, it is beginning, an attempt to navigate some of the ground that is staked by the "postmodern theoretical discourses" and to test the categories of critical theory against cultural memory.

Perhaps the single most important question that a theory of cultural memory raises is the nature of the determinations of the past upon the present. What interests me most about this version of the perennial philosophical problems of freewill or determinism, of chance or design, of mind and matter, and of the more recent theoretical problems of ideology and hegemony, is the way that literary texts figure into memory, the ways culture *inscribes* its meanings in response to these unanswerable questions and in doing so both sustains and interrogates its forms. A hermeneutic theory of memory gives us a way to read these inscriptions, past and present, and to understand the nightmarish weight and the determinant claims of the past upon the present; it also gives us a way to *change* or *reverse* the determinants of past when the past becomes moribund, massive, and sclerotic. I return to the idea that Ross Chambers develops in *Room For Maneuver* that reading is a technology of the self—one, I would add, that cannot be excised from memory or language—that is mediated by desire and a discursive "return of the repressed" that un-settles the frameworks of fixed meaning and such literal or positivist concepts as univocal or monological "Truth." Reading, as Chambers claims, involves complex amnesiac and anamnestic acts, analeptic and proleptic shapings, as Frow says, and through the *slippery* psychic and ideological but ultimately narratological processes of remembering and forgetting a genuine oppositional discourse can be established, one that respects and generates difference and thus possesses the potential to teach us how to *change* ourselves and our worlds *without violence*. The struggle of man against power, to revise Kundera's famous phrase, is indeed the struggle of remembering against forgetting.

One of the most interesting strands of cultural memory to follow in framing this problem is thus the proliferation of what constitutes a memory-text: monuments, buildings, rituals, traditions, inscribed bodies, to be sure, but also films, photographs, landscapes, fashion, quilts, soiled mattresses, people's trash, and the list goes on. In the context of his analysis of unofficial or "new post-colonial memory" in African cities, for example, Alessandro Triulzi reads the wall-paintings, graffiti (such as the "talking walls of Dakar") pavement radio (*radio trottoir*), street names, fast food culture, and rumours as "urban texts" and effects of memory (78-91). But two of most effective locations of memory, two of the most prominent modes or texts of memory, I think, are *architecture* and *bodies*. I have spoken at some length on both topics, and I will not add to that debate here. But I do think that both building and bodies are especially interesting texts to read as cultural inscriptions of the past. I have in mind especially the Victorian mansions of London and the scarred back "remembered" by Jack Maggs, the eponymous hero and transported convict of Peter Carey's latest novel. Maggs recalls numerous figures from and Australian convict novels as intertexts: Dawes/Devine, the brutalized hero of Marcus Clarke's For the Term of Unnatural Life; Daniel Corney, the condemned prisoner in David Malouf's The Conversations at Curlow Creek; and of course Magwitch, the patron of the ersatz gentleman Pip in Charles Dickens' Great Expectations. Maggs is a figure of modern colonial and post-colonial memory, and a particularly ambivalent and Freudian one at that: not only does he function as a literal repository of the penal-colonial past when he returns in the flesh to London (the return of the repressed), but his own unconscious memories of his European and Australian pasts haunt him when Tobias Oates "mesmerizes" him with a magnet and thus claims to unlock his memory. Maggs, we might say, is split or fragmented by his past. Oates, of course, wants to "write up" Maggs' story, to colonize Maggs' remembered past for his own literary ends. Although Carey's latest novel lacks the comic energy of, say, Illywhacker, it stages a kind of hybrid Australian subject as a literary intertext: it reminds us of Australia's penal-colonial past and post-colonial present. Maggs' scarred back and his *carceral unconscious* become texts of memory that Carey reads in the ambivalent and complex colonial and post-colonial relationship of Australia to Britain and, conversely, Britain to Australia.

To be sure, the linkages of cultural memory to the post-colonial remain largely unexplored; my thinking of cultural mnemonics and post-colonialism is very much in progress. In the context of Australia, for example, the "Dream Time" and "Songlines" of Australian Aboriginals are forms of cultural memory in which the past is perpetually re-presented in the present in non-documentary or non-print but nonetheless inscriptive modes of memory. To study these "inscriptions" and social meanings of memory as cultural mnemonics would produce remarkable results—Bruce Chatwin's The Songlines comes to mind, as do Mudrooroo's Master of the Ghost Dreaming and Sam Watson's The Kadaitcha Song. I briefly explore some of this ground in my reading of Remembering Babylon, but only in the context of a comparison Malouf makes between the paranoid and static phonology and epistemology of the settler-invader's documentary culture and the performative and participatory (dynamic and inscriptive) knowledge of the Australian Aboriginals. Another rich archive of texts in which memory is figured as a problem could be assembled around the question, around the social practice and literary trope, of the confessional text. I spoke briefly about confession as a drive to annul the past: certainly Illywhacker cannot be understood without some sense of this genre of writing and of its disciplinary genealogy; in the same way, Malouf's The Conversations at Curlow Creek and Rodney Hall's Yandilli Trilogy, which consists of The Second Bridegroom, The Grisly Wife, and Captivity Captive, must be read as confessional texts in which the persistence of the (disciplinary) past in the present, in memory, is the central problematic. Each of these novels acts as a "place" of memory in its own right, and each explores the confession as a literary trope and mnemonic disturbance, one that is linked to Australia's penal-colonial past; each of these "memory-texts," and countless others which we can read under the auspices of cultural memory and post-colonialism, in one way or another tells a story about the past and in doing so demonstrates a kind

of self-reflexive or metaconsciousness of memory. Whether or not they are examples of an "unlimitable" semiosis or "unmanageable indeterminacy" (Terdiman, *Present Past* 66) is a good question, and this is where the social frames, cultural codes, and matrices of signification that order the social come into play, where the *hermeneutics of suspicion* and the narrative drive of desire, not truth, enable us to ask and to attempt answers to difficult questions: what gets forgotten? what gets remembered? and how? These questions have been at the back of my mind as I prepared this dissertation: how is memory buttressed to narrative and not to truth? how are memories forms of individual and cultural narration? How do we gather our thoughts and ourselves and inscribe cultural meanings and values at the level of the social, whether as myths, as traditions, as religious systems, as history, as novels, as architecture, as confessional texts, as landscapes, and so forth. It is within this space of signs, this "social space we communally share with 'others,'" as Bhabha writes, "and from which solidarity is not simply based on similarity but on the recognition [the remembrance or forgetting] of difference" ("Unpacking" 211; emphasis added), that we must learn to remember the past as much as our selves in new ways. This is not, I think, a straight-forward affirmation of (multi)cultural relativism, of the liberal category of human "goodness," or even of an "organic" collective; nor is it a diffusion of memory into the postmodern sphere of culture or the "virtual" empire of the sign—the proliferation of "groundless" representation that Terdiman implicitly warns against in his conception of the end of the modern memory crisis. Instead, it is a reading of memory that foregrounds the difficult conceptual and cultural terrain, the mobilities and constraints, that surround the subject of memory, that organize personal and national narration: a remembering of the past that is characterized by hermeneutic or interpretive mnemonics and that acknowledges the paradox of the presence and absence of the past and of the need for perpetual re-reading and re-interpretation. As Linda Hutcheon write in *The Poetics of Postmodernism*, following the argument made by Ihab Hassan, the "presence of the past" or the "present-ification" of the past that has typically been seen as postmodern "does not deny the existence of the past"; what it does is "question whether we can ever know that past other than through its textual remains" (Hutcheon, *Poetics* 19-20).

We return once again, and finally, to the textual or inscriptive models of memory—to the signet ring and the wax tablet, to the palimpsest memory of the textual trace, to the inscribed rock or brick surface, to the *Wunderblock* or mystic writing pad, to the sound-image of the signified, to the omnipresent electronic digit. Each of these models or metaphors demonstrate the centrality of inscription to meaning and to memory; each models a "marking" of time, as Huyssen puts it, and of the discursive process of meaning-making. Hayden White has called this discourse: the product of *consciousness seeking understanding*. When it comes to the problem of the past, to consciousness seeking meaning or understanding in forms in cultural expressions and in mnemonic systems in general, we see that 'truth' is a derivative of interpretation" (Terdiman, *Present Past* 354). So, Terdiman continues,

[o]ur encounters with any form of constituted representation—texts or memories—are intrinsically *underdetermined*. Any attempt exhaustively to exhibit their determination fails, not because of any lack of critical stamina or acumen, but because the horizon of such exhaustiveness is an impossible form of *possession* of the impalpable. . . . we cannot ever possess text, memories, language, or symbols in that [empirical, positivist] way. What we can know and articulate in any communicative situation—whether literary or psychological—cannot be fenced off or absolutely bounded, owing to characteristics inherent to language, subjectivity, and epistemology. (354)

Thus Terdiman concedes that interpretative dominance is always a question of power, that ambivalence is a basic condition of knowing and being, and that when it comes to memory and to meaning-making in general a balance is needed in-between fact and interpretation, in-between reference and hermeneutics: "Interpretation can best be understood in the equipoise and in the tension of these polar, contradictory dynamics" (356).

Curiously, Terdiman himself acknowledges the importance of an "in-between" or interstitial understanding of memory, of what I think of as hybrid model of culture and a discursive model of memory-as-text, of memory-as-desire, of memory as a re-presentation of the past that is narratological and hence reversible and useful. "The problem," Terdiman writes, "is not getting the right readings [or Truth], but getting reading right" (356). The point is not to possess the past, to strategically master it, but to tactically "*understand the force of its claim on the present* without thereby supposing that such a claim is sovereign, or that contemporaneity is simply swamped or displaced by memory" (356). Such a tactical and self-reflexive model of culture and memory is

a model of cultural and textual understanding that could conceive of how the contents of our memory and our past retain—and how they could assert—the capacity to ground or norm interpretations, so that the relativism of the latter might be brought into contact with a principled and nuanced complex of constraints. What would be the character of such interpretations normed by memory, but responsive to its representational and transformative nature? (352)

It has been my argument that a theory of cultural memory might help us begin to answer some of these questions about memory and legitimation, even though Terdiman hedges his bets here and opts for a more properly dialectic model—a "delicate dialectic" that would mediate between *reproduction* and *representation*, between literal retrieval and interpretation. Certainly, Terdiman's point about reading memory is paramount: as a literary critic, I believe writing and reading matter, although I am less certain than Terdiman about what it means to get "reading right," to "norm" interpretation. Memory disseminates into *dialogic* and *discursive* questions of power and knowledge, of narration and interpretation.

It remains to be said that the relation between cultural memory, psychoanalysis, and language is another problematic that I have only scratched the surface of here, to employ the metaphor of the wax tablet. I have sketched some of Freud's basic concepts, with the help of my guides, but I have not (im)pressed my interrogation of memory and the subject much deeper than that. Without question, these are critical problems and concepts that are in need of much further work. For instance, the filiations between memory and the subject, between memory and language, and between memory and desire could be followed through in much more detail, in the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan, on the one hand, or in the dialogism of Mikhail Bakhtin, on the other. A more sophisticated treatment of the mechanisms and matrices of signification, of the way in which the sign is inscribed "in" material at the level of language and of memory, the way that sings, utterances, "individual words" carry with them the histories of their own (material) production and the way that these histories are part of the history of cultural struggle, a point that Terdiman develops in his work, particularly in "Deconstructing Memory" and *Present Past*. Such an exploration of the sign and the mechanism of (cultural) inscription is no doubt warranted in a discussion of cultural memory—it might begin with a history of the sign and proceed at a much deeper level into the interrelated mechanics of cultural semiosis, of physiology, of psychology, of neurology, and technology. Perhaps the inscription of the sign in memory and in language, though, are similar, if not identical, processes; I suspect that this might well be the case but at this point cannot prove my hunch. Perhaps the inscription-model of memory has stood the test of time so well because it in fact models the abstract and oblique but intimate processes of human consciousness and being—because memory does circumscribe language as much as language circumscribes memory. Can the subject remember without language? Can the subject speak or write without memory? These questions lead us into philosophical and critical debates that greatly exceed the scope of my current argument.

The psychoanalytical and phenomenological project, of course, have informed some aspects of this dissertation, but other than touching on Freud's pioneering work and on the work of some of his contemporaries, and other than noting the remarkable analysis done by Gaston Bachelard on memory and space and treating and treating, very superficially, some ideas on

memory and time from Heidegger's *Being and Time*. I have not spoken in great detail nor at length about these subjects. And although I have touched upon the problems of race and desire in the *sociological* question of memory, I have not said much about the construction of gender nor of the inroads made by various feminisms into the problem of the past and into the "gendered" subject-of-memory. Vron Ware, for example, begins such a theoretical excavation of the "radical potential" and possible blindness of women's history and its intersection with cultural memory in "Defining Forces: 'Race,' Gender and Memories of Empire". Kate Grenville's *Joan Makes History* stages some of these questions as well in its novelistic excavation and re-interpretation of the Australian past and, put more precisely, of the "forgotten" roles played by women in Australian history. Grenville's novel is a text-of-memory, a paratactical literary re-membering in which the protagonist, Joan, conceived just off the Australian coast in the first year of Federation in a ship "built for the transport of many in cheapness rather than of a few in luxury" (9), assumes the persona of anyone from the loyal wife of Captain Cook to a swagwoman to an Aboriginal Australian woman, a "white boss' gin" (171). Grenville's heroine thus *re-presents* and *re-interprets*—literally *re-makes* and *re-cognizes*—Australian history in the present, a task she begins with the anaphoric chant "Imagine." Perhaps the most sophisticated fictional treatments of the intersection of memory, race, and gender, from the perspective of post-colonialism, however, are Toni Morrison's. For Morrison, whose conception of "rememoration" we have briefly touched on, "the act of imagination is bound up with memory": the past "floods" the present" but instead of the forgetfulness of Lethe it leaves its mark, its traces; the writer's task, Morrison contends, is to re-present that past, to re-read it, even if it is a "text" as painful and difficult to remember as the scars on a slave's back. The past must be read and remembered, and the flood water of the past, Morrison allusively suggests, like the ghost who refuses to disappear into oblivion or like the writer, is "forever trying to get back to where it was" ("Site of Memory" 305).

Clearly the psychological and phenomenological projects differ greatly, but they contribute to a cultural and semiological understanding of memory. Every thought we think in language, every word we speak, every character we write, puts us in a social position and in an iterative temporality that we can never fully or directly inhabit, and that always only partly "circumscribes" us. Does memory determine us and "contain" language? Or do we determine our memories? do language and consciousness circumscribe memory? Both assertions might well be true.

What then, can be said about cultural memory? Quite a lot more, I dare say, and, no doubt, in more elegant and orderly ways. But a time and a space comes when one must attempt an ending, when one must release what one has seized in his well-intentioned attempts at interpretation and critical evaluation: a point must come where and when it is necessary to conjure an ending. Memory, I think, to borrow Jameson's phrase, is one of the ways that we try to *grasp the present from within*. No sooner have I said that, though, than I realize I am always already wrestling with the past, with that which seems to determine and outlast me and my *gathered* and *ungathered* thoughts. A past, a text, that I cannot master. Memory can distort and disfigure, but it can also counteract the disfigurements and the disappearances of temporality; memory can "flood" the present and pile up wreckage from the past, but it can also stir the cold waters of Lethe and break the tragic silence Simonides faced at Scopas' banquet; memory can extract an eyeball or transform our psyches into garbage heaps, as Borges warns, or our bodies into pathological "barrels" full of reasons and resentments, as Zarathustra reminds us, but it can also help us to learn and to recover from tragedy. Of course, we "know that narratives about the past are made of silences, not all of which are deliberate or even perceptible as such within the time of their production. We also know that the present is itself no clearer than the past" (Trouillot 152). When it comes to making sense of things, we are in the shadows of memory, we are on the scored

textual surfaces of the middle where signs are provisionally fixed, where the past is inscribed layer upon layer and thus seems to outlast us, or not to last long enough, as the case may be.

I have already hinted that there are no clear-cut edges to memory, that to remember and to forget is to be in-between. But by "reading" the cultural texts of memory well—rigorously, self-reflexively—and by interpreting the cultural frames that determine how we apprehend the past and upon which it is written—novels, buildings, bodies, landscapes—we might well learn how to avoid repeating the past, as Santayana's famous maxim goes; no less importantly, we might learn how to *fix*, and *unfix*, our personal and social pasts in the (at least) double meaning of those terms. In doing so we might well learn to make use of the past to make ourselves "happy" in the present; as Nietzsche reminds us, this is not a simple nor a facile state of mind—not the narcotic blisses of fundamentalist religions or tradition, of Prozac or heroin—but a difficult and exacting and responsible (because self-conscious) balance of remembering with an active and rigorous forgetting of the past. In this way, an individual or culture can thrive. This Nietzschean balance, I think, is both the starting point for and one possible goal of the cultural analysis of memory and its social organization. In an age in which the proliferation of information and the increasing efficacy of digital storage systems and electronic media make "memory work" seem archaic, in what seems to be an increasingly *international* and bewilderingly impersonal *late-capitalist* present, memory work is as crucial as it ever was. We have not fallen from history into memory or amnesia but stumbled into a future and onto what seem to be "new" techniques and cultural surfaces where we must inscribe and read the present past; we must re-learn to read memory and its "secrets" and "mysteries" *responsibly*, and to use wisely its new technical forms of preserving and re-presenting the past, all of which will demand relentless self-reflection and critical analysis if we want to understand the past, much less our present selves. How do we orient ourselves in the present in relation to a past that looks, on the one hand, to be overwhelming and, on the other, to be increasingly abstract? Where is the past? How does it determine our present? How is memory socially organized as a dynamic cybernetic but also psychological system? How can something that is absent become, in some cases, the cause of neurotic obsession? of crippling an attenuated terror? How does the past become something that must be confessed? How do we read the past and in that process fashion our selves in the fictional instantaneity of the present? How, as Homi Bhabha asks, should we think of culture as transformation and memory as a discursive return and release in that intervening, interstitial time and space, as a post-colonial *working through* in the time lag of the present of "the problem of memory"? a "reconstructing a 'sign' of history that may not provide a causal or deterministic narrative" ("Unpacking" 204)? How do we speak *of* and *for*, rather than *to*, the dead? the silenced? the disappeared?

These questions have perplexed thinkers for ages, and I am sure they will continue to do so in the future. They will continue to shape my own thinking about memory and culture, about theory and literature, about language and signs, about memory and information technologies—my thinking of memory is very much in progress. In Western culture, as Frow reminds us, "script and print have been of paramount importance in shaping memory and thought; in our world it is almost certainly the mass electronic media that play the crucial role in channelling and actively forming collective memory" and in the way that we "make connections between public events and private experience" (*Time* 243). As an inscriptive or hermeneutic technology, memory plays a crucial role in the way we organize our worlds and our selves, in the ways we gather our thoughts of the past and the present. To remember is to re-present: to read the past as a "technical" inscription or mediatory writing; to think of the sign as material; to think of social life as "representation," "interpretation," "supplement," and "deferral" instead of "origin," "essence," "nostalgia," and "loss." To remember, we might say, is to "re-write" and to "re-read," and the relationship of this mnemonic inscription and interpretation to the past, as we have already noted, is not a relation of truth but of desire, a textual logic that operates in the protean structures, cognitive practices, and narratological shapings of the psychic and social systems. Such is the

(theoretical and literary) nexus of meaning and memory, of signs and life, of inscription and interpretation, of being and time; such is the social organization of remembering and forgetting, of technology and texts. And it always has been. As Roland Barthes once wrote: "it is precisely because I forget that I read" (S/Z 11).

Works Cited

- Ahmad, Aijaz. In Theory. London: Verso, 1992.
- Alter, Robert. Partial Magic: The Novel as a Self-Conscious Genre. Berkeley: U California P, 1975.
- Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses." Lenin and Philosophy 1971. Trans. Ben Brewster. Contemporary Critical Theory. Ed. Dan Latimer. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989. 60-102.
- Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 1983. London: Verso/NLB, 1991.
- Andrews, Barry. "More Sinned Against Than Sinning." Literary Criterion 15.3-4 (1980): 166-182.
- Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. 1958. 2nd ed. Chicago: U Chicago P, 1998.
- Aristotle. Poetics. New York: Oxford UP, 1968.
- Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-colonial Literatures. New York: Routledge, 1989.
- . Key Concepts in Post-colonial Studies. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Assmann, Aleida. "Text, Traces, Trash: The Changing Media of Cultural Memory." Representations 56 (Fall 1996): 123-134.
- Augustine. Confessions. London: Penguin Books, 1961.
- Bachelard, Gaston. The Poetics of Space. 1958. Trans. Maria Jolas. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination. Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. U Texas P Slavic Series. 1. Austin: U of Texas P, 1981.
- . Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Ed. and Trans. Caryl Emerson. Theory and History of Lit. 8. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1984.
- Bennett, Tony. "1988: History and the Bicentenary." Australian-Canadian Studies 7.1-2 (1989): 154-62.
- Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken, 1968.
- Bentham, Jeremy. The Panopticon Writings. Ed. Milan Bozovic. London: Verso, 1995.
- Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. 1908. Trans. N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer. New York: Zone, 1991.
- Best, Stephen, and Douglas Kellner. Postmodern Theory. New York: Guildford, 1991.
- Bhabha, Homi. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge, 1994.
- . "Introduction: Narrating the Nation." Nation and Narration. New York: Routledge, 1990. 1-7.
- . "Unpacking My Library . . . Again." The Post-colonial Question. Ed. Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti. London: Routledge, 1996. 199-211.
- Bliss, Carolyn. "The Revisionary Lover: The Misprision of the Past in Peter Carey." Australian and New Zealand Studies in Canada 6 (1991): 45-54.
- Bodnar, John. Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992.
- Borges, Jorge Luis. "Funes, the Memorious." Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings. New York: New Directions, 1962.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. The Field of Cultural Production. Ed. Randal Johnson. New York: Columbia UP, 1993.
- . Outline of a Theory of Practice. Trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1977.
- . The Rules of Art. Trans. Susan Emanuel. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995.
- Bové, Paul. "Introduction: Nietzsche's Use and Abuse of History and the Problems of Revision: 'Late-comers Live Truly an Ironical Existence.'" Boundary 2 7.2 (Winter 1979): 1-16.

- Boyer, Robert. Atrocity and Amnesia: The Political Novel Since 1945. New York: Oxford UP, 1985.
- Bozovic, Milan. Introduction. The Panopticon Writings. By Jeremy Bentham. London: Verso, 1995. 1-28.
- Brewer, Anthony. Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.
- Bronowski, Jacob. "Introduction." Blake: Poems and Letters. New York: Penguin, 1958.
- Brown, Paul. "'This Thing of Darkness I Acknowledge Mine.'" Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism. Ed. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985. 48-71.
- Carey, Peter. Bliss. New York: Harper and Row, 1981.
- . Illywhacker. London: Faber and Faber, 1985.
- . Jack Maggs. New York: Vintage, 1997.
- Carroll, John. "Australian Foundation." Intruders in the Bush. Ed. John Carroll. 2nd ed. Melbourne: Oxford UP, 1982. 181-92.
- . "The Australian Way of Life." Intruders in the Bush. Ed. John Carroll. 2nd ed. Melbourne: Oxford UP, 1982. 229-40.
- Carruthers, Mary. The Book of Memory: A Study in Medieval Culture. 1990. New York: Cambridge UP, 1992.
- Carter, Paul. The Road to Botany Bay: An Exploration of Landscape and History. New York: Knopf, 1988.
- Casey, Edward S. Remembering: A Phenomenological Study. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1987.
- Chambers, Ross. Room to Maneuver: Reading the Oppositional in Narrative. Chicago: U Chicago P, 1991.
- Chatwin, Bruce. The Songlines. New York: Viking Penguin, 1987.
- Chomsky, Noam. Perspectives on Power. Montreal: Black Rose Book, 1997.
- Clarke, Marcus. For the Term of His Natural Life. North Ryde: Angus & Robertson Publishers, 1929.
- Cochrane, Peter, and David Goodman. "The Great Australian Journey: Cultural Logic and Nationalism in the Postmodern Era." Australian Historical Studies 23.91 (1988): 21-44.
- Coetzee, J. M. Foe. London: Penguin, 1986.
- Collits, Terry. "Theorizing Racism." De-scribing Empire. Ed. Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson. London: Routledge, 1994. 61-69.
- Connor, Steven. Postmodernist Culture. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
- Connerton, Paul. "Contemporary Cultural Amnesia." Conference Paper, June 21, 1993.
- . How Societies Remember. New York: Cambridge UP, 1989.
- Conrad, Joseph. Heart of Darkness. 1899. Toronto: Oxford UP, 1990.
- . Lord Jim. 1900. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1957.
- Conway, Hazel, and Rowan Roenisch. Understanding Architecture: An Introduction to Architecture and Architectural History. London: Routledge, 1994.
- Cook, Patricia. "Introduction." Philosophical Uses of Historical Traditions. Galley Proofs. Durham: Duke UP, 1993. 1-18.
- Coser, Lewis A. Introduction. On Collective Memory. By Maurice Halbwachs. Ed. Lewis Coser. The Heritage of Sociology. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992. 1-34.
- Culler, Jonathan. "In Defence of Overinterpretation." Interpretation and Overinterpretation. Ed. Stefan Collini. 109-124.
- . The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981.
- . Structuralist Poetics. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1975. 189-238.
- Daniel, Helen. Liars: Australian New Novelists. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1988.
- . "The Liar's Lump" or "A Salesman's Sense of History": Peter Carey's Illywhacker. Southerly 47.2 (1986): 157-67.

- . "Lies for Sale: Peter Carey." Liars: Australian New Novelists. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1988. 147-184.
- . "Peter Carey: The Rivalries of Fiction." International Literature in English: Essays on the Major Writers. Ed. Robert L. Ross. New York: Garland, 1991. 405-415.
- Danto, Arthur C. Embodied Meanings. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994.
- . "The Shape of Artistic Pasts: East and West." Culture and Modernity: The Authority of the Past. Ed. Eliot Deutsch. Honolulu: U Hawaii P, 1991.
- Davis, Natalie Zemon, and Randolph Starn. "Introduction." Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 1-6.
- Davison, Graeme. "The Use and Abuse of Australian History." Australian Historical Studies 23.91 (1988): 55-76.
- Debord, Guy. The Society of Spectacle. 1967. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. New York: Zone, 1995.
- De Certeau, Michel. Heterologies: Discourse on the Other. Trans. Brian Massumi. Theory and History of Lit. 17. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1986.
- Defoe, Daniel. Robinson Crusoe. 1719. London: Penguin, 1985.
- Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1983.
- . A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism & Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1987.
- De Man, Paul. "The Rhetoric of Temporality." Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Criticism. 2nd ed. Theory and History of Literature. Vol. 7. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1983.
- Derrida, Jacques. The Gift of Death. Trans. David Wills. Chicago: U Chicago P, 1995.
- . Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1974.
- Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. London: Verso, 1978.
- During, Simon. Foucault and Literature: Towards a Genealogy of Writing. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Esbenshade, Richard. "Remembering to Forget: Memory, History, National Identity in Postwar East-Central Europe." Representations 49 (Winter 1995): 72-89.
- Eco, Umberto, et al. Interpretation and Overinterpretation. Ed. Stefan Collini. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992.
- . Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984.
- Edwards, Brian. "Deceptive Constructions: The Art of Building in Peter Carey's *Illywhacker*." Australian and New Zealand Studies in Canada. 4 (1990): 39-56.
- Elliott, Brian. "The Convict Novel and Australian Literature: The Progress of Myth." Quadrant 29.1-2 (1985): 116-18.
- Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press, 1967.
- Fara, Patricia, and Karalyn Paterson. Introduction. Memory. Ed. Patricia Fara and Karalyn Paterson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 1-9.
- Fletcher, M. D. "Post-colonial Peter Carey." Span 32 (1991): 12-23.
- Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon, 1972.
- . Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
- . Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Ed. Donald F. Bouchard. New York: Cornell UP, 1997.
- . The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. World of Man. Ed. R. D. Laing. New York: Vintage/Random House, 1973.
- . "Theatrum Philosophicum." Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Ed. Donald F. Bouchard. New York: Cornell UP, 1997.
- Frow, John. Cultural Studies and Cultural Value. Oxford: Clarendon, 1995.

- . "In the Penal Colony" Australian Humanities Review (April 1999): Sec. I-VI. n. pag. Online. 7 June 1999. Available FTP:
<http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/AHR/archive/Issue-April-1999/frow3.html>
- . Time and Commodity Culture. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1997.
- Freud, Sigmund. The Interpretation of Dreams. Trans. and Ed. James Strachey. New York: Avon Books, 1965.
- Fussell, Paul. The Great War and Modern Memory. New York: Oxford UP, 1975.
- Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Harper Collins, 1973.
- Greenblatt, Stephen. "Culture." Critical Terms for Literary Study. Ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin. Chicago: U Chicago P, 1990. 225-32.
- . Shakespearean Negotiations. Berkeley: U California P, 1988.
- Grenville, Kate. Joan Makes History. London: Heinemann, 1988.
- Griffiths, Gareth. "Myth of Authenticity." De-scribing Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality. Ed. Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson. New York: Routledge, 1994. 70-85.
- Halbwachs, Maurice. On Collective Memory. Ed. and Trans. Lewis Coser. The Heritage of Sociology. Chicago: U Chicago P, 1992.
- Hall, Catherine. "Histories, Empires, and the Post-colonial Moment." The Post-colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons. Ed. Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti. London: Routledge, 1996. 65-77.
- . "'Turning a Blind Eye': Memories of Empire." Memory. Ed. Patricia Fara and Karalyn Paterson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 27-26.
- Hall, Rodney. Captivity Captive. 1988. New York: Fireside/Simon and Schuster, 1989.
- . The Second Bridegroom. Ringwood: McPhee Gribble/Penguin, 1991.
- Hall, Stuart. "When was 'the Post-colonial'? Thinking at the Limit." The Post-colonial Question. Ed. Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti. London: Routledge, 1996. 242-60.
- Harlow, Barbara. Barred: Women, Writing and Political Detention. Hanover: Wesleyan UP/UP of New England, 1992.
- Hassall, Anthony. Dancing on Hot Macadam. St Lucia: U Queensland P, 1994.
- Heidegger, Martin. Author's Preface. Being and Time. By Heidegger. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York P, 1996. Trans of Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953. (xvii).
- . Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York P, 1996. Trans of Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953.
- . "What Calls for Thinking." Trans. Fred. D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray. Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings. Ed. David Ferrell Krell. New York: Harper Row, 1977. 341-67.
- Hergenhan, Laurie. Unnatural Lives: Studies in Australian Convict Fiction. 1983. St. Lucia: U Queensland P, 1993.
- Herrmann, Douglas, and Roger Chaffin, eds. Memory in Historical Perspective: The Literature Before Ebbinghaus. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988.
- Hirst, John. Convict Society and its Enemies. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. Introduction. The Invention of Tradition. Ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. 1983. Cambridge: Cambridge UP/Canto, 1992.
- Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition. 1983. Cambridge: Cambridge UP/Canto, 1992.
- Hodge, Bob, and Vijay Mishra. Dark Side of the Dream: Australian Literature and the Postcolonial Mind. Australian Cultural Studies. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990.
- Hofstadter, Douglas. Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. New York: Vintage Books, 1980.
- Hollier, Denis. Against Architecture: The Writing of Georges Bataille. Trans. Betsy Wing. Cambridge: MIT P, 1993.
- Horne, Donald. The Great Museum. London: Pluto Press, 1984.

- Huggan, Graham. "Some Recent Australian Fictions in the Age of Tourism: Murray Bail, Inez Baranay, Gerard Lee." Australian Literary Studies 15.4 (1992): 168-77.
- Hughes, Robert. The Fatal Shore: The Epic of Australia's Founding. New York: Knopf, 1987.
- . The Shock of the New: Art and the Century of Change. London: Thames and Hudson, 1991.
- . The Culture of Complaint. New York: Warner, 1993.
- Hulme, Peter. Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean 1492-1797. New York: Routledge, 1986.
- Hunter, Ian. Memory. Baltimore: Penguin, 1957.
- Hutcheon, Linda. The Politics of Postmodernism. London: Routledge, 1989.
- Huxley, Aldous. Eyeless in Gaza. London: Chatto & Windus, 1969.
- Ireland, David. The Unknown Industrial Prisoner. 1971. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1979.
- Iser, Wolfgang. Foreword. "Intertextuality: The Epitome of Culture." Memory and Literature. By Renate Lachmann. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1997. vii-xviii.
- Jackson, R. V. "Luxury in Punishment: Jeremy Bentham on the Cost of the Convict Colony in New South Wales." Australian Historical Studies 23.90 (April 1988): 42-59.
- Jacoby, Russell. Social Amnesia. Boston: Beacon P, 1975.
- James, William. Principles of Psychology. New York: Holt, 1890.
- Jameson, Fredric. "Afterword—Marxism and Postmodernism." Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique. Ed. Douglas Kellner. Washington, DC: Maisonneuve P, 1989. 369-87.
- . The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. London: Methuen, 1981.
- . Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
- Johnson, Colin. (Mudrooroo). Doctor Wooreddy's Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World. New York: Ballantine, 1983.
- . Master of the Ghost Dreaming. North Ryde, NSW: Angus & Robertson, 1991.
- Johnson, Randal. "Introduction." The Field of Cultural Production. Pierre Bourdieu. New York: Columbia UP, 1993.
- Jung, C. G. Memories, Dreams, Reflections. Ed. Aniela Jaffé. Trans. Richard and Clara Watson. 1961. New York: Vintage, 1965.
- Juvan, Marko. "On Literature as a Cultural Memory." CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture: A WWWeb Journal. (March 1999): n. pag. 1-5. Online 18 July 1999. Available FTP: <http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/clcwebjournal/clcweb99-1/juvan99.html> An updated version of "Literature as Cultural Memory: A Report on the XVth Triennial Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association/Association Internationale de Littérature Comparée (Leiden University, August 1997)." Canadian Review of Comparative Literature 24.4 (1997): 1089-101.
- Kamman, Michael. Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of American Culture. 1991. New York: Vintage, 1993.
- Kaufman, Walter. Introduction. On the Genealogy of Morals. By Friedrich Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1969.
- Keneally, Thomas. The Playmaker. 1987. London: Sceptre, 1988.
- . Bring Larks and Heroes. Melbourne: Cassell, 1967.
- Knapp, Steven. "Collective Memory and the Actual Past." Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 123-49.
- Kristeva, Julia. The Kristeva Reader. Ed. Toril Moi. New York: Columbia UP, 1986.
- . The Powers of Horror. Trans. Leon Roudiez. New York: Columbia UP, 1982.
- Kroker, Arthur, and David Cook. The Post Modern Scene. 2nd ed. Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1987.
- Kundera, Milan. The Art of the Novel. 1986. New York: HarperCollins, 1988.
- . The Book of Laughter and Forgetting. 1978. Trans. Michael Henry Heim. New York: Penguin, 1986.

- Lachmann, Renate. Memory and Literature: Intertextuality in Russian Modernism. Trans. Roy Sellars and Anthony Wall. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1997.
- Lawson, Alan. "The Discovery of Nationality in Australian and Canadian Literatures." The Post-Colonial Studies Reader. Ed. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. London: Routledge, 1995. 167-69.
- Leps, Marie-Christine. Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of Deviance in Nineteenth-Century Discourse. Durham: Duke UP, 1992.
- Loomba, Anita. Colonialism/Postcolonialism. The New Critical Idiom. London: Routledge, 1988.
- Lotman, Yury. "On the Semiotic Mechanism of Culture." New Literary History 9.2 (Winter 1978): 211-32.
- Lukacs, George. History and Class Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971.
- Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Postmodern Condition. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1991.
- McQueen, Humphrey. A New Britannia. Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1970.
- Malouf, David. An Imaginary Life. 1978. Picador/Pan Macmillan, 1980.
- . Conversations at Curlew Creek. Toronto: Knopf, 1996.
- . Remembering Babylon. Toronto: Vintage/Random House, 1993.
- . 12 Edmonstone Street. Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1985.
- Marx, Karl. "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte." 1852. The Marx-Engels Reader. 2nd ed. Ed. Robert Tucker. New York: W.W. Norton, 1972.
- Mitchell, Juliet. "Memory and Psychoanalysis." Memory. Ed. Patricia Fara and Karalyn Paterson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 95-112.
- Morris, Peter. "Theories of Memory: An Historical Perspective." Theoretical Aspects of Memory. Ed. P. E. Morris and Michael Gruneberg. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: Routledge, 1994.
- Morris, Peter, and Michael Gruneberg. Theoretical Aspects of Memory. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: Routledge, 1994.
- Morrison, Toni. Beloved. London: Pluto, 1985.
- . "The Site of Memory." Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures. Ed. Russell Ferguson et al. New York: New Museum of Contemporary Art; Cambridge: MIT, 1990. 299-305.
- Nelson, Cary. Repression and Recovery. Madison, WI: U Wisconsin P, 1989.
- Neuman, Shirley. "Autobiography, Bodies, Manhood." Prose Studies 14.2 (1991): 137-165.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1967.
- . On the Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage, 1967.
- . "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Untimely Meditations. Trans. R. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983. 57-124.
- . "On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense." The Rhetorical Tradition. Ed. Patricia Bizzel and Bruce Herberg. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's P, 1990. 888-96.
- . Untimely Meditations. Trans. R. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983.
- Nora, Pierre. "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire." Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 7-25.
- Olick, Jeffrey. "Social Memory Studies: from 'collective memory' to the historical sociology of mnemonic practices." Annual Review of Sociology. Online 23 July 1999. Available FTP: http://library.northernlight.com/PN1998101901000175.html?no_highlight=1&
- Ommundsen, Wenche. "Narrative Navel Gazing." Southern Review 22 (1989): 264-74.
- Orwell, George. Nineteen Eighty-Four. 1949. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984.
- Otis, Laura. Organic Memory: History and the Body in the Late Nineteenth & Early Twentieth Centuries. Lincoln, NE: U Nebraska P, 1994.
- Parkin, Alan J. Memory: Phenomena, Experiment, and Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
- Porter, Hal. The Tilted Cross. St. Lucia: U Queensland P, 1961.

- Priessnitz, Horst. "The Bridled Pegasus, or, Is there a Colonial Poetics of Intertextuality?" European Perspectives: Contemporary Essays on Australian Literature. Ed. Bruce Clunies Ross and Werner Senn. Australian Literary Studies 15.2. St. Lucia: U Queensland P, 1991.
- Proust, Marcel. Remembrance of Things Past: Vol 1. 1913-1919. London: Penguin, 1983.
- Pullen, Charles. "Samuel Beckett and the Cultural Memory: How to Read Samuel Beckett." Queen's Quarterly 94.2 (1987): 288-99.
- Pynchon, Thomas. The Crying of Lot 49. 1965. New York: Harper and Row, 1990.
- . Gravity's Rainbow. 1983. New York: Penguin, 1987.
- Richards, Thomas. "Archive and Utopia." Representations 37 (Winter 1992): 104-135.
- Ricoeur, Paul. Time and Narrative. 3 vols. Chicago: U Chicago P, 1988.
- Rosaldo, Renato. "Imperialist Nostalgia." Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 107-23.
- Rose, Stephen. "How Brains Make Memories." Memory. Ed. Patricia Fara and Karalyn Patterson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.
- Roth, Michael. "Remembering Forgetting." Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 49-68.
- Rushdie, Salman. The Satanic Verses. 1988. Dover, Delaware: The Consortium Inc., 1992.
- . Midnight's Children. 1981. London: Picador, 1982.
- Russell, Bertrand. The History of Western Philosophy. 1946. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Ryan, Simon. "Inscribing the Emptiness: Cartography, Exploration and the Construction of Australia." De-scribing Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality. Ed. Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson. New York: Routledge, 1994. 115-30.
- Said, Edward. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf, 1993.
- . Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979.
- . The World, the Text, and the Critic. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983.
- Saussure, Ferdinand. "Nature of the Linguistic Sign." Trans. Wade Baskin. From A Course in General Linguistics. 1919. Rpt. in Contemporary Critical Theory. Ed. Dan Latimer. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989. 3-16.
- Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain. Toronto: Oxford UP, 1985.
- Sejnowski, Terrence. "Memory and Neural Networks." Memory. Ed. Patricia Fara and Karalyn Paterson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 162-181.
- Sennett, Richard. "Disturbing Memories." Memory. Ed. Patricia Fara and Karalyn Paterson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 10-26.
- Shea, Victor. "New Historicism." Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory: Approaches, Scholars, Terms. Ed. Irena R. Makaryk. Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1993. 124-29.
- Silverman, Kaja. The Subject of Semiotics. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983.
- Slemon, Stephen. "Bone of Contention." The Body in Literature. Ed. Anthony Purdy. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1992. 163-77.
- . "Climbing Mount Everest: Postcolonialism in the Culture of Ascent." Canadian Literature 158 (Autumn 1998): 15-41.
- . "Cultural Alterity and Colonial Discourse." Southern Review 20.1 (1987): 102-07.
- . "The Scramble for Post-colonialism." De-scribing Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality. Ed. Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson. New York: Routledge, 1994. 15-32.
- Smith, Neil. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space. Oxford: Basil Blackwood, 1984.
- Smith, Paul. Discerning the Subject. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1988.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: Routledge, 1988.
- . The Post-colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues. Ed. Sarah Harasym. New York: Routledge, 1990.
- . Translator's Preface. Of Grammatology. By Jacques Derrida. Trans. Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1974. ix-xxxvii.

- Spinks, Lee. "Allegory, Space, Colonialism: Remembering Babylon and the Production of Colonial History." Australian Literary Studies 17,2 (1995): 166-174.
- Stambaugh, Joan. Translator's Preface. Being and Time. By Heidegger. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York P, 1996. Trans of Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953. xiii-xvi.
- Stern, Randolph. Introduction. Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 1-6.
- Stauth, Georg, and Bryan Turner. "Nostalgia, Postmodernism and the Critique of Mass Culture." Theory, Culture & Society 5 (1988): 509-26.
- Stern, J. P. Introduction. Untimely Meditations. By Friedrich Nietzsche. Trans. R. Hollingdale. Cambridge UP, 1983. vii-xxcii.
- Strauss, Claude Levi. "A Writing Lesson." Contemporary Literary Theory. Ed. Dan Latimer. Trans. John Russell. Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989. 29-44. Rpt. from Tristes Tropiques.
- Suzuki, David. "Back to the Future: Is this the World We Want?" Common Ground 68 (1997): 21-24.
- Tambling, Jeremy. "Memory, Mourning, and Melancholy." Conference Paper.
- Tautsky, Thomas. "'Getting the Corner Right': An Interview With Peter Carey." Australian and New Zealand Studies in Canada 4 (1990): 27-38.
- Terdiman, Richard. Discourse/Counter-Discourse: The Theory and Practice of Symbolic Resistance in Nineteenth-Century France. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
- . Present Past. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993.
- Thwaites, Tony. "More Tramps at Home: Seeing Australia First." Meanjin 46.1 (1987): 400-09.
- Tiffin, Chris, and Alan Lawson, eds. De-Scribing Empire. London: Routledge, 1994.
- Tiffin, Chris, and Alan Lawson. Introduction. De-scribing Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality. Ed. Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson. New York: Routledge, 1994. 1-14.
- Tiffin, Helen. "Post-Colonial Literatures and Counter-Discourse." Kunapipi. 9.3 (1987): 17-34.
- Tomlinson, John. Cultural Imperialism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1991.
- Tucker, James. Ralph Rashleigh. 1929. Ed. Colin Roderick. London: Folio Society, 1970.
- Turner, Graeme. "American Dreaming: The Fictions of Peter Carey." Australian Literary Studies 12.4 (1986): 431-41.
- . Making It National: Nationalism and Australian Popular Culture. Australian Cultural Studies. Ed. John Tulloch. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994.
- . National Fictions: Literature, Film, and the Construction of Australian Narrative. Australian Cultural Studies. Ed. John Tulloch. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986.
- . "Nationalising the Author." Australian Literary Studies 16.2 (1993): 131-39.
- Vatimo, Gianni. The Transparent Society. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1992.
- Veaser, H. Aram, ed. The New Historicism. New York: Routledge, 1989.
- . The New Historicism Reader. New York: Routledge, 1994.
- Viswanathan, Gauri. The Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India. New York: Columbia UP, 1989.
- Wallace, Jo-Ann. "De-scribing The Waterbabies: 'The Child in Post-colonial Theory. De-scribing Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality. Ed. Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson. New York: Routledge, 1994. 171-84.
- Ward, Russel. The Australian Legend. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1958.
- Ware, Vron. "Defining Forces: 'Race, Gender and Memories of Empire.'" The Post-colonial Question. Ed. Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti. London: Routledge, 1996. 142-56.
- Watson, Sam. The Kadaitcha Sung. Ringwood: Penguin, 1990.
- Watt, Ian. The Rise of the Novel. Berkeley: U California P, 1962.
- White, Hayden. "The Tasks of Intellectual History." The Monist 53 (1969): 606-30.
- . Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1978.
- White, Patrick. A Fringe of Leaves. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976.

- White, Richard. Inventing Australia. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1981.
- Whitlock, Gillian. "'The Carceral Archipelago: Marcus Clarke's His Natural Life and John Richardson's Wacousta.'" Australian/Canadian Literatures in English. Ed. Russel McDougall and Gillian Whitlock. Melbourne: Methuen, 1987. 49-67.
- . "White Diasporas: Joan (and Ana) Make History." Australian and New Zealand Studies in Canada 12 (December 1994): 90-100.
- Wilde, Oscar. "The Decay of Lying." Critical Theory Since Plato. Ed. Hazard Adams. Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1971. 673-686.
- Wilkes, G. A. A Dictionary of Australian Colloquialisms. Sydney: Sydney UP, 1978.
- Williams, David. Confessional Fictions: A Portrait of the Artist in the Canadian Novel. Toronto: U Toronto P, 1991.
- Williams, Raymond. Culture and Society. 1958. New York: Columbia UP, 1983.
- . "Introduction to the Morningside Edition." Culture and Society. 1958. New York: Columbia UP, 1983.
- . Keywords. London: Flamingo, 1983.
- . Marxism and Literature. New York: Oxford UP, 1977.
- . Modern Tragedy. London: Chatto and Windus, 1966.
- . The Long Revolution. New York: Columbia UP, 1961.
- Wilson, Robert. "Hyperplay: Playing the Sly Man at Theory." Mattoid 51 (1997): 42-68.
- . "Theory as Template: The New Australian Novel." Mattoid 33 (1989): 159-73.
- Wright, Elizabeth. Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice. Ed. Terence Hawkes. New Accents London: Methuen, 1984.
- Wright, Ronald. Stolen Continents: The "New World Through Indian Eyes". 1992. Toronto: Penguin, 1993.
- Yates, Frances A. The Art of Memory. 1966. London: Pimlico, 1992.
- Young, Robert. Colonial Desire. London: Routledge: 1995.
- . White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. New York: Routledge, 1990.